fix(picker): keep max_models=0 distinct from unlimited; lock cap semantics

Follow-up to the cap-removal salvage. The contributor guarded the new
unlimited default with `[:max_models] if max_models else ...`, which conflates
max_models=0 (used by slug-only callers that want an empty model list) with
None (unlimited). Tighten to `is not None` at all five slicing sites in
list_authenticated_providers / list_picker_providers, and add a regression test
asserting the three-way contract: None=full, 0=empty, N=first N.

.gitignore

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 *.pyc*
 __pycache__/
 .venv/
+.venv
 .vscode/
 .env
 .env.local

Dockerfile

@@ -9,8 +9,11 @@ FROM ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.11.6-python3.13-trixie@sha256:b3c543b6c4f23a5f2df228
 FROM node:22-bookworm-slim@sha256:7af03b14a13c8cdd38e45058fd957bf00a72bbe17feac43b1c15a689c029c732 AS node_source
 FROM debian:13.4
 
-# Disable Python stdout buffering to ensure logs are printed immediately
+# Disable Python stdout buffering to ensure logs are printed immediately.
+# Do not write .pyc files at runtime: /opt/hermes is immutable in the
+# published container and writable state belongs under /opt/data.
 ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
+ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
 
 # Store Playwright browsers outside the volume mount so the build-time
 # install survives the /opt/data volume overlay at runtime.
@@ -186,36 +189,38 @@ RUN cd web && npm run build && \
 
 # ---------- Source code ----------
 # .dockerignore excludes node_modules, so the installs above survive.
-COPY --chown=hermes:hermes . .
+COPY . .
 
 # ---------- Permissions ----------
-# Make install dir world-readable so any HERMES_UID can read it at runtime.
-# The venv needs to be traversable too.
-# node_modules trees additionally need to be writable by the hermes user
-# so the runtime `npm install` triggered by _tui_need_npm_install() in
-# hermes_cli/main.py succeeds (see #18800). /opt/hermes/web is build-time
-# only (HERMES_WEB_DIST points at hermes_cli/web_dist) and is intentionally
-# not chowned here.
-# /opt/hermes/gateway is runtime-writable: Python may create __pycache__ and
-# gateway state artifacts beneath the package after services drop privileges,
-# especially when the hermes UID is remapped at boot (#27221).
-# The .venv MUST remain hermes-writable so lazy_deps.py can install
-# remaining optional platform packages and future pin bumps at first use.
-# Without this, `uv pip install` fails with EACCES and adapters silently
-# fail to load.  See tools/lazy_deps.py.
+# Link hermes-agent itself (editable). Deps are already installed in the
+# cached layer above; `--no-deps` makes this a fast egg-link creation with no
+# resolution or downloads.
+RUN uv pip install --no-cache-dir --no-deps -e "."
+
+# Keep /opt/hermes immutable for the runtime hermes user. Hosted/container
+# instances must not be able to self-edit the installed source or venv; user
+# data, skills, plugins, config, logs, and dashboard uploads live under
+# /opt/data instead. Root can still repair the image during build/boot, but
+# supervised Hermes processes drop to the non-root hermes user.
 USER root
-RUN chmod -R a+rX /opt/hermes && \
-    chown -R hermes:hermes /opt/hermes/.venv /opt/hermes/ui-tui /opt/hermes/gateway /opt/hermes/node_modules
+RUN mkdir -p /opt/hermes/bin && \
+    cp /opt/hermes/docker/hermes-exec-shim.sh /opt/hermes/bin/hermes && \
+    chmod 0755 /opt/hermes/bin/hermes && \
+    printf 'docker\n' > /opt/hermes/.install_method && \
+    chown -R root:root /opt/hermes && \
+    chmod -R a+rX /opt/hermes && \
+    chmod -R a-w /opt/hermes
+# The ``.install_method`` stamp is baked next to the running code (the install
+# tree), NOT into $HERMES_HOME. $HERMES_HOME (/opt/data) is a shared data
+# volume that is commonly bind-mounted from the host and even shared with a
+# host-side Desktop/CLI install; stamping it at boot used to clobber that
+# host install's marker and wrongly block its ``hermes update``. A code-scoped
+# stamp is read first by detect_install_method() and is immune to the share.
 # Start as root so the s6-overlay stage2 hook can usermod/groupmod and chown
 # the data volume. Each supervised service then drops to the hermes user via
 # `s6-setuidgid hermes` in its run script. If HERMES_UID is unset, services
 # run as the default hermes user (UID 10000).
 
-# ---------- Link hermes-agent itself (editable) ----------
-# Deps are already installed in the cached layer above; `--no-deps` makes
-# this a fast (~1s) egg-link creation with no resolution or downloads.
-RUN uv pip install --no-cache-dir --no-deps -e "."
-
 # ---------- Bake build-time git revision ----------
 # .dockerignore excludes .git, so `git rev-parse HEAD` from inside the
 # container always returns nothing — meaning `hermes dump` reports
@@ -235,8 +240,9 @@ RUN uv pip install --no-cache-dir --no-deps -e "."
 # every published image has it.
 ARG HERMES_GIT_SHA=
 RUN if [ -n "${HERMES_GIT_SHA}" ]; then \
+        chmod u+w /opt/hermes && \
         printf '%s\n' "${HERMES_GIT_SHA}" > /opt/hermes/.hermes_build_sha && \
-        chown hermes:hermes /opt/hermes/.hermes_build_sha; \
+        chmod a-w /opt/hermes /opt/hermes/.hermes_build_sha; \
     fi
 
 # ---------- s6-overlay service wiring ----------
@@ -282,6 +288,8 @@ ENV HERMES_WEB_DIST=/opt/hermes/hermes_cli/web_dist
 # check. (A separate launcher hardening is tracked independently.)
 ENV HERMES_TUI_DIR=/opt/hermes/ui-tui
 ENV HERMES_HOME=/opt/data
+ENV HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT=/opt/data
+ENV HERMES_DISABLE_LAZY_INSTALLS=1
 
 # `docker exec` privilege-drop shim. When operators run
 # `docker exec <c> hermes ...` they default to root, and any file the
@@ -294,7 +302,6 @@ ENV HERMES_HOME=/opt/data
 # Recursion is impossible because the shim exec's the venv binary by
 # absolute path (/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/hermes). See the shim source for
 # the opt-out env var (HERMES_DOCKER_EXEC_AS_ROOT=1).
-COPY --chmod=0755 docker/hermes-exec-shim.sh /opt/hermes/bin/hermes
 
 # Pre-s6 entrypoint.sh did `source .venv/bin/activate` which exported
 # the venv bin onto PATH; Architecture B's main-wrapper.sh does the

agent/agent_init.py

@@ -1156,6 +1156,9 @@ def init_agent(
                         "hermes_home": str(get_hermes_home()),
                         "agent_context": "primary",
                     }
+                    if _init_kwargs["platform"] == "cli":
+                        _init_kwargs["warning_callback"] = agent._emit_warning
+                        _init_kwargs["status_callback"] = agent._emit_status
                     # Thread session title for memory provider scoping
                     # (e.g. honcho uses this to derive chat-scoped session keys)
                     if agent._session_db:
@@ -1224,6 +1227,12 @@ def init_agent(
     # targets.
     agent._task_completion_guidance = bool(_agent_section.get("task_completion_guidance", True))
 
+    # Universal parallel-tool-call guidance toggle.  Default True.  Separate
+    # flag from task_completion_guidance because a user may want one but not
+    # the other.  Steers the model to batch independent tool calls into a
+    # single turn; the runtime already executes such batches concurrently.
+    agent._parallel_tool_call_guidance = bool(_agent_section.get("parallel_tool_call_guidance", True))
+
     # Local Python toolchain probe toggle.  Default True.  When False,
     # the probe is skipped entirely (no subprocess calls, no system-prompt
     # line).  Useful for users on exotic setups where the probe heuristics

agent/agent_runtime_helpers.py

@@ -1839,28 +1839,42 @@ def invoke_tool(agent, function_name: str, function_args: dict, effective_task_i
     elif function_name == "memory":
         def _execute(next_args: dict) -> Any:
             target = next_args.get("target", "memory")
+            operations = next_args.get("operations")
             from tools.memory_tool import memory_tool as _memory_tool
             result = _memory_tool(
                 action=next_args.get("action"),
                 target=target,
                 content=next_args.get("content"),
                 old_text=next_args.get("old_text"),
+                operations=operations,
                 store=agent._memory_store,
             )
-            # Bridge: notify external memory provider of built-in memory writes
-            if agent._memory_manager and next_args.get("action") in {"add", "replace"}:
-                try:
-                    agent._memory_manager.on_memory_write(
-                        next_args.get("action", ""),
-                        target,
-                        next_args.get("content", ""),
-                        metadata=agent._build_memory_write_metadata(
-                            task_id=effective_task_id,
-                            tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
-                        ),
+            # Bridge: notify external memory provider of built-in memory writes.
+            # Covers both the single-op shape and each add/replace inside a batch.
+            if agent._memory_manager:
+                if operations:
+                    _mem_ops = [
+                        op for op in operations
+                        if isinstance(op, dict) and op.get("action") in {"add", "replace"}
+                    ]
+                else:
+                    _mem_ops = (
+                        [{"action": next_args.get("action"), "content": next_args.get("content")}]
+                        if next_args.get("action") in {"add", "replace"} else []
                     )
-                except Exception:
-                    pass
+                for _op in _mem_ops:
+                    try:
+                        agent._memory_manager.on_memory_write(
+                            _op.get("action", ""),
+                            target,
+                            _op.get("content", "") or "",
+                            metadata=agent._build_memory_write_metadata(
+                                task_id=effective_task_id,
+                                tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
+                            ),
+                        )
+                    except Exception:
+                        pass
             return _finish_agent_tool(result, next_args)
     elif agent._memory_manager and agent._memory_manager.has_tool(function_name):
         def _execute(next_args: dict) -> Any:

agent/background_review.py

@@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ def summarize_background_review_actions(
                     "target": args.get("target", "memory"),
                     "content": args.get("content", ""),
                     "old_text": args.get("old_text", ""),
+                    "operations": args.get("operations") or [],
                     "name": args.get("name", ""),
                     "old_string": args.get("old_string", ""),
                     "new_string": args.get("new_string", ""),
@@ -353,6 +354,7 @@ def summarize_background_review_actions(
             content = detail.get("content", "")
             old_text = detail.get("old_text", "")
             skill_name = detail.get("name", "")
+            operations = detail.get("operations") or []
             max_preview = 120
             if is_skill:
                 change = data.get("_change", {})
@@ -376,6 +378,21 @@ def summarize_background_review_actions(
                     actions.append(f"📝 Skill '{skill_name}' rewritten: {description}")
                 else:
                     actions.append(f"📝 {message}" if message else f"Skill {action}")
+            elif operations:
+                for op in operations:
+                    op = op or {}
+                    op_act = op.get("action", "")
+                    op_content = (op.get("content") or "")
+                    op_old = (op.get("old_text") or "")
+                    if op_act == "add" and op_content:
+                        preview = op_content[:max_preview] + ("…" if len(op_content) > max_preview else "")
+                        actions.append(f"{label} ➕ {preview}")
+                    elif op_act == "replace" and op_content:
+                        preview = op_content[:max_preview] + ("…" if len(op_content) > max_preview else "")
+                        actions.append(f"{label} ✏️ {preview}")
+                    elif op_act == "remove" and op_old:
+                        preview = op_old[:60] + ("…" if len(op_old) > 60 else "")
+                        actions.append(f"{label} ➖ {preview}")
             elif action == "add" and content:
                 preview = content[:max_preview] + ("…" if len(content) > max_preview else "")
                 actions.append(f"{label} ➕ {preview}")
@@ -391,6 +408,7 @@ def summarize_background_review_actions(
             "added" in message_lower
             or "replaced" in message_lower
             or "removed" in message_lower
+            or "applied" in message_lower
             or (target and "add" in message.lower())
             or "Entry added" in message
         ):

agent/billing_view.py

@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+"""Surface-agnostic core for the Phase 2b terminal-billing screens.
+
+One fetch/parse per concern, consumed identically by the CLI handler
+(``cli.py::_show_billing``), the TUI JSON-RPC methods
+(``tui_gateway/server.py``), and any other surface. Mirrors the proven
+``agent/account_usage.py::build_credits_view`` pattern: parse the server payload
+into a frozen dataclass; **fail open** — when not logged in or the portal is
+unreachable, return a struct with ``logged_in=False`` and let the surface degrade
+gracefully (never crash).
+
+Money discipline: the server emits decimal STRINGS (``"142.5"``, not fixed 2dp).
+We keep them as :class:`decimal.Decimal` end-to-end and only format for display.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from decimal import Decimal, InvalidOperation
+from typing import Any, Optional
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+# =============================================================================
+# Decimal money helpers
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+def parse_money(value: Any) -> Optional[Decimal]:
+    """Parse a server money value (decimal string) into :class:`Decimal`.
+
+    Returns None for missing/invalid input. Never raises. Accepts str/int (and,
+    defensively, float — though the server always sends strings).
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        # Decimal(str(...)) avoids binary-float artifacts if a float ever sneaks in.
+        return Decimal(str(value).strip())
+    except (InvalidOperation, ValueError, TypeError):
+        return None
+
+
+def format_money(value: Optional[Decimal]) -> str:
+    """Format a Decimal as ``$X`` / ``$X.YY`` for display.
+
+    Whole dollars show no decimals; any fractional amount shows exactly 2dp:
+    ``Decimal("142.5")`` → ``"$142.50"``, ``Decimal("100")`` → ``"$100"``,
+    ``Decimal("0.01")`` → ``"$0.01"``.
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return "—"
+    if value == value.to_integral_value():
+        # Whole dollars — no decimal point. format(..., "f") avoids 1E+3 for 1000.
+        return f"${format(value.to_integral_value(), 'f')}"
+    # Fractional — always show 2dp.
+    return f"${format(value.quantize(Decimal('0.01')), 'f')}"
+
+
+# =============================================================================
+# Parsed sub-structures
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CardInfo:
+    brand: str
+    last4: str
+
+    @property
+    def masked(self) -> str:
+        return f"{self.brand} ····{self.last4}"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class MonthlyCap:
+    limit_usd: Optional[Decimal] = None
+    spent_this_month_usd: Optional[Decimal] = None
+    is_default_ceiling: bool = False
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AutoReload:
+    enabled: bool = False
+    threshold_usd: Optional[Decimal] = None
+    reload_to_usd: Optional[Decimal] = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BillingState:
+    """Parsed ``GET /api/billing/state`` — the overview screen's data.
+
+    Fail-open: ``logged_in=False`` (and empty fields) when not logged in or the
+    portal is unreachable.
+    """
+
+    logged_in: bool
+    org_id: Optional[str] = None
+    org_slug: Optional[str] = None
+    org_name: Optional[str] = None
+    role: Optional[str] = None  # "OWNER" | "ADMIN" | "MEMBER"
+    balance_usd: Optional[Decimal] = None
+    cli_billing_enabled: bool = False
+    charge_presets: tuple[Decimal, ...] = ()
+    min_usd: Optional[Decimal] = None
+    max_usd: Optional[Decimal] = None
+    card: Optional[CardInfo] = None
+    monthly_cap: Optional[MonthlyCap] = None
+    auto_reload: Optional[AutoReload] = None
+    portal_url: Optional[str] = None
+    # When the fetch failed (vs cleanly not-logged-in), the message for the surface.
+    error: Optional[str] = None
+
+    @property
+    def is_admin(self) -> bool:
+        """True for OWNER/ADMIN — the roles that can manage billing."""
+        return (self.role or "").upper() in ("OWNER", "ADMIN")
+
+    @property
+    def can_charge(self) -> bool:
+        """True when the UI should offer charge/auto-reload actions.
+
+        Admin role AND the per-org kill-switch on. (The server still enforces;
+        this is just for graying out actions the user can't take.)
+        """
+        return self.is_admin and self.cli_billing_enabled
+
+
+def _parse_card(raw: Any) -> Optional[CardInfo]:
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        return None
+    brand = raw.get("brand")
+    last4 = raw.get("last4")
+    if isinstance(brand, str) and isinstance(last4, str):
+        return CardInfo(brand=brand, last4=last4)
+    return None
+
+
+def _parse_monthly_cap(raw: Any) -> Optional[MonthlyCap]:
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        return None
+    return MonthlyCap(
+        limit_usd=parse_money(raw.get("limitUsd")),
+        spent_this_month_usd=parse_money(raw.get("spentThisMonthUsd")),
+        is_default_ceiling=bool(raw.get("isDefaultCeiling")),
+    )
+
+
+def _parse_auto_reload(raw: Any) -> Optional[AutoReload]:
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        return None
+    return AutoReload(
+        enabled=bool(raw.get("enabled")),
+        threshold_usd=parse_money(raw.get("thresholdUsd")),
+        reload_to_usd=parse_money(raw.get("reloadToUsd")),
+    )
+
+
+def billing_state_from_payload(
+    payload: dict[str, Any], *, portal_url: Optional[str] = None
+) -> BillingState:
+    """Map a raw ``/api/billing/state`` JSON dict into :class:`BillingState`."""
+    raw_org = payload.get("org")
+    org: dict[str, Any] = raw_org if isinstance(raw_org, dict) else {}
+    raw_bounds = payload.get("bounds")
+    bounds: dict[str, Any] = raw_bounds if isinstance(raw_bounds, dict) else {}
+
+    presets: list[Decimal] = []
+    for item in payload.get("chargePresets") or ():
+        parsed = parse_money(item)
+        if parsed is not None:
+            presets.append(parsed)
+
+    return BillingState(
+        logged_in=True,
+        org_id=org.get("id"),
+        org_slug=org.get("slug"),
+        org_name=org.get("name"),
+        role=org.get("role"),
+        balance_usd=parse_money(payload.get("balanceUsd")),
+        cli_billing_enabled=bool(payload.get("cliBillingEnabled")),
+        charge_presets=tuple(presets),
+        min_usd=parse_money(bounds.get("minUsd")),
+        max_usd=parse_money(bounds.get("maxUsd")),
+        card=_parse_card(payload.get("card")),
+        monthly_cap=_parse_monthly_cap(payload.get("monthlyCap")),
+        auto_reload=_parse_auto_reload(payload.get("autoReload")),
+        portal_url=portal_url,
+    )
+
+
+# =============================================================================
+# Fail-open builders (the surface front doors)
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+def build_billing_state(*, timeout: float = 15.0) -> BillingState:
+    """Fetch + parse ``/api/billing/state``. Fail-open.
+
+    Returns ``BillingState(logged_in=False)`` when not logged in. On a portal/HTTP
+    failure, returns ``logged_in=False`` with ``error`` set so the surface can show
+    a clear message rather than crashing.
+    """
+    try:
+        from hermes_cli.nous_billing import (
+            BillingAuthError,
+            BillingError,
+            _absolutize_portal_url,
+            get_billing_state,
+            resolve_portal_base_url,
+        )
+    except Exception:
+        return BillingState(logged_in=False, error="billing client unavailable")
+
+    try:
+        payload = get_billing_state(timeout=timeout)
+    except BillingAuthError:
+        return BillingState(logged_in=False)
+    except BillingError as exc:
+        logger.debug("billing ▸ /state fetch failed (fail-open)", exc_info=True)
+        return BillingState(logged_in=False, error=str(exc))
+    except Exception:
+        logger.debug("billing ▸ /state unexpected error (fail-open)", exc_info=True)
+        return BillingState(logged_in=False, error="could not load billing state")
+
+    # Prefer a server-supplied portalUrl if present (resolved to absolute in case
+    # it's relative); else build the standard one.
+    raw_portal = payload.get("portalUrl") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
+    portal_url = _absolutize_portal_url(raw_portal) if raw_portal else None
+    if not portal_url:
+        try:
+            portal_url = _fallback_portal_url(resolve_portal_base_url())
+        except Exception:
+            portal_url = None
+
+    return billing_state_from_payload(payload, portal_url=portal_url)
+
+
+def _fallback_portal_url(base: str) -> str:
+    """Standard billing deep-link when the server omits ``portalUrl``."""
+    return f"{base.rstrip('/')}/billing?topup=open"
+
+
+# =============================================================================
+# Idempotency
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+def new_idempotency_key() -> str:
+    """Fresh UUID for a user-confirmed purchase (reuse on retry of the SAME buy).
+
+    The ``Idempotency-Key`` header is mandatory on ``POST /charge``; generate one
+    per confirmed purchase and reuse it across retries so a double-submit collapses
+    to a single charge. Never reuse a key across different amounts (the server
+    returns 409 idempotency_conflict).
+    """
+    return str(uuid.uuid4())
+
+
+# =============================================================================
+# Amount validation (Screen 3 custom input)
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AmountValidation:
+    ok: bool
+    amount: Optional[Decimal] = None
+    error: Optional[str] = None
+
+
+def validate_charge_amount(
+    raw: str, *, min_usd: Optional[Decimal], max_usd: Optional[Decimal]
+) -> AmountValidation:
+    """Validate a custom charge amount against bounds + 2dp (multipleOf 0.01).
+
+    Mirrors the server's accept/reject so the UI can give instant feedback rather
+    than round-tripping a sure-to-fail charge. The server is still authoritative.
+    """
+    cleaned = (raw or "").strip().lstrip("$").strip()
+    amount = parse_money(cleaned)
+    if amount is None:
+        return AmountValidation(ok=False, error="Enter a dollar amount, e.g. 100")
+    if amount <= 0:
+        return AmountValidation(ok=False, error="Amount must be greater than $0")
+    # multipleOf 0.01 — reject sub-cent precision.
+    if amount != amount.quantize(Decimal("0.01")):
+        return AmountValidation(ok=False, error="Amount can't be smaller than a cent")
+    if min_usd is not None and amount < min_usd:
+        return AmountValidation(ok=False, error=f"Minimum is {format_money(min_usd)}")
+    if max_usd is not None and amount > max_usd:
+        return AmountValidation(ok=False, error=f"Maximum is {format_money(max_usd)}")
+    return AmountValidation(ok=True, amount=amount)

agent/codex_responses_adapter.py

@@ -262,6 +262,26 @@ def _responses_tools(tools: Optional[List[Dict[str, Any]]] = None) -> Optional[L
     return converted or None
 
 
+# Provider-executed built-in tool *declaration* types accepted on the
+# Responses ``tools`` array.  These are declared by ``type`` alone (no
+# client-side name/parameters schema) and run server-side — the provider
+# owns the implementation and reports progress via the matching ``*_call``
+# output items.  Hermes injects xAI's native ``web_search`` for the xAI
+# transport (see agent/transports/codex.py); the rest are listed so the
+# preflight validator passes them through rather than rejecting them as
+# "unsupported type".  Mirrors the ``*_call`` item-type set used in
+# _normalize_codex_response.
+_RESPONSES_BUILTIN_TOOL_TYPES = {
+    "web_search",
+    "web_search_preview",
+    "file_search",
+    "code_interpreter",
+    "image_generation",
+    "computer_use_preview",
+    "local_shell",
+}
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Message format conversion
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -802,7 +822,22 @@ def _preflight_codex_api_kwargs(
         for idx, tool in enumerate(tools):
             if not isinstance(tool, dict):
                 raise ValueError(f"Codex Responses tools[{idx}] must be an object.")
-            if tool.get("type") != "function":
+
+            tool_type = tool.get("type")
+
+            # Provider-executed built-in tools (xAI native web_search, code
+            # interpreter, etc.) are declared by ``type`` alone and carry no
+            # ``name``/``parameters`` schema — the provider owns the
+            # implementation.  Pass them through verbatim instead of forcing
+            # them through the function-tool validation below (which would
+            # otherwise reject them with "unsupported type").  See
+            # agent/transports/codex.py for where xAI's native web_search is
+            # injected.
+            if tool_type in _RESPONSES_BUILTIN_TOOL_TYPES:
+                normalized_tools.append(dict(tool))
+                continue
+
+            if tool_type != "function":
                 raise ValueError(f"Codex Responses tools[{idx}] has unsupported type {tool.get('type')!r}.")
 
             name = tool.get("name")
@@ -1086,6 +1121,33 @@ def _normalize_codex_response(
     saw_final_answer_phase = False
     saw_reasoning_item = False
 
+    # Server-side built-in tool calls (xAI's native web_search, code
+    # interpreter, etc.) are executed by the provider and reported as
+    # discrete ``*_call`` output items.  xAI's /v1/responses surface
+    # (e.g. grok-composer-2.5-fast on SuperGrok OAuth) routinely leaves
+    # these items at ``status="in_progress"`` even when the overall
+    # ``response.status == "completed"`` — the search ran to completion
+    # server-side, the per-item status simply isn't reconciled.  These
+    # are NOT a signal that the model's turn is unfinished, so they must
+    # not flip ``has_incomplete_items``.  Only the response-level status
+    # and genuine model output items (message/reasoning/function_call)
+    # govern the incomplete verdict.  Without this guard, any turn where
+    # grok-composer invokes server-side search is misclassified as
+    # ``finish_reason="incomplete"`` and burns 3 fruitless continuation
+    # retries before failing with "Codex response remained incomplete
+    # after 3 continuation attempts".  client-side function/custom tool
+    # calls keep their own in_progress handling below (they are skipped,
+    # not awaited).
+    _SERVER_SIDE_TOOL_CALL_TYPES = {
+        "web_search_call",
+        "file_search_call",
+        "code_interpreter_call",
+        "image_generation_call",
+        "computer_call",
+        "local_shell_call",
+        "mcp_call",
+    }
+
     for item in output:
         item_type = getattr(item, "type", None)
         item_status = getattr(item, "status", None)
@@ -1094,7 +1156,10 @@ def _normalize_codex_response(
         else:
             item_status = None
 
-        if item_status in {"queued", "in_progress", "incomplete"}:
+        if (
+            item_status in {"queued", "in_progress", "incomplete"}
+            and item_type not in _SERVER_SIDE_TOOL_CALL_TYPES
+        ):
             has_incomplete_items = True
             saw_streaming_or_item_incomplete = True
 

agent/conversation_compression.py

@@ -512,6 +512,16 @@ def compress_context(
             old_title = agent._session_db.get_session_title(agent.session_id)
             # Trigger memory extraction on the old session before it rotates.
             agent.commit_memory_session(messages)
+            # Flush any un-persisted messages from the current turn to the
+            # old session *before* rotating.  compress_context() can be
+            # called mid-turn (auto-compress when context exceeds threshold)
+            # at a point when _flush_messages_to_session_db() has not yet
+            # run.  Without this, messages generated during the current turn
+            # are silently lost on session rotation (#47202).
+            try:
+                agent._flush_messages_to_session_db(messages)
+            except Exception:
+                pass  # best-effort — don't block compression on a flush error
             agent._session_db.end_session(agent.session_id, "compression")
             old_session_id = agent.session_id
             agent.session_id = f"{datetime.now().strftime('%Y%m%d_%H%M%S')}_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:6]}"

agent/conversation_loop.py

@@ -3756,8 +3756,30 @@ def run_conversation(
                     assistant_msg = agent._build_assistant_message(assistant_message, finish_reason)
                     messages.append(assistant_msg)
                     for tc in assistant_message.tool_calls:
-                        if tc.function.name not in agent.valid_tool_names:
-                            content = f"Tool '{tc.function.name}' does not exist. Available tools: {available}"
+                        _tc_name = tc.function.name
+                        if _tc_name not in agent.valid_tool_names:
+                            # A blank/whitespace-only name is not a typo the
+                            # model can fuzzy-correct toward a real tool — it is
+                            # almost always a weak open model echoing tool-call
+                            # XML/JSON it saw in file or tool output (#47967:
+                            # <tool_call>/<invoke name=...> payloads in a file
+                            # prime mimo/nemotron-class models to emit empty
+                            # structured calls). Dumping the full tool catalog
+                            # in that case feeds the priming loop more names to
+                            # mimic and inflates context 3-4x across retries, so
+                            # send a terse error that tells the model in-context
+                            # tool-call syntax is DATA, not a call to make.
+                            if not (_tc_name or "").strip():
+                                content = (
+                                    "Tool call rejected: the tool name was empty. "
+                                    "If tool-call XML or JSON appeared in file "
+                                    "contents or tool output, that is data — do "
+                                    "not re-emit it as a tool call. To call a "
+                                    "tool, use a valid name from your tool list; "
+                                    "otherwise reply in plain text."
+                                )
+                            else:
+                                content = f"Tool '{_tc_name}' does not exist. Available tools: {available}"
                         else:
                             content = "Skipped: another tool call in this turn used an invalid name. Please retry this tool call."
                         messages.append({

agent/model_metadata.py

@@ -275,6 +275,10 @@ DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LENGTHS = {
     # via a custom provider. Values sourced from models.dev (2026-04).
     # Keys use substring matching (longest-first), so e.g. "grok-4.20"
     # matches "grok-4.20-0309-reasoning" / "-non-reasoning" / "-multi-agent-0309".
+    # OAuth-only slug; absent from GET /v1/models. xAI publishes a 200k
+    # usable context window for Composer 2.5 on Grok Build (SuperGrok /
+    # Premium+); /v1/responses additionally enforces a ~262144 input+output
+    # budget, but the usable context (what we track here) is 200k.
     "grok-composer": 200000,    # grok-composer-2.5-fast (Grok Build CLI)
     "grok-build": 256000,       # grok-build-0.1
     "grok-code-fast": 256000,   # grok-code-fast-1

agent/prompt_builder.py

@@ -305,6 +305,47 @@ TASK_COMPLETION_GUIDANCE = (
     "is always better than inventing a result."
 )
 
+# Universal parallel-tool-call guidance — applied to ALL models.
+#
+# Why this matters for cost: every assistant turn resends the entire
+# accumulated conversation (and, on cache-friendly providers, re-reads the
+# cached prefix and pays for the newly-appended turn). A model that issues
+# one tool call per turn multiplies the number of round-trips — and therefore
+# the resent context — for any task that needs several independent reads,
+# searches, or safe lookups. Batching independent calls into a single
+# assistant response collapses N turns into one, cutting both latency and the
+# resent-context cost that compounds over a long conversation.
+#
+# The hermes-agent runtime already executes a batch of tool calls
+# concurrently when they are independent (read-only tools always; path-scoped
+# file ops when their targets don't overlap — see
+# run_agent._execute_tool_calls / tool_dispatch_helpers). The missing piece
+# was telling the *model* to emit those calls together in the first place.
+# Until now the only batching steer in the prompt lived in
+# GOOGLE_MODEL_OPERATIONAL_GUIDANCE — Gemini/Gemma got it, every other model
+# got nothing. This block makes the steer universal; the now-redundant
+# Google-only bullet has been dropped so no model receives it twice.
+#
+# Short on purpose — shipped in the cached system prompt to every user, every
+# session. Token cost is paid once at install and amortised across all
+# sessions via prefix caching. Keep it tight.
+#
+# Ported from cline/cline#11514 ("encourage parallel tool calls"), adapted
+# from Cline's TypeScript tool-surface guidance to hermes-agent's Python
+# prompt-assembly architecture.
+PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE = (
+    "# Parallel tool calls\n"
+    "When you need several pieces of information that don't depend on each "
+    "other, request them together in a single response instead of one tool "
+    "call per turn. Independent reads, searches, web fetches, and read-only "
+    "commands should be batched into the same assistant turn — the runtime "
+    "executes independent calls concurrently, and batching avoids resending "
+    "the whole conversation on every extra round-trip.\n"
+    "Only serialize calls when a later call genuinely depends on an earlier "
+    "call's result (e.g. you must read a file before you can patch it). When "
+    "in doubt and the calls are independent, batch them."
+)
+
 # OpenAI GPT/Codex-specific execution guidance.  Addresses known failure modes
 # where GPT models abandon work on partial results, skip prerequisite lookups,
 # hallucinate instead of using tools, and declare "done" without verification.
@@ -386,9 +427,10 @@ GOOGLE_MODEL_OPERATIONAL_GUIDANCE = (
     "package.json, requirements.txt, Cargo.toml, etc. before importing.\n"
     "- **Conciseness:** Keep explanatory text brief — a few sentences, not "
     "paragraphs. Focus on actions and results over narration.\n"
-    "- **Parallel tool calls:** When you need to perform multiple independent "
-    "operations (e.g. reading several files), make all the tool calls in a "
-    "single response rather than sequentially.\n"
+    # Parallel-tool-call steering now lives in the universal
+    # PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE block (injected for all models), so it is no
+    # longer duplicated here — keeping it would send Gemini/Gemma the same
+    # instruction twice.
     "- **Non-interactive commands:** Use flags like -y, --yes, --non-interactive "
     "to prevent CLI tools from hanging on prompts.\n"
     "- **Keep going:** Work autonomously until the task is fully resolved. "

agent/system_prompt.py

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ from agent.prompt_builder import (
     KANBAN_GUIDANCE,
     MEMORY_GUIDANCE,
     OPENAI_MODEL_EXECUTION_GUIDANCE,
+    PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE,
     PLATFORM_HINTS,
     SESSION_SEARCH_GUIDANCE,
     SKILLS_GUIDANCE,
@@ -123,6 +124,17 @@ def build_system_prompt_parts(agent: Any, system_message: Optional[str] = None)
     if getattr(agent, "_task_completion_guidance", True) and agent.valid_tool_names:
         stable_parts.append(TASK_COMPLETION_GUIDANCE)
 
+    # Universal parallel-tool-call guidance.  Tells the model to batch
+    # independent tool calls into one assistant turn rather than emitting one
+    # call per turn — the runtime already runs independent calls concurrently
+    # (read-only tools always; non-overlapping path-scoped file ops), so the
+    # only thing missing was steering the model to produce the batch.  Cuts
+    # round-trips and the resent-context cost that compounds over a long
+    # conversation.  Gated by config.yaml ``agent.parallel_tool_call_guidance``
+    # (default True) and only injected when tools are actually loaded.
+    if getattr(agent, "_parallel_tool_call_guidance", True) and agent.valid_tool_names:
+        stable_parts.append(PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE)
+
     # Tool-aware behavioral guidance: only inject when the tools are loaded
     tool_guidance = []
     if "memory" in agent.valid_tool_names:

agent/tool_executor.py

@@ -1012,28 +1012,42 @@ def execute_tool_calls_sequential(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
         elif function_name == "memory":
             def _execute(next_args: dict) -> Any:
                 target = next_args.get("target", "memory")
+                operations = next_args.get("operations")
                 from tools.memory_tool import memory_tool as _memory_tool
                 result = _memory_tool(
                     action=next_args.get("action"),
                     target=target,
                     content=next_args.get("content"),
                     old_text=next_args.get("old_text"),
+                    operations=operations,
                     store=agent._memory_store,
                 )
-                # Bridge: notify external memory provider of built-in memory writes
-                if agent._memory_manager and next_args.get("action") in {"add", "replace"}:
-                    try:
-                        agent._memory_manager.on_memory_write(
-                            next_args.get("action", ""),
-                            target,
-                            next_args.get("content", ""),
-                            metadata=agent._build_memory_write_metadata(
-                                task_id=effective_task_id,
-                                tool_call_id=getattr(tool_call, "id", None),
-                            ),
+                # Bridge: notify external memory provider of built-in memory writes.
+                # Covers both the single-op shape and each add/replace inside a batch.
+                if agent._memory_manager:
+                    if operations:
+                        _mem_ops = [
+                            op for op in operations
+                            if isinstance(op, dict) and op.get("action") in {"add", "replace"}
+                        ]
+                    else:
+                        _mem_ops = (
+                            [{"action": next_args.get("action"), "content": next_args.get("content")}]
+                            if next_args.get("action") in {"add", "replace"} else []
                         )
-                    except Exception:
-                        pass
+                    for _op in _mem_ops:
+                        try:
+                            agent._memory_manager.on_memory_write(
+                                _op.get("action", ""),
+                                target,
+                                _op.get("content", "") or "",
+                                metadata=agent._build_memory_write_metadata(
+                                    task_id=effective_task_id,
+                                    tool_call_id=getattr(tool_call, "id", None),
+                                ),
+                            )
+                        except Exception:
+                            pass
                 return result
             function_result, function_args = _run_agent_tool_execution_middleware(
                 agent,

agent/transports/codex.py

@@ -128,6 +128,65 @@ class ResponsesApiTransport(ProviderTransport):
         reasoning_effort = _effort_clamp.get(reasoning_effort, reasoning_effort)
 
         response_tools = _responses_tools(tools)
+
+        # xAI server-side web search.
+        #
+        # grok models on xAI's /v1/responses surface (notably
+        # grok-composer-2.5-fast on SuperGrok OAuth) have a *native*,
+        # server-executed web search.  When the model is handed a
+        # client-side function literally named ``web_search``, it routes
+        # the intent to that native engine — but because the tool is
+        # declared as a plain ``function`` rather than xAI's first-class
+        # ``{"type": "web_search"}`` built-in, the server-side search is
+        # dispatched but never reconciled: the response streams reasoning
+        # + ``web_search_call`` progress items, the searches never reach
+        # ``status="completed"`` in the assembled output, no final
+        # message is emitted, and ``_normalize_codex_response`` correctly
+        # sees reasoning-with-no-answer and reports ``incomplete``.  The
+        # turn then burns 3 continuation retries and fails with "Codex
+        # response remained incomplete after 3 continuation attempts".
+        # Verified live against grok-composer-2.5-fast (2026-06).
+        #
+        # Fix: when the agent HAS a client-side ``web_search`` function (i.e.
+        # the user enabled the web toolset), declare xAI's native
+        # ``web_search`` built-in instead so the search actually runs to
+        # completion server-side and the model streams a real answer.  The
+        # Responses API rejects two tools sharing the name ``web_search``
+        # (HTTP 400 "Duplicate tool names"), so we drop the client-side
+        # ``web_search`` function for the xAI path and let the native tool
+        # satisfy it.  All other client-side tools (read_file, terminal,
+        # web_extract, MCP tools, …) are untouched and continue to dispatch
+        # through Hermes's agent loop.
+        #
+        # Scope: we ONLY swap in the native built-in when the client
+        # ``web_search`` was actually present.  We do NOT force-enable Grok
+        # server-side search on turns where the user never had web enabled —
+        # that would silently route around Hermes's web-provider config and
+        # tool-trace/citation plumbing for every xai-oauth turn.  The swap is
+        # a 1:1 replacement of an already-requested capability, not an
+        # additive grant.
+        #
+        # NOTE: for the swapped case this routes ``web_search`` to Grok's
+        # native search engine for xAI sessions instead of Hermes's
+        # configured web provider (Tavily/etc.), and those results bypass
+        # Hermes's tool-trace / citation plumbing (they arrive baked into the
+        # model's answer rather than as a tool result the loop observes).
+        # Scoped to ``is_xai_responses`` deliberately; narrow to specific
+        # models if a future grok variant should keep the client-side
+        # function.
+        if is_xai_responses and response_tools:
+            has_client_web_search = any(
+                isinstance(t, dict) and t.get("name") == "web_search"
+                for t in response_tools
+            )
+            if has_client_web_search:
+                filtered = [
+                    t for t in response_tools
+                    if not (isinstance(t, dict) and t.get("name") == "web_search")
+                ]
+                filtered.append({"type": "web_search"})
+                response_tools = filtered
+
         # ``tools`` MUST be omitted entirely when there are no functions to
         # expose: the openai SDK's ``responses.stream()`` / ``responses.parse()``
         # eagerly call ``_make_tools(tools)`` which does ``for tool in tools``

apps/bootstrap-installer/src-tauri/src/update.rs

@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ async fn run_update(app: AppHandle) -> Result<()> {
     emit_stage(&app, "rebuild", StageState::Running, None, None);
     let started = Instant::now();
     let rebuild_args: Vec<String> = vec!["desktop".into(), "--build-only".into()];
-    let rebuild = run_streamed(
+    let mut rebuild = run_streamed(
         &app,
         &hermes,
         &rebuild_args,
@@ -295,6 +295,33 @@ async fn run_update(app: AppHandle) -> Result<()> {
         Some("rebuild"),
     )
     .await?;
+
+    // Retry-once: the first `--build-only` can return nonzero on a still-settling
+    // post-update tree or a network-blocked Electron fetch that our self-heal
+    // repaired mid-run. A second attempt then builds clean off the healed dist
+    // (the content-hash stamp makes it a near-no-op when the first actually
+    // succeeded). Without this the updater bails here and never reaches the
+    // relaunch below — the app updates but doesn't restart. Matches the
+    // retry-once `hermes update` already does above, and `hermes update`'s own
+    // desktop rebuild in cmd_update.
+    if rebuild_needs_retry(rebuild.exit_code) {
+        emit_log(
+            &app,
+            Some("rebuild"),
+            LogStream::Stdout,
+            "[rebuild] first desktop rebuild failed; retrying once (a self-healed \
+             Electron download builds clean on the second run)…",
+        );
+        rebuild = run_streamed(
+            &app,
+            &hermes,
+            &rebuild_args,
+            &install_root,
+            &child_env,
+            Some("rebuild"),
+        )
+        .await?;
+    }
     let rebuild_ms = started.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
 
     if rebuild.exit_code != Some(0) {
@@ -533,6 +560,14 @@ fn is_locked(path: &Path) -> bool {
     }
 }
 
+/// Whether the `desktop --build-only` rebuild should be retried once. Any
+/// non-success exit qualifies: the common cause is a transient first-attempt
+/// failure (still-settling tree / self-healed Electron download) that a clean
+/// second run resolves.
+fn rebuild_needs_retry(exit_code: Option<i32>) -> bool {
+    exit_code != Some(0)
+}
+
 /// Spawn `hermes <args>` from `cwd`, stream stdout/stderr as Log events on the
 /// bootstrap channel, and return the exit code. Mirrors powershell::run_script
 /// but for an arbitrary command (no install.ps1 -File wrapping).
@@ -970,6 +1005,16 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(update_branch_from_args(["--update"]), None);
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn rebuild_retries_only_on_failure() {
+        assert!(!rebuild_needs_retry(Some(0)), "a clean rebuild must not retry");
+        assert!(rebuild_needs_retry(Some(1)), "a failed rebuild retries once");
+        assert!(
+            rebuild_needs_retry(None),
+            "a killed/signalled rebuild (no exit code) retries once"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn parses_only_app_targets() {
         assert_eq!(

apps/desktop/electron/main.cjs

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ const { readDirForIpc } = require('./fs-read-dir.cjs')
 const { gitRootForIpc } = require('./git-root.cjs')
 const { worktreesForIpc } = require('./git-worktrees.cjs')
 const { OFFICIAL_REPO_HTTPS_URL, isOfficialSshRemote } = require('./update-remote.cjs')
+const { runRebuildWithRetry } = require('./update-rebuild.cjs')
 const {
   buildPosixCleanupScript,
   buildWindowsCleanupScript,
@@ -2009,10 +2010,14 @@ async function applyUpdatesPosixInApp() {
   }
 
   emitUpdateProgress({ stage: 'rebuild', message: 'Rebuilding the desktop app…', percent: 60 })
-  const rebuilt = await runStreamedUpdate(hermes, ['desktop', '--build-only'], {
-    cwd: updateRoot,
-    env,
-    stage: 'rebuild'
+  // Retry-once: a first rebuild can fail on a still-settling tree or a
+  // self-healed (network-blocked) Electron download; a second run builds clean
+  // off the healed dist so we reach the swap+relaunch below instead of bailing.
+  const rebuilt = await runRebuildWithRetry(attempt => {
+    if (attempt > 0) {
+      emitUpdateProgress({ stage: 'rebuild', message: 'Retrying the desktop rebuild…', percent: 60 })
+    }
+    return runStreamedUpdate(hermes, ['desktop', '--build-only'], { cwd: updateRoot, env, stage: 'rebuild' })
   })
   if (rebuilt.code !== 0) {
     emitUpdateProgress({
@@ -6546,6 +6551,12 @@ app.on('before-quit', () => {
   flushDesktopLogBufferSync()
   closePreviewWatchers()
 
+  // Kill open PTYs before environment teardown to avoid the node-pty#904
+  // ThreadSafeFunction SIGABRT race.
+  for (const id of [...terminalSessions.keys()]) {
+    disposeTerminalSession(id)
+  }
+
   if (hermesProcess && !hermesProcess.killed) {
     hermesProcess.kill('SIGTERM')
   }

apps/desktop/electron/update-rebuild.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+'use strict'
+
+/**
+ * Retry-once policy for the desktop `--build-only` rebuild during self-update.
+ *
+ * The first rebuild can return nonzero on a still-settling post-update tree or a
+ * network-blocked Electron fetch that the installer's self-heal repaired mid-run.
+ * A second attempt then builds clean off the healed dist (the content-hash stamp
+ * makes it a near-no-op when the first actually succeeded). Without the retry the
+ * updater bails before the relaunch step — the app updates but doesn't restart.
+ */
+
+function shouldRetryRebuild(code) {
+  return code !== 0
+}
+
+/**
+ * Run `rebuild()` (async, resolves `{ code, ... }`), retrying once on failure.
+ * Returns the final result.
+ */
+async function runRebuildWithRetry(rebuild) {
+  let result = await rebuild(0)
+  if (shouldRetryRebuild(result.code)) {
+    result = await rebuild(1)
+  }
+  return result
+}
+
+module.exports = { shouldRetryRebuild, runRebuildWithRetry }

apps/desktop/electron/update-rebuild.test.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for electron/update-rebuild.cjs — the retry-once policy for the desktop
+ * `--build-only` rebuild during self-update.
+ *
+ * Run with: node --test electron/update-rebuild.test.cjs
+ * (Wired into npm test:desktop:platforms in package.json.)
+ *
+ * Why this matters: a first rebuild can return nonzero on a still-settling tree
+ * or a self-healed (network-blocked) Electron download. Without a second attempt
+ * the updater bails before the relaunch step — the app updates but never restarts
+ * (the field report behind this fix). The retry must fire on failure, not on
+ * success, and must run at most twice.
+ */
+
+const test = require('node:test')
+const assert = require('node:assert/strict')
+
+const { shouldRetryRebuild, runRebuildWithRetry } = require('./update-rebuild.cjs')
+
+test('shouldRetryRebuild retries only on a non-success exit', () => {
+  assert.equal(shouldRetryRebuild(0), false)
+  assert.equal(shouldRetryRebuild(1), true)
+  assert.equal(shouldRetryRebuild(null), true)
+})
+
+test('a clean first rebuild runs once and does not retry', async () => {
+  const codes = []
+  const result = await runRebuildWithRetry(attempt => {
+    codes.push(attempt)
+    return Promise.resolve({ code: 0 })
+  })
+  assert.deepEqual(codes, [0])
+  assert.equal(result.code, 0)
+})
+
+test('a failed first rebuild retries once and succeeds', async () => {
+  const codes = []
+  const result = await runRebuildWithRetry(attempt => {
+    codes.push(attempt)
+    return Promise.resolve({ code: attempt === 0 ? 1 : 0 })
+  })
+  assert.deepEqual(codes, [0, 1])
+  assert.equal(result.code, 0)
+})
+
+test('a rebuild that keeps failing runs at most twice and reports the failure', async () => {
+  const codes = []
+  const result = await runRebuildWithRetry(attempt => {
+    codes.push(attempt)
+    return Promise.resolve({ code: 1, error: 'rebuild-failed' })
+  })
+  assert.deepEqual(codes, [0, 1])
+  assert.equal(result.code, 1)
+  assert.equal(result.error, 'rebuild-failed')
+})

apps/desktop/package.json

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
     "build": "node scripts/assert-root-install.cjs && node scripts/write-build-stamp.cjs && node scripts/stage-native-deps.cjs && tsc -b && vite build && npm run postbuild",
     "postbuild": "node scripts/assert-dist-built.cjs",
     "prebuilder": "node scripts/patch-electron-builder-mac-binary.cjs",
-    "builder": "cross-env NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=16384 electron-builder",
+    "builder": "cross-env NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=16384 node scripts/run-electron-builder.cjs",
     "pack": "npm run build && npm run builder -- --dir",
     "dist": "npm run build && npm run builder",
     "dist:mac": "npm run build && npm run builder -- --mac",
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
     "test:desktop:nsis": "node scripts/test-desktop.mjs nsis",
     "test:desktop:existing": "node scripts/test-desktop.mjs existing",
     "test:desktop:fresh": "node scripts/test-desktop.mjs fresh",
-    "test:desktop:platforms": "node --test electron/bootstrap-platform.test.cjs electron/hardening.test.cjs electron/backend-env.test.cjs electron/backend-probes.test.cjs electron/bootstrap-runner.test.cjs electron/connection-config.test.cjs electron/dashboard-token.test.cjs electron/gateway-ws-probe.test.cjs electron/oauth-net-request.test.cjs electron/desktop-uninstall.test.cjs electron/session-windows.test.cjs electron/workspace-cwd.test.cjs electron/fs-read-dir.test.cjs electron/git-root.test.cjs electron/windows-child-process.test.cjs electron/update-remote.test.cjs electron/windows-user-env.test.cjs",
+    "test:desktop:platforms": "node --test electron/bootstrap-platform.test.cjs electron/hardening.test.cjs electron/backend-env.test.cjs electron/backend-probes.test.cjs electron/bootstrap-runner.test.cjs electron/connection-config.test.cjs electron/dashboard-token.test.cjs electron/gateway-ws-probe.test.cjs electron/oauth-net-request.test.cjs electron/desktop-uninstall.test.cjs electron/session-windows.test.cjs electron/workspace-cwd.test.cjs electron/fs-read-dir.test.cjs electron/git-root.test.cjs electron/windows-child-process.test.cjs electron/update-remote.test.cjs electron/update-rebuild.test.cjs electron/windows-user-env.test.cjs",
     "typecheck": "tsc -p . --noEmit",
     "lint": "eslint src/ electron/",
     "lint:fix": "eslint src/ electron/ --fix",
@@ -135,7 +135,6 @@
   },
   "build": {
     "electronVersion": "40.10.2",
-    "electronDist": "../../node_modules/electron/dist",
     "appId": "com.nousresearch.hermes",
     "productName": "Hermes",
     "executableName": "Hermes",

apps/desktop/scripts/patch-electron-builder-mac-binary.cjs

@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ const replacement = `    // ${marker}: electron-builder 26.8.x can sometimes cop
     if (!fs.existsSync(bundledElectronBinary)) {
         const candidates = [
             path.join(packager.info.framework.distMacOsAppName, "Contents", "MacOS", electronBranding.productName),
+            // npm may nest the workspace-only electron devDep under
+            // apps/desktop/node_modules (process.cwd() during pack), or hoist
+            // it to the repo root. Try the workspace-local install first, then
+            // the root hoist, so the fallback works under either layout.
+            path.join(process.cwd(), "node_modules", "electron", "dist", "Electron.app", "Contents", "MacOS", electronBranding.productName),
             path.join(process.cwd(), "..", "..", "node_modules", "electron", "dist", "Electron.app", "Contents", "MacOS", electronBranding.productName),
         ];
         const sourceBinary = candidates.find(candidate => fs.existsSync(candidate));

apps/desktop/scripts/run-electron-builder.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+"use strict"
+
+// Resolve electronDist at runtime (#38673, #47917): electron-builder 26.8.x can
+// re-unpack a broken Electron.app; reusing the installed dist dodges that.
+// npm workspace hoisting is non-deterministic — require.resolve finds electron
+// wherever it landed. Dist present → -c.electronDist=<abs>/dist; absent → let
+// electron-builder fetch via @electron/get (electronVersion + ELECTRON_MIRROR).
+
+const fs = require("node:fs")
+const path = require("node:path")
+const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process")
+
+function electronDistDir() {
+  try {
+    return path.join(path.dirname(require.resolve("electron/package.json")), "dist")
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+function distBinary(dist) {
+  if (process.platform === "darwin") {
+    return path.join(dist, "Electron.app", "Contents", "MacOS", "Electron")
+  }
+  if (process.platform === "win32") {
+    return path.join(dist, "electron.exe")
+  }
+  return path.join(dist, "electron")
+}
+
+function electronBuilderCli() {
+  const pkgJson = require.resolve("electron-builder/package.json")
+  const bin = require(pkgJson).bin
+  const rel = typeof bin === "string" ? bin : bin["electron-builder"]
+  return path.join(path.dirname(pkgJson), rel)
+}
+
+const dist = electronDistDir()
+const args = []
+if (dist && fs.existsSync(distBinary(dist))) {
+  args.push(`-c.electronDist=${dist}`)
+} else {
+  console.warn(
+    "[run-electron-builder] no local electron dist; electron-builder will fetch " +
+      "via @electron/get (electronVersion + ELECTRON_MIRROR)."
+  )
+}
+args.push(...process.argv.slice(2))
+
+const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [electronBuilderCli(), ...args], {
+  stdio: "inherit",
+})
+if (result.error) {
+  console.error(`[run-electron-builder] spawn failed: ${result.error.message}`)
+  process.exit(1)
+}
+process.exit(result.status == null ? 1 : result.status)

apps/desktop/src/app/chat/index.tsx

@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ import { Backdrop } from '@/components/Backdrop'
 import { PromptOverlays } from '@/components/prompt-overlays'
 import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button'
 import { Codicon } from '@/components/ui/codicon'
+import { ErrorState } from '@/components/ui/error-state'
 import { getGlobalModelOptions, type HermesGateway } from '@/hermes'
+import { useI18n } from '@/i18n'
 import type { ChatMessage } from '@/lib/chat-messages'
 import { quickModelOptions, sessionTitle, toRuntimeMessage } from '@/lib/chat-runtime'
 import { useIncrementalExternalStoreRuntime } from '@/lib/incremental-external-store-runtime'
@@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ import {
   $lastVisibleMessageIsUser,
   $messages,
   $messagesEmpty,
+  $resumeExhaustedSessionId,
   $selectedStoredSessionId,
   $sessions,
   sessionPinId
@@ -86,7 +89,9 @@ interface ChatViewProps extends Omit<React.ComponentProps<'div'>, 'onSubmit'> {
   onEdit: (message: AppendMessage) => Promise<void>
   onReload: (parentId: string | null) => Promise<void>
   onRestoreToMessage?: (messageId: string) => Promise<void>
+  onRetryResume: (sessionId: string) => void
   onTranscribeAudio?: (audio: Blob) => Promise<string>
+  onDismissError?: (messageId: string) => void
 }
 
 interface ChatHeaderProps {
@@ -272,9 +277,12 @@ export function ChatView({
   onEdit,
   onReload,
   onRestoreToMessage,
-  onTranscribeAudio
+  onRetryResume,
+  onTranscribeAudio,
+  onDismissError
 }: ChatViewProps) {
   const location = useLocation()
+  const { t } = useI18n()
   const activeSessionId = useStore($activeSessionId)
   const awaitingResponse = useStore($awaitingResponse)
   const busy = useStore($busy)
@@ -296,6 +304,7 @@ export function ChatView({
   const messagesEmpty = useStore($messagesEmpty)
   const lastVisibleIsUser = useStore($lastVisibleMessageIsUser)
   const selectedSessionId = useStore($selectedStoredSessionId)
+  const resumeExhaustedSessionId = useStore($resumeExhaustedSessionId)
   const routedSessionId = routeSessionId(location.pathname)
   const isRoutedSessionView = Boolean(routedSessionId)
 
@@ -315,9 +324,21 @@ export function ChatView({
   // session exists — even if it has zero messages (a brand-new routed
   // session). The flicker where `busy` flips true briefly during hydrate
   // is handled by `threadLoadingState`'s last-visible-user gate.
-  const loadingSession = isRoutedSessionView && (routeSessionMismatch || (messagesEmpty && !activeSessionId))
+  //
+  // resumeExhausted: the bounded auto-retry in use-route-resume gave up on this
+  // routed session (gateway RPC + REST fallback failed through every attempt).
+  // Suppress the loader and show an explicit error + manual Retry instead of
+  // spinning forever. Gated on the route matching so a stale latch from another
+  // session can't blank the current one.
+  const resumeExhausted = isRoutedSessionView && resumeExhaustedSessionId === routedSessionId
+
+  const loadingSession =
+    !resumeExhausted && isRoutedSessionView && (routeSessionMismatch || (messagesEmpty && !activeSessionId))
+
   const threadLoading = threadLoadingState(loadingSession, busy, awaitingResponse, lastVisibleIsUser)
-  const showChatBar = !loadingSession
+  // Hide the composer in the exhausted error state too: there's no live runtime
+  // to send to until a retry rebinds one.
+  const showChatBar = !loadingSession && !resumeExhausted
   const threadKey = selectedSessionId || activeSessionId || (isRoutedSessionView ? location.pathname : 'new')
 
   const modelOptionsQuery = useQuery<ModelOptionsResponse>({
@@ -432,6 +453,7 @@ export function ChatView({
             loading={threadLoading}
             onBranchInNewChat={onBranchInNewChat}
             onCancel={onCancel}
+            onDismissError={onDismissError}
             onRestoreToMessage={onRestoreToMessage}
             sessionId={activeSessionId}
             sessionKey={threadKey}
@@ -465,6 +487,21 @@ export function ChatView({
             </Suspense>
           )}
         </ChatRuntimeBoundary>
+        {resumeExhausted && routedSessionId && (
+          <div className="absolute inset-0 z-10 grid place-items-center bg-(--ui-chat-surface-background) px-8 py-10">
+            <ErrorState
+              className="max-w-sm"
+              description={t.desktop.resumeStrandedBody}
+              title={t.desktop.resumeStrandedTitle}
+            >
+              <div className="grid justify-items-center">
+                <Button onClick={() => onRetryResume(routedSessionId)} size="sm" variant="outline">
+                  {t.desktop.resumeRetry}
+                </Button>
+              </div>
+            </ErrorState>
+          </div>
+        )}
         {showChatBar && <ScrollToBottomButton />}
         <ChatDropOverlay kind={dragKind} />
         <ChatSwapOverlay profile={gatewaySwapTarget} />

apps/desktop/src/app/desktop-controller.tsx

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import { useSkinCommand } from '@/themes/use-skin-command'
 
 import { formatRefValue } from '../components/assistant-ui/directive-text'
 import { getCronJobs, getSessionMessages, listAllProfileSessions, type SessionInfo, triggerCronJob } from '../hermes'
-import { preserveLocalAssistantErrors, toChatMessages } from '../lib/chat-messages'
+import { type ChatMessage, chatMessageText, preserveLocalAssistantErrors, toChatMessages } from '../lib/chat-messages'
 import {
   isMessagingSource,
   LOCAL_SESSION_SOURCE_IDS,
@@ -52,7 +52,10 @@ import {
   $currentCwd,
   $freshDraftReady,
   $gatewayState,
+  $messages,
   $messagingSessions,
+  $resumeFailedSessionId,
+  $resumeExhaustedSessionId,
   $selectedStoredSessionId,
   $sessions,
   $workingSessionIds,
@@ -199,6 +202,8 @@ export function DesktopController() {
   const activeSessionId = useStore($activeSessionId)
   const currentCwd = useStore($currentCwd)
   const freshDraftReady = useStore($freshDraftReady)
+  const resumeFailedSessionId = useStore($resumeFailedSessionId)
+  const resumeExhaustedSessionId = useStore($resumeExhaustedSessionId)
   const filePreviewTarget = useStore($filePreviewTarget)
   const previewTarget = useStore($previewTarget)
   const selectedStoredSessionId = useStore($selectedStoredSessionId)
@@ -736,6 +741,49 @@ export function DesktopController() {
     [branchCurrentSession, refreshSessions]
   )
 
+  // Clear a failed turn's red error banner from the transcript. Errors are
+  // renderer-local state (never persisted), so dismissing is purely a view +
+  // session-cache edit. A message that errored before emitting any visible
+  // text is a bare error placeholder → drop it entirely; one that streamed
+  // partial output then failed keeps its content and just sheds the error.
+  // Both the per-runtime cache AND the live $messages view must be updated:
+  // `preserveLocalAssistantErrors` re-grafts any still-errored message it
+  // finds in the view onto the next session.info flush, so clearing only the
+  // cache would let the heartbeat resurrect the banner.
+  const dismissError = useCallback(
+    (messageId: string) => {
+      const runtimeSessionId = activeSessionIdRef.current
+
+      if (!runtimeSessionId) {
+        return
+      }
+
+      const clearErrorIn = (messages: ChatMessage[]): ChatMessage[] =>
+        messages.flatMap(message => {
+          if (message.id !== messageId || !message.error) {
+            return [message]
+          }
+
+          if (!chatMessageText(message).trim() && !message.parts.some(part => part.type !== 'text')) {
+            return []
+          }
+
+          return [{ ...message, error: undefined, pending: false }]
+        })
+
+      // View first: the flush below reads $messages as the "current" baseline
+      // for error preservation, so the banner must be gone from it before the
+      // cache update triggers a re-sync.
+      setMessages(clearErrorIn($messages.get()))
+
+      updateSessionState(runtimeSessionId, state => ({
+        ...state,
+        messages: clearErrorIn(state.messages)
+      }))
+    },
+    [activeSessionIdRef, updateSessionState]
+  )
+
   const startSessionInWorkspace = useCallback(
     (path: null | string) => {
       startFreshSessionDraft()
@@ -845,6 +893,8 @@ export function DesktopController() {
     gatewayState,
     locationPathname: location.pathname,
     resumeSession,
+    resumeFailedSessionId,
+    resumeExhaustedSessionId,
     routedSessionId,
     runtimeIdByStoredSessionIdRef,
     selectedStoredSessionId,
@@ -994,6 +1044,7 @@ export function DesktopController() {
           void removeSession(selectedStoredSessionId)
         }
       }}
+      onDismissError={dismissError}
       onEdit={editMessage}
       onPasteClipboardImage={() => void composer.pasteClipboardImage()}
       onPickFiles={() => void composer.pickContextPaths('file')}
@@ -1002,6 +1053,7 @@ export function DesktopController() {
       onReload={reloadFromMessage}
       onRemoveAttachment={id => void composer.removeAttachment(id)}
       onRestoreToMessage={restoreToMessage}
+      onRetryResume={sessionId => void resumeSession(sessionId, true)}
       onSteer={steerPrompt}
       onSubmit={submitText}
       onThreadMessagesChange={handleThreadMessagesChange}

apps/desktop/src/app/session/hooks/use-message-stream.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import {
   type GatewayEventPayload,
   reasoningPart,
   renderMediaTags,
+  textPart,
   upsertToolPart
 } from '@/lib/chat-messages'
 import { coerceGatewayText, coerceThinkingText, normalizePersonalityValue } from '@/lib/chat-runtime'
@@ -1080,6 +1081,32 @@ export function useMessageStream({
           // completions / watch matches here — re-sync the status stack.
           void refreshBackgroundProcesses(sessionId)
         }
+      } else if (event.type === 'review.summary') {
+        // Self-improvement background review saved something to memory/skills
+        // and emitted a persistent summary (Python formats it as
+        // "💾 Self-improvement review: …"). The CLI prints this via
+        // prompt_toolkit and the Ink TUI renders it as a system line; the
+        // desktop has neither, so without this handler the skill/memory
+        // change happens silently. Surface it as a persistent system message
+        // in the transcript so the user is always informed — it must not be a
+        // transient toast that can be missed.
+        const text = coerceGatewayText(payload?.text).trim()
+
+        if (text && sessionId) {
+          flushQueuedDeltas(sessionId)
+          updateSessionState(sessionId, state => ({
+            ...state,
+            messages: [
+              ...state.messages,
+              {
+                id: `review-summary-${Date.now()}`,
+                role: 'system',
+                parts: [textPart(text)],
+                timestamp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
+              }
+            ]
+          }))
+        }
       } else if (event.type === 'error') {
         const errorMessage = payload?.message || 'Hermes reported an error'
         const looksLikeProviderSetup = isProviderSetupErrorMessage(errorMessage)

apps/desktop/src/app/session/hooks/use-route-resume.test.tsx

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ import { cleanup, render } from '@testing-library/react'
 import type { MutableRefObject } from 'react'
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
 
+import { $resumeExhaustedSessionId, setResumeExhaustedSessionId } from '@/store/session'
+
 import { useRouteResume } from './use-route-resume'
 
 interface HarnessProps {
@@ -13,6 +15,8 @@ interface HarnessProps {
   gatewayState: string
   locationPathname: string
   resumeSession: (sessionId: string, focus: boolean) => Promise<unknown>
+  resumeFailedSessionId?: null | string
+  resumeExhaustedSessionId?: null | string
   routedSessionId: null | string
   runtimeIdByStoredSessionIdRef: MutableRefObject<Map<string, string>>
   selectedStoredSessionId: null | string
@@ -20,8 +24,12 @@ interface HarnessProps {
   startFreshSessionDraft: (focus: boolean) => unknown
 }
 
-function RouteResumeHarness(props: HarnessProps) {
-  useRouteResume(props)
+function RouteResumeHarness({
+  resumeFailedSessionId = null,
+  resumeExhaustedSessionId = null,
+  ...props
+}: HarnessProps) {
+  useRouteResume({ ...props, resumeExhaustedSessionId, resumeFailedSessionId })
 
   return null
 }
@@ -256,3 +264,212 @@ describe('useRouteResume', () => {
     expect(resumeSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith('session-1', true)
   })
 })
+
+describe('useRouteResume bounded auto-retry after a failed resume', () => {
+  afterEach(() => {
+    cleanup()
+    vi.useRealTimers()
+    vi.restoreAllMocks()
+    setResumeExhaustedSessionId(null)
+  })
+
+  // Common stranded-window props: gateway open, route on the session, no runtime
+  // yet, and the ref already synced to the route (resumeSession sets it at entry
+  // before failing) — the exact state that defeats the main effect's self-heal.
+  function strandedProps(resumeSession: (sid: string, focus: boolean) => Promise<unknown>) {
+    return {
+      activeSessionId: null,
+      activeSessionIdRef: { current: null } as MutableRefObject<null | string>,
+      creatingSessionRef: { current: false },
+      currentView: 'chat',
+      freshDraftReady: false,
+      gatewayState: 'open',
+      locationPathname: '/session-1',
+      resumeSession,
+      routedSessionId: 'session-1',
+      runtimeIdByStoredSessionIdRef: { current: new Map<string, string>() },
+      selectedStoredSessionId: 'session-1',
+      // Synced to the route by the failed resume's synchronous entry-write.
+      selectedStoredSessionIdRef: { current: 'session-1' } as MutableRefObject<null | string>,
+      startFreshSessionDraft: vi.fn()
+    }
+  }
+
+  it('retries the resume on backoff when the routed session is flagged as failed', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers()
+    const resumeSession = vi.fn(async () => undefined)
+
+    render(<RouteResumeHarness {...strandedProps(resumeSession)} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" />)
+
+    // The main effect fires one resume on mount (pathname-changed). Clear it so
+    // we assert purely the bounded-retry effect's scheduled retry below.
+    resumeSession.mockClear()
+
+    // No immediate fire — the retry is scheduled behind the backoff timer.
+    expect(resumeSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+
+    // First backoff window (1s) elapses → one retry.
+    vi.advanceTimersByTime(1_000)
+    expect(resumeSession).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+    expect(resumeSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith('session-1', true)
+  })
+
+  it('does NOT retry a failed session that is not the routed one', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers()
+    const resumeSession = vi.fn(async () => undefined)
+
+    // The failure flag points at a different session than the route.
+    render(<RouteResumeHarness {...strandedProps(resumeSession)} resumeFailedSessionId="other-session" />)
+    resumeSession.mockClear() // drop the mount resume
+
+    vi.advanceTimersByTime(10_000)
+    expect(resumeSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('skips the scheduled retry if the session already recovered when the timer fires', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers()
+    const resumeSession = vi.fn(async () => undefined)
+    const props = strandedProps(resumeSession)
+
+    render(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" />)
+    resumeSession.mockClear() // drop the mount resume
+
+    // A resume landed while we waited: runtime is now bound.
+    props.activeSessionIdRef.current = 'runtime-1'
+
+    vi.advanceTimersByTime(8_000)
+    expect(resumeSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('stops retrying after MAX_RESUME_RETRIES consecutive failures', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers()
+    const resumeSession = vi.fn(async () => undefined)
+    const props = strandedProps(resumeSession)
+
+    // Model the real re-arm loop: resumeSession clears $resumeFailedSessionId at
+    // entry (null) and a repeat failure re-sets it ('session-1'). That null->id
+    // toggle is what re-runs the effect and advances the bounded counter. The
+    // routed session never changes, so the counter is NOT reset between cycles.
+    const { rerender } = render(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" />)
+    resumeSession.mockClear() // drop the mount resume; count only the retries
+
+    for (let i = 0; i < 8; i += 1) {
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(8_000) // fire the scheduled retry (if any)
+      rerender(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId={null} />) // cleared at entry
+      rerender(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" />) // re-armed on failure
+    }
+
+    // Capped at MAX_RESUME_RETRIES (4): a persistently dead backend can't
+    // hot-loop the resume forever.
+    expect(resumeSession.mock.calls.length).toBe(4)
+
+    // Once auto-retry gives up, the exhausted latch is armed for the routed
+    // session so the chat view can swap the perpetual loader for an explicit
+    // error + manual Retry instead of spinning forever.
+    expect($resumeExhaustedSessionId.get()).toBe('session-1')
+  })
+
+  it('does not arm the exhausted latch while retries remain', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers()
+    const resumeSession = vi.fn(async () => undefined)
+    const props = strandedProps(resumeSession)
+
+    const { rerender } = render(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" />)
+    resumeSession.mockClear()
+
+    // Two failure cycles — still under the 4-retry cap, so the latch must stay
+    // clear and the loader keeps spinning (auto-recovery hasn't given up yet).
+    for (let i = 0; i < 2; i += 1) {
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(8_000)
+      rerender(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId={null} />)
+      rerender(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" />)
+    }
+
+    expect($resumeExhaustedSessionId.get()).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('clears a stale exhausted latch when the route moves off the stranded session', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers()
+    const resumeSession = vi.fn(async () => undefined)
+    const props = strandedProps(resumeSession)
+
+    // Pre-arm the latch as if this session had exhausted its retries.
+    setResumeExhaustedSessionId('session-1')
+
+    // Route is now on a different, healthy session that is not flagged as
+    // failed — the retry effect's "route moved off" branch clears the latch.
+    render(
+      <RouteResumeHarness
+        {...props}
+        activeSessionId="runtime-2"
+        activeSessionIdRef={{ current: 'runtime-2' }}
+        locationPathname="/session-2"
+        resumeFailedSessionId={null}
+        routedSessionId="session-2"
+        selectedStoredSessionId="session-2"
+        selectedStoredSessionIdRef={{ current: 'session-2' }}
+      />
+    )
+
+    expect($resumeExhaustedSessionId.get()).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('resets the retry counter for a fresh backoff cycle when the exhausted latch clears (manual retry, same session)', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers()
+    const resumeSession = vi.fn(async () => undefined)
+    const props = strandedProps(resumeSession)
+
+    // Phase A — exhaust the bounded auto-retry (counter → MAX) like a dead
+    // backend. The resumeExhaustedSessionId prop stays null here: the hook sets
+    // the store, which doesn't feed back into the prop in this harness.
+    const { rerender } = render(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" />)
+    resumeSession.mockClear()
+    for (let i = 0; i < 8; i += 1) {
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(8_000)
+      rerender(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId={null} />)
+      rerender(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" />)
+    }
+    expect(resumeSession.mock.calls.length).toBe(4) // capped
+    expect($resumeExhaustedSessionId.get()).toBe('session-1')
+
+    // Phase B — user clicks Retry on the SAME stranded session. resumeSession
+    // clears both latches at entry; the exhausted latch's armed->cleared edge
+    // must reset the attempt counter so a fresh bounded cycle runs, not a single
+    // one-shot attempt that immediately re-arms the error. Model the prop
+    // transitions: reflect the armed latch, then clear it (retry), then re-arm
+    // the failure latch on the fresh failure.
+    resumeSession.mockClear()
+    rerender(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeExhaustedSessionId="session-1" resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" />)
+    rerender(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeExhaustedSessionId={null} resumeFailedSessionId={null} />)
+    rerender(<RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeExhaustedSessionId={null} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" />)
+
+    // A real retry fires again instead of staying pinned at MAX (which would
+    // dispatch nothing). Without the reset the counter stays >= MAX and this
+    // advance dispatches zero resumes.
+    vi.advanceTimersByTime(8_000)
+    expect(resumeSession.mock.calls.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
+  })
+
+  it('does not burn retry attempts on unrelated re-renders during the backoff window', () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers()
+    const props = strandedProps(vi.fn())
+
+    // Mount schedules the first backoff timer. Then re-render repeatedly with a
+    // fresh resumeSession identity (referential instability — a real dep change
+    // for the retry effect) WITHOUT ever letting the timer fire. The old code
+    // incremented the attempt counter at schedule time, so >= MAX re-renders
+    // armed the exhausted error with zero resumes actually dispatched. The fix
+    // only advances the counter when a timer truly fires, so the latch stays
+    // clear no matter how many spurious re-renders happen mid-backoff.
+    const { rerender } = render(
+      <RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" resumeSession={vi.fn(async () => undefined)} />
+    )
+    for (let j = 0; j < 8; j += 1) {
+      rerender(
+        <RouteResumeHarness {...props} resumeFailedSessionId="session-1" resumeSession={vi.fn(async () => undefined)} />
+      )
+    }
+
+    expect($resumeExhaustedSessionId.get()).toBeNull()
+  })
+})

apps/desktop/src/app/session/hooks/use-route-resume.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import { type MutableRefObject, useEffect, useRef } from 'react'
 
 import { isNewChatRoute } from '@/app/routes'
+import { setResumeExhaustedSessionId } from '@/store/session'
 
 interface RouteResumeOptions {
   activeSessionId: string | null
@@ -11,6 +12,17 @@ interface RouteResumeOptions {
   gatewayState: string | undefined
   locationPathname: string
   resumeSession: (sessionId: string, focus: boolean) => Promise<unknown>
+  // Stored-session id whose most recent resume failed terminally (set by
+  // useSessionActions, mirrored from $resumeFailedSessionId). While this equals
+  // routedSessionId the window would otherwise latch on the loader forever, so
+  // the bounded-retry effect below re-attempts the resume.
+  resumeFailedSessionId: string | null
+  // Stored-session id whose bounded auto-retry has EXHAUSTED (mirrored from
+  // $resumeExhaustedSessionId). Only resumeSession clears this latch (manual
+  // Retry / reconnect / reselect) — the auto-retry loop never does — so its
+  // armed->cleared edge is an unambiguous "give me a fresh backoff cycle"
+  // signal the effect below uses to reset the attempt counter.
+  resumeExhaustedSessionId: string | null
   routedSessionId: string | null
   runtimeIdByStoredSessionIdRef: MutableRefObject<Map<string, string>>
   selectedStoredSessionId: string | null
@@ -18,6 +30,19 @@ interface RouteResumeOptions {
   startFreshSessionDraft: (focus: boolean) => unknown
 }
 
+// Bounded auto-retry for a stranded session window. A resume can fail terminally
+// (gateway RPC reject + REST fallback failure) on a transiently wedged backend —
+// dead provider key, a runaway turn hogging the dispatcher, flaky DNS. Without a
+// retry the loader latches forever. We retry with backoff, capped, so a
+// genuinely dead backend doesn't hot-loop the resume.
+const MAX_RESUME_RETRIES = 4
+const RESUME_RETRY_BASE_MS = 1_000
+const RESUME_RETRY_MAX_MS = 8_000
+
+function resumeRetryDelayMs(attempt: number): number {
+  return Math.min(RESUME_RETRY_MAX_MS, RESUME_RETRY_BASE_MS * 2 ** attempt)
+}
+
 // HashRouter boot edge case: pathname briefly reads `/` before the hash is
 // parsed. If the hash references a real session, defer; resume picks it up
 // next tick. Without this, ctrl+R on `#/:sessionId` flashes 5 loading states.
@@ -49,6 +74,8 @@ export function useRouteResume({
   gatewayState,
   locationPathname,
   resumeSession,
+  resumeFailedSessionId,
+  resumeExhaustedSessionId,
   routedSessionId,
   runtimeIdByStoredSessionIdRef,
   selectedStoredSessionId,
@@ -58,6 +85,16 @@ export function useRouteResume({
   const lastPathnameRef = useRef<string | null>(null)
   const seenGatewayStateRef = useRef(false)
   const wasGatewayOpenRef = useRef(false)
+  // Per-session retry bookkeeping for the bounded auto-retry effect below. Keyed
+  // by the session id we're retrying so switching chats resets the counter.
+  const retrySessionIdRef = useRef<string | null>(null)
+  const retryAttemptRef = useRef(0)
+  // Tracks the previous exhausted-latch value so we can detect its armed->cleared
+  // edge. resumeSession clears $resumeExhaustedSessionId on a manual Retry /
+  // reconnect / reselect; that transition is our cue to reset the attempt counter
+  // for a fresh backoff cycle on the SAME session (the auto-retry loop itself
+  // never touches this latch, so it can't spuriously trigger the reset).
+  const prevResumeExhaustedRef = useRef<string | null>(null)
 
   useEffect(() => {
     const gatewayOpen = gatewayState === 'open'
@@ -139,4 +176,111 @@ export function useRouteResume({
     selectedStoredSessionIdRef,
     startFreshSessionDraft
   ])
+
+  // Bounded auto-retry: when the routed session's resume failed terminally
+  // (resumeFailedSessionId matches the route), schedule a backoff retry so the
+  // window recovers on its own instead of latching the loader forever. This is
+  // the safety net the main effect above can't provide: after a failed resume,
+  // selectedStoredSessionIdRef.current already equals the route (resumeSession
+  // sets it synchronously at entry) and the pathname/gateway are unchanged, so
+  // none of stuckOnRoutedSession / pathnameChanged / gatewayBecameOpen fire
+  // again. resumeSession clears resumeFailedSessionId on its next attempt; a
+  // success keeps it clear (the effect's guard then no-ops), a repeat failure
+  // re-arms it and we back off further, capped at MAX_RESUME_RETRIES.
+  useEffect(() => {
+    // Detect the exhausted-latch armed->cleared edge for the current route. Only
+    // resumeSession clears $resumeExhaustedSessionId (manual Retry / reconnect /
+    // reselect) — the auto-retry loop never touches it — so this transition
+    // uniquely means "the user asked for another go." Reset the attempt counter
+    // for a fresh bounded backoff cycle on the SAME session. Without this,
+    // retryAttemptRef stays pinned at MAX after exhaustion (the !stranded reset
+    // below only fires on a route CHANGE to a different session), so a manual
+    // retry on the same stranded session would get exactly ONE attempt and then
+    // immediately re-arm the exhausted error — never the renewed backoff cycle
+    // the store/session.ts + use-session-actions.ts comments promise. (Point 2)
+    const wasExhausted = prevResumeExhaustedRef.current
+    prevResumeExhaustedRef.current = resumeExhaustedSessionId
+    if (wasExhausted && wasExhausted === routedSessionId && resumeExhaustedSessionId !== wasExhausted) {
+      retrySessionIdRef.current = routedSessionId
+      retryAttemptRef.current = 0
+    }
+
+    if (currentView !== 'chat' || gatewayState !== 'open') {
+      return
+    }
+
+    const stranded =
+      Boolean(routedSessionId) &&
+      resumeFailedSessionId === routedSessionId &&
+      !creatingSessionRef.current
+
+    if (!stranded) {
+      // Route moved off the stranded session (or it recovered) — reset the
+      // counter so a future failure on another session starts fresh, and clear
+      // any exhausted-latch armed for a session we're no longer viewing (never
+      // the current route: that's the error state we want to keep showing).
+      // resumeSession also clears it on a fresh attempt; this covers a plain
+      // route-change away from the stranded window.
+      if (retrySessionIdRef.current !== routedSessionId) {
+        retrySessionIdRef.current = null
+        retryAttemptRef.current = 0
+        setResumeExhaustedSessionId(current => (current && current !== routedSessionId ? null : current))
+      }
+
+      return
+    }
+
+    // New stranded session id → reset the attempt counter.
+    if (retrySessionIdRef.current !== routedSessionId) {
+      retrySessionIdRef.current = routedSessionId
+      retryAttemptRef.current = 0
+    }
+
+    if (retryAttemptRef.current >= MAX_RESUME_RETRIES) {
+      // Give up auto-retrying a persistently dead backend; the user can still
+      // reconnect / reselect (which resets the counter via the branch above).
+      // Surface an explicit error + manual Retry in the chat view instead of
+      // spinning the loader forever — resumeSession (manual Retry / reconnect /
+      // reselect) clears this latch and resets the counter for a fresh cycle.
+      setResumeExhaustedSessionId(routedSessionId)
+
+      return
+    }
+
+    const attempt = retryAttemptRef.current
+    const sessionId = routedSessionId as string
+
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      // Re-check liveness at fire time: a resume may have landed while we waited.
+      if (
+        creatingSessionRef.current ||
+        selectedStoredSessionIdRef.current !== sessionId ||
+        activeSessionIdRef.current !== null
+      ) {
+        return
+      }
+
+      // Consume an attempt ONLY now that a resume is actually dispatching.
+      // Incrementing at schedule time (the old behavior) let unrelated dep
+      // changes during the 1s–8s backoff window — a transient gatewayState
+      // flip, a non-referentially-stable resumeSession — clear the pending
+      // timer and re-run the effect, burning an attempt without any resume
+      // having fired. A flapping backend could then hit MAX in a couple of
+      // re-renders with far fewer than MAX real attempts. (Point 3)
+      retryAttemptRef.current += 1
+      void resumeSession(sessionId, true)
+    }, resumeRetryDelayMs(attempt))
+
+    return () => clearTimeout(timer)
+  }, [
+    activeSessionIdRef,
+    creatingSessionRef,
+    currentView,
+    gatewayState,
+    resumeSession,
+    resumeFailedSessionId,
+    resumeExhaustedSessionId,
+    routedSessionId,
+    selectedStoredSessionIdRef
+  ])
 }

apps/desktop/src/app/session/hooks/use-session-actions.test.tsx

@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@ import type { MutableRefObject } from 'react'
 import { useEffect } from 'react'
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
 
+import { getSessionMessages } from '@/hermes'
 import { $activeGatewayProfile, $newChatProfile } from '@/store/profile'
-import { $currentCwd } from '@/store/session'
+import { $currentCwd, $messages, $resumeFailedSessionId, setMessages, setResumeFailedSessionId } from '@/store/session'
 
 import type { ClientSessionState } from '../../types'
 
@@ -117,3 +118,142 @@ describe('createBackendSessionForSend profile routing', () => {
     expect(params).toMatchObject({ profile: 'default' })
   })
 })
+
+// ── Resume failure recovery (the "stuck loading session window" bug) ──────────
+// When session.resume rejects AND the REST transcript fallback ALSO fails, the
+// hook must (a) not throw out of the fallback (which stranded the loader), and
+// (b) arm $resumeFailedSessionId so use-route-resume can retry. A resume that
+// succeeds must NOT leave the flag armed.
+function ResumeHarness({
+  onReady,
+  requestGateway
+}: {
+  onReady: (resume: (storedSessionId: string, replaceRoute?: boolean) => Promise<unknown>) => void
+  requestGateway: <T>(method: string, params?: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<T>
+}) {
+  const ref = <T,>(value: T): MutableRefObject<T> => ({ current: value })
+
+  const actions = useSessionActions({
+    activeSessionId: null,
+    activeSessionIdRef: ref<string | null>(null),
+    busyRef: ref(false),
+    creatingSessionRef: ref(false),
+    ensureSessionState: () => ({}) as ClientSessionState,
+    getRouteToken: () => 'token',
+    navigate: vi.fn() as never,
+    requestGateway,
+    runtimeIdByStoredSessionIdRef: ref(new Map<string, string>()),
+    selectedStoredSessionId: null,
+    selectedStoredSessionIdRef: ref<string | null>(null),
+    sessionStateByRuntimeIdRef: ref(new Map<string, ClientSessionState>()),
+    syncSessionStateToView: vi.fn(),
+    updateSessionState: (_sessionId, updater) => updater({} as ClientSessionState)
+  })
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    onReady(actions.resumeSession)
+  }, [actions.resumeSession, onReady])
+
+  return null
+}
+
+describe('resumeSession failure recovery', () => {
+  afterEach(() => {
+    cleanup()
+    setResumeFailedSessionId(null)
+    setMessages([])
+    vi.restoreAllMocks()
+  })
+
+  async function runResume(
+    requestGateway: <T>(method: string, params?: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<T>
+  ): Promise<void> {
+    let resume: ((storedSessionId: string, replaceRoute?: boolean) => Promise<unknown>) | null = null
+    render(<ResumeHarness onReady={r => (resume = r)} requestGateway={requestGateway} />)
+    await waitFor(() => expect(resume).not.toBeNull())
+    await resume!('stored-1', true)
+  }
+
+  it('arms $resumeFailedSessionId when resume RPC and REST fallback both fail', async () => {
+    // session.resume rejects (e.g. timeout against a wedged backend)...
+    const requestGateway = vi.fn(async (method: string) => {
+      if (method === 'session.resume') {
+        throw new Error('request timed out: session.resume')
+      }
+
+      return {} as never
+    })
+
+    // ...and the REST transcript fallback also rejects (backend unreachable).
+    vi.mocked(getSessionMessages).mockRejectedValue(new Error('network down'))
+
+    await runResume(requestGateway)
+
+    // The window is no longer silently stranded: the failure latch is armed for
+    // the stored session, which use-route-resume consumes to retry.
+    expect($resumeFailedSessionId.get()).toBe('stored-1')
+  })
+
+  it('does NOT arm the failure latch when the resume RPC fails but the REST fallback paints history', async () => {
+    // session.resume rejects, but the REST transcript fallback succeeds and
+    // hydrates a readable transcript — the window is NOT stranded.
+    const requestGateway = vi.fn(async (method: string) => {
+      if (method === 'session.resume') {
+        throw new Error('request timed out: session.resume')
+      }
+
+      return {} as never
+    })
+
+    vi.mocked(getSessionMessages).mockResolvedValue({
+      messages: [
+        { content: 'hello', role: 'user', timestamp: 1 },
+        { content: 'hi there', role: 'assistant', timestamp: 2 }
+      ],
+      session_id: 'stored-1'
+    } as never)
+
+    await runResume(requestGateway)
+
+    // Arming here would auto-retry a window that already shows history and,
+    // on exhaustion, blank that transcript behind the error overlay — a
+    // regression vs. plain fallback-success. The latch must stay clear.
+    expect($resumeFailedSessionId.get()).toBeNull()
+    // The fallback transcript is visible.
+    expect($messages.get().length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
+  })
+
+  it('does NOT throw out of the fallback when REST also fails (no unhandled rejection)', async () => {
+    const requestGateway = vi.fn(async (method: string) => {
+      if (method === 'session.resume') {
+        throw new Error('request timed out: session.resume')
+      }
+
+      return {} as never
+    })
+
+    vi.mocked(getSessionMessages).mockRejectedValue(new Error('network down'))
+
+    // resumeSession must resolve (swallow the fallback failure), not reject.
+    await expect(runResume(requestGateway)).resolves.toBeUndefined()
+  })
+
+  it('leaves the failure latch clear when resume succeeds', async () => {
+    // Pre-arm to prove a successful resume clears it (entry-clear path).
+    setResumeFailedSessionId('stored-1')
+
+    const requestGateway = vi.fn(async (method: string, params?: Record<string, unknown>) => {
+      if (method === 'session.resume') {
+        return { session_id: 'runtime-1', resumed: params?.session_id, messages: [], info: {} } as never
+      }
+
+      return {} as never
+    })
+
+    vi.mocked(getSessionMessages).mockResolvedValue({ messages: [] } as never)
+
+    await runResume(requestGateway)
+
+    expect($resumeFailedSessionId.get()).toBeNull()
+  })
+})

apps/desktop/src/app/session/hooks/use-session-actions.ts

@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ import {
   setFreshDraftReady,
   setIntroSeed,
   setMessages,
+  setResumeExhaustedSessionId,
+  setResumeFailedSessionId,
   setSelectedStoredSessionId,
   setSessions,
   setSessionStartedAt,
@@ -579,6 +581,15 @@ export function useSessionActions({
       clearNotifications()
       setSelectedStoredSessionId(storedSessionId)
       selectedStoredSessionIdRef.current = storedSessionId
+      // Optimistically clear any prior resume-failure latch for this session:
+      // we're attempting a fresh resume, so the self-heal in use-route-resume
+      // must not keep treating it as stranded. It's re-armed below only if THIS
+      // attempt fails terminally (RPC reject + REST fallback failure).
+      setResumeFailedSessionId(current => (current === storedSessionId ? null : current))
+      // Also clear the exhausted-latch: a fresh attempt (manual Retry, reconnect,
+      // reselect) gives the bounded auto-retry counter a clean cycle, so the
+      // chat view drops the error state and shows the loader again.
+      setResumeExhaustedSessionId(current => (current === storedSessionId ? null : current))
 
       const warmRuntimeId = runtimeIdByStoredSessionIdRef.current.get(storedSessionId)
 
@@ -769,13 +780,41 @@ export function useSessionActions({
           return
         }
 
-        const fallback = await getSessionMessages(storedSessionId, sessionProfile)
+        // The gateway resume RPC failed. Try the REST transcript as a fallback
+        // so the window at least shows history. CRITICAL: this fallback must be
+        // wrapped in its own try — if it ALSO throws (wedged/unreachable backend,
+        // the common case when resume failed in the first place), an unguarded
+        // throw here skips setMessages AND leaves activeSessionId null with an
+        // empty transcript. That is the exact state the thread loader latches on
+        // forever (messagesEmpty && !activeSessionId) with no recovery path —
+        // the "open in new window stays stuck loading, even after a nap" bug.
+        try {
+          const fallback = await getSessionMessages(storedSessionId, sessionProfile)
 
-        if (!isCurrentResume()) {
-          return
+          if (!isCurrentResume()) {
+            return
+          }
+
+          setMessages(preserveLocalAssistantErrors(toChatMessages(fallback.messages), $messages.get()))
+        } catch {
+          // Fallback also failed: nothing to paint. Leave whatever messages are
+          // already shown and fall through to arm the resume-failure latch so
+          // use-route-resume re-attempts the resume on the next render / window
+          // focus / gateway reconnect instead of stranding the loader.
+        }
+
+        if (isCurrentResume() && $messages.get().length === 0) {
+          // Arm the self-heal ONLY when the window is still empty: the gateway
+          // resume rejected AND the REST fallback failed to paint a transcript.
+          // That is the exact stranded state the loader latches on
+          // (messagesEmpty && !activeSessionId), and matches $resumeFailedSessionId's
+          // documented contract. If the REST fallback DID paint history, the
+          // window is readable — arming here would needlessly auto-retry and,
+          // once retries exhaust, blank that visible transcript behind the
+          // exhausted-state error overlay (a regression vs. plain fallback success).
+          setResumeFailedSessionId(storedSessionId)
         }
 
-        setMessages(preserveLocalAssistantErrors(toChatMessages(fallback.messages), $messages.get()))
         notifyError(err, copy.resumeFailed)
       } finally {
         if (isCurrentResume()) {

apps/desktop/src/components/assistant-ui/streaming.test.tsx

@@ -378,6 +378,20 @@ function IntroHarness() {
   )
 }
 
+function DismissibleErrorHarness({ onDismissError }: { onDismissError: (messageId: string) => void }) {
+  const runtime = useExternalStoreRuntime<ThreadMessage>({
+    messages: [assistantErrorMessage('OpenRouter rejected the request (403).')],
+    isRunning: false,
+    onNew: async () => {}
+  })
+
+  return (
+    <AssistantRuntimeProvider runtime={runtime}>
+      <Thread onDismissError={onDismissError} />
+    </AssistantRuntimeProvider>
+  )
+}
+
 describe('assistant-ui streaming renderer', () => {
   beforeEach(() => {
     resizeObservers.clear()
@@ -421,6 +435,23 @@ describe('assistant-ui streaming renderer', () => {
     expect(screen.getByRole('alert').textContent).toContain('OpenRouter rejected the request (403).')
   })
 
+  it('omits the dismiss control when no onDismissError handler is supplied', () => {
+    render(<MessageHarness message={assistantErrorMessage('OpenRouter rejected the request (403).')} />)
+
+    expect(screen.queryByRole('button', { name: 'Dismiss error' })).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('invokes onDismissError with the errored message id when the dismiss control is clicked', () => {
+    const onDismissError = vi.fn()
+    render(<DismissibleErrorHarness onDismissError={onDismissError} />)
+
+    const dismiss = screen.getByRole('button', { name: 'Dismiss error' })
+    fireEvent.click(dismiss)
+
+    expect(onDismissError).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+    expect(onDismissError).toHaveBeenCalledWith('assistant-error-1')
+  })
+
   // Scroll behavior (follow-at-bottom, escape-on-scroll-up, re-engage) is owned
   // by the use-stick-to-bottom library and covered by its own test suite. We
   // don't re-assert its scrollTop mechanics here — doing so in jsdom (no real

apps/desktop/src/components/assistant-ui/thread.tsx

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ import { attachmentDisplayText, attachmentId, pathLabel } from '@/lib/chat-runti
 import { DATA_IMAGE_URL_RE } from '@/lib/embedded-images'
 import { LinkifiedText } from '@/lib/external-link'
 import { triggerHaptic } from '@/lib/haptics'
-import { GitBranchIcon, Loader2Icon, Volume2Icon, VolumeXIcon } from '@/lib/icons'
+import { GitBranchIcon, Loader2Icon, Volume2Icon, VolumeXIcon, XIcon } from '@/lib/icons'
 import { extractPreviewTargets } from '@/lib/preview-targets'
 import { useEnterAnimation } from '@/lib/use-enter-animation'
 import { cn } from '@/lib/utils'
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ export const Thread: FC<{
   loading?: ThreadLoadingState
   onBranchInNewChat?: (messageId: string) => void
   onCancel?: () => Promise<void> | void
+  onDismissError?: (messageId: string) => void
   onRestoreToMessage?: (messageId: string) => Promise<void> | void
   sessionId?: string | null
   sessionKey?: string | null
@@ -180,18 +181,19 @@ export const Thread: FC<{
   loading,
   onBranchInNewChat,
   onCancel,
+  onDismissError,
   onRestoreToMessage,
   sessionId = null,
   sessionKey
 }) => {
   const messageComponents = useMemo(
     () => ({
-      AssistantMessage: () => <AssistantMessage onBranchInNewChat={onBranchInNewChat} />,
+      AssistantMessage: () => <AssistantMessage onBranchInNewChat={onBranchInNewChat} onDismissError={onDismissError} />,
       SystemMessage,
       UserEditComposer: () => <UserEditComposer cwd={cwd} gateway={gateway} sessionId={sessionId} />,
       UserMessage: () => <UserMessage onCancel={onCancel} onRestoreToMessage={onRestoreToMessage} />
     }),
-    [cwd, gateway, onBranchInNewChat, onCancel, onRestoreToMessage, sessionId]
+    [cwd, gateway, onBranchInNewChat, onCancel, onDismissError, onRestoreToMessage, sessionId]
   )
 
   const emptyPlaceholder = intro ? (
@@ -245,9 +247,13 @@ const CenteredThreadSpinner: FC = () => {
   )
 }
 
-const AssistantMessage: FC<{ onBranchInNewChat?: (messageId: string) => void }> = ({ onBranchInNewChat }) => {
+const AssistantMessage: FC<{
+  onBranchInNewChat?: (messageId: string) => void
+  onDismissError?: (messageId: string) => void
+}> = ({ onBranchInNewChat, onDismissError }) => {
   const messageId = useAuiState(s => s.message.id)
   const messageRuntime = useMessageRuntime()
+  const { t } = useI18n()
 
   // PERF: this component must NOT subscribe to the streaming text. Every
   // selector here returns a value that stays referentially stable across
@@ -306,10 +312,20 @@ const AssistantMessage: FC<{ onBranchInNewChat?: (messageId: string) => void }>
         )}
         <MessagePrimitive.Error>
           <ErrorPrimitive.Root
-            className="mt-1.5 text-[0.78rem] leading-5 text-[color-mix(in_srgb,var(--dt-destructive)_78%,var(--ui-text-secondary))]"
+            className="mt-1.5 flex items-start gap-1.5 text-[0.78rem] leading-5 text-[color-mix(in_srgb,var(--dt-destructive)_78%,var(--ui-text-secondary))]"
             role="alert"
           >
-            <ErrorPrimitive.Message />
+            <ErrorPrimitive.Message className="min-w-0 flex-1" />
+            {onDismissError && (
+              <TooltipIconButton
+                className="-my-0.5 shrink-0 text-current opacity-70 hover:opacity-100"
+                onClick={() => onDismissError(messageId)}
+                side="top"
+                tooltip={t.assistant.thread.dismissError}
+              >
+                <XIcon className="size-3.5" />
+              </TooltipIconButton>
+            )}
           </ErrorPrimitive.Root>
         </MessagePrimitive.Error>
       </div>
@@ -811,7 +827,7 @@ function StickyHumanMessageContainer({ attachments, children }: { attachments?:
 // so without the carve-out, clicking a stuck bubble drags the window instead of
 // opening the edit composer.
 const USER_BUBBLE_BASE_CLASS =
-  'composer-human-message standalone-glass relative flex w-full min-w-0 max-w-full flex-col gap-1.5 overflow-hidden rounded-xl border bg-(--dt-user-bubble) px-3 py-2 text-left [-webkit-app-region:no-drag]'
+  'composer-human-message standalone-glass relative flex w-full min-w-0 max-w-full flex-col gap-1.5 overflow-y-auto rounded-xl border bg-(--dt-user-bubble) px-3 py-2 text-left [-webkit-app-region:no-drag]'
 
 const USER_ACTION_ICON_BUTTON_CLASS =
   'grid place-items-center rounded-md bg-transparent text-(--ui-text-secondary) transition-colors hover:bg-(--ui-control-active-background) hover:text-foreground disabled:cursor-default disabled:text-(--ui-text-quaternary) disabled:opacity-70'

apps/desktop/src/i18n/en.ts

@@ -1733,6 +1733,7 @@ export const en: Translations = {
       refresh: 'Refresh',
       moreActions: 'More actions',
       branchNewChat: 'Branch in new chat',
+      dismissError: 'Dismiss error',
       readAloudFailed: 'Read aloud failed',
       preparingAudio: 'Preparing audio...',
       stopReading: 'Stop reading',
@@ -1842,6 +1843,9 @@ export const en: Translations = {
     regenerateFailed: 'Regenerate failed',
     editFailed: 'Edit failed',
     resumeFailed: 'Resume failed',
+    resumeStrandedTitle: "Couldn't load this session",
+    resumeStrandedBody: 'The connection to this session failed and automatic retries gave up. Check that the gateway is running, then try again.',
+    resumeRetry: 'Retry',
     nothingToBranch: 'Nothing to branch',
     branchNeedsChat: 'Start or resume a chat before branching.',
     sessionBusy: 'Session busy',

apps/desktop/src/i18n/ja.ts

@@ -1864,6 +1864,7 @@ export const ja = defineLocale({
       refresh: '更新',
       moreActions: 'その他のアクション',
       branchNewChat: '新しいチャットでブランチ',
+      dismissError: 'エラーを閉じる',
       readAloudFailed: '読み上げに失敗しました',
       preparingAudio: '音声を準備中...',
       stopReading: '読み上げを停止',
@@ -1973,6 +1974,9 @@ export const ja = defineLocale({
     regenerateFailed: '再生成に失敗しました',
     editFailed: '編集に失敗しました',
     resumeFailed: '再開に失敗しました',
+    resumeStrandedTitle: 'このセッションを読み込めませんでした',
+    resumeStrandedBody: 'このセッションへの接続に失敗し、自動再試行も停止しました。ゲートウェイが実行中か確認してから、もう一度お試しください。',
+    resumeRetry: '再試行',
     nothingToBranch: 'ブランチするものがありません',
     branchNeedsChat: 'ブランチする前にチャットを開始または再開してください。',
     sessionBusy: 'セッションが使用中',

apps/desktop/src/i18n/types.ts

@@ -1373,6 +1373,7 @@ export interface Translations {
       refresh: string
       moreActions: string
       branchNewChat: string
+      dismissError: string
       readAloudFailed: string
       preparingAudio: string
       stopReading: string
@@ -1480,6 +1481,9 @@ export interface Translations {
     regenerateFailed: string
     editFailed: string
     resumeFailed: string
+    resumeStrandedTitle: string
+    resumeStrandedBody: string
+    resumeRetry: string
     nothingToBranch: string
     branchNeedsChat: string
     sessionBusy: string

apps/desktop/src/i18n/zh-hant.ts

@@ -1806,6 +1806,7 @@ export const zhHant = defineLocale({
       refresh: '重新整理',
       moreActions: '更多動作',
       branchNewChat: '在新聊天中分支',
+      dismissError: '关闭错误',
       readAloudFailed: '朗讀失敗',
       preparingAudio: '正在準備音訊...',
       stopReading: '停止朗讀',
@@ -1913,6 +1914,9 @@ export const zhHant = defineLocale({
     regenerateFailed: '重新生成失敗',
     editFailed: '編輯失敗',
     resumeFailed: '繼續失敗',
+    resumeStrandedTitle: '無法載入此工作階段',
+    resumeStrandedBody: '與此工作階段的連線失敗，自動重試已停止。請確認閘道正在執行，然後重試。',
+    resumeRetry: '重試',
     nothingToBranch: '沒有可分支的內容',
     branchNeedsChat: '分支前請先開始或繼續一個聊天。',
     sessionBusy: '工作階段忙碌中',

apps/desktop/src/i18n/zh.ts

@@ -1912,6 +1912,7 @@ export const zh: Translations = {
       refresh: '刷新',
       moreActions: '更多操作',
       branchNewChat: '在新对话中分支',
+      dismissError: '关闭错误',
       readAloudFailed: '朗读失败',
       preparingAudio: '正在准备音频...',
       stopReading: '停止朗读',
@@ -2020,6 +2021,9 @@ export const zh: Translations = {
     regenerateFailed: '重新生成失败',
     editFailed: '编辑失败',
     resumeFailed: '恢复失败',
+    resumeStrandedTitle: '无法加载此会话',
+    resumeStrandedBody: '与此会话的连接失败，自动重试已停止。请确认网关正在运行，然后重试。',
+    resumeRetry: '重试',
     nothingToBranch: '没有可分支的内容',
     branchNeedsChat: '分支前请先开始或恢复一个对话。',
     sessionBusy: '会话忙碌中',

apps/desktop/src/store/session.ts

@@ -218,6 +218,23 @@ export const $lastVisibleMessageIsUser = computed($messages, lastVisibleMessageI
 export const $freshDraftReady = atom(false)
 export const $busy = atom(false)
 export const $awaitingResponse = atom(false)
+// Stored-session id whose most recent resume FAILED terminally (the gateway RPC
+// rejected AND the REST transcript fallback also failed), leaving the window
+// with no runtime and an empty transcript. Drives use-route-resume's self-heal:
+// while this matches the routed session the loader would otherwise latch
+// forever (messagesEmpty && !activeSessionId), so the hook re-attempts the
+// resume on the next render/focus/reconnect instead of stranding the window.
+// Null whenever the active route has a healthy (or in-flight) resume.
+export const $resumeFailedSessionId = atom<string | null>(null)
+// Stored-session id whose resume has EXHAUSTED its bounded auto-retries (the
+// terminal-failure latch above kept failing through all MAX_RESUME_RETRIES
+// attempts). Distinct from $resumeFailedSessionId, which is armed *during* the
+// backoff window too: this fires only once auto-recovery has given up, so the
+// chat view can swap the perpetual loader for an explicit error + manual Retry
+// affordance. A fresh resumeSession() (manual Retry, reconnect, reselect)
+// clears it and resets the retry counter. Null whenever the active route has a
+// healthy, in-flight, or still-auto-retrying resume.
+export const $resumeExhaustedSessionId = atom<string | null>(null)
 export const $currentModel = atom(storedString(COMPOSER_MODEL_KEY) ?? '')
 export const $currentProvider = atom(storedString(COMPOSER_PROVIDER_KEY) ?? '')
 export const $currentReasoningEffort = atom(storedString(COMPOSER_EFFORT_KEY) ?? '')
@@ -262,6 +279,8 @@ export const setActiveSessionId = (next: Updater<string | null>) => updateAtom($
 export const setSelectedStoredSessionId = (next: Updater<string | null>) => updateAtom($selectedStoredSessionId, next)
 export const setMessages = (next: Updater<ChatMessage[]>) => updateAtom($messages, next)
 export const setFreshDraftReady = (next: Updater<boolean>) => updateAtom($freshDraftReady, next)
+export const setResumeFailedSessionId = (next: Updater<string | null>) => updateAtom($resumeFailedSessionId, next)
+export const setResumeExhaustedSessionId = (next: Updater<string | null>) => updateAtom($resumeExhaustedSessionId, next)
 export const setBusy = (next: Updater<boolean>) => updateAtom($busy, next)
 export const setAwaitingResponse = (next: Updater<boolean>) => updateAtom($awaitingResponse, next)
 

cli.py

@@ -1984,6 +1984,24 @@ _ACCENT = _SkinAwareAnsi("response_border", "#FFD700", bold=True)
 _DIM = "\x1b[2;3m"
 
 
+def _b(s: str) -> str:
+    """Bold if stdout is a real TTY; plain text otherwise (slash-worker safe)."""
+    import sys as _sys
+    try:
+        return f"\x1b[1m{s}\x1b[0m" if _sys.stdout.isatty() else str(s)
+    except Exception:
+        return str(s)
+
+
+def _d(s: str) -> str:
+    """Dim-italic if stdout is a real TTY; plain text otherwise."""
+    import sys as _sys
+    try:
+        return f"\x1b[2;3m{s}\x1b[0m" if _sys.stdout.isatty() else str(s)
+    except Exception:
+        return str(s)
+
+
 def _accent_hex() -> str:
     """Return the active skin accent color for legacy CLI output lines."""
     try:
@@ -3664,7 +3682,7 @@ class HermesCLI(CLIAgentSetupMixin, CLICommandsMixin):
         if getattr(self, "_resize_recovery_pending", False):
             return
         now = time.monotonic()
-        if hasattr(self, "_app") and self._app and (now - self._last_invalidate) >= min_interval:
+        if hasattr(self, "_app") and self._app and (now - getattr(self, "_last_invalidate", 0.0)) >= min_interval:
             self._last_invalidate = now
             self._app.invalidate()
 
@@ -5957,6 +5975,18 @@ class HermesCLI(CLIAgentSetupMixin, CLICommandsMixin):
 
         old_session_id = self.session_id
         if self._session_db and old_session_id:
+            # Flush any un-persisted messages from the current turn to the
+            # old session *before* rotating.  /new can be called mid-turn
+            # when _flush_messages_to_session_db() has not yet run — without
+            # this, messages generated during the current turn are silently
+            # lost on session rotation (#47202).
+            if self.agent:
+                try:
+                    self.agent._flush_messages_to_session_db(
+                        self.conversation_history
+                    )
+                except Exception:
+                    pass  # best-effort
             try:
                 self._session_db.end_session(old_session_id, "new_session")
             except Exception:
@@ -6359,6 +6389,17 @@ class HermesCLI(CLIAgentSetupMixin, CLICommandsMixin):
 
         in_main_thread = threading.current_thread() is threading.main_thread()
 
+        # Slash-worker guard (#23185 / billing auto-reload hang): when a
+        # prompt_toolkit app is running but we're on a non-main thread (the
+        # process_loop / TUI slash-worker daemon thread), stdin is owned by the
+        # event loop / JSON-RPC pipe.  A bare input() there blocks forever until
+        # the worker's 45s timeout fires.  We cannot safely prompt off the main
+        # thread, so cancel cleanly (None) instead of hanging — mirrors the
+        # _stdin_fallback discipline in _prompt_text_input_modal.
+        if self._app and not in_main_thread:
+            self._invalidate()
+            return None
+
         if self._app and in_main_thread:
             from prompt_toolkit.application import run_in_terminal
             was_visible = self._status_bar_visible
@@ -6930,7 +6971,7 @@ class HermesCLI(CLIAgentSetupMixin, CLICommandsMixin):
             try:
                 if ctx is None:
                     raise RuntimeError("inventory context unavailable")
-                providers = build_models_payload(ctx, max_models=50)["providers"]
+                providers = build_models_payload(ctx)["providers"]
             except Exception:
                 providers = []
 
@@ -7506,6 +7547,8 @@ class HermesCLI(CLIAgentSetupMixin, CLICommandsMixin):
             self._show_usage()
         elif canonical == "credits":
             self._show_credits()
+        elif canonical == "billing":
+            self._show_billing(cmd_original)
         elif canonical == "insights":
             self._show_insights(cmd_original)
         elif canonical == "copy":
@@ -8425,7 +8468,7 @@ class HermesCLI(CLIAgentSetupMixin, CLICommandsMixin):
 
         if not view.logged_in:
             print()
-            print(f"  💳 {_DIM}Not logged into Nous Portal.{_RST}")
+            _cprint(f"  💳 {_d('Not logged into Nous Portal.')}")
             print("  Run `hermes portal` to log in, then /credits.")
             return
 
@@ -8487,6 +8530,628 @@ class HermesCLI(CLIAgentSetupMixin, CLICommandsMixin):
         else:
             print("  🟡 Cancelled. No credits added.")
 
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # /billing — Phase 2b terminal billing (CLI surface, all 5 screens)
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    def _show_billing(self, command: str = "/billing"):
+        """`/billing` — terminal billing for Nous (one interactive modal).
+
+        ZERO sub-commands: any argument is ignored. Bare ``/billing`` always
+        opens the Overview (Screen 1), whose numbered menu is the *only* way to
+        reach the Buy / Auto-reload / Monthly-limit sub-screens. (Per the unified
+        UX spec §0.4 — ``/billing buy`` etc. are gone; we don't error on a stray
+        arg, we just open the menu.)
+
+        Interactive CLI uses the prompt_toolkit modal; non-interactive contexts
+        (TUI slash-worker / no live app) render text + the portal deep-link, never
+        prompting (the URL is the affordance), same discipline as ``_show_credits``.
+        All money is Decimal end-to-end; the terminal never collects card details.
+        """
+        from agent.billing_view import build_billing_state
+
+        state = build_billing_state()
+        if not state.logged_in:
+            print()
+            if state.error:
+                _msg = f"Couldn't load billing: {state.error}"
+                _cprint(f"  💳 {_d(_msg)}")
+            else:
+                _cprint(f"  💳 {_d('Not logged into Nous Portal.')}")
+                print("  Run `hermes portal` to log in, then /billing.")
+            return
+
+        # Any sub-arg is intentionally ignored — always open the menu.
+        self._billing_overview(state)
+
+    def _billing_portal_hint(self, state, *, reason: str = "") -> None:
+        """Print a portal deep-link line (the funnel for portal-only actions)."""
+        url = getattr(state, "portal_url", None)
+        if not url:
+            return
+        if reason:
+            print(f"  {reason}")
+        print(f"  Manage on portal: {url}")
+
+    def _billing_overview(self, state):
+        """Screen 1 — overview: balance, spend bar, role-gated action menu."""
+        from agent.billing_view import format_money
+
+        print()
+        _cprint(f"  💳 {_b('Usage credits')}")
+        print(f"  {'─' * 41}")
+
+        cap = state.monthly_cap
+        if cap is not None and cap.limit_usd is not None:
+            spent = format_money(cap.spent_this_month_usd)
+            limit = format_money(cap.limit_usd)
+            ceiling = " (default ceiling)" if cap.is_default_ceiling else ""
+            bar, pct = self._billing_spend_bar(
+                cap.spent_this_month_usd, cap.limit_usd
+            )
+            print(f"  {spent} of {limit} used{ceiling}   {bar} {pct}%")
+
+        print(f"  Balance: {format_money(state.balance_usd)}")
+
+        ar = state.auto_reload
+        if ar is not None:
+            if ar.enabled:
+                print(
+                    f"  Auto-reload: on — below {format_money(ar.threshold_usd)} "
+                    f"→ reload to {format_money(ar.reload_to_usd)}"
+                )
+            else:
+                print("  Auto-reload: off")
+
+        if state.org_name:
+            role = (state.role or "").title()
+            _org_line = f"Org: {state.org_name}{f' · {role}' if role else ''}"
+            _cprint(f"  {_d(_org_line)}")
+        print(f"  {'─' * 41}")
+
+        # Action gating: admin + kill-switch for charge/auto-reload; everyone gets portal.
+        if not state.is_admin:
+            _cprint(f"  {_d('Billing actions require an org admin/owner.')}")
+            self._billing_portal_hint(state)
+            return
+        if not state.cli_billing_enabled:
+            _cprint(f"  {_d('Terminal billing is turned off for this org.')}")
+            self._billing_portal_hint(state, reason="Enable it on the portal to buy credits here.")
+            return
+
+        # Optimistic funnel: no card on file → a charge will 403 no_payment_method.
+        # Surface that up front (with the portal link) but DON'T hide Buy — /state.card
+        # can't fully prove CLI-chargeability, so we advise rather than gate.
+        if state.card is None:
+            _cprint(
+                f"  {_d('No saved card for terminal charges yet — set one up on the portal first.')}"
+            )
+            self._billing_portal_hint(state)
+
+        # Non-interactive (slash-worker / no live app): no modal, no sub-command
+        # advertising — just the portal funnel (the URL is the affordance).
+        if not getattr(self, "_app", None):
+            self._billing_portal_hint(state)
+            return
+
+        choices = [
+            ("buy", "Buy credits", "purchase a one-time credit top-up"),
+            ("auto", "Adjust auto-reload", "configure automatic top-ups"),
+            ("limit", "Adjust monthly limit", "show the monthly spend cap (read-only)"),
+            ("portal", "Manage on portal", "open the billing page in your browser"),
+            ("cancel", "Cancel", "do nothing"),
+        ]
+        # The overview summary is already printed above; the modal only needs to
+        # present the action menu — repeating the title/balance reads as a dupe.
+        raw = self._prompt_text_input_modal(
+            title="💳 Choose an action", detail="",
+            choices=choices,
+        )
+        choice = self._normalize_slash_confirm_choice(raw, choices)
+        if choice == "buy":
+            self._billing_buy_flow(state)
+        elif choice == "auto":
+            self._billing_auto_reload_flow(state)
+        elif choice == "limit":
+            self._billing_limit_screen(state)
+        elif choice == "portal":
+            self._billing_open_portal(state)
+        else:
+            print("  🟡 Cancelled.")
+
+    def _billing_spend_bar(self, spent, limit, *, cells: int = 10):
+        """Render a 10-cell `█`/`░` spend bar + integer percent from spent/limit.
+
+        Returns ``(bar, pct)`` where ``bar`` is like ``[████░░░░░░]`` and ``pct``
+        is the spent/limit percentage clamped to 0..100. Box-drawing glyphs are
+        not SGR codes, so this is leak-safe even without ``_b()``/``_d()``.
+        """
+        from decimal import Decimal
+
+        try:
+            s = Decimal(str(spent)) if spent is not None else Decimal("0")
+            l = Decimal(str(limit)) if limit is not None else Decimal("0")
+        except Exception:
+            s, l = Decimal("0"), Decimal("0")
+        if l <= 0:
+            pct = 0
+        else:
+            pct = int((s / l) * 100)
+        pct = max(0, min(100, pct))
+        filled = int(round(pct / 100 * cells))
+        filled = max(0, min(cells, filled))
+        bar = ("█" * filled) + ("░" * (cells - filled))
+        return bar, pct
+
+    def _billing_open_portal(self, state):
+        url = getattr(state, "portal_url", None)
+        if not url:
+            print("  No portal URL available.")
+            return
+        opened = False
+        try:
+            import webbrowser
+
+            opened = webbrowser.open(url)
+        except Exception:
+            opened = False
+        if not opened:
+            print(f"  Open this URL: {url}")
+        print("  Complete billing changes in the browser.")
+
+    def _billing_require_admin(self, state) -> bool:
+        """Guard charge/auto-reload entry points; print + return False if blocked."""
+        if not state.is_admin:
+            print()
+            _cprint(f"  💳 {_d('Billing actions require an org admin/owner.')}")
+            self._billing_portal_hint(state)
+            return False
+        if not state.cli_billing_enabled:
+            print()
+            _cprint(f"  💳 {_d('Terminal billing is turned off for this org.')}")
+            self._billing_portal_hint(state, reason="Enable it on the portal first.")
+            return False
+        return True
+
+    def _billing_buy_flow(self, state):
+        """Screen 2 (preset select) → Screen 3 (confirm + charge + poll)."""
+        from agent.billing_view import format_money, validate_charge_amount
+
+        if not self._billing_require_admin(state):
+            return
+
+        # Screen 3 — preset selection.
+        if not getattr(self, "_app", None):
+            presets = ", ".join(format_money(p) for p in state.charge_presets)
+            print()
+            _cprint(f"  💳 {_b('Buy usage credits')}")
+            print(f"  Presets: {presets}")
+            print("  Run this in the interactive CLI to complete a purchase.")
+            self._billing_portal_hint(state)
+            return
+
+        preset_choices = []
+        for p in state.charge_presets:
+            preset_choices.append((str(p), format_money(p), "one-time credit purchase"))
+        preset_choices.append(("custom", "Custom amount…", "enter your own amount"))
+        preset_choices.append(("cancel", "Cancel", "do nothing"))
+
+        card = state.card
+        detail = f"Payment: {card.masked}" if card else "No saved card on file"
+        raw = self._prompt_text_input_modal(
+            title="💳 Buy usage credits", detail=detail, choices=preset_choices,
+        )
+        choice = self._normalize_slash_confirm_choice(raw, preset_choices)
+        if not choice or choice == "cancel":
+            print("  🟡 Cancelled. No credits added.")
+            return
+
+        from decimal import Decimal
+
+        if choice == "custom":
+            entered = self._prompt_text_input("  Amount (USD): ")
+            if entered is None:
+                # None = cancelled (e.g. slash-worker can't prompt off-thread).
+                print("  🟡 Cancelled. No credits added.")
+                return
+            v = validate_charge_amount(
+                entered or "", min_usd=state.min_usd, max_usd=state.max_usd
+            )
+            if not v.ok:
+                print(f"  🔴 {v.error}")
+                return
+            amount = v.amount
+        else:
+            try:
+                amount = Decimal(choice)
+            except Exception:
+                print("  🔴 Invalid selection.")
+                return
+
+        self._billing_confirm_and_charge(state, amount)
+
+    def _billing_confirm_and_charge(self, state, amount):
+        """Screen 3 — confirm total + consent, charge, then poll to settlement."""
+        from agent.billing_view import format_money, new_idempotency_key
+
+        card = state.card
+        print()
+        _cprint(f"  💳 {_b('Confirm purchase')}")
+        print(f"  {'─' * 41}")
+        print(f"  Total: {format_money(amount)}")
+        if card:
+            print(f"  Payment: {card.masked}")
+        print(f"  {'─' * 41}")
+        _consent = (
+            "By confirming, you allow Nous Research to charge your card."
+        )
+        _cprint(f"  {_d(_consent)}")
+
+        confirm_choices = [
+            ("pay", f"Pay {format_money(amount)} now", "submit the charge"),
+            ("cancel", "Go back", "do not charge"),
+        ]
+        if not getattr(self, "_app", None):
+            print("  Run in the interactive CLI to confirm a purchase.")
+            return
+        raw = self._prompt_text_input_modal(
+            title=f"💳 Pay {format_money(amount)}?",
+            detail=(card.masked if card else "no saved card"),
+            choices=confirm_choices,
+        )
+        choice = self._normalize_slash_confirm_choice(raw, confirm_choices)
+        if choice != "pay":
+            print("  🟡 Cancelled. No credits added.")
+            return
+
+        # Submit the charge with a fresh idempotency key (reused on retry).
+        from hermes_cli.nous_billing import (
+            BillingError,
+            BillingScopeRequired,
+            post_charge,
+        )
+
+        key = new_idempotency_key()
+        try:
+            result = post_charge(amount_usd=amount, idempotency_key=key)
+        except BillingScopeRequired:
+            self._billing_handle_scope_required(state)
+            return
+        except BillingError as exc:
+            self._billing_render_charge_error(state, exc)
+            return
+
+        charge_id = result.get("chargeId")
+        if not charge_id:
+            print("  🔴 No charge id returned; please check the portal.")
+            return
+        _cprint(f"  {_d('Charge submitted — confirming settlement…')}")
+        self._billing_poll_charge(state, charge_id, amount)
+
+    def _billing_poll_charge(self, state, charge_id, amount):
+        """Poll loop: 2s interval, 5-min cap, cancellable. settled = ledger truth."""
+        import time as _time
+
+        from agent.billing_view import format_money
+        from hermes_cli.nous_billing import (
+            BillingError,
+            BillingRateLimited,
+            get_charge_status,
+        )
+
+        deadline = _time.time() + 300  # 5-minute cap
+        interval = 2.0
+        while _time.time() < deadline:
+            try:
+                status = get_charge_status(charge_id)
+            except BillingRateLimited as exc:
+                # Retry-after, NOT a failure — back off and keep polling.
+                wait = exc.retry_after or 5
+                _time.sleep(min(wait, 30))
+                continue
+            except BillingError as exc:
+                print(f"  🔴 Could not check the charge: {exc}")
+                return
+
+            state_str = status.get("status")
+            if state_str == "settled":
+                amt = status.get("amountUsd")
+                from agent.billing_view import parse_money
+
+                shown = format_money(parse_money(amt)) if amt else format_money(amount)
+                print(f"  ✅ {shown} in credits added.")
+                return
+            if state_str == "failed":
+                self._billing_render_charge_failed(state, status.get("reason"))
+                return
+            # pending → wait and poll again
+            _time.sleep(interval)
+
+        # Past the cap with no terminal state = timeout (not an error).
+        print(f"  🟡 Still processing after 5 minutes — this is a timeout, not a "
+              f"failure. Check /billing or the portal shortly.")
+        self._billing_portal_hint(state)
+
+    def _billing_render_charge_failed(self, state, reason):
+        """Branch the poll `failed` reasons to the right copy + portal funnel."""
+        reason = (reason or "").strip()
+        if reason == "authentication_required":
+            print("  🔴 Your bank requires verification (3DS). Complete it on the "
+                  "portal to finish this purchase.")
+        elif reason == "payment_method_expired":
+            print("  🔴 Your card has expired. Update it on the portal.")
+        elif reason == "card_declined":
+            print("  🔴 Your card was declined. Try another card on the portal.")
+        else:
+            print(f"  🔴 The charge didn't go through ({reason or 'processing_error'}).")
+        self._billing_portal_hint(state)
+
+    def _billing_render_charge_error(self, state, exc):
+        """Render a typed BillingError at submit time (pre-poll)."""
+        from hermes_cli.nous_billing import BillingRateLimited
+
+        code = getattr(exc, "error", None)
+        portal_url = getattr(exc, "portal_url", None) or getattr(state, "portal_url", None)
+        if code == "no_payment_method":
+            print("  💳 No saved card for terminal charges yet. Set one up on the "
+                  "portal (one-time credit buys don't save a reusable card).")
+        elif code == "cli_billing_disabled":
+            print("  🔴 Terminal billing is turned off for this org — an admin must enable it on the portal.")
+        elif code == "monthly_cap_exceeded":
+            remaining = (getattr(exc, "payload", {}) or {}).get("remainingUsd")
+            if remaining is not None:
+                print(f"  🔴 Monthly spend cap reached — ${remaining} headroom left.")
+            else:
+                print("  🔴 Monthly spend cap reached.")
+        elif isinstance(exc, BillingRateLimited):
+            wait = getattr(exc, "retry_after", None)
+            mins = f" (try again in ~{max(1, round(wait / 60))} min)" if wait else ""
+            print(f"  🟡 Too many charges right now{mins}. This isn't a payment failure.")
+        else:
+            print(f"  🔴 {exc}")
+        if portal_url:
+            print(f"  Portal: {portal_url}")
+
+    def _billing_handle_scope_required(self, state):
+        """403 insufficient_scope → lazy step-up re-auth (plan D-A)."""
+        print()
+        print("  💳 Terminal billing needs an extra permission (billing:manage).")
+        _scope_msg = (
+            "An org admin/owner must tick \"Allow terminal billing\" during "
+            "login."
+        )
+        _cprint(f"  {_d(_scope_msg)}")
+        if not getattr(self, "_app", None):
+            print("  Run `hermes portal` and approve terminal billing, then retry.")
+            return
+        confirm_choices = [
+            ("yes", "Re-authorize now", "open the portal to grant billing access"),
+            ("no", "Not now", "cancel"),
+        ]
+        raw = self._prompt_text_input_modal(
+            title="💳 Grant terminal billing access?",
+            detail="Opens the portal device-authorization page.",
+            choices=confirm_choices,
+        )
+        choice = self._normalize_slash_confirm_choice(raw, confirm_choices)
+        if choice != "yes":
+            print("  🟡 Cancelled.")
+            return
+        try:
+            from hermes_cli.auth import step_up_nous_billing_scope
+
+            granted = step_up_nous_billing_scope(open_browser=True)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            print(f"  🔴 Re-authorization failed: {exc}")
+            return
+        if granted:
+            print("  ✅ Billing permission granted.")
+            # Step-up only grants the billing:manage TOKEN scope; the ORG
+            # kill-switch (cli_billing_enabled) is a separate gate. Re-fetch
+            # /state so we don't over-promise when a charge would still hit
+            # cli_billing_disabled.
+            from agent.billing_view import build_billing_state
+
+            fresh = build_billing_state()
+            if fresh.logged_in and fresh.cli_billing_enabled:
+                print("  Run /billing buy again to continue.")
+            else:
+                print("  🟡 Permission granted, but terminal billing is still turned "
+                      "off for this org. Enable it in the portal, then run /billing again.")
+                self._billing_portal_hint(fresh)
+        else:
+            print("  🟡 Terminal billing was not granted (an admin must tick the box).")
+
+    def _billing_auto_reload_flow(self, state):
+        """Screen 4 — auto-reload config: threshold + reload-to → PATCH.
+
+        Prefills the current values from ``state.auto_reload``. Validates both
+        amounts (2dp, within bounds, ``reload_to > threshold``). When auto-reload
+        is already on, offers a "Turn off" path (PATCH ``enabled:false``).
+        """
+        from agent.billing_view import format_money, validate_charge_amount
+
+        if not self._billing_require_admin(state):
+            return
+
+        card = state.card
+        ar = state.auto_reload
+        currently_on = bool(ar and ar.enabled)
+
+        print()
+        _cprint(f"  💳 {_b('Auto-reload')}")
+        print(f"  {'─' * 41}")
+        _cprint(f"  {_d('Automatically buy more credits when your balance is low.')}")
+        if card:
+            print(f"  Card on file: {card.masked}")
+        else:
+            print("  No saved card — set one up on the portal first.")
+            self._billing_portal_hint(state)
+            return
+        if currently_on:
+            print(
+                f"  Currently: below {format_money(ar.threshold_usd)} → "
+                f"reload to {format_money(ar.reload_to_usd)}"
+            )
+
+        if not getattr(self, "_app", None):
+            print("  Run in the interactive CLI to configure auto-reload.")
+            self._billing_portal_hint(state)
+            return
+
+        # When already enabled, let the user turn it off without re-entering values.
+        if currently_on:
+            top_choices = [
+                ("edit", "Edit thresholds", "change when / how much to reload"),
+                ("off", "Turn off", "disable auto-reload"),
+                ("cancel", "Cancel", "do nothing"),
+            ]
+            raw = self._prompt_text_input_modal(
+                title="💳 Auto-reload",
+                detail=(
+                    f"On — below {format_money(ar.threshold_usd)} → "
+                    f"reload to {format_money(ar.reload_to_usd)}"
+                ),
+                choices=top_choices,
+            )
+            top = self._normalize_slash_confirm_choice(raw, top_choices)
+            if top == "off":
+                self._billing_auto_reload_disable(state)
+                return
+            if top != "edit":
+                print("  🟡 Cancelled.")
+                return
+
+        # Field 1 — threshold (prefilled when editing an existing config).
+        cur_thr = format_money(ar.threshold_usd) if currently_on else None
+        thr_prompt = "  When balance falls below (USD)"
+        thr_prompt += f" [{cur_thr}]: " if cur_thr else ": "
+        threshold_raw = self._prompt_text_input(thr_prompt)
+        if threshold_raw is None:
+            # None = cancelled (e.g. slash-worker can't prompt off-thread).
+            print("  🟡 Cancelled.")
+            return
+        if not (threshold_raw or "").strip() and currently_on:
+            threshold_amt = ar.threshold_usd  # keep current value on empty input
+        else:
+            tv = validate_charge_amount(
+                threshold_raw or "", min_usd=state.min_usd, max_usd=state.max_usd
+            )
+            if not tv.ok or tv.amount is None:
+                print(f"  🔴 {tv.error}")
+                return
+            threshold_amt = tv.amount
+
+        # Field 2 — reload-to (prefilled when editing an existing config).
+        cur_rel = format_money(ar.reload_to_usd) if currently_on else None
+        rel_prompt = "  Reload balance to (USD)"
+        rel_prompt += f" [{cur_rel}]: " if cur_rel else ": "
+        reload_raw = self._prompt_text_input(rel_prompt)
+        if reload_raw is None:
+            print("  🟡 Cancelled.")
+            return
+        if not (reload_raw or "").strip() and currently_on:
+            reload_amt = ar.reload_to_usd  # keep current value on empty input
+        else:
+            rv = validate_charge_amount(
+                reload_raw or "", min_usd=state.min_usd, max_usd=state.max_usd
+            )
+            if not rv.ok or rv.amount is None:
+                print(f"  🔴 {rv.error}")
+                return
+            reload_amt = rv.amount
+
+        if reload_amt is None or threshold_amt is None or reload_amt <= threshold_amt:
+            print("  🔴 Reload-to amount must be greater than the threshold.")
+            return
+
+        print()
+        _ar_consent = (
+            f"By confirming, you authorize Nous Research to charge {card.masked} "
+            f"whenever your balance reaches {format_money(threshold_amt)}. "
+            f"Turn off any time here or on the portal."
+        )
+        _cprint(f"  {_d(_ar_consent)}")
+        confirm_choices = [
+            ("agree", "Agree and turn on", "enable auto-reload"),
+            ("cancel", "Cancel", "do nothing"),
+        ]
+        raw = self._prompt_text_input_modal(
+            title="💳 Turn on auto-reload?",
+            detail=f"Below {format_money(threshold_amt)} → reload to {format_money(reload_amt)}",
+            choices=confirm_choices,
+        )
+        choice = self._normalize_slash_confirm_choice(raw, confirm_choices)
+        if choice != "agree":
+            print("  🟡 Cancelled.")
+            return
+
+        from hermes_cli.nous_billing import (
+            BillingError,
+            BillingScopeRequired,
+            patch_auto_top_up,
+        )
+
+        try:
+            patch_auto_top_up(
+                enabled=True, threshold=float(threshold_amt), top_up_amount=float(reload_amt)
+            )
+        except BillingScopeRequired:
+            self._billing_handle_scope_required(state)
+            return
+        except BillingError as exc:
+            self._billing_render_charge_error(state, exc)
+            return
+        print(f"  ✅ Auto-reload on: below {format_money(threshold_amt)} → "
+              f"reload to {format_money(reload_amt)}.")
+
+    def _billing_auto_reload_disable(self, state):
+        """Turn off auto-reload (PATCH ``enabled:false``).
+
+        The endpoint requires ``threshold``/``topUpAmount`` in the body even when
+        disabling, so we echo back the current values (falling back to 0).
+        """
+        from hermes_cli.nous_billing import (
+            BillingError,
+            BillingScopeRequired,
+            patch_auto_top_up,
+        )
+
+        ar = state.auto_reload
+        thr = float(ar.threshold_usd) if ar and ar.threshold_usd is not None else 0.0
+        rel = float(ar.reload_to_usd) if ar and ar.reload_to_usd is not None else 0.0
+        try:
+            patch_auto_top_up(enabled=False, threshold=thr, top_up_amount=rel)
+        except BillingScopeRequired:
+            self._billing_handle_scope_required(state)
+            return
+        except BillingError as exc:
+            self._billing_render_charge_error(state, exc)
+            return
+        print("  ✅ Auto-reload turned off.")
+
+    def _billing_limit_screen(self, state):
+        """Screen 5 — monthly spend limit (read-only; cap is portal-only)."""
+        from agent.billing_view import format_money
+
+        print()
+        _cprint(f"  💳 {_b('Monthly spend limit')}")
+        print(f"  {'─' * 41}")
+        cap = state.monthly_cap
+        if cap is None or cap.limit_usd is None:
+            _cprint(f"  {_d('No monthly cap visible (managed on the portal).')}")
+        else:
+            spent = format_money(cap.spent_this_month_usd)
+            limit = format_money(cap.limit_usd)
+            ceiling = " (default ceiling)" if cap.is_default_ceiling else ""
+            print(f"  {spent} of {limit} used this month{ceiling}")
+        _limit_note = (
+            "The monthly limit is set on the portal — the terminal shows "
+            "it read-only."
+        )
+        _cprint(f"  {_d(_limit_note)}")
+        self._billing_portal_hint(state)
+
     def _show_insights(self, command: str = "/insights"):
         """Show usage insights and analytics from session history."""
         # Parse optional --days flag

docker/stage2-hook.sh

@@ -28,14 +28,13 @@ as_hermes() { [ "$(id -u)" = 0 ] || { "$@"; return; }; s6-setuidgid hermes "$@";
 # arbitrary host UID (the classic `--user $(id -u):$(id -g)` invocation people
 # used in the tini era to make container-written files match their host user).
 #
-# Under s6-overlay this no longer works: the bootstrap (UID remap, volume +
-# build-tree chown, config seeding) all require root, and they're skipped when
-# the container starts non-root. The baked image trees (/opt/data, /opt/hermes/
-# .venv, ui-tui, node_modules) stay owned by the hermes build UID (10000), so an
-# arbitrary `--user` UID can't write them — the runtime then fails with EACCES
-# on a bind mount, or hard-crashes on a named volume (Docker initialises the
-# volume from the image as UID 10000, and the non-root start can't even `cd`
-# into $HERMES_HOME). See #34837 for the supervision-tree side of this.
+# Under s6-overlay this no longer works: the bootstrap (UID remap, data-volume
+# ownership, config seeding) requires root, and it is skipped when the container
+# starts non-root. The baked install tree under /opt/hermes is intentionally
+# root-owned and non-writable; mutable runtime state must live under
+# $HERMES_HOME. An arbitrary `--user` UID therefore cannot repair or populate
+# the data volume, and startup fails with EACCES. See #34837 for the
+# supervision-tree side of this.
 #
 # The supported way to match host-side ownership is to start as root (the image
 # default) and pass HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID — or the PUID/PGID aliases — which the
@@ -53,9 +52,10 @@ if [ "$cur_uid" != 0 ] && [ "$cur_uid" != "$(id -u hermes)" ]; then
 [stage2] ERROR: container started with --user $cur_uid (an arbitrary, non-hermes UID).
 
 This is not supported under the s6-overlay image. The container bootstrap
-(UID remap, volume ownership, dependency installs) needs to start as root,
-and the baked image directories are owned by the hermes user (UID $(id -u hermes)),
-so a pinned --user UID cannot write them — startup will fail.
+(UID remap, data-volume ownership, config seeding) needs to start as root,
+and the baked /opt/hermes install tree is intentionally root-owned and
+non-writable, so a pinned --user UID cannot repair startup state — startup
+will fail.
 
 To make container-written files match your HOST user, DON'T use --user.
 Start the container as root (the default) and pass your host UID/GID instead:
@@ -207,49 +207,13 @@ if [ "$needs_chown" = true ]; then
     done
 fi
 
-# --- Fix ownership of build trees under $INSTALL_DIR ---
-# Hermes-owned trees under $INSTALL_DIR must be re-chowned whenever the
-# runtime hermes UID no longer owns them — otherwise:
-#   - .venv: lazy_deps.py cannot install platform packages (discord.py,
-#     telegram, slack, etc.) with EACCES (#15012, #21100)
-#   - ui-tui: esbuild rebuilds dist/entry.js on every TUI launch (when
-#     the source mtime is newer than dist/ or when HERMES_TUI_FORCE_BUILD
-#     is set) and writes to ui-tui/dist/. Without this chown the new
-#     hermes UID can't write the build output (#28851).
-#   - gateway: Python writes __pycache__ and runtime artifacts beneath the
-#     gateway package on first import. After a UID remap those source-owned
-#     paths still belong to the build-time UID (10000) unless repaired here,
-#     producing EACCES for the supervised gateway (#27221).
-#   - node_modules: root-level dependencies (puppeteer, web tooling)
-#     that runtime code may walk/update.
-# The set mirrors the build-time `chown -R hermes:hermes` line in the
-# Dockerfile — keep them in sync if the Dockerfile chown set changes.
-# These are under $INSTALL_DIR (not $HERMES_HOME), so the bind-mount
-# concern doesn't apply — recursive is fine.
-#
-# This MUST be gated independently of the $HERMES_HOME ownership check
-# above. `usermod -u <new> hermes` re-chowns the hermes home dir
-# ($HERMES_HOME == /opt/data) to the new UID as a side effect, so after a
-# HERMES_UID/PUID remap `stat $HERMES_HOME` always already matches the new
-# UID and `needs_chown` is false — but the build trees under /opt/hermes
-# are NOT touched by usermod and remain owned by the build-time UID
-# (10000). Gating them on $HERMES_HOME ownership (as #35027 did) silently
-# skipped this chown on the common PUID/NAS path, regressing lazy installs
-# and TUI rebuilds. Probe the build trees directly instead: chown only
-# when the venv is not already owned by the runtime hermes UID. Idempotent
-# and skips the expensive recursive chown on every restart once ownership
-# is settled.
-venv_owner=$(stat -c %u "$INSTALL_DIR/.venv" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-if [ -n "$venv_owner" ] && [ "$venv_owner" != "$actual_hermes_uid" ]; then
-    echo "[stage2] Fixing ownership of build trees under $INSTALL_DIR to hermes ($actual_hermes_uid)"
-    chown -R hermes:hermes \
-        "$INSTALL_DIR/.venv" \
-        "$INSTALL_DIR/ui-tui" \
-        "$INSTALL_DIR/gateway" \
-        "$INSTALL_DIR/node_modules" \
-        2>/dev/null || \
-        echo "[stage2] Warning: chown of build trees failed (rootless container?) — continuing"
-fi
+# --- Immutable install tree ---
+# Do not chown runtime code or dependency trees under $INSTALL_DIR back to the
+# hermes user. Hosted/container instances keep mutable state under
+# $HERMES_HOME (/opt/data) and run with PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE plus
+# HERMES_DISABLE_LAZY_INSTALLS=1. Keeping /opt/hermes root-owned and
+# non-writable prevents an agent session from self-modifying the installed
+# source, venv, TUI bundle, or node_modules and bricking the gateway.
 
 # Always reset ownership of $HERMES_HOME/profiles to hermes on every
 # boot. Profile dirs and files can land owned by root when commands
@@ -327,13 +291,25 @@ as_hermes mkdir -p \
     "$HERMES_HOME/pairing" \
     "$HERMES_HOME/platforms/pairing"
 
-# --- Install-method stamp (read by detect_install_method() in hermes status) ---
-# Preserved from the tini-era entrypoint (PR #27843). Must be written as
-# the hermes user so ownership matches the file's documented owner.
-# tee is invoked directly via s6-setuidgid (no `sh -c` wrapper) for the
-# same shell-metacharacter safety described above.
-printf 'docker\n' | as_hermes tee "$HERMES_HOME/.install_method" >/dev/null \
-    || true
+# --- Install-method stamp ---
+# The 'docker' stamp is baked into the immutable install tree at
+# /opt/hermes/.install_method (see Dockerfile), NOT written here into
+# $HERMES_HOME. detect_install_method() reads the code-scoped stamp first.
+#
+# Why we no longer stamp $HERMES_HOME: it is a shared DATA volume, commonly
+# bind-mounted from the host (~/.hermes:/opt/data) and sometimes shared with a
+# host-side Desktop/CLI install. Stamping 'docker' here clobbered that host
+# install's marker, so its in-app updater read 'docker' and refused to run
+# 'hermes update'. To heal homes already poisoned by older images, remove a
+# stale 'docker' stamp from $HERMES_HOME if one is present (the host install's
+# own installer re-creates its code-scoped stamp; a genuine container relies on
+# the baked /opt/hermes stamp, so deleting the data-dir copy is safe).
+if [ -f "$HERMES_HOME/.install_method" ]; then
+    stamped="$(tr -d '[:space:]' < "$HERMES_HOME/.install_method" 2>/dev/null || true)"
+    if [ "$stamped" = "docker" ]; then
+        rm -f "$HERMES_HOME/.install_method" 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+fi
 
 # --- Seed config files (only on first boot) ---
 seed_one() {

docs/relay-connector-contract.md

@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+# Relay ↔ Connector Contract (v1, EXPERIMENTAL)
+
+> **Status:** EXPERIMENTAL. This contract MAY CHANGE without a deprecation
+> cycle until at least two real Class-1 platforms (Discord + Telegram) have
+> validated it. Evolution during the experimental phase is **additive-only**,
+> gated by `contract_version`. A breaking change updates both repos in lockstep.
+
+This document is the formal interface between the **Hermes gateway** (Python,
+`gateway/relay/`) and the **connector** (Node/TypeScript,
+`NousResearch/gateway-gateway`). The connector implementer's first action is to
+read this file.
+
+The gateway runs a generic `RelayAdapter` that dials **out** to the connector,
+receives a `CapabilityDescriptor` at handshake, then exchanges normalized
+`MessageEvent`s (inbound) and actions (outbound) over a per-turn bidirectional
+WebSocket. The gateway never learns which concrete platform is fronting it; the
+connector owns all platform-specific socket/identity logic.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Handshake
+
+1. Gateway opens the transport (`connect`).
+2. Gateway calls `handshake()`; connector returns a `CapabilityDescriptor`
+   (section 2) describing the platform this adapter instance fronts.
+3. Gateway configures the adapter from the descriptor (char limit, length unit,
+   draft/edit/thread/markdown capabilities) and registers an inbound handler.
+4. Connector then streams inbound events and accepts outbound actions.
+
+`contract_version` (currently `1`) is carried in the descriptor. The gateway
+ignores unknown descriptor fields (forward-compat) and fills missing optional
+fields from defaults.
+
+---
+
+## 2. CapabilityDescriptor (handshake payload)
+
+JSON object. Source of truth: `gateway/relay/descriptor.py`.
+
+| Field | Type | Required | Meaning |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `contract_version` | int | yes | Contract version (additive-only within a version). |
+| `platform` | string | yes | Platform name (e.g. `"discord"`, `"telegram"`). |
+| `label` | string | yes | Human-readable label. |
+| `max_message_length` | int | yes | Char limit; gateway exposes as `MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH`. 0 → treat as 4096. |
+| `supports_draft_streaming` | bool | yes | Native draft-streaming preview support. |
+| `supports_edit` | bool | yes | Edit-based streaming possible; if false, consumer degrades to one-message-per-segment. |
+| `supports_threads` | bool | yes | `create_handoff_thread` capability. |
+| `markdown_dialect` | string | yes | `"plain"`, `"markdown_v2"`, `"discord"`, … (drives `supports_code_blocks`). |
+| `len_unit` | string | yes | `"chars"` (builtin len) or `"utf16"` (Telegram UTF-16 code units). |
+| `emoji` | string | no | Display emoji (default 🔌). |
+| `platform_hint` | string | no | System-prompt platform hint. |
+| `pii_safe` | bool | no | Redact PII in session descriptions. |
+
+Most fields are a projection of the gateway's existing `PlatformEntry`; the
+runtime-only fields (`len_unit`, `supports_*`, `markdown_dialect`) come from the
+live platform adapter's capability methods.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Inbound: `MessageEvent` envelope
+
+The connector normalizes each platform wire event into a `MessageEvent`
+(`gateway/platforms/base.py`) and delivers it to the gateway. **Inbound is
+delivered over a signed HTTP POST, not the outbound `/relay` WebSocket** (see
+the transport note below). The gateway keys the session via `build_session_key()`
+from the embedded `SessionSource` — so populating the right discriminators is
+the single highest-correctness responsibility of the connector.
+
+### Inbound transport (signed HTTP POST, not the outbound WS)
+
+The gateway dials **out** to the connector's `/relay` WebSocket for the
+handshake + outbound actions (§4) + its own `/stop` egress (§5). Inbound,
+however, is delivered the other way: the connector **POSTs** the normalized
+event to the gateway's inbound endpoint (`HttpGatewayDelivery` on the connector;
+`gateway/relay/inbound_receiver.py` on the gateway). The reason is
+multi-instance: the connector instance that owns a platform's socket (and thus
+produces inbound events) is generally **not** the instance a given gateway
+dialed its outbound WS into, so inbound must target a tenant **endpoint** (which
+may load-balance across gateway instances) rather than ride one gateway's
+outbound socket. Each delivery is HMAC-signed with the per-tenant **delivery
+key** (§6.1); the gateway verifies the signature over the exact raw bytes before
+accepting the event. Two POST targets:
+
+- `POST {gatewayEndpoint}`            → `{"type":"message", "event": <MessageEvent>}`
+- `POST {gatewayEndpoint}/interrupt`  → `{"type":"interrupt", "session_key", "reason"?}` (§5)
+
+> An earlier draft of this contract delivered inbound over the WS `inbound`
+> frame. That only works single-instance and predates the multi-instance
+> socket-ownership + channel-auth model; the signed-HTTP path above is the
+> shipped design.
+
+### SessionSource fields (the wire surface)
+
+Source of truth: `SessionSource.to_dict()` in `gateway/session.py`. These are
+every key the gateway accepts on the wire. `platform`, `chat_id`, `chat_type`,
+`user_id`, `user_name`, `thread_id`, `chat_name`, and `chat_topic` are always
+present (may be `null`); the rest are included only when set.
+
+| Field | Type | Always sent | Meaning |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `platform` | string | yes | Platform name (matches the descriptor's `platform`). |
+| `chat_id` | string | yes | Primary conversation id (channel/chat). Session-key discriminator. |
+| `chat_type` | string | yes | `dm` / `group` / `channel` / `thread` / `forum`. |
+| `chat_name` | string\|null | yes | Human-readable chat name. |
+| `user_id` | string\|null | yes | Message author id. Session-key discriminator. |
+| `user_name` | string\|null | yes | Author display name. |
+| `thread_id` | string\|null | yes | Thread/forum-topic id when in a thread. Session-key discriminator. |
+| `chat_topic` | string\|null | yes | Channel topic/description (Discord, Slack). |
+| `user_id_alt` | string | no | Platform-specific stable alt id (Signal UUID, Feishu union_id). |
+| `chat_id_alt` | string | no | Alternate chat id (e.g. Signal group internal id). |
+| `guild_id` | string | no | Discord guild / Slack workspace / Matrix server scope. **REQUIRED for Discord server isolation.** Session-key discriminator. |
+| `parent_chat_id` | string | no | Parent channel when `chat_id` refers to a thread. |
+| `message_id` | string | no | Id of the triggering message (for pin/reply/react). |
+
+> `is_bot` (author-is-a-bot/webhook classification) exists on the gateway-side
+> dataclass but is **intentionally NOT on the wire** in v1 — it is not part of
+> `to_dict()`. Do not add it to the connector's `SessionSource` until it is
+> first added here and to `to_dict()` (additive bump).
+
+### SessionSource discriminators per platform
+
+| Platform | chat_id | chat_type | user_id | thread_id | guild_id |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| **Discord** | channel id | `dm`/`group`/`thread` | author id | thread channel id (threads) | **guild id** (REQUIRED for server isolation) |
+| **Telegram** | chat id | `dm`/`group`/`forum` | from id | forum topic id (forums) | — |
+
+**Get Discord's `guild_id` wrong and two servers collide into one session.**
+This is the #1 High-severity risk. The gateway's `build_session_key()` is the
+conformance oracle: for a given `SessionSource`, the connector's normalization
+must produce the same key the Python adapter would. (The Phase-1 stub tests
+assert known-input → known-key.)
+
+### Bot identity vs tenant (single-bot consolidation, Appendix A)
+
+The envelope carries the **originating bot identity** as a field **distinct from
+tenant**. Tenant is resolved from the event's own discriminator (Discord
+`guild_id`, Telegram `chat_id`, webhook path/subdomain) — **never** from which
+token/socket/process delivered it. This keeps one shared bot able to front many
+tenants (Phase 6) without overloading an existing field.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Outbound: action set
+
+The gateway calls the transport with action dicts. Source of truth:
+`gateway/relay/transport.py` + `gateway/relay/adapter.py`.
+
+| `op` | Fields | Result |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `send` | `chat_id`, `content`, `reply_to?`, `metadata?` | `{success: bool, message_id?, error?}` |
+| `edit` | `chat_id`, `message_id`, `content`, `metadata?` | `{success: bool, error?}` |
+| `typing` | `chat_id` | `{success: bool}` |
+| `follow_up` | `session_key`, `kind`, `content`, `metadata?` | `{success: bool, message_id?, error?}` |
+
+`get_chat_info(chat_id)` is a separate proxied call returning at least
+`{name, type}`. Media actions follow the same envelope shape (deferred to a
+later contract revision; additive).
+
+**`follow_up` (A2 capability action).** Some inbound payloads carry a credential
+that acts on the **shared** bot identity (e.g. a Discord interaction follow-up
+token). Per §6 the connector strips that at the edge and binds it in its
+capability vault keyed by the session; it **never reaches the gateway**. To use
+it, the gateway issues `follow_up` naming the **session it is already in**
+(`session_key`) plus the capability `kind` (e.g. `discord.interaction_token`) —
+**never a token**. The connector resolves the real value from its vault,
+enforces the tenant match (tenant B can never wield tenant A's capability), and
+egresses. `success: false` when the capability is absent/expired or the tenant
+doesn't match — the gateway has nothing to retry with, by design (a leaked
+gateway holds zero capability material). Source of truth:
+`gateway/relay/transport.py` (`send_follow_up`) + `gateway/relay/adapter.py`.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Interrupt (`/stop`) routing
+
+- **Gateway → connector:** `send_interrupt(session_key, reason?)` egresses a
+  mid-turn `/stop` over the outbound WS. The connector MUST forward it to the
+  gateway instance running that `session_key` (the routing invariant).
+- **Connector → gateway:** an inbound interrupt for a `session_key` is delivered
+  as a **signed HTTP POST** to `{gatewayEndpoint}/interrupt` (§3 transport note),
+  and bridged by the adapter's `on_interrupt(session_key, chat_id)` into the
+  existing per-session interrupt mechanism, cancelling exactly that turn
+  (siblings untouched).
+
+The gateway→connector `/stop` rides the outbound WS; the connector→gateway
+interrupt rides the same signed-HTTP inbound path as a normalized event.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Trust boundary & signed-body handling (A2)
+
+**The connector is the sole crypto/identity boundary. The gateway re-validates
+nothing.**
+
+Webhook signatures (Discord ed25519, Twilio HMAC, WeCom BizMsgCrypt) are
+computed over exact raw bytes, and some payloads are *encrypted* with a shared
+secret. The connector fronts a **shared** bot for many tenants and holds every
+tenant's platform secrets, so it:
+
+- **verifies / decrypts at the edge** (the only place the secrets live),
+- **normalizes** the payload into a tenant-scoped `MessageEvent` (§3),
+- **strips any shared-identity capability** out of the payload and binds it in
+  its capability vault, keyed by the session (see §4 `follow_up`),
+- **forwards only the sanitized `MessageEvent`** — never the raw signed body.
+
+The gateway therefore performs **no** platform signature/crypto verification on
+the relay path; it trusts the normalized event. This is an enforced invariant on
+the gateway side (`tests/gateway/relay/test_relay_sheds_crypto.py`: the relay
+package imports/calls no platform-crypto).
+
+**Why not "forward the signed body byte-for-byte so the gateway re-validates"?**
+That earlier model is incoherent under an untrusted, disposable tenant gateway:
+
+- Re-validating Twilio HMAC / WeCom crypto would require handing the gateway the
+  **shared signing secret** — which is itself the leak, and on a shared bot it's
+  a *cross-tenant* leak.
+- WeCom payloads are encrypted with the shared secret; the connector must decrypt
+  at the edge just to route, so forwarding ciphertext would again require giving
+  the gateway the secret.
+- A Discord interaction token lives **inside** the signed JSON body — you cannot
+  both preserve the bytes and strip the credential; they are the same bytes.
+
+So byte-preservation is abandoned deliberately: the connector re-serializes the
+sanitized event and the gateway trusts it. This also unifies the passthrough and
+relay planes — both are "verify at the edge → emit a normalized event," differing
+only in transport. See `docs/capability-trust-boundary.md` (connector repo:
+`gateway-gateway`) for the full A2 rationale and the connector-side vault.
+
+### 6.1 Channel authentication (the connector⇄gateway link itself)
+
+A2 makes the connector the sole holder of platform secrets while the gateway may
+be **customer-managed and internet-exposed**, so the connector⇄gateway channel
+is itself authenticated. The gateway holds two enrollment-issued credentials
+(`hermes gateway enroll` → connector `/relay/enroll`): a **per-gateway secret**
+and a **per-tenant delivery key**. Both are HMAC-SHA256 schemes with a
+multi-secret rotation verify list (gateway side: `gateway/relay/auth.py`;
+connector side: `src/core/relayAuthToken.ts` + `src/core/deliverySigning.ts`).
+
+| Leg | Credential | Mechanism |
+|-----|-----------|-----------|
+| Gateway → connector WS upgrade | per-gateway secret | An `Authorization` bearer header on the `/relay` upgrade. The token is `base64url(payload:exp:sig)` where `payload = gatewayId` and `sig = HMAC(payload:exp, secret)`. Connector verifies and rejects the upgrade (**close 4401**) on mismatch/absence/revocation. The authenticated tenant comes from the connector's store, never the `hello` frame. |
+| Connector → gateway inbound POST | per-tenant delivery key | Two headers: `x-relay-timestamp` (unix seconds) and `x-relay-signature` (hex `HMAC(ts.rawBody, deliveryKey)`). Gateway verifies over the **exact raw bytes** within a ±300s replay window before accepting the event; rejects **401** otherwise. |
+
+This is the **channel** authenticator — distinct from platform crypto, which the
+relay path still sheds entirely (§6). The gateway holds zero platform secrets;
+these two keys authenticate only the connector link. Full threat model +
+enrollment/rotation/kill-switch design: `docs/connector-gateway-auth-design.md`
+(connector repo).
+
+---
+
+## 7. Versioning policy
+
+- `contract_version` is an int; bump **only** for additive changes during the
+  experimental phase (new optional fields, new `op`s).
+- A breaking change (renamed/removed field, changed semantics) requires a
+  coordinated update of both repos and a version bump.
+- The connector's first PR references the commit SHA of this file it implements
+  against.

gateway/config.py

@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ class Platform(Enum):
     BLUEBUBBLES = "bluebubbles"
     QQBOT = "qqbot"
     YUANBAO = "yuanbao"
+    RELAY = "relay"  # generic relay adapter fronted by the connector (EXPERIMENTAL)
     @classmethod
     def _missing_(cls, value):
         """Accept unknown platform names only for known plugin adapters.
@@ -492,6 +493,13 @@ _PLATFORM_CONNECTED_CHECKERS: dict[Platform, Callable[[PlatformConfig], bool]] =
         (cfg.extra.get("client_id") or os.getenv("DINGTALK_CLIENT_ID"))
         and (cfg.extra.get("client_secret") or os.getenv("DINGTALK_CLIENT_SECRET"))
     ),
+    # Relay dials OUT to a connector; it is "connected" once an endpoint URL is
+    # configured (extra["relay_url"] or extra["url"]). The capability descriptor
+    # is negotiated at handshake time, so the URL is the only config-level
+    # signal in the experimental phase. EXPERIMENTAL — may change.
+    Platform.RELAY: lambda cfg: bool(
+        cfg.extra.get("relay_url") or cfg.extra.get("url")
+    ),
 }
 
 

gateway/relay/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+"""Relay/connector support package for the Hermes gateway.
+
+EXPERIMENTAL. This package implements the gateway side of the "Gateway Gateway"
+relay design: a generic ``RelayAdapter`` plus the wire-serializable
+``CapabilityDescriptor`` the connector hands it at handshake time, and the
+production ``WebSocketRelayTransport`` that dials the connector. The public API
+(module names, descriptor field set, transport protocol) MAY CHANGE without a
+deprecation cycle until at least two real Class-1 platforms (Discord + Telegram)
+have shaken out the schema.
+
+See ``docs/relay-connector-contract.md`` for the formal cross-repo interface.
+
+Activation is driven by configuration, not a separate feature flag: the relay
+platform is registered when a connector relay URL is configured
+(``GATEWAY_RELAY_URL`` env or ``gateway.relay_url`` in config.yaml). Deployments
+that don't set it are unaffected — exactly the same shape as ``gateway.proxy_url``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from typing import Optional
+
+
+def relay_url() -> Optional[str]:
+    """The connector relay endpoint URL, or None when relay is not configured.
+
+    Checks ``GATEWAY_RELAY_URL`` (convenient for Docker) first, then
+    ``gateway.relay_url`` in config.yaml. A non-empty value activates the relay
+    platform; absence means a normal direct/single-tenant gateway.
+    """
+    url = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_URL", "").strip()
+    if url:
+        return url.rstrip("/")
+    try:
+        from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config  # late import to avoid cycle
+
+        cfg = _load_gateway_config()
+        url = (cfg.get("gateway") or {}).get("relay_url", "").strip()
+        if url:
+            return url.rstrip("/")
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - config absence/parse must never crash registration
+        pass
+    return None
+
+
+def relay_platform_identity() -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Platform + bot id this gateway fronts over the relay (for the handshake hello).
+
+    Defaults to ``("relay", "")``; overridable via ``GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORM`` /
+    ``GATEWAY_RELAY_BOT_ID`` so one connector can front several platforms.
+    """
+    platform = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORM", "relay").strip() or "relay"
+    bot_id = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_BOT_ID", "").strip()
+    return platform, bot_id
+
+
+def relay_connection_auth() -> tuple[Optional[str], Optional[str]]:
+    """The (gateway_id, upgrade_secret) this gateway authenticates the WS upgrade with.
+
+    Both come from enrollment (``hermes gateway enroll`` writes them to
+    ``~/.hermes/.env``): ``GATEWAY_RELAY_ID`` identifies the enrolled instance,
+    ``GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET`` is the per-gateway signing secret. Either absent ->
+    ``(None, None)`` and the transport dials unauthenticated (dev/test, or a
+    connector that doesn't enforce auth). Checks env first (Docker), then
+    ``gateway.relay_id`` / ``gateway.relay_secret`` in config.yaml.
+    """
+    gateway_id = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_ID", "").strip()
+    secret = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET", "").strip()
+    if not (gateway_id and secret):
+        try:
+            from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config  # late import to avoid cycle
+
+            cfg = (_load_gateway_config().get("gateway") or {})
+            gateway_id = gateway_id or str(cfg.get("relay_id", "") or "").strip()
+            secret = secret or str(cfg.get("relay_secret", "") or "").strip()
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - config absence/parse must never crash registration
+            pass
+    return (gateway_id or None, secret or None)
+
+
+def relay_inbound_config() -> tuple[Optional[str], Optional[str], int]:
+    """Resolve (delivery_key, bind_host, bind_port) for the inbound receiver.
+
+    The connector delivers normalized inbound events to this gateway over a
+    SIGNED HTTP POST (not the outbound WS), verified with the per-tenant delivery
+    key issued at enrollment (``GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY``). The receiver only
+    starts when a delivery key AND a bind port are configured — a gateway with no
+    public inbound URL (e.g. a purely outbound dev run) simply doesn't run it.
+
+    Env first (Docker), then ``gateway.relay_delivery_key`` /
+    ``gateway.relay_inbound_host`` / ``gateway.relay_inbound_port`` in config.yaml.
+    Port 0 (default/unset) -> receiver disabled.
+    """
+    key = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY", "").strip()
+    host = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_INBOUND_HOST", "").strip()
+    port_raw = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_INBOUND_PORT", "").strip()
+    if not (key and port_raw):
+        try:
+            from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config  # late import to avoid cycle
+
+            cfg = (_load_gateway_config().get("gateway") or {})
+            key = key or str(cfg.get("relay_delivery_key", "") or "").strip()
+            host = host or str(cfg.get("relay_inbound_host", "") or "").strip()
+            if not port_raw:
+                port_raw = str(cfg.get("relay_inbound_port", "") or "").strip()
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - config absence/parse must never crash registration
+            pass
+    try:
+        port = int(port_raw) if port_raw else 0
+    except ValueError:
+        port = 0
+    return (key or None, host or "0.0.0.0", port)
+
+
+def relay_endpoint() -> Optional[str]:
+    """The gateway's own PUBLIC inbound URL, asserted to the connector at provision.
+
+    The connector delivers signed inbound POSTs to this URL and stores it on the
+    tenant's route rows. It is gateway-asserted (the connector scopes it to the
+    verified tenant, so a dishonest gateway can only misdirect its OWN inbound).
+    The *source* of the value differs by deployment but the code path is uniform:
+    a self-hosted operator sets ``GATEWAY_RELAY_ENDPOINT`` (mirrors how they set
+    ``HERMES_DASHBOARD_PUBLIC_URL``); a hosted/NAS container has the same var
+    stamped in (NAS knows the public URL only in that case). Absent -> the
+    gateway provisions outbound-only (no inbound routes written).
+
+    Env first (Docker), then ``gateway.relay_endpoint`` in config.yaml.
+    """
+    url = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_ENDPOINT", "").strip()
+    if not url:
+        try:
+            from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config  # late import to avoid cycle
+
+            cfg = (_load_gateway_config().get("gateway") or {})
+            url = str(cfg.get("relay_endpoint", "") or "").strip()
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - config absence/parse must never crash boot
+            url = ""
+    return url.rstrip("/") or None
+
+
+def relay_route_keys() -> list[str]:
+    """Discriminators (guild_ids / chat_ids / paths) this gateway's tenant owns.
+
+    Gateway-provided config, paired with ``relay_endpoint()``: the connector
+    writes one route row per (routeKey -> tenant, endpoint), so route keys only
+    take effect alongside an endpoint. Empty -> outbound-only provisioning (the
+    connector accepts an empty set and writes no route rows).
+
+    ``GATEWAY_RELAY_ROUTE_KEYS`` is comma-separated; config.yaml
+    ``gateway.relay_route_keys`` may be a list or a comma string.
+    """
+    raw = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_ROUTE_KEYS", "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        try:
+            from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config  # late import to avoid cycle
+
+            cfg = (_load_gateway_config().get("gateway") or {})
+            val = cfg.get("relay_route_keys", "")
+            if isinstance(val, (list, tuple)):
+                return [str(k).strip() for k in val if str(k).strip()]
+            raw = str(val or "").strip()
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001
+            raw = ""
+    return [k.strip() for k in raw.split(",") if k.strip()]
+
+
+def _provision_url(relay_dial_url: str) -> str:
+    """Map the ``ws(s)://…/relay`` dial URL to the ``http(s)://…/relay/provision`` POST URL."""
+    raw = relay_dial_url.rstrip("/")
+    if raw.startswith("ws://"):
+        raw = "http://" + raw[len("ws://"):]
+    elif raw.startswith("wss://"):
+        raw = "https://" + raw[len("wss://"):]
+    if raw.endswith("/relay"):
+        raw = raw[: -len("/relay")]
+    return f"{raw}/relay/provision"
+
+
+def _post_provision(
+    *,
+    provision_url: str,
+    access_token: str,
+    gateway_id: str,
+    platform: str,
+    bot_id: str,
+    gateway_endpoint: Optional[str],
+    route_keys: list[str],
+    timeout: float = 15.0,
+) -> dict:
+    """POST to the connector's ``/relay/provision`` and return the JSON body.
+
+    The connector validates ``access_token`` against NAS, derives the
+    authoritative tenant, mints the per-gateway secret + per-tenant delivery key,
+    upserts the tenant's route rows, and returns
+    ``{secret, deliveryKey, tenant, gatewayId, routeKeys}``. Raises RuntimeError
+    with a user-facing message on any non-2xx / transport failure.
+    """
+    import json
+    import urllib.error
+    import urllib.request
+
+    body: dict = {
+        "gatewayId": gateway_id,
+        "platform": platform,
+        "botId": bot_id,
+        "gatewayEndpoint": gateway_endpoint or "",
+        "routeKeys": route_keys,
+    }
+    data = json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8")
+    req = urllib.request.Request(
+        provision_url,
+        data=data,
+        method="POST",
+        headers={
+            "Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}",
+            "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+        },
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
+            payload = json.loads(resp.read().decode())
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        detail = ""
+        try:
+            detail = (json.loads(exc.read().decode()) or {}).get("error", "")
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"connector returned HTTP {exc.code}" + (f": {detail}" if detail else "")
+        ) from exc
+    except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"could not reach connector: {exc.reason}") from exc
+
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not payload.get("secret"):
+        raise RuntimeError("connector returned an unexpected response (no secret)")
+    return payload
+
+
+def self_provision_if_managed() -> bool:
+    """Managed-boot self-provision: mint relay creds in-process, no human, no disk.
+
+    Fires only on a MANAGED boot (``is_managed()``) with relay configured
+    (``relay_url()`` set) and NO per-gateway secret already present. In that case
+    the runtime resolves the agent's own Nous access token (the same
+    ``resolve_nous_access_token()`` the enroll CLI / dashboard register use),
+    POSTs ``/relay/provision`` asserting its own endpoint + route keys, and sets
+    ``GATEWAY_RELAY_ID`` / ``GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET`` / ``GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY``
+    into ``os.environ`` so the subsequent ``register_relay_adapter()`` picks them
+    up. The creds live ONLY in process memory — never written to ``~/.hermes/.env``
+    (``save_env_value`` refuses under managed anyway, and keeping the secret off
+    any volume is the stronger posture).
+
+    Stateless: process-env creds don't survive a restart, so a managed container
+    re-provisions every boot; the connector's rotation window covers a still-
+    connected prior instance. An explicitly-pinned ``GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET`` (env
+    or config) is RESPECTED — self-provision skips so an operator pin isn't
+    stomped.
+
+    Returns True if it provisioned, False otherwise. NEVER raises: a provision
+    failure logs and returns False so the gateway still boots (and
+    ``register_relay_adapter`` will simply dial unauthenticated / be rejected,
+    rather than the whole gateway crashing).
+    """
+    import logging
+
+    logger = logging.getLogger("gateway.relay")
+
+    try:
+        from hermes_cli.config import is_managed
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001
+        return False
+
+    if not is_managed():
+        return False
+    dial_url = relay_url()
+    if not dial_url:
+        return False
+
+    # Respect an already-present (pinned/stamped) secret — don't stomp it.
+    existing_id, existing_secret = relay_connection_auth()
+    if existing_id and existing_secret:
+        logger.info("relay self-provision skipped: GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET already set")
+        return False
+
+    try:
+        from hermes_cli.auth import resolve_nous_access_token
+
+        access_token = resolve_nous_access_token()
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - boot must survive a token failure
+        logger.warning("relay self-provision skipped: could not resolve Nous token (%s)", exc)
+        return False
+
+    platform, bot_id = relay_platform_identity()
+    # gatewayId default mirrors the enroll CLI's hostname-based slug.
+    import socket
+
+    try:
+        host = socket.gethostname().strip()
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001
+        host = ""
+    gateway_id = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_ID", "").strip() or f"gw-{host or 'hermes'}"
+    endpoint = relay_endpoint()
+    route_keys = relay_route_keys()
+
+    try:
+        result = _post_provision(
+            provision_url=_provision_url(dial_url),
+            access_token=access_token,
+            gateway_id=gateway_id,
+            platform=platform,
+            bot_id=bot_id,
+            gateway_endpoint=endpoint,
+            route_keys=route_keys,
+        )
+    except RuntimeError as exc:
+        logger.warning("relay self-provision failed (%s); gateway will boot without relay auth", exc)
+        return False
+
+    # Set creds in-process so register_relay_adapter() + relay_inbound_config()
+    # read them from os.environ. Never logged.
+    os.environ["GATEWAY_RELAY_ID"] = str(result.get("gatewayId") or gateway_id)
+    os.environ["GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET"] = str(result.get("secret") or "")
+    os.environ["GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY"] = str(result.get("deliveryKey") or "")
+    tenant = str(result.get("tenant") or "")
+    logger.info(
+        "relay self-provisioned (gateway_id=%s tenant=%s routes=%d inbound=%s)",
+        os.environ["GATEWAY_RELAY_ID"],
+        tenant or "?",
+        len(route_keys),
+        "yes" if endpoint else "outbound-only",
+    )
+    return True
+
+
+def register_relay_adapter(force: bool = False, url: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
+    """Register the generic ``relay`` platform via the platform registry.
+
+    Registers when a relay URL is configured (or ``force=True`` for tests, which
+    builds a transport-less adapter — the unit-test posture). Returns True if
+    registration happened. Additive: uses the same registry path as plugin
+    adapters, so no core dispatch changes are needed.
+
+    When a URL is present the factory builds a live ``WebSocketRelayTransport``;
+    the ``RelayAdapter`` negotiates the real ``CapabilityDescriptor`` at
+    ``connect()`` time via ``transport.handshake()``.
+    """
+    resolved_url = url if url is not None else relay_url()
+    if not (force or resolved_url):
+        return False
+
+    from gateway.platform_registry import PlatformEntry, platform_registry
+    from gateway.relay.adapter import RelayAdapter
+    from gateway.relay.descriptor import CONTRACT_VERSION, CapabilityDescriptor
+
+    platform, bot_id = relay_platform_identity()
+
+    def _factory(config):
+        # Placeholder descriptor; replaced by the negotiated one at connect time
+        # when a transport is present. With no URL (force/test) the adapter is
+        # transport-less and keeps the placeholder.
+        placeholder = CapabilityDescriptor(
+            contract_version=CONTRACT_VERSION,
+            platform=platform,
+            label="Relay",
+            max_message_length=4096,
+            supports_draft_streaming=False,
+            supports_edit=True,
+            supports_threads=False,
+            markdown_dialect="plain",
+            len_unit="chars",
+        )
+        transport = None
+        if resolved_url:
+            from gateway.relay.ws_transport import WebSocketRelayTransport
+
+            gateway_id, upgrade_secret = relay_connection_auth()
+            transport = WebSocketRelayTransport(
+                resolved_url,
+                platform,
+                bot_id,
+                gateway_id=gateway_id,
+                upgrade_secret=upgrade_secret,
+            )
+        return RelayAdapter(config, placeholder, transport=transport)
+
+    platform_registry.register(
+        PlatformEntry(
+            name="relay",
+            label="Relay",
+            adapter_factory=_factory,
+            check_fn=lambda: True,
+            source="builtin",
+            emoji="\U0001f50c",
+        )
+    )
+    return True

gateway/relay/adapter.py

@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+"""RelayAdapter — one generic gateway adapter fronted by the connector. EXPERIMENTAL.
+
+A single ``BasePlatformAdapter`` subclass that, at handshake, receives a
+``CapabilityDescriptor`` from the connector telling it which platform it is
+fronting and which capabilities to advertise to the ``GatewayStreamConsumer``.
+It implements the four abstract methods (``connect`` / ``disconnect`` / ``send``
+/ ``get_chat_info``) plus the capability surface (``MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH``,
+``message_len_fn``, ``supports_draft_streaming``) by delegating wire I/O to an
+injected transport and reading capabilities off the descriptor.
+
+There is NO per-platform gateway code: the connector is the only side that knows
+"this chat_id maps to a Discord channel, send it via the Discord websocket."
+The gateway sees an ordinary ``MessageEvent`` in and calls ``adapter.send`` out.
+
+EXPERIMENTAL: the transport protocol and descriptor schema may change without a
+deprecation cycle until >=2 Class-1 platforms validate them.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, Optional
+
+from gateway.config import Platform, PlatformConfig
+from gateway.platforms.base import BasePlatformAdapter, SendResult
+from gateway.relay.descriptor import CapabilityDescriptor
+from gateway.relay.transport import RelayTransport
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+def _utf16_len(text: str) -> int:
+    """Count UTF-16 code units (Telegram's length unit)."""
+    return len(text.encode("utf-16-le")) // 2
+
+
+# Table-driven length-unit selection from the descriptor's ``len_unit``.
+_LEN_FNS: Dict[str, Callable[[str], int]] = {
+    "chars": len,
+    "utf16": _utf16_len,
+}
+
+
+class RelayAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
+    """Generic relay adapter advertising a connector-negotiated capability profile."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        config: PlatformConfig,
+        descriptor: CapabilityDescriptor,
+        transport: Optional[RelayTransport] = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        # The relay adapter fronts many platforms but presents as a single
+        # logical platform to the runner; Platform.RELAY identifies it.
+        super().__init__(config, Platform.RELAY)
+        self.descriptor = descriptor
+        self._transport = transport
+        # Capability surface read by stream_consumer (getattr(..., 4096)).
+        self.MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH = descriptor.max_message_length
+        self.supports_code_blocks = descriptor.markdown_dialect not in ("", "plain")
+        # Inbound delivery receiver (signed connector→gateway HTTP POSTs). Built
+        # lazily in connect() when a delivery key + bind port are configured; a
+        # purely-outbound dev gateway runs without it. See inbound_receiver.py.
+        self._inbound_runner: Any = None
+
+    # ── capability surface (from descriptor) ─────────────────────────────
+    @property
+    def message_len_fn(self) -> Callable[[str], int]:
+        return _LEN_FNS.get(self.descriptor.len_unit, len)
+
+    def supports_draft_streaming(
+        self,
+        chat_type: Optional[str] = None,
+        metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
+    ) -> bool:
+        return self.descriptor.supports_draft_streaming
+
+    # ── abstract methods (delegated to the transport) ────────────────────
+    async def connect(self) -> bool:
+        if self._transport is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("RelayAdapter has no transport configured")
+        self._transport.set_inbound_handler(self._on_inbound)
+        ok = await self._transport.connect()
+        if not ok:
+            return False
+        # Negotiate the real capability descriptor from the connector and adopt
+        # it — the placeholder passed at construction is replaced by what the
+        # connector advertises for the platform this gateway actually fronts.
+        try:
+            descriptor = await self._transport.handshake()
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - a failed handshake = a failed connect
+            logger.warning("relay handshake failed: %s", exc)
+            return False
+        self._apply_descriptor(descriptor)
+        # Start the signed inbound-delivery receiver if configured (the connector
+        # POSTs normalized events to it over HTTP, verified with the tenant
+        # delivery key). Non-fatal: a receiver bind failure must not fail the
+        # outbound connection — the gateway can still send.
+        await self._maybe_start_inbound_receiver()
+        return True
+
+    async def _maybe_start_inbound_receiver(self) -> None:
+        """Start the inbound HTTP receiver when a delivery key + port are set."""
+        from gateway.relay import relay_inbound_config
+
+        delivery_key, host, port = relay_inbound_config()
+        if not (delivery_key and port):
+            return  # no inbound URL configured -> outbound-only gateway
+        try:
+            from aiohttp import web
+
+            from gateway.relay.inbound_receiver import InboundDeliveryReceiver
+
+            receiver = InboundDeliveryReceiver(
+                delivery_key_verify_list=lambda: [delivery_key],
+                on_message=self._on_inbound,
+                on_interrupt=self.on_interrupt,
+            )
+            runner = web.AppRunner(receiver.build_app(), access_log=None)
+            await runner.setup()
+            site = web.TCPSite(runner, host, port)
+            await site.start()
+            self._inbound_runner = runner
+            logger.info("relay inbound receiver listening on http://%s:%s", host, port)
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - inbound bind failure must not kill outbound
+            logger.warning("relay inbound receiver failed to start: %s", exc)
+            self._inbound_runner = None
+
+    def _apply_descriptor(self, descriptor: CapabilityDescriptor) -> None:
+        """Adopt a (re)negotiated descriptor into the live capability surface."""
+        self.descriptor = descriptor
+        self.MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH = descriptor.max_message_length
+        self.supports_code_blocks = descriptor.markdown_dialect not in ("", "plain")
+
+    async def _on_inbound(self, event) -> None:
+        """Bridge a connector-delivered MessageEvent into the normal adapter path."""
+        await self.handle_message(event)
+
+    async def on_interrupt(self, session_key: str, chat_id: str) -> None:
+        """Bridge a connector-delivered /stop into the adapter's interrupt path.
+
+        The connector forwards a mid-turn interrupt down the socket owned by
+        the gateway instance running ``session_key``; this routes it to the
+        existing per-session interrupt mechanism (sets the
+        ``_active_sessions[session_key]`` Event and clears typing), cancelling
+        the right turn without touching sibling sessions.
+        """
+        await self.interrupt_session_activity(session_key, chat_id)
+
+    async def disconnect(self) -> None:
+        if self._inbound_runner is not None:
+            try:
+                await self._inbound_runner.cleanup()
+            except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - best-effort teardown
+                pass
+            self._inbound_runner = None
+        if self._transport is not None:
+            await self._transport.disconnect()
+
+    async def send(
+        self,
+        chat_id: str,
+        content: str,
+        reply_to: Optional[str] = None,
+        metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
+    ) -> SendResult:
+        if self._transport is None:
+            return SendResult(success=False, error="no transport")
+        result = await self._transport.send_outbound(
+            {
+                "op": "send",
+                "chat_id": chat_id,
+                "content": content,
+                "reply_to": reply_to,
+                "metadata": metadata or {},
+            }
+        )
+        return SendResult(
+            success=bool(result.get("success")),
+            message_id=result.get("message_id"),
+            error=result.get("error"),
+        )
+
+    async def get_chat_info(self, chat_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        # Proxied to the connector (it owns the platform connection / cache).
+        if self._transport is None:
+            return {"name": chat_id, "type": "dm"}
+        return await self._transport.get_chat_info(chat_id)
+
+    async def send_follow_up(
+        self,
+        session_key: str,
+        kind: str,
+        content: str,
+        metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
+    ) -> SendResult:
+        """Send via a shared-identity capability bound to a session (A2 outbound).
+
+        The gateway never holds the credential: it names the session it is
+        already in plus the capability ``kind``, and the connector resolves the
+        real value from its vault and egresses (enforcing the tenant match). Used
+        e.g. to post a Discord interaction follow-up as the shared bot without
+        the token ever reaching the gateway. See RelayTransport.send_follow_up.
+        """
+        if self._transport is None:
+            return SendResult(success=False, error="no transport")
+        result = await self._transport.send_follow_up(
+            {
+                "op": "follow_up",
+                "session_key": session_key,
+                "kind": kind,
+                "content": content,
+                "metadata": metadata or {},
+            }
+        )
+        return SendResult(
+            success=bool(result.get("success")),
+            message_id=result.get("message_id"),
+            error=result.get("error"),
+        )

gateway/relay/auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+"""Gateway-side relay authentication primitives. EXPERIMENTAL.
+
+The connector⇄gateway channel is authenticated because a gateway may be
+customer-managed and internet-exposed (see the connector repo
+``docs/connector-gateway-auth-design.md``). This module is the **gateway half**
+of two HMAC schemes whose wire bytes must match the connector's TypeScript
+exactly:
+
+1. **WS upgrade auth** (gateway → connector): the gateway presents
+   ``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` on the ``/relay`` WebSocket upgrade, where
+   ``token = make_upgrade_token(gateway_id, secret)``. Mirrors the connector's
+   ``relayAuthToken.ts`` ``makeToken`` (``src/core/relayAuthToken.ts``):
+   ``base64url(f"{payload}:{exp}:{sig}")`` with
+   ``sig = HMAC_SHA256(f"{payload}:{exp}", secret).hexdigest()`` and
+   ``payload == gateway_id``.
+
+2. **Inbound delivery signature** (connector → gateway): the connector signs
+   each inbound POST with the per-tenant *delivery key*, carried as
+   ``x-relay-timestamp`` + ``x-relay-signature`` headers; the gateway verifies
+   before accepting the event. Mirrors the connector's ``deliverySigning.ts``:
+   ``sig = HMAC_SHA256(f"{ts}.{body_json}", key).hexdigest()`` over the EXACT
+   request body bytes, with a replay-window skew check.
+
+Both schemes use a **multi-secret verify list** (primary first, then a secondary
+during a rotation window), exactly like ``api/src/handlers/stats_oauth.ts`` — so
+a secret rotation doesn't invalidate outstanding tokens.
+
+EXPERIMENTAL: may change without a deprecation cycle until ≥2 Class-1 platforms
+validate the relay contract.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import time
+from typing import Optional, Sequence
+
+# Header names the connector uses for inbound delivery signatures
+# (connector ``src/core/deliverySigning.ts`` — DELIVERY_TS_HEADER / SIG_HEADER).
+DELIVERY_TS_HEADER = "x-relay-timestamp"
+DELIVERY_SIG_HEADER = "x-relay-signature"
+
+# Default replay window for an inbound delivery signature (connector default).
+_DEFAULT_MAX_SKEW_SECONDS = 300
+# Default TTL for an upgrade token (connector ``makeUpgradeToken`` default).
+_DEFAULT_UPGRADE_TTL_SECONDS = 300
+
+
+def _hmac_hex(payload: str, secret: str) -> str:
+    """HMAC-SHA256 hex digest of ``payload`` under ``secret`` (UTF-8)."""
+    return hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), payload.encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+
+
+def sign(payload: str, secret: str) -> str:
+    """HMAC-SHA256 hex digest — the connector's ``sign`` (relayAuthToken.ts)."""
+    return _hmac_hex(payload, secret)
+
+
+def verify_signature(payload: str, sig_hex: str, secrets: Sequence[str]) -> bool:
+    """Constant-time check that ``sig_hex`` is a valid HMAC of ``payload`` under
+    ANY of ``secrets`` (rotation window). Length-mismatched candidates are
+    skipped without a timing leak. Mirrors ``verifySignature``.
+    """
+    try:
+        sig_buf = bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return False
+    if len(sig_buf) == 0:
+        return False
+    for secret in secrets:
+        if not secret:
+            continue
+        expected = bytes.fromhex(_hmac_hex(payload, secret))
+        if len(expected) != len(sig_buf):
+            continue
+        if hmac.compare_digest(sig_buf, expected):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def make_token(payload: str, secret: str, ttl_seconds: int = 0) -> str:
+    """Build a signed, optionally-expiring token — the connector's ``makeToken``.
+
+    ``base64url(f"{payload}:{exp}:{sig}")`` where ``exp`` is a unix-seconds
+    expiry (0 = never) and ``sig = HMAC_SHA256(f"{payload}:{exp}", secret)``.
+    base64url is unpadded to match Node's ``Buffer.toString("base64url")``.
+    """
+    exp = int(time.time()) + ttl_seconds if ttl_seconds > 0 else 0
+    signed = f"{payload}:{exp}"
+    sig = _hmac_hex(signed, secret)
+    raw = f"{signed}:{sig}".encode("utf-8")
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
+
+
+def make_upgrade_token(
+    gateway_id: str, secret: str, ttl_seconds: int = _DEFAULT_UPGRADE_TTL_SECONDS
+) -> str:
+    """The WS-upgrade bearer token a gateway sends: ``payload = gateway_id``.
+
+    The connector peeks ``gateway_id`` (the payload head) to index its secret
+    verify list, then verifies the signature against that gateway's stored
+    secret(s). Mirrors the connector's ``makeUpgradeToken``.
+    """
+    return make_token(gateway_id, secret, ttl_seconds)
+
+
+def verify_token(token: str, secrets: Sequence[str]) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Verify a token built by ``make_token``; return the payload or None.
+
+    Splits from the right so a payload may itself contain colons (mirrors the
+    connector's ``verifyToken``). Rejects an expired token and any signature
+    that doesn't match a secret in the verify list.
+    """
+    try:
+        # base64url decode with padding restored.
+        padded = token + "=" * (-len(token) % 4)
+        decoded = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(padded.encode("ascii")).decode("utf-8")
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return None
+    parts = decoded.split(":")
+    if len(parts) < 3:
+        return None
+    sig = parts[-1]
+    try:
+        exp = int(parts[-2])
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    payload = ":".join(parts[:-2])
+    if exp != 0 and int(time.time()) > exp:
+        return None
+    signed = f"{payload}:{exp}"
+    return payload if verify_signature(signed, sig, secrets) else None
+
+
+def _delivery_payload(ts: int, body_json: str) -> str:
+    """Signed material for an inbound delivery: ``f"{ts}.{body_json}"``."""
+    return f"{ts}.{body_json}"
+
+
+def verify_delivery_signature(
+    body_json: str,
+    timestamp: Optional[str],
+    signature: Optional[str],
+    verify_keys: Sequence[str],
+    max_skew_seconds: int = _DEFAULT_MAX_SKEW_SECONDS,
+    *,
+    now: Optional[int] = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """Verify a connector→gateway inbound delivery signature.
+
+    ``body_json`` MUST be the exact request body bytes decoded as UTF-8 — the
+    connector signs over the literal serialized body, so the gateway verifies
+    over the literal received body (no re-serialization). Checks the timestamp
+    is within ``max_skew_seconds`` of now and the HMAC matches any key in the
+    rotation verify list. Mirrors the connector's ``verifyDeliverySignature``.
+    """
+    if not timestamp or not signature:
+        return False
+    try:
+        ts = int(timestamp)
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return False
+    current = now if now is not None else int(time.time())
+    if abs(current - ts) > max_skew_seconds:
+        return False
+    return verify_signature(_delivery_payload(ts, body_json), signature, verify_keys)

gateway/relay/descriptor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+"""CapabilityDescriptor — the relay handshake payload. EXPERIMENTAL.
+
+The connector hands a ``CapabilityDescriptor`` to the gateway's ``RelayAdapter``
+at handshake time; it tells the adapter which platform it is fronting and which
+capabilities to advertise to the ``GatewayStreamConsumer`` (char limit,
+draft-streaming, edit/threading support, markdown dialect, length unit). It is
+the linchpin of the generalization: one gateway adapter serves Discord,
+Telegram, Matrix, Signal, ... without per-platform branching.
+
+EXPERIMENTAL: this schema MAY CHANGE without a deprecation cycle until at least
+two real Class-1 platforms have validated it. Evolution during the experimental
+phase is additive-only, gated by ``contract_version`` (see
+docs/relay-connector-contract.md).
+
+Field origins (most are a wire-serializable projection of ``PlatformEntry`` plus
+the per-instance capability methods on ``BasePlatformAdapter``):
+
+- ``max_message_length`` -> ``PlatformEntry.max_message_length`` / adapter
+  ``MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH`` attribute (read by stream_consumer).
+- ``len_unit``           -> selects which ``message_len_fn`` the adapter installs
+  ("chars" = builtin len; "utf16" = Telegram-style UTF-16 code-unit counting).
+- ``supports_draft_streaming`` -> adapter ``supports_draft_streaming()`` probe.
+- ``supports_edit``      -> whether edit-based streaming is possible (Discord/
+  Telegram yes; Signal/SMS no -> consumer degrades to one-message-per-segment).
+- ``supports_threads``   -> ``create_handoff_thread`` capability flag.
+- ``markdown_dialect``   -> presentation hint (e.g. "markdown_v2", "discord").
+- ``emoji`` / ``platform_hint`` / ``pii_safe`` -> ``PlatformEntry`` fields of the
+  same name.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+
+# Bump additively (never reinterpret an existing field) during the experimental
+# phase; a breaking change requires updating both repos in lockstep.
+CONTRACT_VERSION = 1
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CapabilityDescriptor:
+    """Immutable capability descriptor negotiated at relay handshake.
+
+    Frozen so a descriptor cannot be mutated after handshake — the adapter
+    advertises a fixed capability profile for the life of the connection.
+    """
+
+    contract_version: int
+    platform: str
+    label: str
+    max_message_length: int
+    supports_draft_streaming: bool
+    supports_edit: bool
+    supports_threads: bool
+    markdown_dialect: str
+    len_unit: str  # "chars" | "utf16"
+    emoji: str = "\U0001f50c"  # 🔌 default (matches PlatformEntry default)
+    platform_hint: str = ""
+    pii_safe: bool = False
+
+    def to_json(self) -> str:
+        """Serialize to a compact, stable JSON string for the handshake frame."""
+        return json.dumps(asdict(self), sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_json(cls, data: str) -> "CapabilityDescriptor":
+        """Deserialize from a handshake JSON string.
+
+        Unknown keys are ignored (forward-compat: a newer connector may send
+        fields this gateway does not know yet); missing optional keys fall back
+        to dataclass defaults.
+        """
+        raw = json.loads(data)
+        known = {f for f in cls.__dataclass_fields__}  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        filtered = {k: v for k, v in raw.items() if k in known}
+        return cls(**filtered)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_platform_entry(
+        cls,
+        entry,
+        *,
+        len_unit: str = "chars",
+        supports_draft_streaming: bool = False,
+        supports_edit: bool = True,
+        supports_threads: bool = False,
+        markdown_dialect: str = "plain",
+    ) -> "CapabilityDescriptor":
+        """Project a ``gateway.platform_registry.PlatformEntry`` into a descriptor.
+
+        Demonstrates the descriptor is a *subset/projection* of what
+        ``PlatformEntry`` already encodes, not a parallel concept: ``label``,
+        ``max_message_length``, ``emoji``, ``platform_hint``, ``pii_safe`` and
+        the platform name come straight off the entry. The runtime capability
+        bits that ``PlatformEntry`` does NOT encode (length unit, draft/edit/
+        thread/markdown behavior) are supplied by the caller — in production
+        the connector fills these from the live adapter's capability methods.
+
+        ``max_message_length`` of 0 on a ``PlatformEntry`` means "no limit";
+        we map that to the stream_consumer default of 4096 so the descriptor
+        always carries a concrete chunking bound.
+        """
+        max_len = getattr(entry, "max_message_length", 0) or 4096
+        return cls(
+            contract_version=CONTRACT_VERSION,
+            platform=entry.name,
+            label=entry.label,
+            max_message_length=max_len,
+            supports_draft_streaming=supports_draft_streaming,
+            supports_edit=supports_edit,
+            supports_threads=supports_threads,
+            markdown_dialect=markdown_dialect,
+            len_unit=len_unit,
+            emoji=getattr(entry, "emoji", "\U0001f50c"),
+            platform_hint=getattr(entry, "platform_hint", ""),
+            pii_safe=getattr(entry, "pii_safe", False),
+        )

gateway/relay/inbound_receiver.py

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+"""Gateway-side inbound delivery receiver. EXPERIMENTAL.
+
+The connector delivers normalized inbound events to a tenant's gateway over a
+**signed HTTP POST** (connector ``src/relay/httpGatewayDelivery.ts``), NOT over
+the gateway's outbound ``/relay`` WebSocket: the connector instance that owns a
+platform socket is generally not the instance a given gateway dialed out to, so
+inbound is delivered to a tenant ENDPOINT (which may load-balance across gateway
+instances). Each delivery is HMAC-signed with the per-tenant **delivery key**
+(``gateway/relay/auth.py``); this receiver verifies the signature over the EXACT
+raw request bytes before accepting the event.
+
+Two routes (mirroring the connector's two POST targets):
+  POST {base}            {"type":"message",  "event": <MessageEvent>, ...}
+  POST {base}/interrupt  {"type":"interrupt","session_key": ..., "reason"?}
+
+The receiver:
+  1. reads the RAW body bytes (never a reparsed/re-serialized form — the HMAC is
+     over the literal bytes the connector signed),
+  2. verifies ``x-relay-signature`` / ``x-relay-timestamp`` against the delivery
+     key verify list (primary + secondary during rotation), within the replay
+     window — rejects 401 on any failure,
+  3. parses the JSON and dispatches: a ``message`` to the inbound handler (the
+     RelayAdapter's ``handle_message`` via the transport's normal path), an
+     ``interrupt`` to the interrupt handler.
+
+EXPERIMENTAL: the transport protocol may change without a deprecation cycle
+until ≥2 Class-1 platforms validate it. See docs/relay-connector-contract.md.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import logging
+from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Optional, Sequence
+
+from gateway.platforms.base import MessageEvent
+from gateway.relay.auth import (
+    DELIVERY_SIG_HEADER,
+    DELIVERY_TS_HEADER,
+    verify_delivery_signature,
+)
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+# Callbacks the receiver dispatches verified deliveries to.
+InboundMessageHandler = Callable[[MessageEvent], Awaitable[None]]
+InboundInterruptHandler = Callable[[str, str], Awaitable[None]]
+
+try:  # lazy/optional dep — mirrors the other HTTP-receiving adapters
+    from aiohttp import web
+except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover - exercised only when the extra is absent
+    web = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+
+AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE = web is not None
+
+
+def _event_from_wire(raw: dict) -> MessageEvent:
+    """Rebuild a MessageEvent from the connector's normalized inbound payload.
+
+    Identical mapping to the WS transport's ``_event_from_wire`` (the wire shape
+    is the same; only the transport differs). Kept here so the HTTP receiver has
+    no import dependency on the WS transport module.
+    """
+    from gateway.config import Platform
+    from gateway.platforms.base import MessageType
+    from gateway.session import SessionSource
+
+    src = raw.get("source", {}) or {}
+    platform = src.get("platform", "relay")
+    try:
+        platform_enum = Platform(platform)
+    except ValueError:
+        platform_enum = Platform.RELAY
+
+    source = SessionSource(
+        platform=platform_enum,
+        chat_id=src.get("chat_id", ""),
+        chat_type=src.get("chat_type", "dm"),
+        chat_name=src.get("chat_name"),
+        user_id=src.get("user_id"),
+        user_name=src.get("user_name"),
+        thread_id=src.get("thread_id"),
+        chat_topic=src.get("chat_topic"),
+        user_id_alt=src.get("user_id_alt"),
+        chat_id_alt=src.get("chat_id_alt"),
+        guild_id=src.get("guild_id"),
+        parent_chat_id=src.get("parent_chat_id"),
+        message_id=src.get("message_id"),
+    )
+    try:
+        msg_type = MessageType(raw.get("message_type", "text"))
+    except ValueError:
+        msg_type = MessageType.TEXT
+
+    return MessageEvent(
+        text=raw.get("text", ""),
+        message_type=msg_type,
+        source=source,
+        message_id=raw.get("message_id"),
+        reply_to_message_id=raw.get("reply_to_message_id"),
+        media_urls=raw.get("media_urls") or [],
+    )
+
+
+class InboundDeliveryReceiver:
+    """Verifies + dispatches signed connector→gateway inbound deliveries.
+
+    Transport-agnostic core: ``handle_raw`` takes the raw body bytes + headers +
+    which route was hit and returns ``(status, body)``. The aiohttp wiring
+    (``build_app`` / ``serve``) is a thin shell so the verify+dispatch logic is
+    unit-testable without a live socket.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        delivery_key_verify_list: Callable[[], Sequence[str]],
+        on_message: InboundMessageHandler,
+        on_interrupt: Optional[InboundInterruptHandler] = None,
+        max_skew_seconds: int = 300,
+    ) -> None:
+        # A callable (not a static list) so a rotated delivery key is picked up
+        # without rebuilding the receiver — mirrors the connector's verify list.
+        self._verify_list = delivery_key_verify_list
+        self._on_message = on_message
+        self._on_interrupt = on_interrupt
+        self._max_skew_seconds = max_skew_seconds
+
+    async def handle_raw(
+        self, *, raw_body: bytes, timestamp: Optional[str], signature: Optional[str], is_interrupt: bool
+    ) -> tuple[int, dict]:
+        """Verify the signature over ``raw_body`` and dispatch. Returns (status, json).
+
+        401 on a missing/invalid/expired signature (never dispatches unverified).
+        400 on malformed JSON. 200 on a verified, dispatched delivery.
+        """
+        verify_keys = list(self._verify_list() or [])
+        if not verify_keys:
+            # No delivery key provisioned -> we cannot verify -> reject. A gateway
+            # that hasn't enrolled must not accept inbound (fail closed).
+            logger.warning("relay inbound: no delivery key configured; rejecting")
+            return 401, {"error": "no delivery key configured"}
+
+        # Verify over the EXACT raw bytes the connector signed. Decode to text
+        # with the same UTF-8 the connector's JSON.stringify produced; a single
+        # differing byte breaks the HMAC (raw-body-preservation discipline).
+        body_text = raw_body.decode("utf-8", errors="strict")
+        if not verify_delivery_signature(
+            body_text, timestamp, signature, verify_keys, self._max_skew_seconds
+        ):
+            return 401, {"error": "invalid delivery signature"}
+
+        try:
+            payload = json.loads(body_text)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError:
+            return 400, {"error": "invalid JSON body"}
+
+        if is_interrupt or payload.get("type") == "interrupt":
+            session_key = str(payload.get("session_key", ""))
+            chat_id = str(payload.get("chat_id", "") or payload.get("reason", "") or "")
+            if self._on_interrupt is not None and session_key:
+                await self._on_interrupt(session_key, chat_id)
+            return 200, {"ok": True}
+
+        # Default: a normalized inbound message event.
+        event_raw = payload.get("event")
+        if not isinstance(event_raw, dict):
+            return 400, {"error": "missing event"}
+        event = _event_from_wire(event_raw)
+        await self._on_message(event)
+        return 200, {"ok": True}
+
+    # ── aiohttp wiring (thin shell over handle_raw) ──────────────────────
+    def build_app(self) -> Any:
+        """Build an aiohttp Application exposing the delivery + interrupt routes."""
+        if not AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "InboundDeliveryReceiver requires the 'aiohttp' package "
+                "(install the messaging extra)."
+            )
+
+        async def _deliver(request: Any) -> Any:
+            return await self._respond(request, is_interrupt=False)
+
+        async def _interrupt(request: Any) -> Any:
+            return await self._respond(request, is_interrupt=True)
+
+        app = web.Application()
+        app.router.add_get("/healthz", lambda _: web.Response(text="ok"))
+        app.router.add_post("/", _deliver)
+        app.router.add_post("/interrupt", _interrupt)
+        return app
+
+    async def _respond(self, request: Any, *, is_interrupt: bool) -> Any:
+        # Read the RAW bytes — do NOT use request.json() (it reparses and we'd
+        # verify over a re-serialized form, breaking the HMAC).
+        raw_body = await request.read()
+        status, body = await self.handle_raw(
+            raw_body=raw_body,
+            timestamp=request.headers.get(DELIVERY_TS_HEADER),
+            signature=request.headers.get(DELIVERY_SIG_HEADER),
+            is_interrupt=is_interrupt,
+        )
+        return web.json_response(body, status=status)

gateway/relay/transport.py

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+"""Relay transport protocol — the gateway<->connector wire contract. EXPERIMENTAL.
+
+The ``RelayAdapter`` (gateway side) delegates all wire I/O to a ``RelayTransport``.
+The gateway dials OUT to the connector, so a production transport is a WebSocket
+client; in tests it is an in-memory stub (``tests/gateway/relay/stub_connector.py``).
+
+This module defines the protocol surface only — no concrete transport. The
+contract has four concerns:
+
+  1. Lifecycle: ``connect`` / ``disconnect``.
+  2. Handshake: ``handshake`` returns the ``CapabilityDescriptor`` the connector
+     advertises for the platform this adapter fronts.
+  3. Inbound: ``set_inbound_handler`` registers a callback the transport invokes
+     with each normalized ``MessageEvent`` the connector delivers.
+  4. Outbound: ``send_outbound`` carries send/edit/typing actions back to the
+     connector; ``get_chat_info`` proxies a chat-info lookup; ``send_interrupt``
+     routes a mid-turn /stop down the socket that owns the session_key.
+
+EXPERIMENTAL: may change without a deprecation cycle until >=2 Class-1 platforms
+validate it. See docs/relay-connector-contract.md.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, Dict, Optional, Protocol, runtime_checkable
+
+from gateway.platforms.base import MessageEvent
+from gateway.relay.descriptor import CapabilityDescriptor
+
+# Callback the transport invokes for each inbound normalized event.
+InboundHandler = Callable[[MessageEvent], Awaitable[None]]
+
+
+@runtime_checkable
+class RelayTransport(Protocol):
+    """Full gateway<->connector transport contract."""
+
+    async def connect(self) -> bool:
+        """Open the connection to the connector; return True on success."""
+        ...
+
+    async def disconnect(self) -> None:
+        """Close the connection."""
+        ...
+
+    async def handshake(self) -> CapabilityDescriptor:
+        """Return the capability descriptor the connector advertises."""
+        ...
+
+    def set_inbound_handler(self, handler: InboundHandler) -> None:
+        """Register the callback invoked with each inbound MessageEvent."""
+        ...
+
+    async def send_outbound(self, action: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        """Carry an outbound action (send/edit/typing) to the connector.
+
+        Returns a result dict; for ``op == "send"`` it carries
+        ``success`` and optionally ``message_id`` / ``error``.
+        """
+        ...
+
+    async def get_chat_info(self, chat_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        """Proxy a chat-info lookup to the connector."""
+        ...
+
+    async def send_interrupt(self, session_key: str, reason: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
+        """Route a mid-turn /stop to the connector for ``session_key``.
+
+        The connector forwards it down the socket owned by the gateway
+        instance running that session (the /stop routing invariant). On the
+        gateway side this is the OUTBOUND direction; the actual task
+        cancellation happens when the connector echoes an interrupt inbound
+        (handled in Task 1.4).
+        """
+        ...
+
+    async def send_follow_up(self, action: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        """Act on a shared-identity capability bound to a session (A2 outbound).
+
+        Some platforms hand the connector a credential that acts on the SHARED
+        bot identity (e.g. a Discord interaction follow-up token, valid ~15min).
+        Under A2 that credential NEVER reaches the gateway — the connector
+        stripped it at the edge and bound it in its capability vault keyed by
+        the session. To use it, the gateway issues a SEMANTIC action against the
+        session it is already in; it never names or holds a token.
+
+        The action dict carries:
+          ``op``          == ``"follow_up"``
+          ``session_key`` the session whose bound capability to wield
+          ``kind``        the capability kind (e.g. ``"discord.interaction_token"``)
+          ``content``     the message content to send via that capability
+          ``metadata?``   optional extras
+
+        The connector resolves the real capability (``resolveOutboundCapability``
+        on its side), enforces the tenant match (tenant B can never wield tenant
+        A's capability), and egresses. Returns ``{success, message_id?, error?}``;
+        ``success`` is False when the capability is absent/expired or the tenant
+        doesn't match — the gateway then has nothing to retry with (by design: a
+        leaked gateway holds zero capability material).
+        """
+        ...

gateway/relay/ws_transport.py

@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+"""Production WebSocket RelayTransport — the gateway's live link to the connector.
+
+The gateway dials OUT to the connector's relay endpoint over a WebSocket and
+speaks the newline-delimited JSON frame protocol defined in the connector repo
+(``gateway-gateway`` ``src/relay/protocol.ts``) and mirrored in
+``docs/relay-connector-contract.md``:
+
+  gateway -> connector : hello, outbound, interrupt
+  connector -> gateway : descriptor, inbound, outbound_result, interrupt_inbound
+
+Frames:
+  hello            {type, platform, botId}
+  descriptor       {type, descriptor}                       (handshake reply)
+  inbound          {type, event, bufferId?}                 (a normalized MessageEvent)
+  outbound         {type, requestId, action}                (send/edit/typing/follow_up)
+  outbound_result  {type, requestId, result}
+  interrupt        {type, session_key, reason?}             (gateway egresses /stop)
+  interrupt_inbound{type, session_key, chat_id}             (connector -> owning gateway)
+
+This is the concrete transport behind the ``RelayTransport`` Protocol; the
+``RelayAdapter`` delegates all wire I/O to it. Outbound calls block on a
+per-request future keyed by ``requestId`` until the matching ``outbound_result``
+arrives. A background reader task pumps inbound frames to the registered handler
+and resolves pending outbound futures.
+
+EXPERIMENTAL: the frame schema may change without a deprecation cycle until at
+least two Class-1 platforms validate it.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import json
+import logging
+import uuid
+from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
+
+from gateway.platforms.base import MessageEvent, MessageType
+from gateway.session import SessionSource
+from gateway.relay.descriptor import CapabilityDescriptor
+from gateway.relay.transport import InboundHandler
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+try:  # lazy/optional dep — mirrors gateway/platforms/feishu.py
+    import websockets
+except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover - exercised only when the extra is absent
+    websockets = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+
+WEBSOCKETS_AVAILABLE = websockets is not None
+
+# How long to wait for the handshake descriptor and for each outbound result.
+_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_S = 30.0
+_OUTBOUND_TIMEOUT_S = 30.0
+
+
+def _event_from_wire(raw: Dict[str, Any]) -> MessageEvent:
+    """Rebuild a MessageEvent from the connector's normalized inbound payload.
+
+    The connector emits SessionSource as the snake_case wire form (§3); map it
+    back onto the gateway dataclasses. Unknown message types fall back to TEXT.
+    """
+    src = raw.get("source", {}) or {}
+    from gateway.config import Platform
+
+    platform = src.get("platform", "relay")
+    try:
+        platform_enum = Platform(platform)
+    except ValueError:
+        platform_enum = Platform.RELAY
+
+    source = SessionSource(
+        platform=platform_enum,
+        chat_id=src.get("chat_id", ""),
+        chat_type=src.get("chat_type", "dm"),
+        chat_name=src.get("chat_name"),
+        user_id=src.get("user_id"),
+        user_name=src.get("user_name"),
+        thread_id=src.get("thread_id"),
+        chat_topic=src.get("chat_topic"),
+        user_id_alt=src.get("user_id_alt"),
+        chat_id_alt=src.get("chat_id_alt"),
+        guild_id=src.get("guild_id"),
+        parent_chat_id=src.get("parent_chat_id"),
+        message_id=src.get("message_id"),
+    )
+    try:
+        msg_type = MessageType(raw.get("message_type", "text"))
+    except ValueError:
+        msg_type = MessageType.TEXT
+
+    return MessageEvent(
+        text=raw.get("text", ""),
+        message_type=msg_type,
+        source=source,
+        message_id=raw.get("message_id"),
+        reply_to_message_id=raw.get("reply_to_message_id"),
+        media_urls=raw.get("media_urls") or [],
+    )
+
+
+class WebSocketRelayTransport:
+    """RelayTransport over a WebSocket connection the gateway dials to the connector."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        url: str,
+        platform: str,
+        bot_id: str,
+        *,
+        connect_timeout_s: float = _HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_S,
+        outbound_timeout_s: float = _OUTBOUND_TIMEOUT_S,
+        gateway_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        upgrade_secret: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not WEBSOCKETS_AVAILABLE:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "WebSocketRelayTransport requires the 'websockets' package "
+                "(install the messaging extra)."
+            )
+        self._url = url
+        self._platform = platform
+        self._bot_id = bot_id
+        self._connect_timeout_s = connect_timeout_s
+        self._outbound_timeout_s = outbound_timeout_s
+        # Connection auth (Phase 2): when a per-gateway secret is configured the
+        # gateway presents an HMAC bearer on the WS upgrade so the connector can
+        # authenticate it (reject 4401 otherwise). gateway_id identifies the
+        # enrolled instance — the connector peeks it to index its secret verify
+        # list, then verifies the signature. Absent -> unauthenticated upgrade
+        # (dev/test, or a connector that doesn't enforce auth).
+        self._gateway_id = gateway_id
+        self._upgrade_secret = upgrade_secret
+
+        self._ws: Any = None
+        self._reader: Optional[asyncio.Task[None]] = None
+        self._inbound: Optional[InboundHandler] = None
+        self._descriptor: Optional[CapabilityDescriptor] = None
+        self._descriptor_ready: asyncio.Future[CapabilityDescriptor] | None = None
+        # requestId -> future awaiting the matching outbound_result.
+        self._pending: Dict[str, asyncio.Future[Dict[str, Any]]] = {}
+        self._closing = False
+
+    # ── lifecycle ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    async def connect(self) -> bool:
+        loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+        self._descriptor_ready = loop.create_future()
+        headers = self._upgrade_headers()
+        if headers:
+            self._ws = await websockets.connect(self._url, additional_headers=headers)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+        else:
+            self._ws = await websockets.connect(self._url)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+        self._reader = asyncio.create_task(self._read_loop(), name="relay-ws-reader")
+        # Send hello; the descriptor arrives via the reader and resolves handshake().
+        await self._send({"type": "hello", "platform": self._platform, "botId": self._bot_id})
+        return True
+
+    def _upgrade_headers(self) -> Dict[str, str]:
+        """Auth headers for the WS upgrade, or {} when no secret is configured.
+
+        Presents ``Authorization: Bearer *** where the token is a signed
+        bearer built with the per-gateway secret (``gateway/relay/auth.py``
+        ``make_upgrade_token``), keyed by ``gateway_id`` so the connector can
+        index its verify list. The connector rejects the upgrade (close 4401)
+        when this is missing/invalid/revoked; an unauthenticated connector
+        ignores it.
+        """
+        if not (self._upgrade_secret and self._gateway_id):
+            return {}
+        from gateway.relay.auth import make_upgrade_token
+
+        token = make_upgrade_token(self._gateway_id, self._upgrade_secret)
+        return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
+
+    async def disconnect(self) -> None:
+        self._closing = True
+        if self._reader is not None:
+            self._reader.cancel()
+            try:
+                await self._reader
+            except (asyncio.CancelledError, Exception):  # noqa: BLE001 - best-effort teardown
+                pass
+            self._reader = None
+        if self._ws is not None:
+            try:
+                await self._ws.close()
+            except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001
+                pass
+            self._ws = None
+        # Fail any in-flight outbound waiters so callers don't hang.
+        for fut in self._pending.values():
+            if not fut.done():
+                fut.set_exception(RuntimeError("relay transport closed"))
+        self._pending.clear()
+
+    async def handshake(self) -> CapabilityDescriptor:
+        if self._descriptor is not None:
+            return self._descriptor
+        if self._descriptor_ready is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("handshake() called before connect()")
+        return await asyncio.wait_for(self._descriptor_ready, timeout=self._connect_timeout_s)
+
+    def set_inbound_handler(self, handler: InboundHandler) -> None:
+        self._inbound = handler
+
+    # ── outbound ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    async def send_outbound(self, action: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        return await self._request_response(action)
+
+    async def send_follow_up(self, action: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        # follow_up rides the same outbound frame; the connector dispatches by
+        # action.op. Kept as a distinct method to satisfy the transport Protocol
+        # and to make the A2 call site explicit.
+        return await self._request_response(action)
+
+    async def get_chat_info(self, chat_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        result = await self._request_response(
+            {"op": "get_chat_info", "chat_id": chat_id}, frame_type="outbound"
+        )
+        # The connector answers chat-info inside the outbound_result envelope.
+        info = result.get("chat_info") or result
+        return {"name": info.get("name", chat_id), "type": info.get("type", "dm")}
+
+    async def send_interrupt(self, session_key: str, reason: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
+        await self._send({"type": "interrupt", "session_key": session_key, "reason": reason})
+
+    async def _request_response(
+        self, action: Dict[str, Any], frame_type: str = "outbound"
+    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        if self._ws is None:
+            return {"success": False, "error": "relay transport not connected"}
+        request_id = uuid.uuid4().hex
+        loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+        fut: asyncio.Future[Dict[str, Any]] = loop.create_future()
+        self._pending[request_id] = fut
+        try:
+            await self._send({"type": frame_type, "requestId": request_id, "action": action})
+            return await asyncio.wait_for(fut, timeout=self._outbound_timeout_s)
+        except asyncio.TimeoutError:
+            return {"success": False, "error": "relay outbound timed out"}
+        finally:
+            self._pending.pop(request_id, None)
+
+    # ── wire I/O ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    async def _send(self, frame: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        if self._ws is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("relay transport not connected")
+        await self._ws.send(json.dumps(frame) + "\n")
+
+    async def _read_loop(self) -> None:
+        assert self._ws is not None
+        buf = ""
+        try:
+            async for chunk in self._ws:
+                buf += chunk if isinstance(chunk, str) else chunk.decode("utf-8")
+                # Newline-delimited frames; keep any trailing partial line.
+                *lines, buf = buf.split("\n")
+                for line in lines:
+                    if line.strip():
+                        await self._handle_frame(line)
+        except asyncio.CancelledError:
+            raise
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - log + let the task end; reconnection is caller policy
+            if not self._closing:
+                logger.warning("relay ws read loop ended: %s", exc)
+
+    async def _handle_frame(self, line: str) -> None:
+        try:
+            frame = json.loads(line)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError:
+            logger.warning("relay: skipping malformed frame")
+            return
+        ftype = frame.get("type")
+        if ftype == "descriptor":
+            descriptor = CapabilityDescriptor.from_json(json.dumps(frame.get("descriptor", {})))
+            self._descriptor = descriptor
+            if self._descriptor_ready is not None and not self._descriptor_ready.done():
+                self._descriptor_ready.set_result(descriptor)
+        elif ftype == "inbound":
+            if self._inbound is not None:
+                event = _event_from_wire(frame.get("event", {}))
+                await self._inbound(event)
+        elif ftype == "outbound_result":
+            fut = self._pending.get(frame.get("requestId", ""))
+            if fut is not None and not fut.done():
+                fut.set_result(frame.get("result", {}))
+        elif ftype == "interrupt_inbound":
+            # Bridged into the adapter's interrupt path by the runner wiring.
+            handler = getattr(self, "_interrupt_inbound_handler", None)
+            if handler is not None:
+                await handler(frame.get("session_key", ""), frame.get("chat_id", ""))
+        else:
+            # hello/outbound/interrupt are gateway->connector; ignore if echoed.
+            pass
+
+    def set_interrupt_inbound_handler(self, handler: Any) -> None:
+        """Register the callback for connector->gateway interrupt_inbound frames."""
+        self._interrupt_inbound_handler = handler

gateway/run.py

@@ -5110,6 +5110,31 @@ class GatewayRunner(GatewayAuthorizationMixin, GatewayKanbanWatchersMixin, Gatew
                 "plugin discovery failed at gateway startup", exc_info=True,
             )
 
+        # Register the generic relay adapter when a connector relay URL is
+        # configured (GATEWAY_RELAY_URL / gateway.relay_url). No URL -> no-op, so
+        # direct/single-tenant deployments are unaffected. When configured, the
+        # adapter dials the connector over a WebSocket, negotiates its capability
+        # descriptor at handshake, and bridges inbound/outbound like any platform.
+        try:
+            from gateway.relay import (
+                register_relay_adapter,
+                relay_url,
+                self_provision_if_managed,
+            )
+
+            # Managed boot: self-provision relay creds in-process (resolve the
+            # agent's NAS token -> POST /relay/provision -> set GATEWAY_RELAY_* in
+            # os.environ) BEFORE registration reads them. No-op when not managed,
+            # relay unconfigured, or a secret is already pinned. Never raises.
+            self_provision_if_managed()
+
+            if register_relay_adapter():
+                logger.info("relay adapter registered (connector at %s)", relay_url())
+        except Exception:
+            logger.warning(
+                "relay adapter registration failed at gateway startup", exc_info=True,
+            )
+
         # Register declarative shell hooks from cli-config.yaml.  Gateway
         # has no TTY, so consent has to come from one of the three opt-in
         # channels (--accept-hooks on launch, HERMES_ACCEPT_HOOKS env var,

gateway/slash_commands.py

@@ -2214,7 +2214,9 @@ class GatewaySlashCommandsMixin:
         stranded).
 
         ``diff`` output is truncated for chat bubbles — the full diff lives in
-        the CLI (``/skills diff <id>``) and the pending JSON file.
+        the pending JSON file under ``~/.hermes/pending/skills/``. (Note this is
+        the write-approval ``diff <id>``; the CLI also has an unrelated
+        ``hermes skills diff <name>`` that diffs a bundled skill vs stock.)
         """
         from gateway.run import _hermes_home
         from hermes_cli.write_approval_commands import handle_pending_subcommand
@@ -2252,12 +2254,14 @@ class GatewaySlashCommandsMixin:
                     "(Search/install are CLI-only.)")
 
         # Chat bubbles can't hold a full skill diff — truncate and point at
-        # the real review surfaces.
+        # the real review surface. (Note: `hermes skills diff <name>` is a
+        # *different* command — it diffs a bundled skill against its stock
+        # version — so we point at the pending JSON file, not that command.)
         if args and args[0].lower() == "diff" and len(out) > 3000:
             pending_id = args[1] if len(args) > 1 else "<id>"
             out = (out[:3000]
-                   + f"\n… (truncated — full diff: `/skills diff {pending_id}` "
-                     f"on the CLI, or ~/.hermes/pending/skills/{pending_id}.json)")
+                   + "\n… (truncated — full diff in "
+                     f"~/.hermes/pending/skills/{pending_id}.json)")
         return out
 
     async def _handle_fast_command(self, event: MessageEvent) -> str:
@@ -2584,14 +2588,29 @@ class GatewaySlashCommandsMixin:
                 # session_id for the continuation.  Write the compressed messages
                 # into the NEW session so the original history stays searchable.
                 new_session_id = tmp_agent.session_id
-                if new_session_id != session_entry.session_id:
+                rotated = new_session_id != session_entry.session_id
+                if rotated:
                     session_entry.session_id = new_session_id
                     self.session_store._save()
                     self._sync_telegram_topic_binding(
                         source, session_entry, reason="compress-command",
                     )
 
-                self.session_store.rewrite_transcript(new_session_id, compressed)
+                # Only rewrite the transcript when rotation actually produced a
+                # NEW session id. If _compress_context could not rotate (e.g.
+                # _session_db unavailable, or the DB split raised), session_id
+                # is unchanged and rewrite_transcript() would DELETE the
+                # original messages and replace them with only the compressed
+                # summary — permanent data loss (#44794, #39704). In that case
+                # leave the original transcript intact.
+                if rotated:
+                    self.session_store.rewrite_transcript(new_session_id, compressed)
+                else:
+                    logger.warning(
+                        "Manual /compress: session rotation did not occur "
+                        "(session_id unchanged) — preserving original transcript "
+                        "instead of overwriting it (#44794)."
+                    )
                 # Reset stored token count — transcript changed, old value is stale
                 self.session_store.update_session(
                     session_entry.session_key, last_prompt_tokens=0

hermes_cli/auth.py

@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ DEFAULT_NOUS_PORTAL_URL = "https://portal.nousresearch.com"
 DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL = "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1"
 DEFAULT_NOUS_CLIENT_ID = "hermes-cli"
 NOUS_INFERENCE_INVOKE_SCOPE = "inference:invoke"
+NOUS_BILLING_MANAGE_SCOPE = "billing:manage"
 DEFAULT_NOUS_SCOPE = NOUS_INFERENCE_INVOKE_SCOPE
 NOUS_DEVICE_CODE_SOURCE = "device_code"
 NOUS_AUTH_PATH_INVOKE_JWT = "invoke_jwt"
@@ -7865,6 +7866,7 @@ def _nous_device_code_login(
     timeout_seconds: float = 15.0,
     insecure: bool = False,
     ca_bundle: Optional[str] = None,
+    on_verification: Optional[Callable[[str, str], None]] = None,
 ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     """Run the Nous device-code flow and return full OAuth state without persisting."""
     pconfig = PROVIDER_REGISTRY["nous"]
@@ -7919,6 +7921,16 @@ def _nous_device_code_login(
             else:
                 print("  Could not open browser automatically — use the URL above.")
 
+        # Surface the verification URL/code to an out-of-band consumer (e.g. the
+        # TUI gateway, whose stdout is a JSON-RPC pipe — a plain print() there is
+        # dropped). Fired AFTER the print/browser block and BEFORE polling blocks,
+        # so the consumer can render the link while we wait. Best-effort.
+        if on_verification is not None:
+            try:
+                on_verification(verification_url, user_code)
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+
         effective_interval = max(1, min(interval, DEVICE_AUTH_POLL_INTERVAL_CAP_SECONDS))
         print(f"Waiting for approval (polling every {effective_interval}s)...")
 
@@ -7984,6 +7996,91 @@ def _nous_device_code_login(
         raise
 
 
+def nous_token_has_billing_scope() -> bool:
+    """Return True if the currently-held Nous token carries ``billing:manage``.
+
+    Reads the persisted ``scope`` string saved at login (``_save_provider_state``
+    stores ``token_data.get("scope") or scope``). A space-delimited match. Used by
+    the lazy step-up: if False, the first billing call will 403 ``insufficient_scope``
+    anyway, but checking up front lets a surface skip a doomed round-trip.
+    """
+    try:
+        state = get_provider_auth_state("nous") or {}
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    scope = state.get("scope")
+    if not isinstance(scope, str):
+        return False
+    return NOUS_BILLING_MANAGE_SCOPE in scope.split()
+
+
+def step_up_nous_billing_scope(
+    *,
+    open_browser: bool = True,
+    timeout_seconds: float = 15.0,
+    on_verification: Optional[Callable[[str, str], None]] = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """Re-run the device flow requesting ``billing:manage`` and persist the result.
+
+    The lazy step-up (plan D-A): triggered when a billing endpoint returns
+    ``403 insufficient_scope``. Runs a fresh device-connect with
+    ``inference:invoke tool:invoke billing:manage`` on the scope. The user must be
+    an ADMIN/OWNER and tick "Allow terminal billing" in the portal for the minted
+    token to actually carry the scope; otherwise the server silently downscopes and this
+    returns False.
+
+    Reuses the held credential's portal/inference URLs + client_id so the step-up
+    targets the same deployment (incl. a preview via ``HERMES_PORTAL_BASE_URL`` set
+    at the original login). Persists to the auth store + shared store + pool, exactly
+    like ``_login_nous`` — but WITHOUT the model picker (this is a scope upgrade, not
+    a fresh login).
+
+    Returns True iff the new token carries ``billing:manage``.
+    """
+    prior = get_provider_auth_state("nous") or {}
+    pconfig = PROVIDER_REGISTRY["nous"]
+
+    # Build the step-up scope: existing scopes (if any) + billing:manage, deduped,
+    # order-stable. Fall back to the standard inference+tool+billing set.
+    _raw_scope = prior.get("scope")
+    prior_scope = _raw_scope if isinstance(_raw_scope, str) else ""
+    requested: list[str] = []
+    for tok in (prior_scope.split() or [NOUS_INFERENCE_INVOKE_SCOPE, "tool:invoke"]):
+        if tok and tok not in requested:
+            requested.append(tok)
+    if NOUS_BILLING_MANAGE_SCOPE not in requested:
+        requested.append(NOUS_BILLING_MANAGE_SCOPE)
+    scope = " ".join(requested)
+
+    auth_state = _nous_device_code_login(
+        portal_base_url=prior.get("portal_base_url") or None,
+        inference_base_url=prior.get("inference_base_url") or None,
+        client_id=prior.get("client_id") or pconfig.client_id,
+        scope=scope,
+        open_browser=open_browser,
+        timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
+        on_verification=on_verification,
+    )
+
+    with _auth_store_lock():
+        auth_store = _load_auth_store()
+        _save_provider_state(auth_store, "nous", auth_state)
+        _save_auth_store(auth_store)
+
+    # Mirror to shared store + reseed the pool (best-effort), same as _login_nous.
+    try:
+        _write_shared_nous_state(auth_state)
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    try:
+        _sync_nous_pool_from_auth_store()
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+    granted = auth_state.get("scope")
+    return isinstance(granted, str) and NOUS_BILLING_MANAGE_SCOPE in granted.split()
+
+
 def _login_nous(args, pconfig: ProviderConfig) -> None:
     """Nous Portal device authorization flow."""
     timeout_seconds = getattr(args, "timeout", None) or 15.0

hermes_cli/backup.py

@@ -64,6 +64,39 @@ _EXCLUDED_NAMES = {
     "cron.pid",
 }
 
+# File names that ``hermes import`` must never overwrite, matched by basename so
+# they're caught for the root profile (``gateway_state.json``) and for named
+# profiles alike (``profiles/<name>/gateway_state.json``).
+#
+# These hold *volatile gateway/process runtime state that is namespaced to the
+# machine or container the backup was taken on* — PIDs in a dead process
+# namespace, a runtime lock, the process registry, and the gateway's last
+# recorded run/desired state. Restoring them onto a different host (or a hosted
+# container) is at best meaningless and at worst actively harmful:
+#
+#   - ``gateway_state.json`` drives the container-boot reconciler
+#     (``container_boot._read_desired_state``), which only auto-starts a
+#     gateway whose recorded state is ``running``. A backup taken from a
+#     machine where the gateway was stopped (or carrying a stale/foreign
+#     value) overwrites the container's own state and leaves the gateway
+#     stuck "starting"/"cooking", disconnecting it from the Nous portal
+#     (NS-508 / the second half of NS-501).
+#   - ``gateway.pid`` / ``cron.pid`` / ``gateway.lock`` / ``processes.json``
+#     reference PIDs and locks in the *source* machine's process namespace; a
+#     numerically-equal PID in the new environment is a different process.
+#     These mirror exactly what ``container_boot._STALE_RUNTIME_FILES`` already
+#     sweeps on every container boot.
+#
+# Older backups predate the backup-side exclusions, so we filter on import too
+# rather than trusting the archive's contents.
+_IMPORT_SKIP_NAMES = {
+    "gateway_state.json",
+    "gateway.pid",
+    "cron.pid",
+    "gateway.lock",
+    "processes.json",
+}
+
 # zipfile.open() drops Unix mode bits on extract; restore tightens these to 0600.
 _SECRET_FILE_NAMES = {".env", "auth.json", "state.db"}
 
@@ -385,6 +418,7 @@ def run_import(args) -> None:
 
         errors = []
         restored = 0
+        skipped_runtime: list[str] = []
         t0 = time.monotonic()
 
         for member in members:
@@ -397,6 +431,16 @@ def run_import(args) -> None:
             if not rel:
                 continue
 
+            # Never overwrite volatile gateway/process runtime state. These are
+            # namespaced to the machine/container the backup was taken on;
+            # clobbering them (especially gateway_state.json) breaks the gateway
+            # reconciler on the target and disconnects hosted instances from the
+            # Nous portal. Matched by basename so both the root profile and
+            # named profiles (profiles/<name>/gateway_state.json) are covered.
+            if Path(rel).name in _IMPORT_SKIP_NAMES:
+                skipped_runtime.append(rel)
+                continue
+
             target = hermes_root / rel
 
             # Security: reject absolute paths and traversals
@@ -433,6 +477,16 @@ def run_import(args) -> None:
             if len(errors) > 10:
                 print(f"  ... and {len(errors) - 10} more")
 
+        if skipped_runtime:
+            print(
+                f"\n  Preserved {len(skipped_runtime)} runtime state "
+                f"file(s) (kept this machine's, not the backup's):"
+            )
+            for rel in sorted(skipped_runtime)[:10]:
+                print(f"    {rel}")
+            if len(skipped_runtime) > 10:
+                print(f"    ... and {len(skipped_runtime) - 10} more")
+
         # Post-import: restore profile wrapper scripts
         profiles_dir = hermes_root / "profiles"
         restored_profiles = []

hermes_cli/commands.py

@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ COMMAND_REGISTRY: list[CommandDef] = [
                gateway_only=True),
     CommandDef("usage", "Show token usage and rate limits for the current session", "Info"),
     CommandDef("credits", "Show Nous credit balance and top up", "Info"),
+    CommandDef("billing", "Manage Nous terminal billing — buy credits, auto-reload, limits", "Info"),
     CommandDef("insights", "Show usage insights and analytics", "Info",
                args_hint="[days]"),
     CommandDef("platforms", "Show gateway/messaging platform status", "Info",
@@ -1053,8 +1054,9 @@ _SLACK_PRIORITY_ALIASES = ("btw", "bg")
 # the telegram-parity test reads it so an entry here is a deliberate
 # "Slack-via-/hermes" decision, not a silent clamp.
 #   - credits: the billing/top-up surface; reached via /hermes credits on Slack.
+#   - billing: the terminal-billing surface (buy/auto-reload/limit); /hermes billing.
 #   - debug: the log/report upload surface; reached via /hermes debug on Slack.
-_SLACK_VIA_HERMES_ONLY = frozenset({"credits", "debug"})
+_SLACK_VIA_HERMES_ONLY = frozenset({"credits", "billing", "debug"})
 
 
 def _sanitize_slack_name(raw: str) -> str:

hermes_cli/config.py

@@ -350,52 +350,124 @@ def get_managed_update_command() -> Optional[str]:
     return None
 
 
+def _install_method_project_root(project_root: Optional[Path] = None) -> Path:
+    """Resolve the directory that holds the *running code* (the install tree).
+
+    This is the parent of ``hermes_cli/`` — i.e. the git checkout for source
+    installs, ``/opt/hermes`` inside the published image, the venv's
+    site-packages root for pip installs. It is a property of the running
+    interpreter, NOT of ``$HERMES_HOME``, which is why a code-scoped stamp
+    here is immune to two installs sharing one data directory.
+    """
+    if project_root is not None:
+        return project_root
+    return Path(__file__).parent.parent.resolve()
+
+
 def detect_install_method(project_root: Optional[Path] = None) -> str:
     """Detect how Hermes was installed: 'docker', 'nixos', 'homebrew', 'git', or 'pip'.
 
     Resolution order:
-    1. Stamped ``~/.hermes/.install_method`` file (written by installers)
-    2. HERMES_MANAGED env / .managed marker (NixOS, Homebrew)
-    3. .git directory presence -> 'git'
-    4. Fallback -> 'pip'
+    1. Code-scoped stamp ``<install tree>/.install_method`` (next to the
+       running code) — the authoritative marker.
+    2. Legacy home-scoped stamp ``$HERMES_HOME/.install_method`` — read for
+       backward compatibility, but a ``docker`` value is IGNORED when we are
+       not actually running inside a container (see below).
+    3. HERMES_MANAGED env / .managed marker (NixOS, Homebrew)
+    4. .git directory presence -> 'git'
+    5. Fallback -> 'pip'
+
+    Why the stamp is code-scoped, not home-scoped (issue: shared ``~/.hermes``)
+    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    The install method describes *the binary that is running*, but
+    ``$HERMES_HOME`` is a shared DATA directory — the Docker docs deliberately
+    bind-mount it (``~/.hermes:/opt/data``) so config/sessions/memory persist
+    and can be shared with a host-side Desktop/CLI install. When a
+    containerised gateway and a host install share one ``$HERMES_HOME``, a
+    home-scoped stamp is a single slot describing two different installs:
+    the container stamps ``docker`` on every boot, the host install then reads
+    ``docker`` and ``hermes update`` refuses to run ("doesn't apply inside the
+    Docker container") even though the host binary is a perfectly updatable
+    git/pip install. Scoping the stamp to the install tree gives each install
+    its own truthful marker.
+
+    Self-healing for already-poisoned homes: a legacy ``docker`` value in the
+    home-scoped stamp is only honoured when we are genuinely in a container.
+    On a host install that read a contaminating ``docker`` stamp, we fall
+    through to managed/.git/pip detection instead — so existing shared-home
+    setups recover without the user touching anything.
 
     Note: running inside a container is NOT treated as "docker" on its own.
-    The two supported install paths both self-identify via the
-    ``.install_method`` stamp (caught by step 1), so neither relies on
-    container detection here:
+    The supported installs self-identify via the code-scoped stamp:
       - the curl installer (scripts/install.sh, the README/website install
-        command) git-clones the repo and stamps ``git``;
-      - the published ``nousresearch/hermes-agent`` image stamps ``docker``
-        at boot via ``docker/stage2-hook.sh``.
-    An unsupported manual install dropped into a container (no stamp) was
-    wrongly classified as the published image by bare container detection,
-    so ``hermes update`` bailed with "doesn't apply inside the Docker
-    container". Without that fallback such installs fall through to the
-    ``.git``/pip checks and behave like any off-path install. See issue #34397.
+        command) git-clones the repo and stamps ``git`` next to the code;
+      - the published ``nousresearch/hermes-agent`` image bakes a ``docker``
+        stamp into ``/opt/hermes`` at build time.
+    An unsupported manual install dropped into a container (no stamp) falls
+    through to the ``.git``/pip checks and behaves like any off-path install.
+    See issue #34397.
     """
-    stamp = get_hermes_home() / ".install_method"
+    root = _install_method_project_root(project_root)
+
+    # 1. Code-scoped stamp — authoritative, immune to shared $HERMES_HOME.
     try:
-        method = stamp.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip().lower()
+        method = (root / ".install_method").read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip().lower()
         if method:
             return method
     except OSError:
         pass
+
+    # 2. Legacy home-scoped stamp — back-compat. Ignore a ``docker`` value
+    #    when we are not actually containerised: that is the signature of a
+    #    host install whose shared $HERMES_HOME was stamped by a co-located
+    #    container, and honouring it wrongly blocks ``hermes update``.
+    try:
+        method = (
+            (get_hermes_home() / ".install_method")
+            .read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+            .strip()
+            .lower()
+        )
+        if method and not (method == "docker" and not _running_in_container()):
+            return method
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+
     managed = get_managed_system()
     if managed:
         return managed.lower().replace(" ", "-")
-    if project_root is None:
-        project_root = Path(__file__).parent.parent.resolve()
-    if (project_root / ".git").is_dir():
+    if (root / ".git").is_dir():
         return "git"
     return "pip"
 
 
-def stamp_install_method(method: str) -> None:
-    """Write the install method to ~/.hermes/.install_method."""
-    stamp = get_hermes_home() / ".install_method"
+def _running_in_container() -> bool:
+    """Thin wrapper around ``hermes_constants.is_container`` (import-safe)."""
     try:
-        stamp.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        stamp.write_text(method + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        from hermes_constants import is_container
+
+        return is_container()
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
+
+def stamp_install_method(method: str, project_root: Optional[Path] = None) -> None:
+    """Write the install method next to the running code (code-scoped stamp).
+
+    The stamp lives in the install tree (``<install tree>/.install_method``),
+    not in ``$HERMES_HOME``, so that two installs sharing one data directory
+    do not overwrite each other's marker. See ``detect_install_method`` for
+    the full rationale.
+
+    Best-effort: if the install tree is read-only (e.g. the immutable
+    ``/opt/hermes`` in the published image, which instead bakes the stamp at
+    build time) the write silently no-ops and detection falls back to its
+    other signals.
+    """
+    root = _install_method_project_root(project_root)
+    try:
+        root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        (root / ".install_method").write_text(method + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
     except OSError:
         pass
 
@@ -853,6 +925,15 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
         # plausible-looking output when a real path is blocked.  Costs ~80
         # tokens in the cached system prompt.  Set False to disable globally.
         "task_completion_guidance": True,
+        # Universal parallel-tool-call guidance — short prompt block applied to
+        # all models that tells the model to batch independent tool calls
+        # (reads, searches, web fetches, read-only commands) into one turn
+        # instead of one call per turn.  The runtime already runs independent
+        # calls concurrently, so this just steers the model to produce the
+        # batch — cutting round-trips and the resent-context cost that
+        # compounds over a long conversation.  Costs ~70 tokens in the cached
+        # system prompt.  Set False to disable globally.
+        "parallel_tool_call_guidance": True,
         # Local-environment toolchain probe — surfaces Python/pip/uv/PEP-668
         # state in the system prompt when something non-default is detected
         # (e.g. python3 has no pip module, pip→python version mismatch, PEP
@@ -2424,11 +2505,14 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
     "updates": {
         # Run a full ``hermes backup``-style zip of HERMES_HOME before every
         # ``hermes update``.  Backups land in ``<HERMES_HOME>/backups/`` and
-        # can be restored with ``hermes import <path>``.  Off by default —
-        # on large HERMES_HOME directories the zip can add minutes to every
-        # update.  Set to true to re-enable, or pass ``--backup`` to opt in
-        # for a single update run.
-        "pre_update_backup": False,
+        # can be restored with ``hermes import <path>``.  Defaults to true
+        # after the #48200 incident: a ``hermes update --yes`` run that
+        # computed a wrong path silently wiped the user's ``.env``,
+        # ``MEMORY.md``, ``kanban.db``, custom skills, and scripts in one
+        # go.  The cost of a few minutes of zip time per update is
+        # negligible compared to the alternative.  Set to false to opt
+        # out, or pass ``--no-backup`` for a single update run.
+        "pre_update_backup": True,
         # How many pre-update backup zips to retain.  Older ones are pruned
         # automatically after each successful backup.  Values below 1 are
         # floored to 1 — the backup just created is always preserved.  To

hermes_cli/dump.py

@@ -56,6 +56,30 @@ def _get_git_commit(project_root: Path) -> str:
     return "(unknown)"
 
 
+def _get_git_commit_date(project_root: Path) -> str:
+    """Return the date the HEAD commit was authored (YYYY-MM-DD), or ''.
+
+    Resolves live via ``git log`` on source installs.  The published Docker
+    image excludes ``.git``, so this returns '' there — the dump line simply
+    drops the date suffix in that case (the baked SHA still identifies the
+    build).
+    """
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "log", "-1", "--format=%cd", "--date=short", "HEAD"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5,
+            cwd=str(project_root),
+        )
+        if result.returncode == 0:
+            value = result.stdout.strip()
+            if value:
+                return value
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+    return ""
+
+
 def _redact(value: str) -> str:
     """Redact all but first 4 and last 4 chars.
 
@@ -231,12 +255,12 @@ def run_dump(args):
     hermes_home = get_hermes_home()
 
     try:
-        from hermes_cli import __version__, __release_date__
+        from hermes_cli import __version__
     except ImportError:
         __version__ = "(unknown)"
-        __release_date__ = ""
 
     commit = _get_git_commit(project_root)
+    commit_date = _get_git_commit_date(project_root)
 
     try:
         config = load_config()
@@ -283,10 +307,14 @@ def run_dump(args):
 
     lines = []
     lines.append("--- hermes dump ---")
+    # Identify the build by commit + the date that commit was made, resolved
+    # live via git.  __release_date__ (the package release date) is
+    # intentionally NOT shown here — it reads like a wall-clock timestamp and
+    # confuses support triage.  The commit date is the real "as-of" date.
     ver_str = f"{__version__}"
-    if __release_date__:
-        ver_str += f" ({__release_date__})"
     ver_str += f" [{commit}]"
+    if commit_date:
+        ver_str += f" ({commit_date})"
     lines.append(f"version:          {ver_str}")
     lines.append(f"os:               {os_info}")
     lines.append(f"python:           {sys.version.split()[0]}")

hermes_cli/gateway_enroll.py

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+"""``hermes gateway enroll`` — enroll a self-hosted gateway with a relay connector.
+
+The connector⇄gateway channel is authenticated (the gateway may be
+customer-managed and internet-exposed). This command is the gateway half of the
+zero-touch enrollment in the connector repo's
+``docs/connector-gateway-auth-design.md``:
+
+  1. Resolve a fresh Nous Portal access token from the existing login
+     (``~/.hermes/auth.json``) — the same path ``hermes dashboard register``
+     uses (``resolve_nous_access_token``). This proves *which Nous org (tenant)*
+     the caller owns; the connector derives the authoritative tenant from it via
+     ``GET /api/oauth/account`` (never from anything the gateway asserts).
+  2. POST ``{enrollmentToken, gatewayId}`` to the connector's ``/relay/enroll``
+     with that token in the ``Authorization`` header, over TLS.
+  3. The connector verifies the enrollment token (signature + single-use +
+     tenant match), mints a per-gateway secret, get-or-creates the per-tenant
+     delivery key, and returns both ONCE.
+  4. Persist ``GATEWAY_RELAY_ID`` / ``GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET`` /
+     ``GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY`` (+ ``GATEWAY_RELAY_URL`` if supplied) into
+     ``~/.hermes/.env``. The per-gateway secret authenticates the WS upgrade;
+     the per-tenant delivery key verifies signed inbound deliveries.
+
+Managed/hosted installs do NOT self-enroll: the orchestrator (NAS) mints the
+secret directly and stamps it into the container env, so this command refuses to
+run under ``is_managed()`` (mirrors ``dashboard register``).
+
+EXPERIMENTAL: the relay auth scheme may change without a deprecation cycle until
+≥2 Class-1 platforms validate the contract.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import socket
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from typing import Optional
+
+
+def _default_gateway_id() -> str:
+    """A stable-ish default gateway instance id: ``<hostname>-<pid-free slug>``.
+
+    The gatewayId identifies this enrolled instance for kill-switch granularity
+    (the connector indexes its secret verify list by it). Default to the host
+    name so a human can recognize it; overridable via ``--gateway-id``.
+    """
+    host = ""
+    try:
+        host = socket.gethostname().strip()
+    except Exception:
+        host = ""
+    return f"gw-{host or 'hermes'}"
+
+
+def _resolve_connector_url(override: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Resolve the connector base URL (no trailing slash) for enrollment.
+
+    Precedence: explicit ``--connector-url`` flag > ``GATEWAY_RELAY_URL`` env >
+    ``gateway.relay_url`` in config.yaml. The relay URL is a ``ws(s)://`` dial
+    target; enrollment is an ``http(s)://`` POST to the same host, so we map the
+    scheme. Returns None when nothing is configured (the user must supply one).
+    """
+    raw = (override or os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_URL", "")).strip()
+    if not raw:
+        try:
+            from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config  # late import to avoid cycle
+
+            cfg = (_load_gateway_config().get("gateway") or {})
+            raw = str(cfg.get("relay_url", "") or "").strip()
+        except Exception:
+            raw = ""
+    if not raw:
+        return None
+    raw = raw.rstrip("/")
+    # The relay dial URL is ws(s)://…/relay; enrollment posts to http(s)://…/relay/enroll.
+    if raw.startswith("ws://"):
+        raw = "http://" + raw[len("ws://"):]
+    elif raw.startswith("wss://"):
+        raw = "https://" + raw[len("wss://"):]
+    # Strip a trailing /relay path segment if the user pasted the dial URL.
+    if raw.endswith("/relay"):
+        raw = raw[: -len("/relay")]
+    return raw
+
+
+def _post_enroll(
+    *,
+    connector_base_url: str,
+    access_token: str,
+    enrollment_token: str,
+    gateway_id: str,
+    timeout: float = 15.0,
+) -> dict:
+    """POST to the connector's ``/relay/enroll`` and return the JSON body.
+
+    Raises RuntimeError with a user-facing message on any non-2xx / transport
+    failure. The connector returns ``{secret, deliveryKey, tenant, gatewayId}``
+    on success, ``{error}`` at 400/401/403.
+    """
+    url = f"{connector_base_url.rstrip('/')}/relay/enroll"
+    data = json.dumps({"enrollmentToken": enrollment_token, "gatewayId": gateway_id}).encode("utf-8")
+    req = urllib.request.Request(
+        url,
+        data=data,
+        method="POST",
+        headers={
+            "Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}",
+            "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            "Accept": "application/json",
+        },
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
+            payload = json.loads(resp.read().decode())
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        detail = ""
+        try:
+            detail = (json.loads(exc.read().decode()) or {}).get("error", "")
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        if exc.code == 401:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "Connector rejected the caller identity (401). Your Nous Portal "
+                "token could not be verified — try `hermes auth login nous` and retry."
+            ) from exc
+        if exc.code == 403:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                detail
+                or "Enrollment token invalid, expired, already used, or tenant mismatch (403)."
+            ) from exc
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Connector returned HTTP {exc.code}" + (f": {detail}" if detail else "")
+        ) from exc
+    except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Could not reach the connector at {connector_base_url}: {exc.reason}"
+        ) from exc
+
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not payload.get("secret"):
+        raise RuntimeError("Connector returned an unexpected response (no secret).")
+    return payload
+
+
+def cmd_gateway_enroll(args) -> None:
+    """Enroll this gateway with a relay connector; persist the auth creds to .env."""
+    from hermes_cli.auth import AuthError, resolve_nous_access_token
+    from hermes_cli.config import is_managed, save_env_value
+
+    # Managed installs get GATEWAY_RELAY_* stamped in by the orchestrator (NAS
+    # mints the secret directly per the design's managed shape). Self-enrolling
+    # from inside such a container is a mistake — and save_env_value refuses to
+    # write anyway.
+    if is_managed():
+        print(
+            "✗ `hermes gateway enroll` is not available in a managed/hosted install.\n"
+            "  The relay gateway secret is provisioned by the hosting platform."
+        )
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    enrollment_token = (getattr(args, "token", None) or os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_ENROLL_TOKEN", "")).strip()
+    if not enrollment_token:
+        print(
+            "✗ No enrollment token. Pass --token <token> (or set "
+            "GATEWAY_RELAY_ENROLL_TOKEN).\n"
+            "  The connector mints this single-use token when your tenant's route "
+            "is provisioned; it is delivered with your gateway config."
+        )
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    connector_base_url = _resolve_connector_url(getattr(args, "connector_url", None))
+    if not connector_base_url:
+        print(
+            "✗ No connector URL. Pass --connector-url <url> (or set GATEWAY_RELAY_URL "
+            "/ gateway.relay_url in config.yaml)."
+        )
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    gateway_id = (getattr(args, "gateway_id", None) or _default_gateway_id()).strip()
+
+    # 1. Resolve a fresh Nous access token (the tenant-proving identity).
+    try:
+        access_token = resolve_nous_access_token()
+    except AuthError as exc:
+        if getattr(exc, "relogin_required", False):
+            print("✗ You're not logged into Nous Portal.")
+            print("  Run `hermes setup` (or `hermes auth login nous`) first, then retry.")
+        else:
+            print(f"✗ Could not resolve a Nous Portal access token: {exc}")
+        sys.exit(1)
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print(f"✗ Could not resolve a Nous Portal access token: {exc}")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    # 2-3. Redeem the enrollment token at the connector.
+    try:
+        result = _post_enroll(
+            connector_base_url=connector_base_url,
+            access_token=access_token,
+            enrollment_token=enrollment_token,
+            gateway_id=gateway_id,
+        )
+    except RuntimeError as exc:
+        print(f"✗ Enrollment failed: {exc}")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    secret = str(result.get("secret") or "")
+    delivery_key = str(result.get("deliveryKey") or "")
+    tenant = str(result.get("tenant") or "")
+    resolved_gateway_id = str(result.get("gatewayId") or gateway_id)
+
+    # 4. Persist the creds idempotently. The secret + delivery key are sensitive;
+    #    save_env_value writes them to ~/.hermes/.env (0600 dir) and never logs.
+    to_write = {
+        "GATEWAY_RELAY_ID": resolved_gateway_id,
+        "GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET": secret,
+        "GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY": delivery_key,
+    }
+    # Persist the connector URL too (as the ws(s):// dial target) when supplied
+    # explicitly, so the runtime can dial without re-specifying it.
+    explicit_url = (getattr(args, "connector_url", None) or "").strip()
+    if explicit_url:
+        to_write["GATEWAY_RELAY_URL"] = explicit_url.rstrip("/")
+
+    for key, value in to_write.items():
+        if not value:
+            continue
+        try:
+            save_env_value(key, value)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            print(f"✗ Failed to write {key} to .env: {exc}")
+            sys.exit(1)
+
+    from hermes_cli.config import get_env_path
+
+    print(f'✓ Enrolled gateway "{resolved_gateway_id}"' + (f" for tenant {tenant}" if tenant else ""))
+    print()
+    print(f"  Wrote to {get_env_path()}:")
+    print(f"    GATEWAY_RELAY_ID={resolved_gateway_id}")
+    print("    GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET=<hidden>")
+    print("    GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY=<hidden>")
+    if explicit_url:
+        print(f"    GATEWAY_RELAY_URL={explicit_url.rstrip('/')}")
+    print()
+    print(
+        "  The gateway now authenticates its relay WS upgrade with the per-gateway\n"
+        "  secret and verifies signed inbound deliveries with the tenant delivery\n"
+        "  key. Restart the gateway to pick up the new env."
+    )

hermes_cli/inventory.py

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ def build_models_payload(
     pricing: bool = False,
     capabilities: bool = False,
     force_fresh_nous_tier: bool = False,
-    max_models: int = 50,
+    max_models: int | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
     """Build the ``{providers, model, provider}`` shape every consumer
     needs from a single substrate call.

hermes_cli/main.py

@@ -5110,16 +5110,38 @@ def _purge_electron_build_cache(desktop_dir: Path) -> list[Path]:
     return removed
 
 
-def _electron_dist_binary(project_root: Path) -> Path:
-    """Return the path to the Electron main binary inside ``node_modules``.
+# Last-resort Electron mirror after GitHub download fails (#47266). Only used
+# when the user hasn't pinned ELECTRON_MIRROR.
+_ELECTRON_FALLBACK_MIRROR = "https://npmmirror.com/mirrors/electron/"
 
-    electron-builder reads the binary from ``build.electronDist``
-    (``node_modules/electron/dist``) since #38673, so this is the exact file
-    whose absence makes a pack fail with "The specified electronDist does not
-    exist". The basename differs per OS (the platform Electron is named for the
-    host the build runs on).
+
+def _electron_dir(project_root: Path) -> Path:
+    """Return the Electron package directory the desktop workspace installs.
+
+    npm may keep workspace-only dev dependencies under
+    ``apps/desktop/node_modules`` instead of hoisting them to the repo root.
+    Which layout you get depends on the npm version and what else is installed,
+    so a build path that assumes one or the other breaks intermittently across
+    machines. ``apps/desktop/package.json`` points electron-builder's
+    ``electronDist`` at ``node_modules/electron/dist`` relative to the desktop
+    project, so prefer the workspace-local package and fall back to the root
+    hoist when that's where npm landed it.
     """
-    dist = project_root / "node_modules" / "electron" / "dist"
+    desktop_local = project_root / "apps" / "desktop" / "node_modules" / "electron"
+    if desktop_local.exists():
+        return desktop_local
+    return project_root / "node_modules" / "electron"
+
+
+def _electron_dist_binary(project_root: Path) -> Path:
+    """Return the path to the Electron main binary inside the installed package.
+
+    electron-builder reads the binary from ``build.electronDist`` since #38673,
+    so this is the exact file whose absence makes a pack fail with "The
+    specified electronDist does not exist". The basename differs per OS (the
+    platform Electron is named for the host the build runs on).
+    """
+    dist = _electron_dir(project_root) / "dist"
     if sys.platform == "darwin":
         return dist / "Electron.app" / "Contents" / "MacOS" / "Electron"
     if sys.platform == "win32":
@@ -5141,35 +5163,27 @@ def _electron_dist_ok(project_root: Path) -> bool:
         return False
 
 
+def _electron_pkg_staged_missing_dist(project_root: Path) -> bool:
+    """electron staged (package.json + install.js) but dist missing — blocked postinstall."""
+    electron_dir = _electron_dir(project_root)
+    return (
+        (electron_dir / "package.json").is_file()
+        and (electron_dir / "install.js").is_file()
+        and not _electron_dist_ok(project_root)
+    )
+
+
 def _redownload_electron_dist(
     project_root: Path,
     env: dict,
     *,
     mirror: Optional[str] = None,
 ) -> bool:
-    """(Re)populate ``node_modules/electron/dist`` via electron's own downloader.
-
-    Since #38673 the desktop build pins ``build.electronDist`` to
-    ``node_modules/electron/dist``, so electron-builder reads the Electron binary
-    straight from there and never downloads it during ``npm run pack``. That dist
-    tree is produced by the ``electron`` package's postinstall (``install.js``)
-    during ``npm ci``. When that download is blocked or throttled (GitHub's
-    release host is unreachable in some regions — #47266), the dist is missing
-    and re-running ``pack`` only re-throws "The specified electronDist does not
-    exist". The mirror fallback therefore has to drive *this* downloader, not
-    another ``pack``.
-
-    No-op (returns True) when the dist binary is already present, so an unrelated
-    build failure doesn't trigger a needless ~200 MB re-download. Otherwise drops
-    any partial dist + version marker (electron's install.js short-circuits when
-    ``path.txt`` already matches) and runs the downloader once, optionally via a
-    mirror. Best-effort: never raises. Returns True iff the dist binary exists
-    afterward.
-    """
+    """Best-effort: run electron's install.js to populate dist/ (optional mirror)."""
     if _electron_dist_ok(project_root):
         return True
 
-    electron_dir = project_root / "node_modules" / "electron"
+    electron_dir = _electron_dir(project_root)
     installer = electron_dir / "install.js"
     if not installer.is_file():
         return False
@@ -5194,6 +5208,15 @@ def _redownload_electron_dist(
     return _electron_dist_ok(project_root)
 
 
+def _try_redownload_electron_dist(project_root: Path, env: dict) -> bool:
+    """Canonical download, then fallback mirror unless the user pinned one."""
+    if _redownload_electron_dist(project_root, env):
+        return True
+    if env.get("ELECTRON_MIRROR"):
+        return False
+    return _redownload_electron_dist(project_root, env, mirror=_ELECTRON_FALLBACK_MIRROR)
+
+
 def _stop_desktop_processes_locking_build(desktop_dir: Path) -> list[int]:
     """Terminate any running desktop app executing from this build's ``release``
     dir so a rebuild can replace its (otherwise locked) executable.
@@ -5387,8 +5410,8 @@ def cmd_gui(args: argparse.Namespace):
                 print("  Pre-build first:  cd apps/desktop && npm run build")
                 print("  Or drop --skip-build to install dependencies and build automatically.")
                 sys.exit(1)
-            if not (PROJECT_ROOT / "node_modules" / "electron" / "package.json").exists():
-                print("✗ --skip-build --source requires existing workspace dependencies.")
+            if not (_electron_dir(PROJECT_ROOT) / "package.json").exists():
+                print("✗ --skip-build --source requires existing desktop workspace dependencies.")
                 print(f"  Install first:  cd {PROJECT_ROOT} && npm ci")
                 print("  Or drop --skip-build to install dependencies and build automatically.")
                 sys.exit(1)
@@ -5416,9 +5439,18 @@ def cmd_gui(args: argparse.Namespace):
             nixos_env = _nixos_build_env()
             install_result = _run_npm_install_deterministic(npm, PROJECT_ROOT, capture_output=False, env=nixos_env)
             if install_result.returncode != 0:
-                print("✗ Desktop dependency install failed")
-                print(f"  Run manually:  cd {PROJECT_ROOT} && npm ci")
-                sys.exit(install_result.returncode or 1)
+                if not _electron_pkg_staged_missing_dist(PROJECT_ROOT):
+                    print("✗ Desktop dependency install failed")
+                    print(f"  Run manually:  cd {PROJECT_ROOT} && npm ci")
+                    sys.exit(install_result.returncode or 1)
+                repaired = _try_redownload_electron_dist(PROJECT_ROOT, env)
+                if repaired:
+                    print("  ⚠ Dependency install failed with a missing Electron dist; "
+                          "repopulated it and continuing.")
+                else:
+                    print("  ⚠ Dependency install failed with a missing Electron dist; "
+                          "continuing to the build so electron-builder can attempt "
+                          "the Electron fetch itself.")
 
             build_label = "source build" if source_mode else "packaged app"
             print(f"→ Building desktop {build_label}...")
@@ -5434,31 +5466,15 @@ def cmd_gui(args: argparse.Namespace):
                     print(f"  ⚠ Stopped running desktop app to free the build output (pid {', '.join(map(str, stopped))})")
             build_result = subprocess.run([npm, "run", build_script], cwd=desktop_dir, env=env, check=False)
             if build_result.returncode != 0 and not source_mode:
-                # A corrupt cached Electron zip makes `pack` fail with an ENOENT
-                # on the final `electron` -> `Hermes` rename: unpack-electron
-                # extracted a partial tree (missing the 193 MB binary) from the
-                # bad zip. We do NOT try to prove the zip is corrupt ourselves —
-                # stdlib zipfile silently tolerates the prepended/concatenated
-                # junk that is the most common corruption (a partial download
-                # resumed into the same file), so a `testzip()` gate would pass
-                # and never self-heal. Instead, on any packaged-build failure we
-                # purge the version's cached zip + the half-written unpacked dir
-                # and retry once: @electron/get re-downloads with its own SHASUM
-                # verification, which is the real source of truth. If the
-                # failure was something else, the clean re-download is harmless
-                # and the retry fails the same way.
-                purged = _purge_electron_build_cache(desktop_dir)
-                # electronDist is pinned to node_modules/electron/dist (#38673):
-                # electron-builder reads the Electron binary from there and `pack`
-                # never downloads it, so purging the cache + re-running pack can't
-                # by itself repopulate a missing/partial dist. When the dist is
-                # actually gone, re-run electron's own downloader so the retry has
-                # a binary to read. Gated on the dist check so an unrelated build
-                # failure (tsc/vite) doesn't trigger a pointless ~200 MB refetch.
+                # Corrupt cached Electron zip → partial unpack → ENOENT on rename.
+                # stdlib zipfile won't catch the common concat-junk case, so purge
+                # and retry once; @electron/get SHASUM is the real gate.
+                purged: list[Path] = []
                 restored = False
                 if not _electron_dist_ok(PROJECT_ROOT):
+                    purged = _purge_electron_build_cache(desktop_dir)
                     restored = _redownload_electron_dist(PROJECT_ROOT, env)
-                if purged or restored:
+                if restored:
                     print("  ⚠ Desktop build failed; refreshed the Electron download and retrying once...")
                     for p in purged:
                         print(f"    - {p}")
@@ -5467,35 +5483,16 @@ def cmd_gui(args: argparse.Namespace):
                     _stop_desktop_processes_locking_build(desktop_dir)
                     build_result = subprocess.run([npm, "run", build_script], cwd=desktop_dir, env=env, check=False)
             if build_result.returncode != 0 and not source_mode and not env.get("ELECTRON_MIRROR"):
-                # Still failing and the user hasn't pinned a mirror: GitHub's
-                # Electron release host is likely blocked/throttled (the repeating
-                # "retrying" download log). Retry once via npmmirror.com — the
-                # de-facto Electron community mirror (Alibaba). @electron/get
-                # SHASUM-checks the download, but the SHASUMS come from the same
-                # mirror, so that guards against a corrupt/partial download, NOT
-                # a compromised mirror: reaching for it is an explicit trust
-                # trade-off we only make AFTER the canonical GitHub download has
-                # failed, and we never override a user-pinned ELECTRON_MIRROR.
                 print("  ⚠ Desktop build still failing; the Electron download from "
                       "GitHub looks blocked. Re-downloading via a public mirror "
                       "(npmmirror.com)... (set ELECTRON_MIRROR to use another mirror)")
-                mirror = "https://npmmirror.com/mirrors/electron/"
+                mirror = _ELECTRON_FALLBACK_MIRROR
                 mirror_env = dict(env)
                 mirror_env["ELECTRON_MIRROR"] = mirror
-                # electronDist is pinned (#38673), so `npm run pack` never
-                # downloads Electron — the mirror only helps if it drives
-                # electron's own downloader. Re-fetch the binary through the
-                # mirror first; otherwise the retry just re-reads the same missing
-                # dist and re-throws "electronDist does not exist" (#47266).
-                have_dist = _electron_dist_ok(PROJECT_ROOT)
-                if not have_dist:
-                    have_dist = _redownload_electron_dist(PROJECT_ROOT, env, mirror=mirror)
-                if have_dist:
-                    _stop_desktop_processes_locking_build(desktop_dir)
-                    build_result = subprocess.run([npm, "run", build_script], cwd=desktop_dir, env=mirror_env, check=False)
-                else:
-                    print("  ✗ Could not re-download Electron from the mirror "
-                          "(node_modules/electron/dist still missing)")
+                if not _electron_dist_ok(PROJECT_ROOT):
+                    _redownload_electron_dist(PROJECT_ROOT, env, mirror=mirror)
+                _stop_desktop_processes_locking_build(desktop_dir)
+                build_result = subprocess.run([npm, "run", build_script], cwd=desktop_dir, env=mirror_env, check=False)
             if build_result.returncode != 0:
                 print("✗ Desktop GUI build failed")
                 print(f"  Run manually:  cd apps/desktop && npm run {build_script}")
@@ -6076,6 +6073,10 @@ def _update_via_zip(args):
             )
         if result.get("user_modified"):
             print(f"  ~ {len(result['user_modified'])} user-modified (kept)")
+            print(
+                "    → see them: hermes skills list-modified  "
+                "(diff/reset to resume updates)"
+            )
         if result.get("cleaned"):
             print(f"  − {len(result['cleaned'])} removed from manifest")
         if not result["copied"] and not result.get("updated"):
@@ -8117,7 +8118,13 @@ def _run_pre_update_backup(args) -> None:
         cfg = {}
 
     updates_cfg = cfg.get("updates", {}) if isinstance(cfg, dict) else {}
-    enabled = updates_cfg.get("pre_update_backup", False)
+    # The default config ships with ``pre_update_backup: true`` (see
+    # ``hermes_cli/config.py``). Fall back to true if the key is missing
+    # (e.g. a user has an older custom config without the field). The
+    # ``False`` default from before #48200 caused silent data loss when
+    # an update step computed a wrong path — the cost of a few minutes
+    # of zip time per update is negligible compared to the alternative.
+    enabled = updates_cfg.get("pre_update_backup", True)
     keep = updates_cfg.get("backup_keep", 5)
 
     if not enabled and not force_backup:
@@ -9064,6 +9071,10 @@ def _cmd_update_impl(args, gateway_mode: bool):
                 )
             if result.get("user_modified"):
                 print(f"  ~ {len(result['user_modified'])} user-modified (kept)")
+                print(
+                    "    → see them: hermes skills list-modified  "
+                    "(diff/reset to resume updates)"
+                )
             if result.get("cleaned"):
                 print(f"  − {len(result['cleaned'])} removed from manifest")
             if not result["copied"] and not result.get("updated"):
@@ -11010,6 +11021,13 @@ def cmd_dashboard_register(args):
     _impl(args)
 
 
+def cmd_gateway_enroll(args):
+    """Enroll a self-hosted gateway with a relay connector."""
+    from hermes_cli.gateway_enroll import cmd_gateway_enroll as _impl
+
+    _impl(args)
+
+
 def cmd_completion(args, parser=None):
     """Print shell completion script."""
     from hermes_cli.completion import generate_bash, generate_zsh, generate_fish
@@ -11702,7 +11720,9 @@ def main():
     # =========================================================================
     # gateway + proxy commands  (parsers built in hermes_cli/subcommands/gateway.py)
     # =========================================================================
-    build_gateway_parser(subparsers, cmd_gateway=cmd_gateway, cmd_proxy=cmd_proxy)
+    build_gateway_parser(
+        subparsers, cmd_gateway=cmd_gateway, cmd_proxy=cmd_proxy, cmd_gateway_enroll=cmd_gateway_enroll
+    )
 
     # =========================================================================
     # lsp command

hermes_cli/memory_setup.py

@@ -15,24 +15,50 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
 from hermes_cli.secret_prompt import masked_secret_prompt
 
+_CANCELLED = -1
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Curses-based interactive picker (same pattern as hermes tools)
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-def _curses_select(title: str, items: list[tuple[str, str]], default: int = 0) -> int:
+def _curses_select(
+    title: str,
+    items: list[tuple[str, str]],
+    default: int = 0,
+    *,
+    cancel_returns: int | None = None,
+) -> int:
     """Interactive single-select with arrow keys.
 
     items: list of (label, description) tuples.
-    Returns selected index, or default on escape/quit.
+    Returns selected index, or cancel_returns/default on escape/quit.
     """
     from hermes_cli.curses_ui import curses_radiolist
+
+    if cancel_returns is None:
+        cancel_returns = default
+
     # Format (label, desc) tuples into display strings
     display_items = [
-        f"{label}  {desc}" if desc else label
+        f"{label} - {desc}" if desc else label
         for label, desc in items
     ]
-    return curses_radiolist(title, display_items, selected=default, cancel_returns=default)
+    result = curses_radiolist(title, display_items, selected=default, cancel_returns=cancel_returns)
+    _clear_interactive_transition()
+    return result
+
+
+def _print_cancelled_setup() -> None:
+    print("\n  Cancelled. No changes saved.\n")
+
+
+def _clear_interactive_transition() -> None:
+    """Clear stale curses content before entering a follow-up setup screen."""
+    if not sys.stdout.isatty():
+        return
+    sys.stdout.write("\033[2J\033[H")
+    sys.stdout.flush()
 
 
 def _prompt(label: str, default: str | None = None, secret: bool = False) -> str:
@@ -205,6 +231,8 @@ def cmd_setup_provider(provider_name: str) -> None:
 
     name, _, provider = match
 
+    _clear_interactive_transition()
+
     _install_dependencies(name)
 
     config = load_config()
@@ -241,14 +269,17 @@ def cmd_setup(args) -> None:
     items.append(("Built-in only", "— MEMORY.md / USER.md (default)"))
 
     builtin_idx = len(items) - 1
-    selected = _curses_select("Memory provider setup", items, default=builtin_idx)
+    selected = _curses_select("Memory provider setup", items, default=builtin_idx, cancel_returns=_CANCELLED)
+    if selected == _CANCELLED:
+        _print_cancelled_setup()
+        return
 
     config = load_config()
     if not isinstance(config.get("memory"), dict):
         config["memory"] = {}
 
     # Built-in only
-    if selected >= len(providers) or selected < 0:
+    if selected >= len(providers):
         config["memory"]["provider"] = ""
         save_config(config)
         print("\n  ✓ Memory provider: built-in only")
@@ -257,6 +288,8 @@ def cmd_setup(args) -> None:
 
     name, _, provider = providers[selected]
 
+    _clear_interactive_transition()
+
     # Install pip dependencies if declared in plugin.yaml
     _install_dependencies(name)
 
@@ -309,7 +342,10 @@ def cmd_setup(args) -> None:
                 current_idx = 0
                 if current and current in choices:
                     current_idx = choices.index(current)
-                sel = _curses_select(f"  {desc}", choice_items, default=current_idx)
+                sel = _curses_select(f"  {desc}", choice_items, default=current_idx, cancel_returns=_CANCELLED)
+                if sel == _CANCELLED:
+                    _print_cancelled_setup()
+                    return
                 provider_config[key] = choices[sel]
             elif is_secret:
                 # Prompt for secret
@@ -407,43 +443,53 @@ def cmd_status(args) -> None:
     print(f"  Built-in:  always active")
     print(f"  Provider:  {provider_name or '(none — built-in only)'}")
 
+    providers = _get_available_providers()
+    provider = None
+    for pname, _, candidate in providers:
+        if pname == provider_name:
+            provider = candidate
+            break
+
     if provider_name:
         provider_config = mem_config.get(provider_name, {})
-        if provider_config:
+        display_config = provider_config
+        if provider and hasattr(provider, "get_status_config"):
+            try:
+                display_config = provider.get_status_config(provider_config)
+            except Exception as e:
+                display_config = dict(provider_config) if isinstance(provider_config, dict) else provider_config
+                if isinstance(display_config, dict):
+                    display_config["status_config_error"] = str(e)
+
+        if display_config:
             print(f"\n  {provider_name} config:")
-            for key, val in provider_config.items():
+            for key, val in display_config.items():
                 print(f"    {key}: {val}")
 
-        providers = _get_available_providers()
-        found = any(name == provider_name for name, _, _ in providers)
-        if found:
+        if provider:
             print(f"\n  Plugin:    installed ✓")
-            for pname, _, p in providers:
-                if pname == provider_name:
-                    if p.is_available():
-                        print(f"  Status:    available ✓")
-                    else:
-                        print(f"  Status:    not available ✗")
-                        schema = p.get_config_schema() if hasattr(p, "get_config_schema") else []
-                        # Check all fields that have env_var (both secret and non-secret)
-                        required_fields = [f for f in schema if f.get("env_var")]
-                        if required_fields:
-                            print(f"  Missing:")
-                            for f in required_fields:
-                                env_var = f.get("env_var", "")
-                                url = f.get("url", "")
-                                is_set = bool(os.environ.get(env_var))
-                                mark = "✓" if is_set else "✗"
-                                line = f"    {mark} {env_var}"
-                                if url and not is_set:
-                                    line += f"  → {url}"
-                                print(line)
-                    break
+            if provider.is_available():
+                print(f"  Status:    available ✓")
+            else:
+                print(f"  Status:    not available ✗")
+                schema = provider.get_config_schema() if hasattr(provider, "get_config_schema") else []
+                # Check all fields that have env_var (both secret and non-secret)
+                required_fields = [f for f in schema if f.get("env_var")]
+                if required_fields:
+                    print(f"  Missing:")
+                    for f in required_fields:
+                        env_var = f.get("env_var", "")
+                        url = f.get("url", "")
+                        is_set = bool(os.environ.get(env_var))
+                        mark = "✓" if is_set else "✗"
+                        line = f"    {mark} {env_var}"
+                        if url and not is_set:
+                            line += f"  → {url}"
+                        print(line)
         else:
             print(f"\n  Plugin:    NOT installed ✗")
             print(f"  Install the '{provider_name}' memory plugin to ~/.hermes/plugins/")
 
-    providers = _get_available_providers()
     if providers:
         print(f"\n  Installed plugins:")
         for pname, desc, _ in providers:

hermes_cli/model_switch.py

@@ -1188,7 +1188,6 @@ def prewarm_picker_cache_async() -> Optional["_threading.Thread"]:
                 current_model=ctx.current_model,
                 user_providers=ctx.user_providers,
                 custom_providers=ctx.custom_providers,
-                max_models=50,
             )
         except Exception:
             # Best-effort warmup — never surface errors into the session.
@@ -1206,7 +1205,7 @@ def list_authenticated_providers(
     custom_providers: list | None = None,
     *,
     force_fresh_nous_tier: bool = False,
-    max_models: int = 8,
+    max_models: int | None = None,
     current_model: str = "",
 ) -> List[dict]:
     """Detect which providers have credentials and list their curated models.
@@ -1426,7 +1425,7 @@ def list_authenticated_providers(
             if hermes_id in _MODELS_DEV_PREFERRED:
                 model_ids = _merge_with_models_dev(hermes_id, model_ids)
         total = len(model_ids)
-        top = model_ids[:max_models]
+        top = model_ids[:max_models] if max_models is not None else model_ids
 
         slug = hermes_id
         pinfo = _mdev_pinfo(mdev_id)
@@ -1589,7 +1588,7 @@ def list_authenticated_providers(
                 if hermes_slug in _MODELS_DEV_PREFERRED:
                     model_ids = _merge_with_models_dev(hermes_slug, model_ids)
         total = len(model_ids)
-        top = model_ids[:max_models]
+        top = model_ids[:max_models] if max_models is not None else model_ids
 
         results.append({
             "slug": hermes_slug,
@@ -1664,7 +1663,7 @@ def list_authenticated_providers(
             if not _cp_model_ids:
                 _cp_model_ids = curated.get(_cp.slug, [])
         _cp_total = len(_cp_model_ids)
-        _cp_top = _cp_model_ids[:max_models]
+        _cp_top = _cp_model_ids[:max_models] if max_models is not None else _cp_model_ids
 
         results.append({
             "slug": _cp.slug,
@@ -1813,7 +1812,7 @@ def list_authenticated_providers(
             "name": "Custom endpoint",
             "is_current": True,
             "is_user_defined": True,
-            "models": _models[:max_models] if max_models else _models,
+            "models": _models[:max_models] if max_models is not None else _models,
             "total_models": len(_models),
             "source": "model-config",
             "api_url": str(current_base_url).strip().rstrip("/"),
@@ -2040,7 +2039,7 @@ def list_picker_providers(
     current_base_url: str = "",
     user_providers: dict = None,
     custom_providers: list | None = None,
-    max_models: int = 8,
+    max_models: int | None = None,
     current_model: str = "",
 ) -> List[dict]:
     """Interactive-picker variant of :func:`list_authenticated_providers`.
@@ -2083,7 +2082,7 @@ def list_picker_providers(
             except Exception:
                 live_ids = list(p.get("models", []))
             p = dict(p)
-            p["models"] = live_ids[:max_models]
+            p["models"] = live_ids[:max_models] if max_models is not None else live_ids
             p["total_models"] = len(live_ids)
 
         has_models = bool(p.get("models"))

hermes_cli/nous_billing.py

@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+"""Nous Portal terminal-billing HTTP client (Phase 2b).
+
+Thin, fail-loud client for the four ``/api/billing/*`` endpoints the terminal
+billing screens drive. Companion to ``hermes_cli/nous_account.py`` (which owns
+read-only entitlement/balance) — this module owns the *write* side: buy credits,
+poll a charge, configure auto-reload.
+
+Design rules:
+
+- **Money is decimal, never float.** The server emits decimal STRINGS
+  (``"142.5"`` — not fixed 2dp). We parse with :class:`decimal.Decimal` and never
+  round-trip through float.
+- **This client raises typed exceptions; it does NOT fail open.** Fail-open is the
+  *caller's* job (the ``agent/billing_view.py`` builders) so each surface can
+  decide how to degrade. A raw network/HTTP error here surfaces as
+  :class:`BillingError` (or a subclass) carrying the parsed server ``error`` code,
+  HTTP status, ``portalUrl`` deep-link, and ``retry_after``.
+- **Auth** = the OAuth bearer JWT Hermes already holds for inference
+  (``get_provider_auth_state("nous")["access_token"]``). No API-key auth on these.
+- **Portal base URL** resolves with the same precedence as the device-flow login
+  (``auth.py``): ``HERMES_PORTAL_BASE_URL`` → ``NOUS_PORTAL_BASE_URL`` → the
+  stored auth-state ``portal_base_url`` → the registry default. This is how the
+  E2E run points the client at a preview deployment with zero code change.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from typing import Any, Optional
+
+DEFAULT_PORTAL_BASE_URL = "https://portal.nousresearch.com"
+
+# Default HTTP timeout (seconds). Charge/poll calls are quick; keep this tight so
+# a hung portal doesn't freeze the TUI.
+DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 15.0
+
+# Scope the privileged billing endpoints require. Mirrored from
+# hermes_cli.auth.NOUS_BILLING_MANAGE_SCOPE (kept here too so this module has no
+# import-time dependency on the much heavier auth module).
+BILLING_MANAGE_SCOPE = "billing:manage"
+
+
+# =============================================================================
+# Typed errors
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+class BillingError(Exception):
+    """A billing HTTP call failed.
+
+    Carries everything a surface needs to render the right message + affordance:
+    the server ``error`` code, HTTP ``status``, an optional human ``message``, the
+    ``portalUrl`` deep-link (present on every gate denial), and ``retry_after``
+    seconds (429/503). ``payload`` is the full parsed JSON body when available.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        message: str,
+        *,
+        status: Optional[int] = None,
+        error: Optional[str] = None,
+        portal_url: Optional[str] = None,
+        retry_after: Optional[int] = None,
+        payload: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.status = status
+        self.error = error
+        self.portal_url = portal_url
+        self.retry_after = retry_after
+        self.payload = payload or {}
+
+
+class BillingScopeRequired(BillingError):
+    """``403 insufficient_scope`` — the held token lacks ``billing:manage``.
+
+    The lazy step-up trigger: catching this kicks off a fresh device-connect that
+    requests ``billing:manage`` (and tells the user an ADMIN must tick "Allow
+    terminal billing"). Also fires mid-session if the scope is stripped on refresh
+    after the user loses ADMIN.
+    """
+
+
+class BillingRateLimited(BillingError):
+    """``429 rate_limited`` or ``503 temporarily_unavailable``.
+
+    NOT a payment failure. Carries ``retry_after`` (seconds) — back off and tell
+    the user "try again in N min"; never auto-retry-spam (the limiter is
+    5/org/hr + 5/token/hr and easy to dig deeper into).
+    """
+
+
+class BillingAuthError(BillingError):
+    """``401`` — missing/invalid bearer token (not logged in / expired)."""
+
+
+# =============================================================================
+# Base-URL + auth resolution
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+def resolve_portal_base_url(state: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = None) -> str:
+    """Resolve the portal base URL with login-time precedence.
+
+    ``HERMES_PORTAL_BASE_URL`` → ``NOUS_PORTAL_BASE_URL`` → stored auth-state
+    ``portal_base_url`` → registry default. Trailing slash stripped.
+    """
+    env = os.getenv("HERMES_PORTAL_BASE_URL") or os.getenv("NOUS_PORTAL_BASE_URL")
+    if env and env.strip():
+        return env.strip().rstrip("/")
+    if state:
+        stored = state.get("portal_base_url")
+        if isinstance(stored, str) and stored.strip():
+            return stored.strip().rstrip("/")
+    return DEFAULT_PORTAL_BASE_URL
+
+
+def _absolutize_portal_url(portal_url: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Resolve a (possibly relative) server portalUrl to an absolute URL.
+
+    The server emits ``portalUrl`` relative by design (e.g. ``/billing?topup=open``)
+    — it doesn't know which deployment the client points at. Resolve it against the
+    client's portal base (preview / staging / prod) so deep-links are clickable.
+    Idempotent: an already-absolute URL is returned unchanged (urljoin keeps it).
+    """
+    if not (isinstance(portal_url, str) and portal_url.strip()):
+        return portal_url
+    base = resolve_portal_base_url()
+    # urljoin needs a trailing slash on the base to treat it as a directory and
+    # join an absolute path like "/billing?..." against the host. An already-
+    # absolute portal_url (with its own scheme/host) is returned as-is.
+    return urllib.parse.urljoin(base.rstrip("/") + "/", portal_url)
+
+
+# Short-lived cache for the resolved (token, base). `resolve_nous_access_token`
+# acquires two cross-process file locks + reads two files on every call (even on
+# its fast path), which is wasteful when the 2s/5-min charge poll loop calls a
+# billing endpoint ~150x per purchase. Cache the result briefly: the resolver
+# only ever returns a token with >=120s of life (its refresh skew), so a 30s
+# cache can never hand back an about-to-expire token. A 401 still surfaces
+# normally (the cache holds a valid token, not the HTTP outcome).
+_TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 30.0
+_token_cache: tuple[float, str, str] | None = None  # (cached_at, token, base)
+
+
+def _billing_not_logged_in(exc: Optional[BaseException] = None) -> "BillingAuthError":
+    """Build the canonical 'not logged in' BillingAuthError (single source)."""
+    err = BillingAuthError(
+        "Not logged into Nous Portal — run `hermes portal` to log in.",
+        status=401,
+        error="invalid_token",
+    )
+    if exc is not None:
+        err.__cause__ = exc
+    return err
+
+
+def _resolve_token_and_base(*, use_cache: bool = True) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Return ``(access_token, portal_base_url)`` for billing calls.
+
+    Uses the same refresh-aware resolver the inference path uses
+    (``resolve_nous_access_token``), so a short-lived (~15 min) access token that
+    has expired is transparently refreshed via the stored ``refresh_token``
+    instead of failing as "not logged in". Raises :class:`BillingAuthError` only
+    when there is no usable Nous session at all.
+
+    The result is cached for ``_TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS`` to keep the charge poll
+    loop from re-locking + re-reading the auth store on every 2s tick. Pass
+    ``use_cache=False`` to force a fresh resolution (e.g. after a 401).
+    """
+    global _token_cache
+    import time as _time
+
+    if use_cache and _token_cache is not None:
+        cached_at, token, base = _token_cache
+        if (_time.time() - cached_at) < _TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS:
+            return token, base
+
+    try:
+        from hermes_cli.auth import get_provider_auth_state
+
+        state = get_provider_auth_state("nous") or {}
+    except Exception:
+        state = {}
+
+    base = resolve_portal_base_url(state)
+
+    try:
+        from hermes_cli.auth import AuthError, resolve_nous_access_token
+    except ImportError:
+        # auth module unavailable — fall back to the raw stored token.
+        token = state.get("access_token")
+        if isinstance(token, str) and token.strip():
+            resolved = (token.strip(), base)
+            _token_cache = (_time.time(), *resolved)
+            return resolved
+        raise _billing_not_logged_in()
+
+    try:
+        token = resolve_nous_access_token()
+    except AuthError as exc:
+        raise _billing_not_logged_in(exc) from exc
+    resolved = (token.strip(), base)
+    _token_cache = (_time.time(), *resolved)
+    return resolved
+
+
+# =============================================================================
+# HTTP plumbing
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+def _retry_after_seconds(headers: Any) -> Optional[int]:
+    """Parse a ``Retry-After`` header (integer seconds) — None if absent/bad."""
+    if headers is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        raw = headers.get("Retry-After")
+    except Exception:
+        raw = None
+    if raw is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        return int(str(raw).strip())
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
+def _raise_for_error(
+    status: int, payload: dict[str, Any], headers: Any = None
+) -> None:
+    """Map an HTTP error response to the right typed :class:`BillingError`."""
+    error = payload.get("error") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
+    message = payload.get("message") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
+    portal_url = _absolutize_portal_url(
+        payload.get("portalUrl") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
+    )
+    retry_after = _retry_after_seconds(headers)
+
+    common = {
+        "status": status,
+        "error": error,
+        "portal_url": portal_url,
+        "retry_after": retry_after,
+        "payload": payload if isinstance(payload, dict) else None,
+    }
+
+    if status == 401:
+        raise BillingAuthError(message or "Authentication required.", **common)
+    if status == 403 and error == "insufficient_scope":
+        raise BillingScopeRequired(
+            message or "This action needs the billing:manage scope.", **common
+        )
+    if status in (429, 503):
+        raise BillingRateLimited(
+            message or "Rate limited — try again shortly.", **common
+        )
+    raise BillingError(message or error or f"Billing request failed ({status}).", **common)
+
+
+def _request(
+    method: str,
+    path: str,
+    *,
+    body: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = None,
+    extra_headers: Optional[dict[str, str]] = None,
+    timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
+    _retried_auth: bool = False,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Make an authenticated billing request; return the parsed JSON dict.
+
+    Raises a typed :class:`BillingError` on any non-2xx response (or transport
+    failure). 2xx with an empty body returns ``{}``. A 401 triggers exactly one
+    retry with a freshly-resolved token (bypassing the short token cache) so a
+    cached-but-just-expired token self-heals instead of failing the call.
+    """
+    token, base = _resolve_token_and_base(use_cache=not _retried_auth)
+    url = f"{base}{path}"
+    headers = {
+        "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
+        "Accept": "application/json",
+    }
+    if body is not None:
+        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+    if extra_headers:
+        headers.update(extra_headers)
+
+    data = json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8") if body is not None else None
+    req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
+
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
+            raw = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
+            return json.loads(raw) if raw.strip() else {}
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        # A 401 on a cached token → drop the cache and retry once with a fresh
+        # (refresh-aware) resolve before surfacing the auth error.
+        if exc.code == 401 and not _retried_auth:
+            global _token_cache
+            _token_cache = None
+            return _request(
+                method,
+                path,
+                body=body,
+                extra_headers=extra_headers,
+                timeout=timeout,
+                _retried_auth=True,
+            )
+        raw = ""
+        try:
+            raw = exc.read().decode("utf-8")
+        except Exception:
+            raw = ""
+        try:
+            payload = json.loads(raw) if raw.strip() else {}
+        except json.JSONDecodeError:
+            payload = {}
+        _raise_for_error(exc.code, payload, getattr(exc, "headers", None))
+        raise  # unreachable; _raise_for_error always raises
+    except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
+        raise BillingError(
+            f"Could not reach Nous Portal: {exc.reason}", error="network_error"
+        ) from exc
+
+
+# =============================================================================
+# The four endpoints
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+def get_billing_state(*, timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """``GET /api/billing/state`` — role-tiered overview (no scope required)."""
+    return _request("GET", "/api/billing/state", timeout=timeout)
+
+
+def patch_auto_top_up(
+    *,
+    enabled: bool,
+    threshold: float | str,
+    top_up_amount: float | str,
+    timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """``PATCH /api/billing/auto-top-up`` — configure auto-reload (scope required).
+
+    Body is strict server-side: extra keys (``maxMonthlySpend``, a payment method)
+    are rejected with 400. Numbers are sent as JSON numbers per the contract.
+    """
+    return _request(
+        "PATCH",
+        "/api/billing/auto-top-up",
+        body={
+            "enabled": bool(enabled),
+            "threshold": float(threshold),
+            "topUpAmount": float(top_up_amount),
+        },
+        timeout=timeout,
+    )
+
+
+def post_charge(
+    *,
+    amount_usd: float | str,
+    idempotency_key: str,
+    timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """``POST /api/billing/charge`` — buy credits (scope required).
+
+    ``Idempotency-Key`` header is MANDATORY (a missing header is a server 400, not
+    a default): generate a UUID per user-confirmed purchase and reuse it on retry.
+    Returns ``202 {chargeId}`` — money is NOT confirmed yet; poll with
+    :func:`get_charge_status`.
+    """
+    if not (isinstance(idempotency_key, str) and idempotency_key.strip()):
+        raise BillingError(
+            "Idempotency-Key is required for a charge.",
+            error="idempotency_key_required",
+        )
+    return _request(
+        "POST",
+        "/api/billing/charge",
+        body={"amountUsd": float(amount_usd)},
+        extra_headers={"Idempotency-Key": idempotency_key.strip()},
+        timeout=timeout,
+    )
+
+
+def get_charge_status(
+    charge_id: str, *, timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """``GET /api/billing/charge/{id}`` — poll a charge (scope required).
+
+    Returns ``{status: "pending"|"settled"|"failed", ...}``. An unknown or foreign
+    id returns ``{status:"pending"}`` (never 404, never another org's data) — so a
+    ``pending`` that never resolves past the 5-min cap is a *timeout*, not an error.
+    """
+    if not (isinstance(charge_id, str) and charge_id.strip()):
+        raise BillingError("A charge id is required.", error="invalid_charge_id")
+    # urllib does not need manual quoting for the opaque ids the server mints, but
+    # guard against a stray slash that would change the path shape.
+    safe_id = urllib.parse.quote(charge_id.strip(), safe="")
+    return _request("GET", f"/api/billing/charge/{safe_id}", timeout=timeout)

hermes_cli/runtime_provider.py

@@ -713,6 +713,69 @@ def find_custom_provider_identity(base_url: str) -> Optional[str]:
     return None
 
 
+def canonical_custom_identity(
+    *,
+    base_url: Optional[str] = None,
+    config_provider: Optional[str] = None,
+) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Recover a routable ``custom:<name>`` identity for a bare custom provider.
+
+    The bare string ``"custom"`` is the *resolved billing class* shared by
+    every named ``providers:`` / ``custom_providers:`` entry — it is NOT a
+    routable provider identity (``resolve_runtime_provider("custom")`` falls
+    through to the OpenRouter default URL with no api_key, which surfaces to
+    the user as "No LLM provider configured").
+
+    Any code path that persists or restores a session's provider override
+    must run the resolved provider through this helper so a bare ``"custom"``
+    is upgraded back to its durable ``custom:<name>`` menu key. Two recovery
+    sources, in priority order:
+
+    1. ``base_url`` — reverse-lookup the entry that owns the endpoint URL
+       (the one fact that always survives the persistence round-trip when a
+       URL was recorded).
+    2. ``config_provider`` — the active ``config.model.provider`` (or its
+       ``provider``/``HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER`` equivalent). When the agent
+       was built without a base_url on the override (the recurring
+       Desktop/TUI regression vector), the configured provider is the only
+       durable identity left, so fall back to it when it names a real entry.
+
+    Returns ``custom:<name>`` when a routable identity is recovered, else
+    ``None`` (caller keeps whatever it had — bare ``"custom"`` only as a last
+    resort, e.g. a genuine ad-hoc endpoint with no config entry).
+    """
+    # 1. Reverse-lookup by endpoint URL.
+    if base_url:
+        identity = find_custom_provider_identity(base_url)
+        if identity:
+            return identity
+
+    # 2. Fall back to the configured provider when it names a real entry.
+    candidate = str(config_provider or "").strip()
+    if not candidate:
+        try:
+            candidate = str(_get_model_config().get("provider") or "").strip()
+        except Exception:
+            candidate = ""
+    if not candidate:
+        candidate = os.environ.get("HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER", "").strip()
+
+    candidate_norm = _normalize_custom_provider_name(candidate)
+    # A bare/non-routable candidate cannot heal a bare custom override.
+    if not candidate_norm or candidate_norm in {"custom", "auto", "openrouter"}:
+        return None
+    # Only return it when it actually resolves to a configured custom entry,
+    # so we never invent a `custom:<x>` that resolution can't honor.
+    try:
+        if _get_named_custom_provider(candidate) is not None:
+            if candidate_norm.startswith("custom:"):
+                return candidate_norm
+            return f"custom:{candidate_norm}"
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    return None
+
+
 def _normalize_base_url_for_match(value) -> str:
     return str(value or "").strip().rstrip("/").lower()
 

hermes_cli/secret_prompt.py

@@ -27,16 +27,16 @@ def _collect_masked_input(
     while True:
         ch = read_char()
         if ch == "":
-            write("\n")
+            write("\r\n")
             raise EOFError
         if ch in _ENTER_CHARS:
-            write("\n")
+            write("\r\n")
             return "".join(value)
         if ch == "\x03":
-            write("\n")
+            write("\r\n")
             raise KeyboardInterrupt
         if ch in _EOF_CHARS:
-            write("\n")
+            write("\r\n")
             raise EOFError
         if ch in _BACKSPACE_CHARS:
             if value:

hermes_cli/service_manager.py

@@ -684,10 +684,25 @@ class S6ServiceManager:
         # start`, etc. See `_gateway_command_inner` for the matching
         # guard.
         lines.append("export HERMES_S6_SUPERVISED_CHILD=1")
+        # ``--replace`` makes the supervised gateway authoritative for its
+        # profile's HERMES_HOME. Without it, a gateway started OUTSIDE s6
+        # (a stray ``hermes gateway run`` from a shell, an agent action, or
+        # the Open WebUI helper) grabs the per-HERMES_HOME PID lock first;
+        # the supervised slot then execs a bare ``gateway run``, hits the
+        # "Another gateway instance is already running" guard, exits
+        # non-zero, and s6 restarts it — a restart loop that floods the
+        # log and never binds (NS-505). ``--replace``
+        # instead reaps the stale holder (hardened takeover path: marker +
+        # SIGTERM→SIGKILL-with-confirmation + scoped-lock cleanup, see
+        # gateway/run.py) so s6 always wins. The HERMES_S6_SUPERVISED_CHILD
+        # sentinel above prevents the run→start→run redirect recursion.
+        # Each profile is scoped to its own HERMES_HOME and s6 guarantees a
+        # single supervised instance per slot, so there is no legitimate
+        # supervised sibling for ``--replace`` to clobber.
         if profile == "default":
-            gateway_cmd = "hermes gateway run"
+            gateway_cmd = "hermes gateway run --replace"
         else:
-            gateway_cmd = f"hermes -p {shlex.quote(profile)} gateway run"
+            gateway_cmd = f"hermes -p {shlex.quote(profile)} gateway run --replace"
         # Skip the drop when already non-root (setgroups() lacks CAP_SETGID →
         # s6 boot-loop).
         lines.append(f'[ "$(id -u)" = 0 ] || exec {gateway_cmd}')

hermes_cli/skills_hub.py

@@ -1149,6 +1149,73 @@ def do_reset(name: str, restore: bool = False,
         c.print("[dim]Use /reset to start a new session now, or --now to apply immediately (invalidates prompt cache).[/]\n")
 
 
+def do_list_modified(console: Optional[Console] = None,
+                     as_json: bool = False) -> None:
+    """List bundled skills the user has edited (which `hermes update` keeps)."""
+    from tools.skills_sync import list_user_modified_bundled_skills
+
+    c = console or _console
+    modified = list_user_modified_bundled_skills()
+
+    if as_json:
+        import json
+
+        c.print(json.dumps([m["name"] for m in modified]))
+        return
+
+    if not modified:
+        c.print("[dim]No user-modified bundled skills — everything tracks upstream.[/]\n")
+        return
+
+    c.print(f"\n[bold]{len(modified)} user-modified bundled skill(s)[/] "
+            "[dim](kept as-is by `hermes update`):[/]")
+    for entry in modified:
+        c.print(f"  [yellow]~[/] {entry['name']}")
+    c.print()
+    c.print("[dim]See changes:   hermes skills diff <name>[/]")
+    c.print("[dim]Resume updates: hermes skills reset <name>          (keep your copy, re-baseline)[/]")
+    c.print("[dim]Revert to stock: hermes skills reset <name> --restore[/]\n")
+
+
+def do_diff(name: str, console: Optional[Console] = None) -> None:
+    """Show how the user's copy of a bundled skill differs from the stock version."""
+    from tools.skills_sync import diff_bundled_skill
+
+    c = console or _console
+    result = diff_bundled_skill(name)
+
+    if not result["ok"]:
+        c.print(f"[bold red]Error:[/] {result['message']}\n")
+        return
+
+    if not result["modified"]:
+        c.print(f"[green]{result['message']}[/]\n")
+        return
+
+    c.print(f"\n[bold]{result['message']}[/]\n")
+    for entry in result["diffs"]:
+        status = entry["status"]
+        if status == "modified":
+            # Render the unified diff with light coloring.
+            for line in entry["diff"].splitlines():
+                if line.startswith("+") and not line.startswith("+++"):
+                    c.print(f"[green]{line}[/]")
+                elif line.startswith("-") and not line.startswith("---"):
+                    c.print(f"[red]{line}[/]")
+                elif line.startswith("@@"):
+                    c.print(f"[cyan]{line}[/]")
+                else:
+                    c.print(line, highlight=False)
+        elif status == "added":
+            c.print(f"[green]+ only in your copy:[/] {entry['path']}")
+        elif status == "removed":
+            c.print(f"[red]- only in stock:[/] {entry['path']}")
+        else:  # binary
+            c.print(f"[yellow]~ {entry['path']}:[/] binary file differs")
+    c.print()
+    c.print(f"[dim]Revert with: hermes skills reset {name} --restore[/]\n")
+
+
 def do_opt_out(remove: bool = False,
                console: Optional[Console] = None,
                skip_confirm: bool = False,
@@ -1624,6 +1691,10 @@ def skills_command(args) -> None:
     elif action == "reset":
         do_reset(args.name, restore=getattr(args, "restore", False),
                  skip_confirm=getattr(args, "yes", False))
+    elif action == "list-modified":
+        do_list_modified(as_json=getattr(args, "json", False))
+    elif action == "diff":
+        do_diff(args.name)
     elif action == "opt-out":
         do_opt_out(remove=getattr(args, "remove", False),
                    skip_confirm=getattr(args, "yes", False))
@@ -1654,7 +1725,7 @@ def skills_command(args) -> None:
             return
         do_tap(tap_action, repo=repo)
     else:
-        _console.print("Usage: hermes skills [browse|search|install|inspect|list|check|update|audit|uninstall|reset|opt-out|opt-in|publish|snapshot|tap]\n")
+        _console.print("Usage: hermes skills [browse|search|install|inspect|list|list-modified|diff|check|update|audit|uninstall|reset|opt-out|opt-in|publish|snapshot|tap]\n")
         _console.print("Run 'hermes skills <command> --help' for details.\n")
 
 
@@ -1826,6 +1897,15 @@ def handle_skills_slash(cmd: str, console: Optional[Console] = None) -> None:
         do_reset(name, restore=restore, console=c, skip_confirm=True,
                  invalidate_cache=invalidate_cache)
 
+    elif action in {"list-modified", "modified"}:
+        do_list_modified(console=c, as_json="--json" in args)
+
+    elif action == "diff":
+        if not args:
+            c.print("[bold red]Usage:[/] /skills diff <name>\n")
+            return
+        do_diff(args[0], console=c)
+
     elif action == "publish":
         if not args:
             c.print("[bold red]Usage:[/] /skills publish <skill-path> [--to github] [--repo owner/repo]\n")
@@ -1883,6 +1963,8 @@ def _print_skills_help(console: Console) -> None:
         "  [cyan]update[/] [name]               Update hub skills with upstream changes\n"
         "  [cyan]audit[/] [name]                Re-scan hub skills for security\n"
         "  [cyan]uninstall[/] <name>            Remove a hub-installed skill\n"
+        "  [cyan]list-modified[/]               List bundled skills you've edited (kept by update)\n"
+        "  [cyan]diff[/] <name>                 Diff your copy of a bundled skill vs the stock version\n"
         "  [cyan]reset[/] <name> [--restore]    Reset bundled-skill tracking (fix 'user-modified' flag)\n"
         "  [cyan]publish[/] <path> --repo <r>   Publish a skill to GitHub via PR\n"
         "  [cyan]snapshot[/] export|import      Export/import skill configurations\n"

hermes_cli/subcommands/gateway.py

@@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ def _add_compat_platform_flag(parser: argparse.ArgumentParser) -> None:
     )
 
 
-def build_gateway_parser(subparsers, *, cmd_gateway: Callable, cmd_proxy: Callable) -> None:
+def build_gateway_parser(
+    subparsers, *, cmd_gateway: Callable, cmd_proxy: Callable, cmd_gateway_enroll: Callable
+) -> None:
     """Attach the ``gateway`` and ``proxy`` subcommands to ``subparsers``."""
     # =========================================================================
     # gateway command
@@ -236,6 +238,52 @@ def build_gateway_parser(subparsers, *, cmd_gateway: Callable, cmd_proxy: Callab
         help="Skip the confirmation prompt",
     )
 
+    # gateway enroll — enroll a self-hosted gateway with a relay connector
+    # (connector⇄gateway auth). Redeems a single-use enrollment token for the
+    # per-gateway secret + per-tenant delivery key and writes them to .env.
+    # See docs/relay-connector-contract.md (and the connector repo's
+    # docs/connector-gateway-auth-design.md). EXPERIMENTAL.
+    gateway_enroll = gateway_subparsers.add_parser(
+        "enroll",
+        help="Enroll this gateway with a relay connector (writes relay auth creds to .env)",
+        description=(
+            "Redeem a single-use enrollment token with a relay connector. "
+            "Authenticates as your Nous Portal account (the connector derives the "
+            "authoritative tenant from it), mints this gateway's per-gateway secret "
+            "and per-tenant delivery key, and writes GATEWAY_RELAY_ID / "
+            "GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET / GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY into ~/.hermes/.env. "
+            "Requires being logged in (hermes setup). Not available in managed installs."
+        ),
+    )
+    gateway_enroll.add_argument(
+        "--token",
+        default=None,
+        help=(
+            "The single-use enrollment token from the connector (delivered with "
+            "your gateway config). Also settable via GATEWAY_RELAY_ENROLL_TOKEN."
+        ),
+    )
+    gateway_enroll.add_argument(
+        "--connector-url",
+        dest="connector_url",
+        default=None,
+        help=(
+            "The connector base/relay URL, e.g. wss://connector.example.com/relay "
+            "or https://connector.example.com. Also settable via GATEWAY_RELAY_URL "
+            "/ gateway.relay_url in config.yaml."
+        ),
+    )
+    gateway_enroll.add_argument(
+        "--gateway-id",
+        dest="gateway_id",
+        default=None,
+        help=(
+            "A stable id for this gateway instance (kill-switch granularity). "
+            "Defaults to gw-<hostname>."
+        ),
+    )
+    gateway_enroll.set_defaults(func=cmd_gateway_enroll)
+
     # =========================================================================
     # proxy command — local OpenAI-compatible proxy that attaches the user's
     # OAuth-authenticated provider credentials to outbound requests. Lets

hermes_cli/subcommands/skills.py

@@ -164,6 +164,35 @@ def build_skills_parser(subparsers, *, cmd_skills: Callable) -> None:
         help="Skip confirmation prompt when using --restore",
     )
 
+    skills_list_modified = skills_subparsers.add_parser(
+        "list-modified",
+        help="List bundled skills you've edited (which `hermes update` keeps)",
+        description=(
+            "Show the bundled skills whose local copy differs from the version last "
+            "synced, i.e. the ones `hermes update` reports as user-modified and skips. "
+            "Use `hermes skills diff <name>` to see changes and `hermes skills reset "
+            "<name>` to resume updates."
+        ),
+    )
+    skills_list_modified.add_argument(
+        "--json",
+        action="store_true",
+        help="Output the list as JSON",
+    )
+
+    skills_diff = skills_subparsers.add_parser(
+        "diff",
+        help="Show how your copy of a bundled skill differs from the stock version",
+        description=(
+            "Print a unified diff between your local copy of a bundled skill and the "
+            "current bundled (stock) version, so you can confirm what changed before "
+            "running `hermes skills reset`."
+        ),
+    )
+    skills_diff.add_argument(
+        "name", help="Skill name to diff (e.g. google-workspace)"
+    )
+
     skills_opt_out = skills_subparsers.add_parser(
         "opt-out",
         help="Stop bundled skills from being seeded into this profile",

hermes_cli/web_server.py

@@ -70,7 +70,10 @@ from gateway.status import (
 from utils import env_var_enabled
 
 try:
-    from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request, WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect
+    from fastapi import (
+        FastAPI, File, Form, HTTPException, Request, UploadFile,
+        WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect,
+    )
     from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
     from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, Response
     from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
@@ -82,7 +85,10 @@ except ImportError:
     try:
         from tools.lazy_deps import ensure as _lazy_ensure
         _lazy_ensure("tool.dashboard", prompt=False)
-        from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request, WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect
+        from fastapi import (
+            FastAPI, File, Form, HTTPException, Request, UploadFile,
+            WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect,
+        )
         from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
         from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, Response
         from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
@@ -1486,6 +1492,74 @@ async def upload_managed_file(payload: ManagedFileUpload, request: Request):
     }
 
 
+# Stream uploads to disk in fixed-size chunks. The legacy JSON endpoint above
+# buffers the whole file as a base64 data URL in a JSON body, which (a) inflates
+# the payload ~33%, (b) holds the entire file (plus its decoded copy) in memory,
+# and (c) reliably trips upstream proxy body-size/timeout limits with a 502 on
+# large backup archives (NS-501). This multipart endpoint reads the request body
+# in 1 MiB chunks straight to a temp file, enforces the size cap as it goes, and
+# atomically renames into place — constant memory, no base64 inflation.
+_UPLOAD_CHUNK_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
+
+
+@app.post("/api/files/upload-stream")
+async def upload_managed_file_stream(
+    request: Request,
+    file: UploadFile = File(...),
+    path: str = Form(...),
+    overwrite: bool = Form(True),
+):
+    policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(path, request, for_write=True)
+    if target.exists() and target.is_dir():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="A directory already exists at that path")
+    if target.exists() and not overwrite:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="File already exists")
+
+    try:
+        target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    except PermissionError:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not create parent directory: {exc}")
+
+    # Write to a sibling temp file first so a partial/aborted upload never
+    # clobbers an existing file, then atomically rename into place.
+    tmp_fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
+        prefix=f".{target.name}.", suffix=".upload", dir=str(target.parent)
+    )
+    tmp_path = Path(tmp_name)
+    total = 0
+    try:
+        with os.fdopen(tmp_fd, "wb") as out:
+            while True:
+                chunk = await file.read(_UPLOAD_CHUNK_BYTES)
+                if not chunk:
+                    break
+                total += len(chunk)
+                if total > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
+                    raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File is too large")
+                out.write(chunk)
+        os.replace(tmp_path, target)
+    except HTTPException:
+        tmp_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise
+    except PermissionError:
+        tmp_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
+    except OSError as exc:
+        tmp_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not write file: {exc}")
+    finally:
+        await file.close()
+
+    return {
+        "ok": True,
+        "entry": _managed_file_entry(policy, target),
+        "path": display_path,
+        **_managed_response_meta(policy),
+    }
+
+
 @app.post("/api/files/mkdir")
 async def create_managed_directory(payload: ManagedDirectoryCreate, request: Request):
     policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(payload.path, request, for_write=True)
@@ -3249,7 +3323,6 @@ def get_model_options(profile: Optional[str] = None):
         with _profile_scope(profile):
             return build_models_payload(
                 load_picker_context(),
-                max_models=50,
                 include_unconfigured=True,
                 picker_hints=True,
                 canonical_order=True,
@@ -3324,7 +3397,7 @@ def get_recommended_default_model(provider: str = ""):
     try:
         from hermes_cli.inventory import build_models_payload, load_picker_context
 
-        payload = build_models_payload(load_picker_context(), max_models=50)
+        payload = build_models_payload(load_picker_context())
         for row in payload.get("providers", []):
             if str(row.get("slug", "")).lower() == slug:
                 models = row.get("models") or []
@@ -7519,17 +7592,35 @@ async def list_mcp_catalog(profile: Optional[str] = None):
             }
         for entry in catalog_entries:
             auth = entry.auth
+            transport = entry.transport
+            install = entry.install
             entries.append({
                 "name": entry.name,
                 "description": entry.description,
                 "source": entry.source,
-                "transport": entry.transport.type,
+                "transport": transport.type,
                 "auth_type": getattr(auth, "type", "none"),
                 # Env vars the user must supply (names + prompts only, never values).
                 "required_env": [
                     {"name": e.name, "prompt": e.prompt, "required": e.required}
                     for e in getattr(auth, "env", []) or []
                 ],
+                # Transport details so the UI can show exactly what connects/runs.
+                # The trust model (docs: user-guide/features/mcp) tells users to
+                # inspect command/args/url and the install bootstrap before
+                # installing — surface them rather than hiding them in the repo.
+                "command": transport.command,
+                "args": list(transport.args or []),
+                "url": transport.url,
+                # Git bootstrap (present only for entries that clone + build).
+                "install_url": install.url if install else None,
+                "install_ref": install.ref if install else None,
+                "bootstrap": list(install.bootstrap) if install else [],
+                # Default tool pre-selection hint and post-install guidance.
+                "default_enabled": list(entry.tools.default_enabled)
+                if entry.tools.default_enabled is not None
+                else None,
+                "post_install": entry.post_install or "",
                 "needs_install": entry.install is not None,
                 "installed": installed_state.get(entry.name, (False, False))[0],
                 "enabled": installed_state.get(entry.name, (False, False))[1],

hermes_logging.py

@@ -32,10 +32,39 @@ import logging
 import os
 import sys
 import threading
-from logging.handlers import RotatingFileHandler
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Optional, Sequence
 
+# On Windows, stdlib ``RotatingFileHandler`` calls ``os.rename()`` in
+# ``doRollover()`` and fails with ``PermissionError [WinError 32]`` whenever
+# another process holds an append-mode handle on ``agent.log`` — which is
+# essentially always in Hermes (TUI, gateway, ``hy_memory`` server, MCP
+# servers, and on-demand CLI commands all log from separate processes),
+# pinning ``agent.log`` at the 5 MiB threshold and spamming stderr with
+# a traceback on every emit. ``concurrent-log-handler`` wraps the rename in a
+# cross-process file lock (via ``portalocker``: pywin32 on Windows) so only
+# one process rotates at a time and the others wait their turn.
+#
+# This swap is Windows-ONLY and deliberately so:
+#   * The bug (WinError 32 on rename-while-open) is specific to Windows file
+#     locking semantics — POSIX renames an open file fine, so stdlib already
+#     works correctly on Linux/macOS.
+#   * On POSIX, managed-mode (NixOS) relies on the exact ``_open()`` /
+#     ``doRollover()`` lifecycle of stdlib ``RotatingFileHandler`` (the
+#     ``_ManagedRotatingFileHandler`` subclass chmods 0660 after each). CLH
+#     opens lazily and rotates differently, which breaks the group-writable
+#     guarantee and the eager file-creation those paths depend on.
+# Aliasing keeps every existing ``RotatingFileHandler`` reference in this
+# module (class declaration, ``isinstance`` checks, docstring) working
+# unchanged. See #44873.
+if sys.platform == "win32":
+    from concurrent_log_handler import (  # noqa: E402
+        ConcurrentRotatingFileHandler as RotatingFileHandler,
+    )
+else:
+    from logging.handlers import RotatingFileHandler  # noqa: E402
+
+
 from hermes_constants import get_config_path, get_hermes_home
 
 # Sentinel to track whether setup_logging() has already run.  The function

nix/lib.nix

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ let
 
   # Single npm deps fetch from the workspace root lockfile.
   # All workspace packages share this derivation.
-  npmDepsHash = "sha256-m9cjbjzi4SaFCjODfdrawS5e+1ag+MpRn528/upSNqo=";
+  npmDepsHash = "sha256-kbjJksq7limRIYqP3DwI+GNgCXkG96tXcsQqmuEedxo=";
 
   npmDeps = pkgs.fetchNpmDeps {
     inherit src;

optional-mcps/unreal-engine/manifest.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Nous-approved MCP catalog entry.
+# Presence in this directory = approval. Merged via PR review.
+manifest_version: 1
+
+name: unreal-engine
+description: Drive the Unreal Engine 5.8 editor over its local MCP server.
+source: https://dev.epicgames.com/documentation/unreal-engine/unreal-mcp-in-unreal-editor
+
+# Epic's official "Unreal MCP" plugin (internal id ModelContextProtocol)
+# embeds an MCP server inside the running Unreal Editor process and serves it
+# over local HTTP. There is nothing to install on the Hermes side — the user
+# enables the plugin in-editor and the server binds to 127.0.0.1. Hermes's
+# MCP client just connects to the URL.
+#
+# Default bind is http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp (port + path are configurable in
+# Editor Preferences > General > Model Context Protocol). If you change the
+# port/path in-editor, edit the url in mcp_servers.unreal-engine afterward.
+transport:
+  type: http
+  url: http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp
+
+# The editor-embedded server accepts connections only from the same machine
+# and has no authentication of its own (Epic's experimental design — not for
+# remote use). Nothing to prompt for.
+auth:
+  type: none
+
+# Tool selection at install time:
+# The plugin advertises engine tools (spawn actors, configure lighting, create
+# material instances, inspect Slate widgets, run automation tests) and is
+# user-extensible, so the exact surface depends on the project's enabled
+# toolsets. Leave default_enabled unset — the install-time probe lists whatever
+# the live editor exposes and pre-checks all of it; users prune from there.
+
+post_install: |
+  This entry connects to Epic's official Unreal MCP plugin, which runs INSIDE
+  the Unreal Editor. Before Hermes can connect:
+
+    1. Open your project in Unreal Editor 5.8+.
+    2. Edit > Plugins, search "Unreal MCP", enable it, restart the editor
+       (the Toolset Registry dependency enables automatically).
+    3. Edit > Editor Preferences > General > Model Context Protocol, turn on
+       "Auto Start Server" (or run `ModelContextProtocol.StartServer` in the
+       editor console). It binds to http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp by default.
+
+  Start Hermes AFTER the editor's server is running so the tools are probed.
+  If you changed the port or URL path in Editor Preferences, update the url in
+  mcp_servers.unreal-engine to match.
+
+  Status: Epic ships this as EXPERIMENTAL. The server runs Tool calls serially
+  on the engine game thread — avoid issuing overlapping calls.
+
+  Re-run the tool checklist any time with:
+    hermes mcp configure unreal-engine

plugins/memory/hindsight/__init__.py

@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ class HindsightMemoryProvider(MemoryProvider):
         from hermes_cli.config import save_config
         from hermes_cli.secret_prompt import masked_secret_prompt
 
-        from hermes_cli.memory_setup import _curses_select
+        from hermes_cli.memory_setup import _CANCELLED, _curses_select, _print_cancelled_setup
 
         print("\n  Configuring Hindsight memory:\n")
 
@@ -719,7 +719,10 @@ class HindsightMemoryProvider(MemoryProvider):
         ]
         existing_mode = existing_config.get("mode")
         mode_default_idx = mode_values.index(existing_mode) if existing_mode in mode_values else 0
-        mode_idx = _curses_select("  Select mode", mode_items, default=mode_default_idx)
+        mode_idx = _curses_select("  Select mode", mode_items, default=mode_default_idx, cancel_returns=_CANCELLED)
+        if mode_idx == _CANCELLED:
+            _print_cancelled_setup()
+            return
         mode = mode_values[mode_idx]
 
         provider_config: dict = dict(existing_config)
@@ -737,6 +740,27 @@ class HindsightMemoryProvider(MemoryProvider):
         else:
             deps_to_install = [cloud_dep]
 
+        llm_provider = ""
+        if mode == "local_embedded":
+            providers_list = list(_PROVIDER_DEFAULT_MODELS.keys())
+            llm_items = [
+                (p, f"default model: {_PROVIDER_DEFAULT_MODELS[p]}")
+                for p in providers_list
+            ]
+            existing_llm_provider = provider_config.get("llm_provider")
+            llm_default_idx = providers_list.index(existing_llm_provider) if existing_llm_provider in providers_list else 0
+            llm_idx = _curses_select(
+                "  Select LLM provider",
+                llm_items,
+                default=llm_default_idx,
+                cancel_returns=_CANCELLED,
+            )
+            if llm_idx == _CANCELLED:
+                _print_cancelled_setup()
+                return
+            llm_provider = providers_list[llm_idx]
+            provider_config["llm_provider"] = llm_provider
+
         print("\n  Checking dependencies...")
         uv_path = shutil.which("uv")
         if not uv_path:
@@ -785,18 +809,6 @@ class HindsightMemoryProvider(MemoryProvider):
                 env_writes["HINDSIGHT_API_KEY"] = api_key
 
         else:  # local_embedded
-            providers_list = list(_PROVIDER_DEFAULT_MODELS.keys())
-            llm_items = [
-                (p, f"default model: {_PROVIDER_DEFAULT_MODELS[p]}")
-                for p in providers_list
-            ]
-            existing_llm_provider = provider_config.get("llm_provider")
-            llm_default_idx = providers_list.index(existing_llm_provider) if existing_llm_provider in providers_list else 0
-            llm_idx = _curses_select("  Select LLM provider", llm_items, default=llm_default_idx)
-            llm_provider = providers_list[llm_idx]
-
-            provider_config["llm_provider"] = llm_provider
-
             if llm_provider == "openai_compatible":
                 existing_base_url = provider_config.get("llm_base_url", "")
                 prompt = "  LLM endpoint URL (e.g. http://192.168.1.10:8080/v1)"

plugins/memory/openviking/README.md

@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ Context database by Volcengine (ByteDance) with filesystem-style knowledge hiera
 hermes memory setup    # select "openviking"
 ```
 
+The setup can link to an existing `~/.openviking/ovcli.conf`, copy its current
+connection values into Hermes, or create a minimal `ovcli.conf` when one does
+not exist.
+
 Or manually:
 ```bash
 hermes config set memory.provider openviking
@@ -27,7 +31,14 @@ All config via environment variables in `.env`:
 | Env Var | Default | Description |
 |---------|---------|-------------|
 | `OPENVIKING_ENDPOINT` | `http://127.0.0.1:1933` | Server URL |
-| `OPENVIKING_API_KEY` | (none) | API key (optional) |
+| `OPENVIKING_API_KEY` | (none) | User/admin API key for authenticated servers |
+| `OPENVIKING_ACCOUNT` | `default` | Tenant account for local/trusted mode |
+| `OPENVIKING_USER` | `default` | Tenant user for local/trusted mode |
+| `OPENVIKING_AGENT` | `hermes` | Hermes peer ID in OpenViking, used for peer-scoped memories |
+
+When `OPENVIKING_API_KEY` is set, Hermes lets OpenViking derive account/user
+identity from the key. In local or trusted deployments without an API key,
+Hermes sends `OPENVIKING_ACCOUNT` and `OPENVIKING_USER` as identity headers.
 
 ## Tools
 

plugins/memory/openviking/plugin.yaml

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ version: 2.0.0
 description: "OpenViking context database — session-managed memory with automatic extraction, tiered retrieval, and filesystem-style knowledge browsing."
 pip_dependencies:
   - httpx
-requires_env:
-  - OPENVIKING_ENDPOINT
+requires_env: []
 hooks:
   - on_session_end

plugins/observability/langfuse/__init__.py

@@ -54,6 +54,15 @@ class TraceState:
 
 _STATE_LOCK = threading.Lock()
 _TRACE_STATE: Dict[str, TraceState] = {}
+# Hard cap on live trace state. Each turn keys _TRACE_STATE by a unique
+# turn_id, and an entry is normally reclaimed by _finish_trace when a turn
+# ends cleanly (final response has content and no tool calls). A turn that
+# never reaches that state — interrupted, a tool-only final step, or empty
+# final content — would otherwise linger forever, so over the cap we evict
+# the least-recently-updated entries (ending their root span first). The cap
+# is far above any realistic concurrent-live-turn working set; it exists only
+# to bound the leak from non-finalizing turns, not to limit concurrency.
+_MAX_TRACE_STATE = 256
 _LANGFUSE_CLIENT = None
 _READ_FILE_LINE_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(\d+)\|(.*)$")
 _READ_FILE_HEAD_LINES = 25
@@ -219,14 +228,43 @@ def _get_langfuse() -> Optional[Langfuse]:
     return _LANGFUSE_CLIENT
 
 
-def _trace_key(task_id: str, session_id: str) -> str:
+def _scope_prefix(task_id: str, session_id: str) -> str:
+    """The task/session/thread prefix shared by every trace-key shape."""
     if task_id:
-        return task_id
+        return f"task:{task_id}"
     if session_id:
         return f"session:{session_id}"
     return f"thread:{threading.get_ident()}"
 
 
+def _trace_key(
+    task_id: str,
+    session_id: str,
+    *,
+    turn_id: str = "",
+    api_request_id: str = "",
+) -> str:
+    """Build a stable in-process trace scope key for one agent turn.
+
+    Older Hermes paths only expose ``task_id``/``session_id``. Newer paths
+    pass ``turn_id`` and ``api_request_id`` in LLM/tool hooks; when present,
+    they must scope trace state so concurrent requests sharing one task/session
+    never collide. ``turn_id`` is preferred over ``api_request_id`` so the
+    turn-level ``post_llm_call`` hook (which carries ``turn_id`` but no
+    ``api_request_id``) resolves to the same key as the request-level hooks.
+    """
+    if turn_id:
+        return f"{_scope_prefix(task_id, session_id)}:turn:{turn_id}"
+    if api_request_id:
+        return f"{_scope_prefix(task_id, session_id)}:api:{api_request_id}"
+    # Legacy shape: a bare ``task_id`` (NOT the ``task:`` prefix) when present,
+    # otherwise the session/thread prefix. Kept distinct for backward
+    # compatibility with keys minted before turn/request scoping existed.
+    if task_id:
+        return task_id
+    return _scope_prefix(task_id, session_id)
+
+
 def _is_base64_data_uri(value: str) -> bool:
     prefix = value[:200].lower()
     return prefix.startswith("data:") and ";base64," in prefix
@@ -563,12 +601,15 @@ def _usage_and_cost(response: Any, *, provider: str, api_mode: str, model: str,
 
 
 def _start_root_trace(task_key: str, *, task_id: str, session_id: str, platform: str, provider: str, model: str,
-                      api_mode: str, messages: Any, client: Langfuse) -> TraceState:
+                      api_mode: str, messages: Any, client: Langfuse,
+                      turn_id: str = "", api_request_id: str = "") -> TraceState:
     trace_id = client.create_trace_id(seed=f"{session_id or 'sessionless'}::{task_id or task_key}")
     trace_input = _extract_last_user_message(messages)
     metadata = {
         "source": "hermes",
         "task_id": task_id,
+        "turn_id": turn_id,
+        "api_request_id": api_request_id,
         "platform": platform,
         "provider": provider,
         "model": model,
@@ -669,6 +710,30 @@ def _merge_trace_output(output: Any, state: TraceState) -> Any:
     return merged
 
 
+def _evict_stale_locked() -> None:
+    """Drop least-recently-updated trace state to make room for a new entry.
+
+    Caller MUST hold ``_STATE_LOCK`` and call this immediately before inserting
+    one new entry. Bounds the leak from turns that never reach ``_finish_trace``
+    (interrupted / tool-only final step / empty final content), whose unique
+    per-turn key would otherwise linger forever. We evict down to
+    ``_MAX_TRACE_STATE - 1`` so that the about-to-be-added entry leaves the dict
+    at ``_MAX_TRACE_STATE`` — a true ceiling. The evicted entry's root span is
+    ended so it is not left dangling on the Langfuse side.
+    """
+    over = len(_TRACE_STATE) - (_MAX_TRACE_STATE - 1)
+    if over <= 0:
+        return
+    # Oldest-first by last_updated_at; evict just enough to make room.
+    stale = sorted(_TRACE_STATE.items(), key=lambda kv: kv[1].last_updated_at)[:over]
+    for key, state in stale:
+        _TRACE_STATE.pop(key, None)
+        try:
+            state.root_span.end()
+        except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - fail-open
+            _debug(f"evict stale trace failed: {exc}")
+
+
 def _finish_trace(task_key: str, *, output: Any = None) -> None:
     client = _get_langfuse()
     if client is None:
@@ -712,7 +777,8 @@ def _request_key(api_call_count: Any) -> str:
 def on_pre_llm_call(*, task_id: str = "", session_id: str = "", platform: str = "", model: str = "",
                     provider: str = "", base_url: str = "", api_mode: str = "",
                     api_call_count: int = 0, messages: Any = None, turn_type: str = "user",
-                    conversation_history: Any = None, user_message: Any = None, **_: Any) -> None:
+                    conversation_history: Any = None, user_message: Any = None,
+                    turn_id: str = "", api_request_id: str = "", **_: Any) -> None:
     # Older Hermes branches used pre_llm_call for request-scoped tracing and
     # passed the actual API messages. Current Hermes also has a turn-scoped
     # pre_llm_call used for context injection; tracing that hook creates an
@@ -729,7 +795,12 @@ def on_pre_llm_call(*, task_id: str = "", session_id: str = "", platform: str =
     # pre_llm_call with API messages directly. Current Hermes fires
     # pre_llm_call for context injection (conversation_history/user_message,
     # no messages list) — tracing that would create orphan traces.
-    task_key = _trace_key(task_id, session_id)
+    task_key = _trace_key(
+        task_id,
+        session_id,
+        turn_id=turn_id,
+        api_request_id=api_request_id,
+    )
 
     with _STATE_LOCK:
         state = _TRACE_STATE.get(task_key)
@@ -744,7 +815,10 @@ def on_pre_llm_call(*, task_id: str = "", session_id: str = "", platform: str =
                 api_mode=api_mode,
                 messages=messages,
                 client=client,
+                turn_id=turn_id,
+                api_request_id=api_request_id,
             )
+            _evict_stale_locked()
             _TRACE_STATE[task_key] = state
         state.last_updated_at = time.time()
 
@@ -769,6 +843,8 @@ def on_pre_llm_request(
     max_tokens: Any = None,
     conversation_history: Any = None,
     user_message: Any = None,
+    turn_id: str = "",
+    api_request_id: str = "",
     **_: Any,
 ) -> None:
     client = _get_langfuse()
@@ -782,7 +858,12 @@ def on_pre_llm_request(
         user_message=user_message,
     )
 
-    task_key = _trace_key(task_id, session_id)
+    task_key = _trace_key(
+        task_id,
+        session_id,
+        turn_id=turn_id,
+        api_request_id=api_request_id,
+    )
     req_key = _request_key(api_call_count)
 
     with _STATE_LOCK:
@@ -798,7 +879,10 @@ def on_pre_llm_request(
                 api_mode=api_mode,
                 messages=input_messages,
                 client=client,
+                turn_id=turn_id,
+                api_request_id=api_request_id,
             )
+            _evict_stale_locked()
             _TRACE_STATE[task_key] = state
         state.last_updated_at = time.time()
         previous = state.generations.pop(req_key, None)
@@ -827,12 +911,18 @@ def on_post_llm_call(*, task_id: str = "", session_id: str = "", provider: str =
                      api_duration: float = 0.0, finish_reason: str = "",
                      usage: Any = None, assistant_content_chars: int = 0,
                      assistant_tool_call_count: int = 0, assistant_response: Any = None,
+                     turn_id: str = "", api_request_id: str = "",
                      **_: Any) -> None:
     client = _get_langfuse()
     if client is None:
         return
 
-    task_key = _trace_key(task_id, session_id)
+    task_key = _trace_key(
+        task_id,
+        session_id,
+        turn_id=turn_id,
+        api_request_id=api_request_id,
+    )
     req_key = _request_key(api_call_count)
 
     with _STATE_LOCK:
@@ -950,12 +1040,18 @@ def on_post_llm_call(*, task_id: str = "", session_id: str = "", provider: str =
 
 
 def on_pre_tool_call(*, tool_name: str = "", args: Any = None, task_id: str = "",
-                     session_id: str = "", tool_call_id: str = "", **_: Any) -> None:
+                     session_id: str = "", tool_call_id: str = "",
+                     turn_id: str = "", api_request_id: str = "", **_: Any) -> None:
     client = _get_langfuse()
     if client is None:
         return
 
-    task_key = _trace_key(task_id, session_id)
+    task_key = _trace_key(
+        task_id,
+        session_id,
+        turn_id=turn_id,
+        api_request_id=api_request_id,
+    )
 
     with _STATE_LOCK:
         state = _TRACE_STATE.get(task_key)
@@ -976,8 +1072,14 @@ def on_pre_tool_call(*, tool_name: str = "", args: Any = None, task_id: str = ""
 
 
 def on_post_tool_call(*, tool_name: str = "", args: Any = None, result: Any = None,
-                      task_id: str = "", session_id: str = "", tool_call_id: str = "", **_: Any) -> None:
-    task_key = _trace_key(task_id, session_id)
+                      task_id: str = "", session_id: str = "", tool_call_id: str = "",
+                      turn_id: str = "", api_request_id: str = "", **_: Any) -> None:
+    task_key = _trace_key(
+        task_id,
+        session_id,
+        turn_id=turn_id,
+        api_request_id=api_request_id,
+    )
     observation = None
 
     with _STATE_LOCK:

plugins/platforms/photon/README.md

@@ -131,10 +131,13 @@ All env vars are documented in `plugin.yaml`. The most important:
   the bytes (`content.read()`) and base64-inlines them on the NDJSON event; the
   adapter caches them to the shared media cache and populates `media_urls` /
   `media_types`, so the agent sees the real image/file or can transcribe the
-  voice note — parity with the BlueBubbles iMessage channel. Media larger than
-  `PHOTON_MAX_INLINE_ATTACHMENT_BYTES` (default 20 MB), or any byte read that
-  fails, falls back to a text marker (`[Photon attachment received: …]` or
-  `[Photon voice received: …]`) so the agent still knows something arrived.
+  voice note — parity with the BlueBubbles iMessage channel. Mixed iMessage
+  bubbles that contain both text and attachments are normalized as a grouped
+  payload so the user's typed text is preserved alongside the cached media.
+  Media larger than `PHOTON_MAX_INLINE_ATTACHMENT_BYTES` (default 20 MB), or
+  any byte read that fails, falls back to a text marker (`[Photon attachment
+  received: …]` or `[Photon voice received: …]`) so the agent still knows
+  something arrived.
 - **Outbound attachments are supported.** Images, voice notes, video, and
   documents are sent via `space.send(attachment(...))` /
   `space.send(voice(...))` through the sidecar's `/send-attachment`

plugins/platforms/photon/adapter.py

@@ -508,6 +508,38 @@ class PhotonAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         media_urls: List[str] = []
         media_types: List[str] = []
 
+        def _normalize_binary_payload(
+            payload: Dict[str, Any]
+        ) -> tuple[str, MessageType, List[str], List[str]]:
+            is_voice = payload.get("type") == "voice"
+            name = payload.get("name") or ("voice" if is_voice else "(unnamed)")
+            mime = payload.get("mimeType") or ""
+            mtype = MessageType.VOICE if is_voice else _attachment_message_type(mime)
+            cached = _cache_inbound_attachment(
+                payload, name, mime, force_audio=is_voice
+            )
+            if cached:
+                return (
+                    "(voice)" if is_voice else "(attachment)",
+                    mtype,
+                    [cached],
+                    [mime or ("audio/mp4" if is_voice else "application/octet-stream")],
+                )
+            label = "voice" if is_voice else "attachment"
+            duration = payload.get("duration")
+            duration_text = (
+                f", duration: {duration}s"
+                if isinstance(duration, (int, float))
+                else ""
+            )
+            return (
+                f"[Photon {label} received: {name} "
+                f"({mime or 'unknown MIME'}{duration_text})]",
+                mtype,
+                [],
+                [],
+            )
+
         ctype = content.get("type")
         if ctype == "reaction":
             # Route only tapbacks on messages WE sent — those are implicitly
@@ -551,37 +583,40 @@ class PhotonAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             text = content.get("text") or ""
             mtype = MessageType.TEXT
         elif ctype in {"attachment", "voice"}:
-            is_voice = ctype == "voice"
-            name = content.get("name") or ("voice" if is_voice else "(unnamed)")
-            mime = content.get("mimeType") or ""
-            mtype = MessageType.VOICE if is_voice else _attachment_message_type(mime)
-            cached = _cache_inbound_attachment(
-                content, name, mime, force_audio=is_voice
-            )
-            if cached:
-                media_urls.append(cached)
-                media_types.append(
-                    mime or ("audio/mp4" if is_voice else "application/octet-stream")
-                )
-                # The real bytes are attached, so the agent sees the media
-                # itself — a short marker is enough text, and it keeps group
-                # mention-gating consistent with plain messages.
-                text = "(voice)" if is_voice else "(attachment)"
-            else:
-                # No bytes (over the sidecar cap, a failed read, or a caching
-                # failure) — fall back to a metadata marker so the agent still
-                # knows something arrived.
-                label = "voice" if is_voice else "attachment"
-                duration = content.get("duration")
-                duration_text = (
-                    f", duration: {duration}s"
-                    if isinstance(duration, (int, float))
-                    else ""
-                )
-                text = (
-                    f"[Photon {label} received: {name} "
-                    f"({mime or 'unknown MIME'}{duration_text})]"
-                )
+            text, mtype, media_urls, media_types = _normalize_binary_payload(content)
+        elif ctype == "group":
+            text_parts: List[str] = []
+            mtype = MessageType.TEXT
+            for item in content.get("items") or []:
+                if not isinstance(item, dict):
+                    continue
+                item_content = item.get("content") or {}
+                if not isinstance(item_content, dict):
+                    continue
+                item_type = item_content.get("type")
+                if item_type == "text":
+                    item_text = item_content.get("text") or ""
+                    if item_text:
+                        text_parts.append(item_text)
+                    continue
+                if item_type in {"attachment", "voice"}:
+                    marker, item_mtype, item_urls, item_types = _normalize_binary_payload(
+                        item_content
+                    )
+                    if mtype == MessageType.TEXT:
+                        mtype = item_mtype
+                    media_urls.extend(item_urls)
+                    media_types.extend(item_types)
+                    if not item_urls:
+                        text_parts.append(marker)
+                    continue
+                if item_type:
+                    text_parts.append(f"[Photon content type not handled: {item_type}]")
+            if media_urls and mtype == MessageType.TEXT:
+                mtype = MessageType.DOCUMENT
+            text = "\n".join(part for part in text_parts if part).strip()
+            if not text:
+                text = "(attachment)" if media_urls else "[Photon empty group received]"
         else:
             text = f"[Photon content type not handled: {ctype}]"
             mtype = MessageType.TEXT
@@ -729,6 +764,28 @@ class PhotonAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         # never runs — can't leave it orphaned on the port.
         env["PHOTON_SIDECAR_WATCH_STDIN"] = "1"
 
+        try:
+            patch = subprocess.run(  # noqa: S603
+                [
+                    self._node_bin,
+                    str(_SIDECAR_DIR / "patch-spectrum-mixed-attachments.mjs"),
+                    str(_SIDECAR_DIR),
+                ],
+                capture_output=True,
+                text=True,
+                timeout=10,
+                check=False,
+            )
+            if patch.returncode != 0:
+                raise RuntimeError((patch.stderr or patch.stdout or "").strip())
+            if patch.stderr.strip():
+                logger.debug("[photon] %s", patch.stderr.strip())
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.warning(
+                "[photon] failed to apply Spectrum mixed attachment patch: %s",
+                exc,
+            )
+
         self._sidecar_proc = subprocess.Popen(  # noqa: S603
             [self._node_bin, str(_SIDECAR_DIR / "index.mjs")],
             stdin=subprocess.PIPE,

plugins/platforms/photon/sidecar/index.mjs

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 import http from "node:http";
 import crypto from "node:crypto";
 import { once } from "node:events";
+import { patchSpectrumTs } from "./patch-spectrum-mixed-attachments.mjs";
 
 const projectId = process.env.PHOTON_PROJECT_ID;
 const projectSecret = process.env.PHOTON_PROJECT_SECRET;
@@ -89,7 +90,26 @@ if (!projectId || !projectSecret || !sharedToken) {
 }
 
 // Lazy-load spectrum-ts so a missing install fails with a clear message
-// instead of a cryptic module-resolution error during import.
+// instead of a cryptic module-resolution error during import. Apply Hermes'
+// pinned-sdk compatibility patch first so existing installs self-heal at
+// runtime, not only during npm postinstall.
+try {
+  const patchResult = patchSpectrumTs();
+  if (patchResult.patched) {
+    console.error(
+      `photon-sidecar: spectrum mixed attachment patch applied: ${patchResult.file}`
+    );
+  }
+} catch (e) {
+  console.error(
+    "photon-sidecar: spectrum mixed attachment patch failed. " +
+      "Run `npm install` inside plugins/platforms/photon/sidecar/ or " +
+      "upgrade the Photon sidecar patch for the pinned spectrum-ts version. " +
+      "Original error: " +
+      (e && e.stack ? e.stack : String(e))
+  );
+  process.exit(3);
+}
 let Spectrum,
   imessage,
   attachment,
@@ -273,6 +293,16 @@ async function normalizeContent(content) {
   if (content.type === "attachment" || content.type === "voice") {
     return await normalizeBinaryContent(content);
   }
+  if (content.type === "group") {
+    const items = [];
+    for (const item of Array.isArray(content.items) ? content.items : []) {
+      items.push({
+        id: item && typeof item === "object" ? item.id ?? null : null,
+        content: await normalizeContent(item?.content),
+      });
+    }
+    return { type: "group", items };
+  }
   if (content.type === "reaction") {
     return {
       type: "reaction",

plugins/platforms/photon/sidecar/package-lock.json

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
     "": {
       "name": "@hermes-agent/photon-sidecar",
       "version": "0.3.0",
+      "hasInstallScript": true,
       "dependencies": {
         "spectrum-ts": "3.1.0"
       },

plugins/platforms/photon/sidecar/package.json

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
   "type": "module",
   "main": "index.mjs",
   "scripts": {
-    "start": "node index.mjs"
+    "start": "node index.mjs",
+    "postinstall": "node patch-spectrum-mixed-attachments.mjs"
   },
   "engines": {
     "node": ">=18.17"

plugins/platforms/photon/sidecar/patch-spectrum-mixed-attachments.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+// Patch spectrum-ts' iMessage inbound mapper until upstream preserves mixed
+// text + attachment Apple events. The current spectrum-ts mapper returns only
+// buildAttachmentMessage(...) whenever attachments are present, which drops
+// event.message.content.text before Hermes can see it.
+import fs from "node:fs";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
+
+const MARKER = "Hermes patch: Preserve mixed text + attachment iMessage payloads";
+
+function scriptDir() {
+  return path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+}
+
+function replaceOnce(source, from, to, label) {
+  const count = source.split(from).length - 1;
+  if (count !== 1) {
+    throw new Error(`expected exactly one ${label} match, found ${count}`);
+  }
+  return source.replace(from, to);
+}
+
+function replaceFirst(source, from, to, label) {
+  if (!source.includes(from)) {
+    throw new Error(`expected at least one ${label} match, found 0`);
+  }
+  return source.replace(from, to);
+}
+
+function addTextChildSnippet(messageExpr) {
+  return `if (text2) {\n      items.unshift({\n        ...base,\n        id: formatChildId(0, messageGuidStr),\n        content: asText(text2),\n        partIndex: 0,\n        parentId: messageGuidStr\n      });\n    }`;
+}
+
+function patchRebuild(source) {
+  source = replaceOnce(
+    source,
+    `  const attachments = messageAttachments(message);\n  if (attachments.length === 1) {`,
+    `  const attachments = messageAttachments(message);\n  const text2 = message.content.text;\n  if (attachments.length === 1) {`,
+    "rebuild text capture"
+  );
+  source = replaceOnce(
+    source,
+    `    return buildAttachmentMessage(client, base, info, messageGuidStr, 0);`,
+    `    const msg2 = await buildAttachmentMessage(\n      client,\n      base,\n      info,\n      text2 ? formatChildId(1, messageGuidStr) : messageGuidStr,\n      text2 ? 1 : 0,\n      text2 ? messageGuidStr : void 0\n    );\n    if (text2) {\n      const textMsg = {\n        ...base,\n        id: formatChildId(0, messageGuidStr),\n        content: asText(text2),\n        partIndex: 0,\n        parentId: messageGuidStr\n      };\n      return {\n        ...base,\n        id: messageGuidStr,\n        content: asProviderGroup([textMsg, msg2])\n      };\n    }\n    return msg2;`,
+    "rebuild single attachment"
+  );
+  source = replaceFirst(
+    source,
+    `          formatChildId(i, messageGuidStr),\n          i,\n          messageGuidStr`,
+    `          formatChildId(text2 ? i + 1 : i, messageGuidStr),\n          text2 ? i + 1 : i,\n          messageGuidStr`,
+    "rebuild multi attachment child index"
+  );
+  source = replaceFirst(
+    source,
+    `    return {\n      ...base,\n      id: messageGuidStr,\n      content: asProviderGroup(items)\n    };\n  }\n  if (getBalloonBundleId(message) === URL_BALLOON_BUNDLE_ID) {`,
+    `    ${addTextChildSnippet("message")}\n    return {\n      ...base,\n      id: messageGuidStr,\n      content: asProviderGroup(items)\n    };\n  }\n  if (getBalloonBundleId(message) === URL_BALLOON_BUNDLE_ID) {`,
+    "rebuild multi attachment text child"
+  );
+  source = replaceFirst(
+    source,
+    `  const text2 = message.content.text;\n  return {\n    ...base,`,
+    `  return {\n    ...base,`,
+    "rebuild duplicate text declaration"
+  );
+  return source;
+}
+
+function patchInbound(source) {
+  source = replaceOnce(
+    source,
+    `  const attachments = messageAttachments(event.message);\n  if (attachments.length === 1) {`,
+    `  const attachments = messageAttachments(event.message);\n  const text2 = event.message.content.text;\n  if (attachments.length === 1) {`,
+    "inbound text capture"
+  );
+  source = replaceOnce(
+    source,
+    `      messageGuidStr,\n      0\n    );\n    cacheMessage(cache, msg2);\n    return [msg2];`,
+    `      text2 ? formatChildId(1, messageGuidStr) : messageGuidStr,\n      text2 ? 1 : 0,\n      text2 ? messageGuidStr : void 0\n    );\n    if (text2) {\n      const textMsg = {\n        ...base,\n        id: formatChildId(0, messageGuidStr),\n        content: asText(text2),\n        partIndex: 0,\n        parentId: messageGuidStr\n      };\n      const parent = {\n        ...base,\n        id: messageGuidStr,\n        content: asProviderGroup([textMsg, msg2])\n      };\n      cacheMessage(cache, parent);\n      return [parent];\n    }\n    cacheMessage(cache, msg2);\n    return [msg2];`,
+    "inbound single attachment"
+  );
+  source = replaceOnce(
+    source,
+    `          formatChildId(i, messageGuidStr),\n          i,\n          messageGuidStr`,
+    `          formatChildId(text2 ? i + 1 : i, messageGuidStr),\n          text2 ? i + 1 : i,\n          messageGuidStr`,
+    "inbound multi attachment child index"
+  );
+  source = replaceOnce(
+    source,
+    `    const parent = {\n      ...base,\n      id: messageGuidStr,\n      content: asProviderGroup(items)\n    };`,
+    `    ${addTextChildSnippet("event.message")}\n    const parent = {\n      ...base,\n      id: messageGuidStr,\n      content: asProviderGroup(items)\n    };`,
+    "inbound multi attachment text child"
+  );
+  source = replaceOnce(
+    source,
+    `  const text2 = event.message.content.text;\n  const msg = {`,
+    `  const msg = {`,
+    "inbound duplicate text declaration"
+  );
+  return source;
+}
+
+export function patchSpectrumTs(root = scriptDir()) {
+  const dist = path.join(root, "node_modules", "spectrum-ts", "dist");
+  if (!fs.existsSync(dist)) {
+    throw new Error(`spectrum-ts dist not found: ${dist}`);
+  }
+  const files = fs.readdirSync(dist)
+    .filter((name) => name.endsWith(".js"))
+    .map((name) => path.join(dist, name));
+
+  for (const file of files) {
+    const raw = fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8");
+    if (raw.includes(MARKER)) {
+      return { patched: false, file, reason: "already patched" };
+    }
+    // Normalize to LF for matching so the patch works regardless of the
+    // checkout's line-ending style (Windows git autocrlf produces CRLF,
+    // which would otherwise defeat the \n-based search strings). The
+    // original EOL style is restored on write.
+    const CR = String.fromCharCode(13);
+    const CRLF = CR + "\n";
+    const usedCRLF = raw.includes(CRLF);
+    const original = usedCRLF ? raw.split(CRLF).join("\n") : raw;
+    if (!original.includes("var toInboundMessages = async") ||
+        !original.includes("var rebuildFromAppleMessage = async")) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    let patched = original;
+    patched = patchRebuild(patched);
+    patched = patchInbound(patched);
+    patched = `// ${MARKER}\n${patched}`;
+    if (usedCRLF) {
+      patched = patched.split("\n").join(CRLF);
+    }
+    fs.writeFileSync(file, patched, "utf8");
+    return { patched: true, file };
+  }
+  throw new Error("could not find spectrum-ts iMessage inbound chunk to patch");
+}
+
+const _invokedDirectly =
+  process.argv[1] &&
+  import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(process.argv[1]).href;
+if (_invokedDirectly) {
+  try {
+    const root = process.argv[2] ? path.resolve(process.argv[2]) : scriptDir();
+    const result = patchSpectrumTs(root);
+    const action = result.patched ? "patched" : "ok";
+    console.error(`photon-sidecar: spectrum mixed attachment patch ${action}: ${result.file}`);
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error(`photon-sidecar: spectrum mixed attachment patch failed: ${err?.stack || err}`);
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+}

pyproject.toml

@@ -106,6 +106,11 @@ dependencies = [
   "pathspec==1.1.1",
   "fastapi>=0.104.0,<1",
   "uvicorn[standard]>=0.24.0,<1",
+  # Streaming multipart uploads for the dashboard file manager (NS-501).
+  # FastAPI's UploadFile/Form depend on python-multipart; it is NOT pulled in
+  # by fastapi itself, so the dashboard's multipart upload endpoint would 500
+  # without an explicit dependency here (and in the `web` extra below).
+  "python-multipart>=0.0.9,<1",
   "ptyprocess>=0.7.0,<1; sys_platform != 'win32'",
   "pywinpty>=2.0.0,<3; sys_platform == 'win32'",
   # Image resize recovery for the vision tools. Pillow shrinks oversized images
@@ -116,6 +121,20 @@ dependencies = [
   # install rather than gating it behind an extra + a mid-session lazy install
   # (which deadlocked the CLI under prompt_toolkit — see #40490).
   "Pillow==12.2.0",
+  # Windows log rotation. Stdlib ``RotatingFileHandler.doRollover()`` uses
+  # ``os.rename()`` which fails with ``PermissionError [WinError 32]`` on
+  # Windows whenever any other process holds an append-mode handle on
+  # ``agent.log`` (always the case in Hermes — TUI, gateway, ``hy_memory``
+  # server, MCP servers, and on-demand CLI commands all log from separate
+  # processes), pinning ``agent.log`` at the 5 MiB threshold and spamming
+  # stderr on every emit (see #44873). ``concurrent-log-handler`` wraps the
+  # rename in a cross-process file lock (via ``portalocker``: pywin32 on
+  # Windows) so only one process rotates at a time. ``hermes_logging.py``
+  # aliases it ONLY on Windows — POSIX renames an open file fine, so stdlib
+  # already works there and managed-mode perms depend on its exact lifecycle.
+  # Hence the ``sys_platform == 'win32'`` marker: the dep (and its portalocker
+  # / pywin32 tree) ships only where it's actually used.
+  "concurrent-log-handler==0.9.29; sys_platform == 'win32'",
 ]
 
 [project.optional-dependencies]
@@ -239,7 +258,7 @@ youtube = [
 # `hermes dashboard` (localhost SPA + API).  Not in core to keep the default install lean.
 # starlette==1.0.1 pinned for CVE-2026-48710 (BadHost) — fastapi pulls Starlette
 # transitively and pre-1.0.1 is the vulnerable range. See the mcp extra above.
-web = ["fastapi==0.133.1", "uvicorn[standard]==0.41.0", "starlette==1.0.1"]
+web = ["fastapi==0.133.1", "uvicorn[standard]==0.41.0", "starlette==1.0.1", "python-multipart==0.0.20"]
 all = [
   # Policy (2026-05-12): `[all]` includes only extras that genuinely
   # CAN'T be lazy-installed via `tools/lazy_deps.py` — i.e. things every

scripts/install.ps1

@@ -185,6 +185,18 @@ function Write-Err {
     Write-Host "[X] $Message" -ForegroundColor Red
 }
 
+function Invoke-NativeWithRelaxedErrorAction {
+    param([scriptblock]$Script)
+
+    $prevEAP = $ErrorActionPreference
+    $ErrorActionPreference = "Continue"
+    try {
+        & $Script
+    } finally {
+        $ErrorActionPreference = $prevEAP
+    }
+}
+
 # Inspect npm output for a TLS-trust failure and, if found, print actionable
 # remediation. npm/Node surface corporate MITM proxies and missing root CAs as
 # "unable to get local issuer certificate" / "self-signed certificate in
@@ -318,6 +330,36 @@ function Install-AgentBrowser {
 # Dependency checks
 # ============================================================================
 
+# Resolve the PowerShell host executable used to spawn child PowerShell
+# processes (the astral uv installer below).  We must NOT hardcode the bare
+# name `powershell`: it names *Windows PowerShell* and only resolves when its
+# System32 directory is on PATH.  When install.ps1 is run under PowerShell 7+
+# (`pwsh`) -- or any session where `powershell` isn't on PATH -- a bare
+# `powershell` spawn dies with "The term 'powershell' is not recognized",
+# aborting uv installation (field report: Windows install stuck, uv install
+# failed with exactly that message).  Prefer the absolute path of the host we
+# are already running in (PATH-independent), then fall back to whichever of
+# powershell/pwsh is resolvable, and only then to the bare name.
+function Get-PowerShellHostExe {
+    try {
+        $hostExe = (Get-Process -Id $PID).Path
+        if ($hostExe -and (Test-Path $hostExe)) {
+            $leaf = Split-Path $hostExe -Leaf
+            # Only trust the current host when it is a real PowerShell CLI
+            # (not e.g. powershell_ise.exe or an embedded host that can't take
+            # `-ExecutionPolicy`/`-Command`).
+            if ($leaf -match '^(?i:powershell|pwsh)\.exe$') { return $hostExe }
+        }
+    } catch { }
+    foreach ($candidate in @("powershell", "pwsh")) {
+        $cmd = Get-Command $candidate -CommandType Application -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
+            Select-Object -First 1
+        if ($cmd -and $cmd.Source) { return $cmd.Source }
+    }
+    # Last-ditch: hand back the bare name so the spawn surfaces its own error.
+    return "powershell"
+}
+
 function Install-Uv {
     # Hermes owns its own uv at $HermesHome\bin\uv.exe.  Always install there —
     # no PATH probing, no conda guards, no multi-location resolution chains.
@@ -341,7 +383,11 @@ function Install-Uv {
     try {
         $ErrorActionPreference = "Continue"
         $env:UV_INSTALL_DIR = Join-Path $HermesHome "bin"
-        powershell -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -c "irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex" 2>&1 | Out-Null
+        # Spawn via the resolved host exe (see Get-PowerShellHostExe) rather
+        # than a bare `powershell`, which isn't guaranteed to be on PATH under
+        # PowerShell 7 / pwsh-only setups.
+        $psHostExe = Get-PowerShellHostExe
+        & $psHostExe -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -c "irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex" 2>&1 | Out-Null
         $ErrorActionPreference = $prevEAP
 
         if (Test-Path $managedUv) {
@@ -1306,7 +1352,7 @@ function Install-Repository {
         Write-Info "Trying SSH clone..."
         $env:GIT_SSH_COMMAND = "ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=5"
         try {
-            git -c windows.appendAtomically=false clone --depth 1 --branch $Branch $RepoUrlSsh $InstallDir
+            Invoke-NativeWithRelaxedErrorAction { git -c windows.appendAtomically=false clone --depth 1 --branch $Branch $RepoUrlSsh $InstallDir }
             if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0) { $cloneSuccess = $true }
         } catch { }
         $env:GIT_SSH_COMMAND = $null
@@ -1315,7 +1361,7 @@ function Install-Repository {
             if (Test-Path $InstallDir) { Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $InstallDir -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }
             Write-Info "SSH failed, trying HTTPS..."
             try {
-                git -c windows.appendAtomically=false clone --depth 1 --branch $Branch $RepoUrlHttps $InstallDir
+                Invoke-NativeWithRelaxedErrorAction { git -c windows.appendAtomically=false clone --depth 1 --branch $Branch $RepoUrlHttps $InstallDir }
                 if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0) { $cloneSuccess = $true }
             } catch { }
         }
@@ -1443,8 +1489,20 @@ function Install-Venv {
         Remove-Item -Recurse -Force "venv"
     }
     
-    # uv creates the venv and pins the Python version in one step
-    & $UvCmd venv venv --python $PythonVersion
+    # uv creates the venv and pins the Python version in one step.  uv emits
+    # normal progress such as "Using CPython ..." on stderr; under Windows
+    # PowerShell 5.1 with EAP=Stop that stderr is a NativeCommandError unless
+    # we temporarily relax EAP and trust $LASTEXITCODE for real failures.
+    Invoke-NativeWithRelaxedErrorAction { & $UvCmd venv venv --python $PythonVersion }
+    # Relaxing EAP above means a *genuine* uv-venv failure (exit != 0) no longer
+    # aborts on its own. Capture $LASTEXITCODE immediately and fail fast, so the
+    # `venv` stage can't falsely report success (and Invoke-Stage can't emit
+    # ok=true) when the venv was never created.
+    $venvExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
+    if ($venvExitCode -ne 0) {
+        Pop-Location
+        throw "Failed to create virtual environment (uv venv exited with $venvExitCode)"
+    }
 
     # Neutralize any inherited UV_PYTHON (e.g. $env:UV_PYTHON = "3.14" left in
     # the user's shell). uv honours UV_PYTHON over an existing venv for the
@@ -1514,7 +1572,7 @@ function Install-Dependencies {
         # in the wrong directory and imports fail with ModuleNotFoundError.
         # (Mirrors the same flag in scripts/install.sh::install_deps.)
         $env:UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT = "$InstallDir\venv"
-        & $UvCmd sync --extra all --locked
+        Invoke-NativeWithRelaxedErrorAction { & $UvCmd sync --extra all --locked }
         if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0) {
             Write-Success "Main package installed (hash-verified via uv.lock)"
             $script:InstalledTier = "hash-verified (uv.lock)"
@@ -1589,7 +1647,7 @@ except Exception:
     if (-not $skipPipFallback) {
         foreach ($tier in $installTiers) {
         Write-Info "Trying tier: $($tier.Name) ..."
-        & $UvCmd pip install -e $tier.Spec
+        Invoke-NativeWithRelaxedErrorAction { & $UvCmd pip install -e $tier.Spec }
         if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0) {
             Write-Success "Main package installed ($($tier.Name))"
             $script:InstalledTier = $tier.Name
@@ -2161,39 +2219,31 @@ function Clear-ElectronBuildCache {
     return $removed
 }
 
-# True when node_modules\electron\dist holds a usable Electron binary.
-# electron-builder reads the binary from build.electronDist
-# (node_modules\electron\dist) since #38673, so this is the exact file whose
-# absence makes a pack fail with "The specified electronDist does not exist". A
-# dist dir that exists but is missing electron.exe (partial extraction / aborted
-# postinstall) is NOT ok.
+# Last-resort Electron mirror after GitHub download fails (#47266).
+$script:DesktopElectronFallbackMirror = "https://npmmirror.com/mirrors/electron/"
+
+# Electron package dir — workspace-local nest first, then root hoist.
+function Get-ElectronDir {
+    param([string]$InstallDir)
+    $desktopLocal = Join-Path $InstallDir 'apps\desktop\node_modules\electron'
+    if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $desktopLocal) { return $desktopLocal }
+    return (Join-Path $InstallDir 'node_modules\electron')
+}
+
+# True when dist/ holds a usable Electron binary (#38673 / run-electron-builder.cjs).
 function Test-ElectronDist {
     param([string]$InstallDir)
-    $distExe = Join-Path $InstallDir 'node_modules\electron\dist\electron.exe'
+    $electronDir = Get-ElectronDir -InstallDir $InstallDir
+    $distExe = Join-Path $electronDir 'dist\electron.exe'
     return (Test-Path -LiteralPath $distExe)
 }
 
-# (Re)populate node_modules\electron\dist via electron's own downloader.
-#
-# Since #38673 the desktop build pins build.electronDist to
-# node_modules\electron\dist, so electron-builder reads the Electron binary
-# straight from there and never downloads it during `npm run pack`. That dist
-# tree is produced by the electron package's postinstall (install.js) during
-# `npm ci`. When that download is blocked/throttled (GitHub's release host is
-# unreachable in some regions - #47266), dist is missing and re-running pack only
-# re-throws "The specified electronDist does not exist". The mirror fallback
-# therefore has to drive THIS downloader, not another pack.
-#
-# No-op (returns $true) when the dist binary is already present. Otherwise drops a
-# partial dist + version marker (electron's install.js short-circuits when
-# path.txt already matches) and runs the downloader once, optionally via a
-# mirror. Best-effort: never throws. Returns $true iff the dist binary exists
-# afterward.
+# Best-effort: run electron/install.js to populate dist/ (optional mirror).
 function Restore-ElectronDist {
     param([string]$InstallDir, [string]$Mirror)
     if (Test-ElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir) { return $true }
 
-    $electronDir = Join-Path $InstallDir 'node_modules\electron'
+    $electronDir = Get-ElectronDir -InstallDir $InstallDir
     $distExe = Join-Path $electronDir 'dist\electron.exe'
     $installer = Join-Path $electronDir 'install.js'
     if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $installer)) { return $false }
@@ -2221,6 +2271,23 @@ function Restore-ElectronDist {
     return (Test-Path -LiteralPath $distExe)
 }
 
+function Test-ElectronPkgStagedMissingDist {
+    param([string]$InstallDir)
+    $electronDir = Get-ElectronDir -InstallDir $InstallDir
+    return (
+        (Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $electronDir 'package.json')) -and
+        (Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $electronDir 'install.js')) -and
+        (-not (Test-ElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir))
+    )
+}
+
+function Try-RestoreElectronDist {
+    param([string]$InstallDir)
+    if (Restore-ElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir) { return $true }
+    if ($env:ELECTRON_MIRROR) { return $false }
+    return Restore-ElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir -Mirror $script:DesktopElectronFallbackMirror
+}
+
 function Install-Desktop {
     # Build apps/desktop into a launchable Hermes.exe. Only called from
     # Stage-Desktop, which is itself only included in the manifest when
@@ -2316,10 +2383,16 @@ function Install-Desktop {
         }
         $ErrorActionPreference = $prevEAP
         if ($code -ne 0) {
-            Show-NpmCertHint ($npmOut -join "`n") | Out-Null
-            throw "desktop workspace npm install failed (exit $code) -- see lines above for cause"
+            if (Test-ElectronPkgStagedMissingDist -InstallDir $InstallDir) {
+                Write-Warn "Desktop dependency install failed with a missing Electron dist; attempting self-heal..."
+                Try-RestoreElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir | Out-Null
+            } else {
+                Show-NpmCertHint ($npmOut -join "`n") | Out-Null
+                throw "desktop workspace npm install failed (exit $code) -- see lines above for cause"
+            }
+        } else {
+            Write-Success "Desktop workspace dependencies installed"
         }
-        Write-Success "Desktop workspace dependencies installed"
     } catch {
         if ($prevEAP) { $ErrorActionPreference = $prevEAP }
         Pop-Location
@@ -2362,57 +2435,34 @@ function Install-Desktop {
         & $npmExe run pack 2>&1 | ForEach-Object { "$_" } | Tee-Object -FilePath $buildLog
         $code = $LASTEXITCODE
         if ($code -ne 0) {
-            # A corrupt cached Electron zip makes `pack` fail with an opaque
-            # ENOENT on the final `electron` -> `Hermes` rename: app-builder's
-            # unpack-electron extracted a partial tree (missing the binary) from
-            # the bad zip, and re-running reuses the poisoned cache forever.
-            # Purge the cached download + any stale unpacked output and retry
-            # once; @electron/get re-downloads with its own SHASUM check. Without
-            # this a corrupt download hard-fails the whole installer.
-            $purged = @(Clear-ElectronBuildCache -DesktopDir $desktopDir)
-            # electronDist is pinned to node_modules\electron\dist (#38673):
-            # electron-builder reads the Electron binary from there and `pack`
-            # never downloads it, so purging the cache + re-running pack can't by
-            # itself repopulate a missing/partial dist. When the dist is actually
-            # gone, re-run electron's own downloader so the retry has a binary to
-            # read. Gated on the dist check so an unrelated build failure
-            # (tsc/vite) doesn't trigger a pointless ~200MB refetch.
+            $purged = @()
             $restored = $false
             if (-not (Test-ElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir)) {
+                $purged = @(Clear-ElectronBuildCache -DesktopDir $desktopDir)
                 $restored = Restore-ElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir
             }
-            if ($purged.Count -gt 0 -or $restored) {
+            if ($restored) {
                 Write-Warn "Desktop build failed - refreshed the Electron download, retrying once:"
                 foreach ($p in $purged) { Write-Info "  - $p" }
                 & $npmExe run pack 2>&1 | ForEach-Object { "$_" } | Tee-Object -FilePath $buildLog
                 $code = $LASTEXITCODE
             }
         }
-        # Still failing and the user hasn't pinned their own mirror: GitHub's
-        # Electron release host is likely blocked/throttled (the repeating
-        # "retrying" log). Retry once via npmmirror.com — the de-facto Electron
-        # community mirror (Alibaba). @electron/get SHASUM-checks the download,
-        # but the SHASUMS come from the same mirror, so that guards against a
-        # corrupt/partial download, NOT a compromised mirror: an explicit trust
-        # trade-off we only make AFTER the canonical GitHub download has failed,
-        # and we never override a user-pinned ELECTRON_MIRROR.
         if ($code -ne 0 -and -not $env:ELECTRON_MIRROR) {
-            $mirror = "https://npmmirror.com/mirrors/electron/"
+            $mirror = $script:DesktopElectronFallbackMirror
             Write-Warn "Desktop build still failing - the Electron download from GitHub looks blocked."
             Write-Warn "Re-downloading Electron via a public mirror ($mirror), then rebuilding:"
             Write-Info "  (set ELECTRON_MIRROR yourself to use a different/trusted mirror)"
-            # electronDist is pinned (#38673), so `npm run pack` never downloads
-            # Electron - the mirror only helps if it drives electron's own
-            # downloader. Re-fetch the binary through the mirror first; otherwise
-            # the retry just re-reads the same missing dist and re-throws
-            # "The specified electronDist does not exist" (#47266).
-            $haveDist = Test-ElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir
-            if (-not $haveDist) { $haveDist = Restore-ElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir -Mirror $mirror }
-            if ($haveDist) {
+            if (-not (Test-ElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir)) {
+                Restore-ElectronDist -InstallDir $InstallDir -Mirror $mirror | Out-Null
+            }
+            $prevMirror = $env:ELECTRON_MIRROR
+            $env:ELECTRON_MIRROR = $mirror
+            try {
                 & $npmExe run pack 2>&1 | ForEach-Object { "$_" } | Tee-Object -FilePath $buildLog
                 $code = $LASTEXITCODE
-            } else {
-                Write-Warn "Could not re-download Electron from the mirror (node_modules\electron\dist still missing)"
+            } finally {
+                $env:ELECTRON_MIRROR = $prevMirror
             }
         }
         $ErrorActionPreference = $prevEAP

scripts/install.sh

@@ -2398,24 +2398,24 @@ _desktop_pack() {
     fi
 }
 
-# Public Electron mirror used as a last-resort fallback when GitHub's release
-# host is blocked/throttled (the repeating "retrying" symptom). npmmirror.com is
-# the de-facto Electron community mirror (Alibaba). @electron/get SHASUM-checks
-# the download, but the SHASUMS come from the same mirror — that guards against a
-# corrupt/partial download, NOT a compromised mirror. Reaching for it is an
-# explicit trust trade-off we only make AFTER the canonical GitHub download has
-# failed, and we never override a user-pinned ELECTRON_MIRROR.
+# Last-resort Electron mirror after GitHub download fails (#47266).
 DESKTOP_ELECTRON_FALLBACK_MIRROR="https://npmmirror.com/mirrors/electron/"
 
-# True (returns 0) when node_modules/electron/dist holds a usable Electron
-# binary. electron-builder reads the binary from build.electronDist
-# (node_modules/electron/dist) since #38673, so this is the exact file whose
-# absence makes a pack fail with "The specified electronDist does not exist". A
-# dist dir that exists but is missing the binary (partial extraction / aborted
-# postinstall) is NOT ok. $1 = the workspace root holding node_modules.
+# Electron package dir — workspace-local nest first, then root hoist.
+_electron_dir() {
+    local install_dir="$1"
+    if [ -d "$install_dir/apps/desktop/node_modules/electron" ]; then
+        printf '%s\n' "$install_dir/apps/desktop/node_modules/electron"
+    else
+        printf '%s\n' "$install_dir/node_modules/electron"
+    fi
+}
+
+# True when dist/ holds a usable Electron binary (#38673 / run-electron-builder.cjs).
 _electron_dist_ok() {
     local install_dir="$1"
-    local electron_dir="$install_dir/node_modules/electron"
+    local electron_dir
+    electron_dir="$(_electron_dir "$install_dir")"
     if [ "$OS" = "macos" ]; then
         [ -e "$electron_dir/dist/Electron.app/Contents/MacOS/Electron" ]
     else
@@ -2423,26 +2423,12 @@ _electron_dist_ok() {
     fi
 }
 
-# (Re)populate node_modules/electron/dist via electron's own downloader.
-#
-# Since #38673 the desktop build pins build.electronDist to
-# node_modules/electron/dist, so electron-builder reads the Electron binary
-# straight from there and never downloads it during `npm run pack`. That dist
-# tree is produced by the electron package's postinstall (install.js) during
-# `npm ci`. When that download is blocked/throttled (GitHub's release host is
-# unreachable in some regions - #47266), dist is missing and re-running pack only
-# re-throws "The specified electronDist does not exist". The mirror fallback
-# therefore has to drive THIS downloader, not another pack.
-#
-# No-op (returns 0) when the dist binary is already present. Otherwise drops a
-# partial dist + version marker (electron's install.js short-circuits when
-# path.txt already matches) and runs the downloader once. $1 = the workspace root
-# holding node_modules; optional $2 = an ELECTRON_MIRROR base URL. Best-effort:
-# returns 0 iff the dist binary exists afterward.
+# Best-effort: run electron/install.js to populate dist/ (optional mirror).
 _restore_electron_dist() {
     local install_dir="$1"
     local mirror="${2:-}"
-    local electron_dir="$install_dir/node_modules/electron"
+    local electron_dir
+    electron_dir="$(_electron_dir "$install_dir")"
     _electron_dist_ok "$install_dir" && return 0
 
     [ -f "$electron_dir/install.js" ] || return 1
@@ -2459,6 +2445,19 @@ _restore_electron_dist() {
     _electron_dist_ok "$install_dir"
 }
 
+_electron_pkg_staged_missing_dist() {
+    local install_dir="$1"
+    local electron_dir
+    electron_dir="$(_electron_dir "$install_dir")"
+    [ -f "$electron_dir/package.json" ] && [ -f "$electron_dir/install.js" ] && ! _electron_dist_ok "$install_dir"
+}
+
+_restore_electron_dist_with_fallback() {
+    local install_dir="$1"
+    _restore_electron_dist "$install_dir" \
+        || { [ -z "${ELECTRON_MIRROR:-}" ] && _restore_electron_dist "$install_dir" "$DESKTOP_ELECTRON_FALLBACK_MIRROR"; }
+}
+
 # Build apps/desktop into a launchable native app. Mirrors install.ps1's
 # Install-Desktop: a root-level npm install so the apps/* workspace resolves
 # the desktop's own deps (Electron ~150MB), then `npm run pack`
@@ -2500,7 +2499,12 @@ install_desktop() {
     #    `tsc -b` failing with no obvious cause. Fall back to `npm install`
     #    only if `npm ci` is unavailable or the lockfile is out of sync.
     log_info "Installing desktop workspace dependencies (includes Electron ~150MB, 1-3min)..."
-    ( cd "$INSTALL_DIR" && npm ci ) || ( cd "$INSTALL_DIR" && npm install ) || {
+    if ( cd "$INSTALL_DIR" && npm ci ) || ( cd "$INSTALL_DIR" && npm install ); then
+        log_success "Desktop workspace dependencies installed"
+    elif _electron_pkg_staged_missing_dist "$INSTALL_DIR"; then
+        log_warn "Desktop dependency install failed with a missing Electron dist; attempting self-heal..."
+        _restore_electron_dist_with_fallback "$INSTALL_DIR" || true
+    else
         log_error "Desktop workspace npm install failed"
         # Common cause: a previous 'sudo npm'/'sudo npx' left root-owned files in
         # ~/.npm, so this non-root install can't write the shared cache. npm hides
@@ -2513,8 +2517,7 @@ install_desktop() {
         log_info "Then re-run this installer, or build manually:"
         log_info "  cd \"$INSTALL_DIR\" && npm ci && cd apps/desktop && npm run pack"
         return 1
-    }
-    log_success "Desktop workspace dependencies installed"
+    fi
 
     # 2. Build, with up to three escalating attempts so a transient/blocked
     #    Electron download self-heals instead of failing the whole install:
@@ -2528,21 +2531,13 @@ install_desktop() {
     if _desktop_pack "$desktop_dir"; then
         pack_ok=true
     else
-        # (b) Corrupt cached Electron zip is the most common self-healable cause.
-        local purged
-        purged="$(clear_electron_build_cache "$desktop_dir")"
-        # electronDist is pinned to node_modules/electron/dist (#38673):
-        # electron-builder reads the binary from there and `pack` never downloads
-        # it, so purging the cache + re-running pack can't by itself repopulate a
-        # missing/partial dist. When the dist is actually gone, re-run electron's
-        # own downloader so the retry has a binary to read. Gated on the dist
-        # check so an unrelated build failure (tsc/vite) doesn't trigger a
-        # pointless ~200MB refetch.
+        local purged=""
         local restored=false
         if ! _electron_dist_ok "$INSTALL_DIR"; then
+            purged="$(clear_electron_build_cache "$desktop_dir")"
             if _restore_electron_dist "$INSTALL_DIR"; then restored=true; fi
         fi
-        if [ -n "$purged" ] || [ "$restored" = true ]; then
+        if [ "$restored" = true ]; then
             log_warn "Desktop build failed; refreshed the Electron download and retrying once..."
             if _desktop_pack "$desktop_dir"; then
                 pack_ok=true
@@ -2550,27 +2545,14 @@ install_desktop() {
         fi
     fi
 
-    # (c) Still failing and the user hasn't pinned their own mirror: the GitHub
-    #     release host is likely blocked/throttled. Re-download the Electron
-    #     binary via a public mirror, then retry. The mirror MUST drive
-    #     electron's own downloader — `npm run pack` reads the pinned electronDist
-    #     and never downloads, so a mirror passed only to pack is a no-op (#47266).
+    # (c) GitHub blocked → mirror fallback (#47266).
     if [ "$pack_ok" = false ] && [ -z "${ELECTRON_MIRROR:-}" ]; then
         log_warn "Desktop build still failing — the Electron download from GitHub looks blocked."
         log_warn "Re-downloading Electron via a public mirror ($DESKTOP_ELECTRON_FALLBACK_MIRROR), then rebuilding..."
         log_warn "  (set ELECTRON_MIRROR yourself to use a different/trusted mirror)"
-        local have_dist=false
-        if _electron_dist_ok "$INSTALL_DIR"; then
-            have_dist=true
-        elif _restore_electron_dist "$INSTALL_DIR" "$DESKTOP_ELECTRON_FALLBACK_MIRROR"; then
-            have_dist=true
-        fi
-        if [ "$have_dist" = true ]; then
-            if _desktop_pack "$desktop_dir" "$DESKTOP_ELECTRON_FALLBACK_MIRROR"; then
-                pack_ok=true
-            fi
-        else
-            log_warn "Could not re-download Electron from the mirror (node_modules/electron/dist still missing)"
+        _electron_dist_ok "$INSTALL_DIR" || _restore_electron_dist "$INSTALL_DIR" "$DESKTOP_ELECTRON_FALLBACK_MIRROR" || true
+        if _desktop_pack "$desktop_dir" "$DESKTOP_ELECTRON_FALLBACK_MIRROR"; then
+            pack_ok=true
         fi
     fi
 
@@ -2750,7 +2732,12 @@ run_stage_body() {
             detect_os
             resolve_install_layout
             print_success
-            echo "git" > "$HERMES_HOME/.install_method"
+            # Code-scoped stamp: write next to the install tree, not into
+            # $HERMES_HOME. $HERMES_HOME is a shared data dir (it can be
+            # bind-mounted into a Docker gateway too), so a stamp there gets
+            # clobbered by the container's 'docker' stamp and wrongly blocks
+            # 'hermes update' on this host install. See detect_install_method().
+            echo "git" > "$INSTALL_DIR/.install_method"
             ;;
         *)
             log_error "Unknown stage: $stage"
@@ -2829,7 +2816,12 @@ main() {
 
     print_success
 
-    echo "git" > "$HERMES_HOME/.install_method"
+    # Code-scoped stamp: write next to the install tree, not into $HERMES_HOME.
+    # $HERMES_HOME is a shared data dir (it can be bind-mounted into a Docker
+    # gateway too), so a stamp there gets clobbered by the container's 'docker'
+    # stamp and wrongly blocks 'hermes update' on this host install.
+    # See detect_install_method().
+    echo "git" > "$INSTALL_DIR/.install_method"
 }
 
 if [ "$MANIFEST_MODE" = true ]; then

scripts/release.py

@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ ACP_REGISTRY_MANIFEST = REPO_ROOT / "acp_registry" / "agent.json"
 
 # Auto-extracted from noreply emails + manual overrides
 AUTHOR_MAP = {
+    "286497132+srojk34@users.noreply.github.com": "srojk34",
+    "59806492+sitkarev@users.noreply.github.com": "sitkarev",
+    "zheng@omegasys.eu": "omegazheng",
+    "220877172+james47kjv@users.noreply.github.com": "james47kjv",
+    "yuhanglin@YuhangdeMac-mini.local": "1960697431",
+    "admin@fent.quest": "XVVH",
     "despitemeguru@gmail.com": "definitelynotguru",
     "chaslui@outlook.com": "ChasLui",
     "rio.jeong@thebytesize.ai": "rio-jeong",
@@ -61,6 +67,7 @@ AUTHOR_MAP = {
     "joe.rinaldijohnson@shopify.com": "joerj123",
     "adalsteinnhelgason@Aalsteinns-MacBook-Pro-3.local": "AIalliAI",
     "adalsteinnhelgason@users.noreply.github.com": "AIalliAI",
+    "iamlukethedev@users.noreply.github.com": "iamlukethedev",
     "zhang.hz6666@gmail.com": "HaozheZhang6",
     "barronlroth@gmail.com": "barronlroth",
     "ondrej.drapalik@gmail.com": "OndrejDrapalik",
@@ -86,6 +93,7 @@ AUTHOR_MAP = {
     "al@randomsnowflake.me": "randomsnowflake",
     "zakame@zakame.net": "zakame",
     "152110621+jiangkoumo@users.noreply.github.com": "jiangkoumo",
+    "qinhaojie.exe@bytedance.com": "qin-ctx",
     "834740219@qq.com": "ViewWay",
     "matt@vestigial.dev": "m4dni5",
     "harjoth.khara@gmail.com": "harjothkhara",
@@ -1564,6 +1572,7 @@ AUTHOR_MAP = {
     "bsmith@bramarstrategicservices.com": "bcsmith528",  # PR #20589 salvage (register_slack_action_handler plugin API)
     "sunsky.lau@gmail.com": "liuhao1024",  # PR #45494 salvage (claim session slot before auto-resume task; #45456)
     "andrewdmwalker@gmail.com": "capt-marbles",  # PR #38440 salvage (resolve xAI OAuth credentials across profiles; #43589)
+    "infinitycrew39@gmail.com": "infinitycrew39",  # PR #47945 salvage (scope langfuse trace state by turn/request ids; #48292)
 }
 
 

tests/agent/test_billing_view.py

@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
+"""Unit tests for the Phase 2b terminal-billing core + HTTP client.
+
+Covers:
+- Decimal money parsing/formatting (server emits decimal strings, not 2dp).
+- BillingState payload parsing (role tiering, presets, bounds, sub-structs).
+- Error-code → typed-exception mapping (the live-verified contract matrix).
+- Fail-open builder behavior.
+- Idempotency key generation.
+- Custom-amount validation against bounds + multipleOf 0.01.
+
+No network: HTTP-layer tests drive _raise_for_error directly and monkeypatch the
+request function for the builder.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from decimal import Decimal
+
+import pytest
+
+import agent.billing_view as bv
+from agent.billing_view import (
+    AutoReload,
+    BillingState,
+    CardInfo,
+    MonthlyCap,
+    billing_state_from_payload,
+    build_billing_state,
+    format_money,
+    new_idempotency_key,
+    parse_money,
+    validate_charge_amount,
+)
+import hermes_cli.nous_billing as nb
+from hermes_cli.nous_billing import (
+    BillingAuthError,
+    BillingError,
+    BillingRateLimited,
+    BillingScopeRequired,
+    _raise_for_error,
+    resolve_portal_base_url,
+)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Decimal money
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "raw,expected",
+    [
+        ("142.5", Decimal("142.5")),   # decimal string, NOT 2dp — the headline case
+        ("100", Decimal("100")),
+        ("10000", Decimal("10000")),
+        ("0.01", Decimal("0.01")),
+        (250, Decimal("250")),
+        ("  50  ", Decimal("50")),
+    ],
+)
+def test_parse_money_valid(raw, expected):
+    assert parse_money(raw) == expected
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("raw", [None, "", "abc", "1.2.3", "$5", {}])
+def test_parse_money_invalid_returns_none(raw):
+    assert parse_money(raw) is None
+
+
+def test_parse_money_never_uses_binary_float():
+    # If a float ever sneaks through, we still get an exact decimal, not 0.1+0.2 junk.
+    assert parse_money(0.1) == Decimal("0.1")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "value,expected",
+    [
+        (Decimal("142.5"), "$142.50"),
+        (Decimal("100"), "$100"),
+        (Decimal("0.01"), "$0.01"),
+        (Decimal("1000"), "$1000"),
+        (None, "—"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_format_money(value, expected):
+    assert format_money(value) == expected
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# BillingState payload parsing
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _member_payload() -> dict:
+    return {
+        "org": {"id": "o1", "slug": "acme", "name": "Acme", "role": "MEMBER"},
+        "balanceUsd": "142.5",
+        "cliBillingEnabled": True,
+        "chargePresets": ["100", "250", "500"],
+        "bounds": {"minUsd": "10", "maxUsd": "10000"},
+        "card": None,
+        "monthlyCap": None,
+        "autoReload": None,
+    }
+
+
+def _owner_payload() -> dict:
+    p = _member_payload()
+    p["org"]["role"] = "OWNER"
+    p["card"] = {"brand": "visa", "last4": "4242"}
+    p["monthlyCap"] = {
+        "limitUsd": "1000",
+        "spentThisMonthUsd": "180",
+        "isDefaultCeiling": True,
+    }
+    p["autoReload"] = {"enabled": True, "thresholdUsd": "20", "reloadToUsd": "100"}
+    return p
+
+
+def test_state_member_tier_parse():
+    s = billing_state_from_payload(_member_payload())
+    assert s.logged_in
+    assert s.role == "MEMBER"
+    assert s.balance_usd == Decimal("142.5")
+    assert s.cli_billing_enabled is True
+    assert s.charge_presets == (Decimal("100"), Decimal("250"), Decimal("500"))
+    assert s.min_usd == Decimal("10") and s.max_usd == Decimal("10000")
+    assert s.card is None and s.monthly_cap is None and s.auto_reload is None
+    assert s.is_admin is False
+    assert s.can_charge is False  # not admin
+
+
+def test_state_owner_tier_parse():
+    s = billing_state_from_payload(_owner_payload())
+    assert s.is_admin is True
+    assert s.can_charge is True  # admin + kill-switch on
+    assert s.card == CardInfo(brand="visa", last4="4242")
+    assert s.card is not None and s.card.masked == "visa ····4242"
+    assert s.monthly_cap == MonthlyCap(
+        limit_usd=Decimal("1000"),
+        spent_this_month_usd=Decimal("180"),
+        is_default_ceiling=True,
+    )
+    assert s.auto_reload == AutoReload(
+        enabled=True, threshold_usd=Decimal("20"), reload_to_usd=Decimal("100")
+    )
+
+
+def test_state_can_charge_false_when_killswitch_off():
+    p = _owner_payload()
+    p["cliBillingEnabled"] = False
+    s = billing_state_from_payload(p)
+    assert s.is_admin is True
+    assert s.can_charge is False  # kill-switch off gates the action
+
+
+def test_state_handles_garbage_substructs():
+    p = _member_payload()
+    p["card"] = "not-a-dict"
+    p["monthlyCap"] = 42
+    p["chargePresets"] = ["100", "bad", "250"]  # bad preset dropped, not crash
+    s = billing_state_from_payload(p)
+    assert s.card is None and s.monthly_cap is None
+    assert s.charge_presets == (Decimal("100"), Decimal("250"))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Error-code → typed-exception mapping (live-verified contract)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _Headers:
+    def __init__(self, d):
+        self._d = d
+
+    def get(self, k):
+        return self._d.get(k)
+
+
+def test_401_maps_to_auth_error():
+    with pytest.raises(BillingAuthError) as ei:
+        _raise_for_error(401, {"error": "invalid_token"})
+    assert ei.value.status == 401
+
+
+def test_403_insufficient_scope_maps_to_scope_required():
+    with pytest.raises(BillingScopeRequired) as ei:
+        _raise_for_error(403, {"error": "insufficient_scope", "portalUrl": "/billing"})
+    assert ei.value.error == "insufficient_scope"
+    # portalUrl is resolved to an absolute URL (relative-by-design from the server).
+    assert (ei.value.portal_url or "").startswith("http")
+    assert (ei.value.portal_url or "").endswith("/billing")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("status", [429, 503])
+def test_rate_limited_maps_with_retry_after(status):
+    with pytest.raises(BillingRateLimited) as ei:
+        _raise_for_error(
+            status,
+            {"error": "rate_limited"},
+            _Headers({"Retry-After": "60"}),
+        )
+    assert ei.value.retry_after == 60
+    # Critically: a rate limit is NOT a generic BillingError-only — surfaces branch on type.
+    assert isinstance(ei.value, BillingRateLimited)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "error",
+    [
+        "no_payment_method",
+        "cli_billing_disabled",
+        "role_required",
+        "monthly_cap_exceeded",
+        "org_access_denied",
+    ],
+)
+def test_other_403s_map_to_base_error_with_portal_url(error):
+    with pytest.raises(BillingError) as ei:
+        _raise_for_error(403, {"error": error, "portalUrl": "/billing?topup=open"})
+    # Not a scope/auth/rate subclass — the generic gate-denial path.
+    assert not isinstance(ei.value, (BillingScopeRequired, BillingAuthError, BillingRateLimited))
+    assert ei.value.error == error
+    # portalUrl resolved to an absolute deep-link (server sends it relative).
+    assert (ei.value.portal_url or "").startswith("http")
+    assert (ei.value.portal_url or "").endswith("/billing?topup=open")
+
+
+def test_monthly_cap_exceeded_carries_remaining_in_payload():
+    with pytest.raises(BillingError) as ei:
+        _raise_for_error(
+            403,
+            {
+                "error": "monthly_cap_exceeded",
+                "remainingUsd": "12.50",
+                "isDefaultCeiling": True,
+                "portalUrl": "/billing",
+            },
+        )
+    assert ei.value.payload["remainingUsd"] == "12.50"
+    assert ei.value.payload["isDefaultCeiling"] is True
+
+
+def test_400_amount_out_of_bounds_is_base_error():
+    with pytest.raises(BillingError) as ei:
+        _raise_for_error(400, {"error": "amount_out_of_bounds", "message": "too big"})
+    assert ei.value.status == 400
+    assert "too big" in str(ei.value)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# post_charge requires idempotency key (client-side guard)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_post_charge_requires_idempotency_key():
+    with pytest.raises(BillingError) as ei:
+        nb.post_charge(amount_usd=50, idempotency_key="")
+    assert ei.value.error == "idempotency_key_required"
+
+
+def test_get_charge_status_requires_id():
+    with pytest.raises(BillingError) as ei:
+        nb.get_charge_status("")
+    assert ei.value.error == "invalid_charge_id"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Base-URL resolution precedence
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_portal_base_url_env_override(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_PORTAL_BASE_URL", "https://preview.example.com/")
+    assert resolve_portal_base_url() == "https://preview.example.com"
+
+
+def test_portal_base_url_falls_back_to_state(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_PORTAL_BASE_URL", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("NOUS_PORTAL_BASE_URL", raising=False)
+    assert (
+        resolve_portal_base_url({"portal_base_url": "https://stored.example.com/"})
+        == "https://stored.example.com"
+    )
+
+
+def test_portal_base_url_default(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_PORTAL_BASE_URL", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("NOUS_PORTAL_BASE_URL", raising=False)
+    assert resolve_portal_base_url() == nb.DEFAULT_PORTAL_BASE_URL
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fail-open builder
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_build_billing_state_logged_out_on_auth_error(monkeypatch):
+    def _auth(*a, **kw):
+        raise BillingAuthError("nope", status=401)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(nb, "get_billing_state", _auth)
+    s = build_billing_state()
+    assert s.logged_in is False
+    assert s.error is None  # cleanly logged out, not an error
+
+
+def test_build_billing_state_fail_open_on_http_error(monkeypatch):
+    def _boom(*a, **kw):
+        raise BillingError("portal exploded", status=500)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(nb, "get_billing_state", _boom)
+    s = build_billing_state()
+    assert s.logged_in is False
+    assert "portal exploded" in (s.error or "")
+
+
+def test_build_billing_state_parses_and_prefers_server_portal_url(monkeypatch):
+    payload = _owner_payload()
+    payload["portalUrl"] = "https://portal.example.com/billing?topup=open"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(nb, "get_billing_state", lambda *a, **kw: payload)
+    s = build_billing_state()
+    assert s.logged_in is True
+    assert s.portal_url == "https://portal.example.com/billing?topup=open"
+    assert s.balance_usd == Decimal("142.5")
+
+
+def test_build_billing_state_builds_fallback_portal_url(monkeypatch):
+    payload = _member_payload()  # no portalUrl key
+    monkeypatch.setattr(nb, "get_billing_state", lambda *a, **kw: payload)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(bv, "_fallback_portal_url", lambda base: "FALLBACK")
+    # resolve_portal_base_url is imported into bv via local import; patch nb's.
+    s = build_billing_state()
+    assert s.portal_url == "FALLBACK"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Idempotency
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_new_idempotency_key_unique_and_uuid_shaped():
+    a, b = new_idempotency_key(), new_idempotency_key()
+    assert a != b
+    assert len(a) == 36 and a.count("-") == 4
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Amount validation (Screen 3 custom input)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_validate_amount_ok():
+    v = validate_charge_amount("100", min_usd=Decimal("10"), max_usd=Decimal("10000"))
+    assert v.ok and v.amount == Decimal("100")
+
+
+def test_validate_amount_strips_dollar_sign():
+    v = validate_charge_amount("$250", min_usd=Decimal("10"), max_usd=Decimal("10000"))
+    assert v.ok and v.amount == Decimal("250")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "raw,err_substr",
+    [
+        ("", "dollar amount"),
+        ("0", "greater than"),
+        ("-5", "greater than"),
+        ("10.005", "cent"),       # multipleOf 0.01 — sub-cent rejected
+        ("5", "Minimum"),         # below bounds.minUsd
+        ("99999", "Maximum"),     # above bounds.maxUsd
+    ],
+)
+def test_validate_amount_rejections(raw, err_substr):
+    v = validate_charge_amount(raw, min_usd=Decimal("10"), max_usd=Decimal("10000"))
+    assert not v.ok
+    assert err_substr.lower() in (v.error or "").lower()

tests/agent/test_codex_responses_adapter.py

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import pytest
 from agent.codex_responses_adapter import (
     _format_responses_error,
     _normalize_codex_response,
+    _preflight_codex_api_kwargs,
 )
 
 
@@ -68,6 +69,115 @@ def test_normalize_codex_response_treats_summary_only_reasoning_as_incomplete():
     assert assistant_message.codex_reasoning_items is None
 
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Server-side built-in tool calls (xAI native web_search, code interpreter,
+# etc.) come back as discrete ``*_call`` output items that xAI's
+# /v1/responses surface routinely leaves at ``status="in_progress"`` even
+# when the overall ``response.status == "completed"``.  These must NOT mark
+# the turn incomplete — otherwise grok-composer-2.5-fast research queries
+# (which invoke server-side web_search) get misclassified as
+# ``finish_reason="incomplete"`` and burn 3 fruitless continuation retries
+# before failing with "Codex response remained incomplete after 3
+# continuation attempts".  Observed live against grok-composer-2.5-fast on
+# SuperGrok OAuth (2026-06).
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_normalize_codex_response_ignores_in_progress_server_side_tool_calls():
+    """A completed response with a final message + lingering in_progress
+    server-side web_search_call items resolves to 'stop', not 'incomplete'."""
+    response = SimpleNamespace(
+        status="completed",
+        incomplete_details=None,
+        output=[
+            SimpleNamespace(
+                type="reasoning",
+                id="rs_1",
+                encrypted_content="opaque",
+                summary=[SimpleNamespace(text="researching blades")],
+            ),
+            SimpleNamespace(
+                type="message",
+                role="assistant",
+                status="completed",
+                content=[SimpleNamespace(
+                    type="output_text",
+                    text="Milwaukee M18 blade 49-16-2734, ~$30 OEM.",
+                )],
+            ),
+            SimpleNamespace(type="web_search_call", status="in_progress"),
+            SimpleNamespace(type="web_search_call", status="in_progress"),
+            SimpleNamespace(type="web_search_call", status="in_progress"),
+        ],
+    )
+
+    assistant_message, finish_reason = _normalize_codex_response(response)
+
+    assert finish_reason == "stop"
+    assert assistant_message.content == "Milwaukee M18 blade 49-16-2734, ~$30 OEM."
+
+
+def test_normalize_codex_response_in_progress_message_still_incomplete():
+    """Guard scope: an in_progress *message* item (genuine model output that
+    is still streaming) must still mark the turn incomplete — only
+    server-side ``*_call`` items are exempted."""
+    response = SimpleNamespace(
+        status="completed",
+        incomplete_details=None,
+        output=[
+            SimpleNamespace(
+                type="message",
+                role="assistant",
+                status="in_progress",
+                content=[SimpleNamespace(type="output_text", text="partial...")],
+            ),
+        ],
+    )
+
+    _assistant_message, finish_reason = _normalize_codex_response(response)
+
+    assert finish_reason == "incomplete"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _preflight_codex_api_kwargs — built-in (provider-executed) tools must pass
+# through validation.  Regression guard for the xAI native web_search
+# injection: the preflight validator previously rejected any tool whose
+# ``type != "function"`` with "unsupported type", which would 400 every xAI
+# turn once the native web_search tool is declared.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_preflight_passes_native_web_search_tool_through():
+    kwargs = {
+        "model": "grok-composer-2.5-fast",
+        "instructions": "You are helpful.",
+        "input": [{"role": "user", "content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "hi"}]}],
+        "store": False,
+        "tools": [
+            {"type": "function", "name": "read_file", "description": "Read.",
+             "parameters": {"type": "object", "properties": {}}},
+            {"type": "web_search"},
+        ],
+    }
+    out = _preflight_codex_api_kwargs(kwargs, allow_stream=True)
+    tools = out["tools"]
+    assert {"type": "web_search"} in tools
+    assert any(t.get("type") == "function" and t.get("name") == "read_file" for t in tools)
+
+
+def test_preflight_still_rejects_unknown_tool_type():
+    kwargs = {
+        "model": "grok-composer-2.5-fast",
+        "instructions": "You are helpful.",
+        "input": [{"role": "user", "content": [{"type": "input_text", "text": "hi"}]}],
+        "store": False,
+        "tools": [{"type": "totally_made_up_tool"}],
+    }
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported type"):
+        _preflight_codex_api_kwargs(kwargs, allow_stream=True)
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # _format_responses_error — adapted from anomalyco/opencode#28757.
 # Provider failures should surface BOTH the code (rate_limit_exceeded /

tests/agent/test_empty_tool_name_loop_dampening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+"""Regression for #47967 — empty-name phantom tool calls.
+
+Weak open models (mimo, nemotron-class) that see tool-call XML/JSON sitting in
+file contents or tool output get *primed* and emit their own structured tool
+calls that mimic the payload — usually with an empty/whitespace ``name``. Those
+calls can't be fuzzy-repaired toward a real tool, so the dispatch loop returns an
+error and the model retries. Before this fix, every empty-name error dumped the
+full tool catalog back to the model, which fed the priming loop more names to
+mimic and inflated context 3-4x across the retry budget.
+
+The fix: a blank/whitespace-only tool name gets a terse anti-priming error that
+tells the model in-context tool-call syntax is DATA, with NO catalog dump. A
+genuinely-wrong-but-nonempty name (an actual typo) still gets the full catalog
+so the model can self-correct.
+
+These assert the *behavior contract* of the dispatch branch (what content goes
+back to the model for each name shape), exercised end-to-end through
+``AIAgent.run_conversation`` against an in-process mock provider — not a snapshot
+of the message string.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
+
+import pytest
+
+# Repo root = three levels up from tests/agent/<file>.
+_REPO_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+if _REPO_ROOT not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, _REPO_ROOT)
+
+
+class _MockHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    # Set by the fixture before each request cycle.
+    captured_requests: list = []
+    response_queue: list = []
+
+    def do_POST(self):  # noqa: N802 (http.server API)
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
+        req = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length).decode())
+        type(self).captured_requests.append(req)
+        is_stream = req.get("stream") is True
+        if type(self).response_queue:
+            resp = type(self).response_queue.pop(0)
+        else:
+            resp = _text_resp("DONE")
+        msg = resp["choices"][0]["message"]
+        if is_stream:
+            content = msg.get("content") or ""
+            tcs = msg.get("tool_calls")
+            self.send_response(200)
+            self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
+            self.end_headers()
+            chunks = [{"id": "m", "choices": [{"index": 0, "delta": {"role": "assistant", "content": ""}, "finish_reason": None}]}]
+            if content:
+                chunks.append({"id": "m", "choices": [{"index": 0, "delta": {"content": content}, "finish_reason": None}]})
+            if tcs:
+                for ti, tc in enumerate(tcs):
+                    chunks.append({"id": "m", "choices": [{"index": 0, "delta": {"tool_calls": [{
+                        "index": ti, "id": tc["id"], "type": "function",
+                        "function": {"name": tc["function"]["name"], "arguments": tc["function"]["arguments"]}}]}, "finish_reason": None}]})
+            chunks.append({"id": "m", "choices": [{"index": 0, "delta": {}, "finish_reason": "tool_calls" if tcs else "stop"}]})
+            for c in chunks:
+                self.wfile.write(f"data: {json.dumps(c)}\n\n".encode())
+            self.wfile.write(b"data: [DONE]\n\n")
+            self.wfile.flush()
+        else:
+            body = json.dumps(resp).encode()
+            self.send_response(200)
+            self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+            self.end_headers()
+            self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def log_message(self, *a, **kw):  # silence the default stderr logging
+        pass
+
+
+def _tc_resp(name: str, args: str = "{}") -> dict:
+    return {
+        "id": "m",
+        "choices": [{"index": 0, "message": {
+            "role": "assistant", "content": "",
+            "tool_calls": [{"id": "call_1", "type": "function",
+                            "function": {"name": name, "arguments": args}}]},
+            "finish_reason": "tool_calls"}],
+        "usage": {"prompt_tokens": 10, "completion_tokens": 0, "total_tokens": 10},
+    }
+
+
+def _text_resp(text: str) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "id": "m",
+        "choices": [{"index": 0, "message": {"role": "assistant", "content": text}, "finish_reason": "stop"}],
+        "usage": {"prompt_tokens": 10, "completion_tokens": 0, "total_tokens": 10},
+    }
+
+
+@pytest.fixture()
+def agent_env():
+    """Spin up the mock provider + an isolated HERMES_HOME, yield (agent, helpers)."""
+    _MockHandler.captured_requests = []
+    _MockHandler.response_queue = []
+    srv = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _MockHandler)
+    port = srv.server_address[1]
+    t = threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True)
+    t.start()
+
+    test_home = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="hermes_e2e_47967_")
+    os.makedirs(os.path.join(test_home, ".hermes"))
+    prev_home = os.environ.get("HERMES_HOME")
+    os.environ["HERMES_HOME"] = os.path.join(test_home, ".hermes")
+
+    # Import fresh so the patched conversation_loop is exercised even when the
+    # module was imported earlier in the same worker.
+    for mod in list(sys.modules):
+        if mod == "run_agent" or mod.startswith("agent.") or mod.startswith("tools.") or mod.startswith("hermes_"):
+            del sys.modules[mod]
+    from run_agent import AIAgent
+
+    agent = AIAgent(
+        api_key="test-key", base_url=f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/v1",
+        provider="openai-compat", model="test-model",
+        max_iterations=10, enabled_toolsets=[],
+        quiet_mode=True, skip_context_files=True, skip_memory=True,
+        save_trajectories=False, platform="cli",
+    )
+    agent.valid_tool_names = {"terminal", "read_file", "write_file", "execute_code", "session_search"}
+
+    try:
+        yield agent, _MockHandler
+    finally:
+        srv.shutdown()
+        shutil.rmtree(test_home, ignore_errors=True)
+        if prev_home is None:
+            os.environ.pop("HERMES_HOME", None)
+        else:
+            os.environ["HERMES_HOME"] = prev_home
+
+
+def _tool_results(handler) -> list[str]:
+    out = []
+    for req in handler.captured_requests:
+        for m in req.get("messages", []):
+            if m.get("role") == "tool":
+                out.append(m.get("content", ""))
+    return out
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("blank", ["", "   ", "\n", "\t "])
+def test_empty_tool_name_gets_terse_error_no_catalog(agent_env, blank):
+    """A blank/whitespace tool name must NOT trigger a full tool-catalog dump."""
+    agent, handler = agent_env
+    handler.response_queue.append(_tc_resp(blank, "{}"))
+    handler.response_queue.append(_text_resp("Recovered in plain text."))
+
+    agent.run_conversation("read ./payload and report", conversation_history=[], task_id="t")
+
+    joined = " ".join(_tool_results(handler))
+    assert "tool name was empty" in joined
+    # The whole point: do not feed the priming loop the catalog of names.
+    assert "Available tools:" not in joined
+
+
+def test_unknown_nonempty_name_keeps_catalog(agent_env):
+    """A genuinely-wrong NONempty name still gets the catalog for self-correction."""
+    agent, handler = agent_env
+    handler.response_queue.append(_tc_resp("frobnicate_xyz", "{}"))
+    handler.response_queue.append(_text_resp("ok plain text"))
+
+    agent.run_conversation("do a thing", conversation_history=[], task_id="t")
+
+    joined = " ".join(_tool_results(handler))
+    assert "frobnicate_xyz" in joined
+    assert "Available tools:" in joined
+    assert "tool name was empty" not in joined

tests/agent/test_model_metadata.py

@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ class TestDefaultContextLengths:
                 ("grok-4", 256000),
                 ("grok-4-0709", 256000),
                 ("grok-build-0.1", 256000),
+                ("grok-composer-2.5-fast", 200000),
                 ("grok-code-fast-1", 256000),
                 ("grok-3", 131072),
                 ("grok-3-mini", 131072),

tests/agent/test_prompt_builder.py

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ from agent.prompt_builder import (
     TOOL_USE_ENFORCEMENT_GUIDANCE,
     TOOL_USE_ENFORCEMENT_MODELS,
     OPENAI_MODEL_EXECUTION_GUIDANCE,
+    PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE,
+    GOOGLE_MODEL_OPERATIONAL_GUIDANCE,
     MEMORY_GUIDANCE,
     SESSION_SEARCH_GUIDANCE,
     PLATFORM_HINTS,
@@ -1497,6 +1499,49 @@ class TestOpenAIModelExecutionGuidance:
         assert len(OPENAI_MODEL_EXECUTION_GUIDANCE) > 100
 
 
+class TestParallelToolCallGuidance:
+    """Behavior contracts for the universal parallel-tool-call guidance block.
+
+    Asserts the invariants the block must satisfy (steer batching, scope to
+    independent calls, stay short for the cached prompt) rather than freezing
+    its exact wording.
+    """
+
+    def test_is_nonempty_string(self):
+        assert isinstance(PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE, str)
+        assert PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE.strip()
+
+    def test_steers_batching_into_one_response(self):
+        text = PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE.lower()
+        # Must tell the model to group independent calls together — accept any
+        # phrasing that means "one turn" without freezing exact wording.
+        assert "single response" in text or ("same" in text and "turn" in text)
+        assert "independent" in text
+
+    def test_carves_out_dependent_calls(self):
+        # Must NOT tell the model to batch dependent calls — that would break
+        # ordering (read-before-patch). The block has to acknowledge the
+        # serialize-when-dependent case.
+        text = PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE.lower()
+        assert "depend" in text
+
+    def test_stays_short_for_cached_prompt(self):
+        # Shipped in every cached system prompt — keep it tight. The existing
+        # task-completion block is ~600 chars; allow generous headroom but
+        # guard against accidental essay growth.
+        assert len(PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE) < 900
+
+    def test_has_a_heading(self):
+        # Heading delimits it as its own section in the assembled prompt.
+        assert PARALLEL_TOOL_CALL_GUIDANCE.lstrip().startswith("#")
+
+    def test_not_duplicated_in_google_guidance(self):
+        # The universal block is now the single source of parallel-batching
+        # steer. The Google-only block must NOT carry its own copy, otherwise
+        # Gemini/Gemma would receive the instruction twice in one prompt.
+        assert "parallel tool call" not in GOOGLE_MODEL_OPERATIONAL_GUIDANCE.lower()
+
+
 # =========================================================================
 # Budget warning history stripping
 # =========================================================================

tests/agent/transports/test_codex_transport.py

@@ -263,6 +263,102 @@ class TestCodexBuildKwargs:
         # full history.
         assert "reasoning.encrypted_content" in kw.get("include", [])
 
+    def test_xai_injects_native_web_search_when_client_web_search_present(self, transport):
+        """xAI path swaps a client-side ``web_search`` function for xAI's
+        native server-side ``web_search`` built-in so grok server-side search
+        runs to completion (otherwise the turn stalls as
+        reasoning-with-no-answer -> false 'incomplete' -> 3 retries -> fail).
+        Non-conflicting client tools are preserved.
+        """
+        messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Find current prices."}]
+        kw = transport.build_kwargs(
+            model="grok-composer-2.5-fast", messages=messages,
+            tools=[
+                {"type": "function", "function": {
+                    "name": "read_file", "description": "Read a file.",
+                    "parameters": {"type": "object",
+                                   "properties": {"path": {"type": "string"}}}}},
+                {"type": "function", "function": {
+                    "name": "web_search", "description": "Search the web.",
+                    "parameters": {"type": "object",
+                                   "properties": {"query": {"type": "string"}}}}},
+            ],
+            is_xai_responses=True,
+        )
+        tool_types = [t.get("type") for t in kw.get("tools", [])]
+        assert "web_search" in tool_types, kw.get("tools")
+        # Non-conflicting client-side tools are preserved.
+        names = [t.get("name") for t in kw.get("tools", []) if t.get("type") == "function"]
+        assert "read_file" in names
+
+    def test_xai_does_not_inject_native_web_search_without_client_web_search(self, transport):
+        """The native ``web_search`` built-in is a 1:1 swap for an
+        already-requested client ``web_search`` — NOT an additive grant.  A
+        turn whose toolset has no ``web_search`` (user never enabled the web
+        toolset) must not get Grok server-side search force-injected, which
+        would silently bypass Hermes's web-provider config and tool-trace
+        plumbing for every xai-oauth turn.
+        """
+        messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Read this file."}]
+        kw = transport.build_kwargs(
+            model="grok-composer-2.5-fast", messages=messages,
+            tools=[{"type": "function", "function": {
+                "name": "read_file", "description": "Read a file.",
+                "parameters": {"type": "object",
+                               "properties": {"path": {"type": "string"}}}}}],
+            is_xai_responses=True,
+        )
+        tools = kw.get("tools", [])
+        assert not any(t.get("type") == "web_search" for t in tools), tools
+        names = [t.get("name") for t in tools if t.get("type") == "function"]
+        assert "read_file" in names
+
+    def test_xai_drops_clientside_web_search_to_avoid_duplicate(self, transport):
+        """When the client registers its own 'web_search' function, the xAI
+        path must drop it and rely on the native built-in — otherwise xAI
+        returns HTTP 400 'Duplicate tool names: web_search'."""
+        messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Search the web."}]
+        kw = transport.build_kwargs(
+            model="grok-composer-2.5-fast", messages=messages,
+            tools=[{"type": "function", "function": {
+                "name": "web_search", "description": "Search the web.",
+                "parameters": {"type": "object",
+                               "properties": {"query": {"type": "string"}}}}}],
+            is_xai_responses=True,
+        )
+        tools = kw.get("tools", [])
+        # Exactly one tool named/typed web_search, and it is the native built-in.
+        web_search_entries = [
+            t for t in tools
+            if t.get("name") == "web_search" or t.get("type") == "web_search"
+        ]
+        assert len(web_search_entries) == 1
+        assert web_search_entries[0] == {"type": "web_search"}
+        # No client-side function form of web_search survives.
+        assert not any(
+            t.get("type") == "function" and t.get("name") == "web_search"
+            for t in tools
+        )
+
+    def test_non_xai_path_does_not_inject_native_web_search(self, transport):
+        """Native web_search injection is scoped to xAI — Codex/GitHub paths
+        keep the client-side web_search function untouched."""
+        messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Search."}]
+        kw = transport.build_kwargs(
+            model="gpt-5.4", messages=messages,
+            tools=[{"type": "function", "function": {
+                "name": "web_search", "description": "Search the web.",
+                "parameters": {"type": "object",
+                               "properties": {"query": {"type": "string"}}}}}],
+            is_xai_responses=False,
+        )
+        tools = kw.get("tools", [])
+        assert not any(t.get("type") == "web_search" for t in tools)
+        assert any(
+            t.get("type") == "function" and t.get("name") == "web_search"
+            for t in tools
+        )
+
     def test_xai_reasoning_disabled_no_reasoning_key(self, transport):
         messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Hi"}]
         kw = transport.build_kwargs(

tests/cli/test_prompt_text_input_thread_safety.py

@@ -34,37 +34,35 @@ class TestPromptTextInputThreadSafety:
         # not the orphaned-coroutine result.
         assert mock_rit.called
 
-    def test_background_thread_falls_back_to_direct_input(self):
-        """On a daemon thread, skip run_in_terminal and call input() directly.
+    def test_background_thread_cancels_instead_of_hanging(self):
+        """On a daemon thread with an active app, cancel cleanly (return None).
 
-        This preserves the fallback for any prompt that still runs off the main
-        UI thread: run_in_terminal's coroutine would otherwise be orphaned.
+        stdin is owned by the prompt_toolkit event loop / JSON-RPC pipe on the
+        non-main (process_loop / slash-worker) thread, so a bare input() there
+        would block until the worker's timeout (#23185 / billing auto-reload
+        hang). The guard cancels to None instead of hanging — it must NOT call
+        run_in_terminal (orphaned coroutine) and must NOT call input().
         """
         cli = _make_cli()
-        captured = {}
-
-        def fake_input(prompt):
-            captured["prompt"] = prompt
-            return "1"
 
         result_holder = {}
 
         def run_on_daemon():
             with patch("prompt_toolkit.application.run_in_terminal") as mock_rit, \
-                 patch("builtins.input", side_effect=fake_input):
+                 patch("builtins.input", side_effect=AssertionError("input() must not be called off-main-thread")) as mock_input:
                 result_holder["value"] = cli._prompt_text_input("Choice [1/2/3]: ")
                 result_holder["rit_called"] = mock_rit.called
+                result_holder["input_called"] = mock_input.called
 
         t = threading.Thread(target=run_on_daemon, daemon=True)
         t.start()
         t.join(timeout=2.0)
-        assert not t.is_alive(), "daemon thread hung — input() was not driven"
+        assert not t.is_alive(), "daemon thread hung — guard did not cancel cleanly"
 
-        # run_in_terminal was bypassed entirely on the background thread.
+        # Cancelled cleanly: None returned, neither run_in_terminal nor input() called.
+        assert result_holder["value"] is None
         assert result_holder["rit_called"] is False
-        # input() was invoked with the prompt and its return value was captured.
-        assert captured.get("prompt") == "Choice [1/2/3]: "
-        assert result_holder["value"] == "1"
+        assert result_holder["input_called"] is False
 
     def test_no_app_uses_direct_input(self):
         """Without an active prompt_toolkit app, always call input() directly."""

tests/docker/test_immutable_install_permissions.py

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+"""Docker smoke tests for immutable install permissions."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import subprocess
+import textwrap
+
+
+def test_container_sets_hosted_write_policy_env(built_image: str) -> None:
+    script = (
+        'test "$HERMES_HOME" = "/opt/data" && '
+        'test "$HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT" = "/opt/data" && '
+        'test "$HERMES_DISABLE_LAZY_INSTALLS" = "1" && '
+        'test "$PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE" = "1"'
+    )
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["docker", "run", "--rm", "--entrypoint", "sh", built_image, "-c", script],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+    assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr[-2000:]
+
+
+def test_hermes_user_cannot_modify_install_but_can_write_data(built_image: str) -> None:
+    script = textwrap.dedent(
+        r"""
+        set -eu
+        /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python - <<'PY'
+        from pathlib import Path
+
+        install_file = Path("/opt/hermes/agent/message_sanitization.py")
+        try:
+            with install_file.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                handle.write("\n# unexpected hosted mutation\n")
+        except PermissionError:
+            pass
+        else:
+            raise SystemExit("install source write unexpectedly succeeded")
+
+        skill_dir = Path("/opt/data/skills/permission-smoke")
+        skill_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        skill_file = skill_dir / "SKILL.md"
+        skill_file.write_text("# Permission smoke\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        if skill_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8") != "# Permission smoke\n":
+            raise SystemExit("data write verification failed")
+        PY
+        """
+    ).strip()
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        [
+            "docker",
+            "run",
+            "--rm",
+            "--entrypoint",
+            "su",
+            built_image,
+            "hermes",
+            "-s",
+            "/bin/sh",
+            "-c",
+            script,
+        ],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=120,
+    )
+    assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr[-2000:]

tests/gateway/relay/stub_connector.py

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+"""Test-only in-memory stub connector implementing RelayTransport.
+
+MUST stay under tests/ — never under plugins/ or gateway/ (a CI guard in
+test_no_stub_leak.py asserts this). It lets Phase 1 prove the gateway side of
+the relay end-to-end with zero dependency on the real (Node) connector.
+
+The stub:
+  - hands back a fixed CapabilityDescriptor at handshake,
+  - lets a test push synthetic inbound MessageEvents (push_inbound),
+  - records every outbound action (sent/interrupts) for assertions,
+  - answers get_chat_info from a small fixture map.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
+
+from gateway.platforms.base import MessageEvent
+from gateway.relay.descriptor import CapabilityDescriptor
+from gateway.relay.transport import InboundHandler
+
+
+class StubConnector:
+    """In-memory RelayTransport for tests."""
+
+    def __init__(self, descriptor: CapabilityDescriptor) -> None:
+        self._descriptor = descriptor
+        self._inbound: Optional[InboundHandler] = None
+        self.connected = False
+        self.sent: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self.interrupts: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self.follow_ups: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self.chat_info: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
+        # Canned result for the next send_outbound (override per-test).
+        self.next_send_result: Dict[str, Any] = {"success": True, "message_id": "m1"}
+        # Canned result for the next send_follow_up (override per-test). Default
+        # mimics a resolved capability egress; set success=False to simulate an
+        # absent/expired capability or a tenant mismatch on the connector side.
+        self.next_follow_up_result: Dict[str, Any] = {"success": True, "message_id": "f1"}
+
+    async def connect(self) -> bool:
+        self.connected = True
+        return True
+
+    async def disconnect(self) -> None:
+        self.connected = False
+
+    async def handshake(self) -> CapabilityDescriptor:
+        return self._descriptor
+
+    def set_inbound_handler(self, handler: InboundHandler) -> None:
+        self._inbound = handler
+
+    async def send_outbound(self, action: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        self.sent.append(action)
+        if action.get("op") == "send":
+            return dict(self.next_send_result)
+        return {"success": True}
+
+    async def get_chat_info(self, chat_id: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        return self.chat_info.get(chat_id, {"name": chat_id, "type": "dm"})
+
+    async def send_interrupt(self, session_key: str, reason: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
+        self.interrupts.append({"session_key": session_key, "reason": reason})
+
+    async def send_follow_up(self, action: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        self.follow_ups.append(action)
+        return dict(self.next_follow_up_result)
+
+    # ── test driver ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    async def push_inbound(self, event: MessageEvent) -> None:
+        """Simulate the connector delivering a normalized inbound event."""
+        if self._inbound is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("no inbound handler registered (call adapter.connect first)")
+        await self._inbound(event)

tests/gateway/relay/test_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+"""Unit tests for gateway/relay/auth.py — the gateway-side relay auth primitives.
+
+Two layers:
+
+1. **Self-consistency** — make_token/verify_token round-trip, delivery-signature
+   verify, rotation verify list, tamper + skew + expiry rejection.
+2. **Cross-implementation conformance** — frozen vectors generated by the
+   connector's TypeScript (``src/core/relayAuthToken.ts`` ``makeToken``/``sign``)
+   are reproduced byte-for-byte by the Python port. If the connector ever
+   changes its wire scheme, these vectors must be regenerated in lockstep
+   (and that is the point — the test fails loudly on drift). Regenerate with:
+
+       node -e 'import("./dist/core/relayAuthToken.js").then(m=>{ \
+         const s="00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"; \
+         console.log(m.makeToken("gw-instance-1", s, 0)); \
+         console.log(m.sign("1750000000."+JSON.stringify({a:1}), s)); })'
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+
+from gateway.relay.auth import (
+    DELIVERY_SIG_HEADER,
+    DELIVERY_TS_HEADER,
+    make_token,
+    make_upgrade_token,
+    sign,
+    verify_delivery_signature,
+    verify_signature,
+    verify_token,
+)
+
+# A fixed 256-bit hex secret used for the frozen connector vectors below.
+_SECRET = "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
+
+# ── Frozen vectors produced by the connector's TypeScript (relayAuthToken.ts).
+# Generated via dist/core/relayAuthToken.js makeToken/sign; see module docstring.
+_CONN_TOKEN = "Z3ctaW5zdGFuY2UtMTowOjM3YWE3YjE0NWU4NzY0ZDQwM2JhOWM2MzlmMjMwZGQ2M2RlOGVkOTliODhmZWQzNmFhMDI2MjVhOGE3ZTM1NjQ"
+# The EXACT bytes the connector signed: JS JSON.stringify emits compact JSON
+# (no spaces). The gateway verifies over the literal received body, so the
+# vector is the compact form — NOT Python's spaced json.dumps default. This is
+# the raw-byte-preservation discipline (a single differing byte breaks the HMAC).
+_CONN_BODY = '{"type":"message","event":{"text":"hi","source":{"chat_id":"c1"}}}'
+_CONN_TS = 1750000000
+_CONN_SIG = "ac9509c8dae52b5590f06378260877334ff1adc4b1c96bafa4b514165fae6dc6"
+
+
+# ── Self-consistency ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_token_round_trip_no_expiry():
+    tok = make_token("payload-123", _SECRET, 0)
+    assert verify_token(tok, [_SECRET]) == "payload-123"
+
+
+def test_token_payload_may_contain_colons():
+    # verify_token must split from the right so a colon-bearing payload survives.
+    payload = "agent:main:discord:group:chanA"
+    tok = make_token(payload, _SECRET, 0)
+    assert verify_token(tok, [_SECRET]) == payload
+
+
+def test_upgrade_token_is_make_token_of_gateway_id():
+    assert make_upgrade_token("gw-1", _SECRET, 0) == make_token("gw-1", _SECRET, 0)
+
+
+def test_token_wrong_secret_rejected():
+    tok = make_token("p", _SECRET, 0)
+    assert verify_token(tok, ["deadbeef" * 8]) is None
+
+
+def test_token_expired_rejected():
+    # ttl in the past -> exp < now -> rejected.
+    tok = make_token("p", _SECRET, ttl_seconds=1)
+    # Force expiry by signing with a manual past exp via the low-level helper.
+    # Simpler: a 1s ttl token is still valid now; instead assert a clearly-old one.
+    # Build an already-expired token by hand using the same scheme.
+    import base64
+
+    signed = "p:1"  # exp=1 (1970) -> long past
+    sig = sign(signed, _SECRET)
+    raw = f"{signed}:{sig}".encode()
+    expired = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
+    assert verify_token(expired, [_SECRET]) is None
+    # And the fresh one is accepted.
+    assert verify_token(tok, [_SECRET]) == "p"
+
+
+def test_token_rotation_verify_list():
+    # A token signed with the (old) secondary still verifies during rotation.
+    old, new = _SECRET, "ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100"
+    tok_old = make_token("p", old, 0)
+    assert verify_token(tok_old, [new, old]) == "p"  # primary=new, secondary=old
+    assert verify_token(tok_old, [new]) is None
+
+
+def test_token_garbage_rejected():
+    assert verify_token("not-base64url!!!", [_SECRET]) is None
+    assert verify_token("", [_SECRET]) is None
+
+
+def test_verify_signature_constant_time_multi_secret():
+    payload = "1700000000.body"
+    s = sign(payload, _SECRET)
+    assert verify_signature(payload, s, ["wrong", _SECRET]) is True
+    assert verify_signature(payload, s, ["wrong"]) is False
+    assert verify_signature(payload, "zz", [_SECRET]) is False  # bad hex
+
+
+# ── Delivery signature (connector -> gateway inbound) ──────────────────────
+
+
+def test_delivery_signature_accepts_valid():
+    body = json.dumps({"type": "message", "event": {"text": "x"}})
+    ts = 1700000000
+    s = sign(f"{ts}.{body}", _SECRET)
+    assert verify_delivery_signature(body, str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts) is True
+
+
+def test_delivery_signature_tamper_rejected():
+    body = json.dumps({"type": "message", "event": {"text": "x"}})
+    ts = 1700000000
+    s = sign(f"{ts}.{body}", _SECRET)
+    # A single changed body byte breaks the HMAC.
+    assert verify_delivery_signature(body + " ", str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts) is False
+
+
+def test_delivery_signature_skew_rejected():
+    body = "{}"
+    ts = 1700000000
+    s = sign(f"{ts}.{body}", _SECRET)
+    # Beyond the 300s replay window in either direction.
+    assert verify_delivery_signature(body, str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts + 301) is False
+    assert verify_delivery_signature(body, str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts - 301) is False
+    assert verify_delivery_signature(body, str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts + 299) is True
+
+
+def test_delivery_signature_missing_headers_rejected():
+    assert verify_delivery_signature("{}", None, "abc", [_SECRET]) is False
+    assert verify_delivery_signature("{}", "1700000000", None, [_SECRET]) is False
+    assert verify_delivery_signature("{}", "not-an-int", "abc", [_SECRET]) is False
+
+
+def test_delivery_headers_match_connector_names():
+    # The gateway reads exactly the header names the connector writes.
+    assert DELIVERY_TS_HEADER == "x-relay-timestamp"
+    assert DELIVERY_SIG_HEADER == "x-relay-signature"
+
+
+# ── Cross-implementation conformance (frozen connector vectors) ────────────
+
+
+def test_python_make_token_matches_connector_byte_for_byte():
+    assert make_token("gw-instance-1", _SECRET, 0) == _CONN_TOKEN
+
+
+def test_python_verifies_connector_token():
+    assert verify_token(_CONN_TOKEN, [_SECRET]) == "gw-instance-1"
+
+
+def test_python_sign_matches_connector_delivery_sig():
+    assert sign(f"{_CONN_TS}.{_CONN_BODY}", _SECRET) == _CONN_SIG
+
+
+def test_python_verifies_connector_delivery_signature():
+    assert verify_delivery_signature(_CONN_BODY, str(_CONN_TS), _CONN_SIG, [_SECRET], now=_CONN_TS) is True

tests/gateway/relay/test_contract_doc_conformance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+"""Cross-repo contract conformance: docs/relay-connector-contract.md ⟷ Python.
+
+The contract doc is the formal interface the connector repo
+(NousResearch/gateway-gateway) implements against. The connector's TypeScript
+structs are hand-mirrored from the doc, so if the Python source of truth drifts
+from the doc, the two repos silently diverge and the handshake / session-keying
+breaks only at integration time.
+
+These tests make the doc ⟷ code relationship an enforced invariant:
+
+  * Every ``CapabilityDescriptor`` field (§2 table) is documented with the
+    correct required/optional flag, and the doc lists no fields the dataclass
+    lacks.
+  * Every ``SessionSource`` wire key (what ``to_dict()`` actually serializes)
+    is named in the contract doc's §3 discriminator section, and every
+    discriminator the doc calls out as a column header exists on the dataclass.
+
+They are invariants, NOT change-detector snapshots: they assert the *relation*
+between two artifacts that must move together, not a frozen list of names. Add
+a field to the descriptor and the doc, and the test stays green; add it to only
+one, and CI fails — which is exactly the lockstep guarantee the plan's
+Cross-Repo Coordination Checklist calls for.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from gateway.relay.descriptor import CapabilityDescriptor
+from gateway.session import SessionSource
+
+# Repo root: tests/gateway/relay/ -> repo root is parents[3]
+_CONTRACT_DOC = (
+    Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / "docs" / "relay-connector-contract.md"
+)
+
+
+def _doc_text() -> str:
+    assert _CONTRACT_DOC.exists(), (
+        f"Contract doc missing at {_CONTRACT_DOC}. It is the formal cross-repo "
+        f"interface (Phase 1, Task 1.5) and must ship with the relay adapter."
+    )
+    return _CONTRACT_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def _parse_descriptor_table(text: str) -> dict[str, bool]:
+    """Parse §2's markdown table → {field_name: required}.
+
+    Rows look like: ``| `field` | type | yes|no | meaning |``. Returns a map of
+    field name to whether the Required column says "yes".
+    """
+    fields: dict[str, bool] = {}
+    # Restrict to the §2 section so §3/§4 tables don't bleed in.
+    section = text.split("## 2. CapabilityDescriptor", 1)[-1].split("## 3.", 1)[0]
+    row_re = re.compile(r"^\|\s*`([a-z_]+)`\s*\|[^|]*\|\s*(yes|no)\s*\|", re.M)
+    for name, required in row_re.findall(section):
+        fields[name] = required.strip() == "yes"
+    return fields
+
+
+def test_descriptor_fields_match_contract_doc():
+    """§2 table ⟷ CapabilityDescriptor dataclass, names + required/optional."""
+    documented = _parse_descriptor_table(_doc_text())
+    assert documented, "Failed to parse any descriptor fields from the §2 table."
+
+    dc_fields = CapabilityDescriptor.__dataclass_fields__  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    # A dataclass field is "required" iff it has no default and no default_factory.
+    import dataclasses
+
+    code_required = {
+        name
+        for name, f in dc_fields.items()
+        if f.default is dataclasses.MISSING
+        and f.default_factory is dataclasses.MISSING  # type: ignore[misc]
+    }
+    code_names = set(dc_fields.keys())
+    doc_names = set(documented.keys())
+
+    missing_from_doc = code_names - doc_names
+    assert not missing_from_doc, (
+        f"CapabilityDescriptor fields missing from the §2 contract-doc table: "
+        f"{sorted(missing_from_doc)}. Document them so the connector mirrors them."
+    )
+    extra_in_doc = doc_names - code_names
+    assert not extra_in_doc, (
+        f"Contract-doc §2 table documents fields the dataclass does not have: "
+        f"{sorted(extra_in_doc)}. Remove them or add them to descriptor.py."
+    )
+
+    # Required/optional must agree, so the connector knows which fields it may omit.
+    for name, doc_required in documented.items():
+        assert doc_required == (name in code_required), (
+            f"Field '{name}': contract doc says required={doc_required}, but the "
+            f"dataclass says required={name in code_required}. Reconcile them."
+        )
+
+
+def _session_source_wire_keys() -> set[str]:
+    """Keys ``SessionSource.to_dict()`` can emit (the actual wire surface).
+
+    Build a maximally-populated source so conditionally-included keys (the
+    ``if self.x:`` branches in ``to_dict``) all appear.
+    """
+    from gateway.config import Platform
+
+    src = SessionSource(
+        platform=Platform.DISCORD,
+        chat_id="c",
+        chat_name="n",
+        chat_type="channel",
+        user_id="u",
+        user_name="un",
+        thread_id="t",
+        chat_topic="topic",
+        user_id_alt="ua",
+        chat_id_alt="ca",
+        guild_id="g",
+        parent_chat_id="p",
+        message_id="m",
+    )
+    return set(src.to_dict().keys())
+
+
+def test_session_source_wire_keys_documented_in_contract():
+    """Every wire key SessionSource.to_dict() emits is named in the contract doc.
+
+    The doc enumerates discriminators in prose + a per-platform table (§3) rather
+    than a strict field table, so this asserts presence-by-name: a wire key the
+    connector must populate but which appears nowhere in the doc is a silent gap.
+    """
+    text = _doc_text()
+    # Limit to §3 (the MessageEvent / SessionSource section).
+    section = text.split("## 3. Inbound", 1)[-1].split("## 4.", 1)[0]
+    wire_keys = _session_source_wire_keys()
+
+    # Keys that are self-evidently covered by the §3 narrative/table.
+    # We assert each wire key appears as a backticked token or table cell.
+    undocumented = sorted(k for k in wire_keys if k not in section)
+    assert not undocumented, (
+        f"SessionSource wire keys absent from the §3 contract-doc section: "
+        f"{undocumented}. The connector normalizes events into these keys; if the "
+        f"doc doesn't name them the connector author can't know to populate them. "
+        f"Document them (prose or the discriminator table)."
+    )
+
+
+def test_internal_only_session_fields_stay_off_the_wire():
+    """Guard the inverse: fields deliberately NOT serialized must not leak.
+
+    ``is_bot`` is an internal author-classification flag that today is NOT in
+    ``to_dict()`` (so the connector's TS contract correctly omits it). If someone
+    adds it to the wire without updating the contract doc + connector, this flips
+    and forces the conversation. This documents the intentional omission.
+    """
+    wire_keys = _session_source_wire_keys()
+    assert "is_bot" not in wire_keys, (
+        "is_bot is now serialized by SessionSource.to_dict(). If this is "
+        "intentional, add it to docs/relay-connector-contract.md §3 and the "
+        "connector's SessionSource interface, then update this guard."
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("discriminator", ["chat_id", "chat_type", "user_id", "thread_id", "guild_id"])
+def test_discord_telegram_discriminator_columns_present(discriminator):
+    """§3's per-platform table headers must exist as SessionSource fields.
+
+    These five columns drive build_session_key() and are the #1 High-severity
+    risk surface (Discord guild_id collision). If the doc advertises a
+    discriminator column the dataclass can't carry, the connector has nowhere to
+    put it.
+    """
+    assert discriminator in SessionSource.__dataclass_fields__, (  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        f"Contract doc §3 lists '{discriminator}' as a session discriminator, "
+        f"but SessionSource has no such field."
+    )
+    # And it must be reachable on the wire (chat_type is always emitted; the rest
+    # are conditional but still possible keys).
+    assert discriminator in _session_source_wire_keys(), (
+        f"Discriminator '{discriminator}' never appears in SessionSource.to_dict() "
+        f"output — the connector cannot transmit it to the gateway."
+    )