Three-layer defense against secrets leaking into compaction summaries:
1. Input redaction: redact_sensitive_text() on message content and tool
call arguments in _serialize_for_summary() before sending to summarizer
2. Prompt instructions: NEVER include API keys/tokens/passwords in the
summarizer preamble, template Critical Context section, and focus topic
3. Output redaction: redact_sensitive_text() on the summary output and
_previous_summary for iterative updates
Reuses existing agent/redact.py patterns (sk-*, ghp_*, key=value, etc).
Cherry-picked from PR #9200 by @entropidelic.
Add is_network_accessible() helper using Python's ipaddress module to
robustly classify bind addresses (IPv4/IPv6 loopback, wildcards,
mapped addresses, hostname resolution with DNS-failure-fails-closed).
The API server connect() now refuses to start when the bind address is
network-accessible and no API_SERVER_KEY is set, preventing RCE from
other machines on the network.
Co-authored-by: entropidelic <entropidelic@users.noreply.github.com>
Shell injection via unquoted workdir interpolation in docker, singularity,
and SSH backends. When workdir contained shell metacharacters (e.g.
~/;id), arbitrary commands could execute.
Changes:
- Add shlex.quote() at each interpolation point in docker.py,
singularity.py, and ssh.py with tilde-aware quoting (keep ~
unquoted for shell expansion, quote only the subpath)
- Add _validate_workdir() allowlist in terminal_tool.py as
defense-in-depth before workdir reaches any backend
Original work by Mariano A. Nicolini (PR #5620). Salvaged with fixes
for tilde expansion (shlex.quote breaks cd ~/path) and replaced
incomplete deny-list with strict character allowlist.
Co-authored-by: Mariano A. Nicolini <entropidelic@users.noreply.github.com>
entropidelic