Self-contained docker-compose harness that exercises the new bootstrap
branch against a real Continuwuity homeserver. Three tests:
1. fresh bot → bootstrap fires, /keys/query returns master + ssk
with UNPADDED base64 keyids, current device is signed by the
new SSK
2. second startup with same crypto store → bootstrap is skipped
3. MATRIX_RECOVERY_KEY set → existing verify_with_recovery_key path
takes precedence, no new bootstrap
Run via:
docker compose -f tests/e2e/matrix_xsign_bootstrap/docker-compose.yml up -d
python tests/e2e/matrix_xsign_bootstrap/test_bootstrap.py
docker compose -f tests/e2e/matrix_xsign_bootstrap/docker-compose.yml down -v
The test mirrors the bootstrap snippet from matrix.py inline so it can
run without importing the full hermes gateway and its deps. Skipped
automatically when mautrix isn't installed or the homeserver is
unreachable.
All three pass against ghcr.io/continuwuity/continuwuity:latest
(Continuwuity 0.5.7). The unpadded-keyid assertion is the load-bearing
one — it's exactly the property the PR's bootstrap path provides that
the hand-rolled `base64.b64encode().decode()` scripts get wrong.
Without this, every Matrix bot started under hermes-agent shows the
"Encrypted by a device not verified by its owner" badge in Element
indefinitely, because the cross-signing chain (master → SSK → device)
was never published. Operators currently have to write their own
bootstrap script and remember to run it once per bot — and it's easy
to get wrong (the obvious base64.b64encode().decode() produces padded
keyids that matrix-rust-sdk silently rejects in /keys/query, so even
correctly-signed keys fail to load identity in Element).
mautrix already has the right primitive: generate_recovery_key() does
the full flow — generate seeds, upload privates to SSSS, publish
publics to the homeserver, sign the current device with the new SSK,
and return the human-readable recovery key. We invoke it once on
startup if the bot has no existing cross-signing identity, and log
the recovery key with a clear instruction to save it for future
restarts via MATRIX_RECOVERY_KEY (which the existing recovery-key
path already consumes).
Skipped when MATRIX_RECOVERY_KEY is set (existing path takes over)
or when the bot already has cross-signing keys on the homeserver
(get_own_cross_signing_public_keys returns non-None).
Bootstrap failure is non-fatal — logged with hint about UIA; the bot
continues without cross-signing and Element will show the warning
that prompted this PR. That matches the existing soft-fail pattern
for verify_with_recovery_key.
Tested against Continuwuity 0.5.7 (no UIA required). Synapse with
UIA enabled will need a follow-up PR to thread MATRIX_PASSWORD
through to /keys/device_signing/upload.
Andrew Miller