The contract's §6 still said the connector 'forwards the signed body
byte-for-byte so the gateway's existing crypto validates against unmodified
bytes.' That model is incoherent under an untrusted, disposable tenant
gateway on a shared bot:
- re-validating Twilio HMAC / WeCom crypto needs the shared signing secret
(handing it over IS the cross-tenant leak),
- WeCom payloads are encrypted with that secret (the connector must decrypt
at the edge just to route),
- a Discord interaction token lives inside the signed body — you can't both
preserve the bytes and strip the credential.
Rewrites §6 to the actual model: the connector is the SOLE crypto/identity
boundary — verifies/decrypts at the edge, normalizes to a tenant-scoped
MessageEvent, strips shared-identity capabilities into its vault, and
forwards only the sanitized event. The gateway re-validates nothing (the
invariant test from the crypto-shed commit enforces this). Notes that this
unifies the passthrough + relay planes and points to the connector repo's
capability-trust-boundary.md.
Also documents the follow_up op in §4 (token-less capability action added
in the previous commit). The conformance test (§2/§3 tables) stays green;
contract is unpublished/EXPERIMENTAL so no version-bump ceremony. 55 passed.
6e20c1992f