bfcc9f92b4587ccf8e9f0eeafee85a66b76afd34
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Ben
|
ed9e8ba097 |
feat(dashboard-auth): add pluggable password (non-redirect) login
The dashboard auth gate was OAuth-only: a DashboardAuthProvider could
authenticate only via a redirect to an IDP (start_login -> /auth/callback
-> complete_login). There was no first-class path for username/password
auth, so self-hosters who just want a password on their dashboard had no
clean option short of an external OAuth IDP.
Extend the provider framework with a parallel, non-redirect front door
that converges on the same Session + cookie + refresh machinery:
- base.py: add the optional supports_password flag and
complete_password_login(username, password) -> Session (default
raises NotImplementedError so an OAuth-only provider that forgets the
flag fails loudly). Add InvalidCredentialsError. OAuth providers are
unaffected (flag defaults False; the method is never called).
- routes.py: add POST /auth/password-login, mirroring the cookie-minting
tail of /auth/callback but skipping PKCE/state/code. Returns JSON
{ok, next} (the form POSTs via fetch). Generic 401 for both unknown
user and wrong password (no enumeration oracle); 404 hides whether a
provider exists or supports passwords; per-IP sliding-window rate
limit (10/min -> 429). /api/auth/providers now reports
supports_password so the login page can branch.
- middleware.py: allowlist /auth/password-login (a bootstrap route).
verify/refresh/revoke/ws-tickets/logout need zero changes — a password
session is just a Session with provider-minted opaque tokens.
- login_page.py: render a credential form (instead of a redirect button)
for supports_password providers, wired by a small inline script that
POSTs to /auth/password-login and navigates on success. OAuth-only
pages stay script-free.
|
||
|
Ben
|
0af37ff272 |
style(dashboard-auth): redesign /login page to match Nous design system
The login page is the first surface the user sees on a gated dashboard
and shipped with off-the-shelf system fonts and a generic orange
accent that didn't match the React dashboard waiting on the other
side of the OAuth round trip. Apply the same visual language the SPA
uses (the @nous-research/ui package) so the auth flow feels like one
product, not two.
What changes (visual only — no functional changes):
Typography
- Body: Collapse (regular + bold), served from /fonts/ — the same
woff2 files the dashboard SPA loads via the design-system's
fonts.css.
- Display: Rules Compressed (regular + medium) for the brand
wordmark and the page heading.
- Brand chrome (heading, buttons, footer) uses the DS idiom:
uppercase + letter-spacing 0.2em (matching the DS Button class).
Colour
- Background: #170d02 (deep brown-black; --background-base in DS).
- Accent: #ffac02 (amber; --midground in DS).
- Foreground: #ffffff.
- Hairlines: color-mix() of the midground at 18% / 35%, mirroring
the DS "@theme inline" derived tokens.
Button surface
- Solid amber surface with dark text, no rounded corners (DS Button
is squared). Inset bevel — — directly mirrors the DS
Button SHADOW_DEFAULT (). :active uses filter:invert(1) which matches the DS
Button's .
Atmosphere
- Subtle 3px dither (repeating-conic-gradient at 4% midground) +
a midground radial glow at top — same idioms as the DS .dither
utility and the SPA's panel chrome.
- slide-up fade-in entrance animation matching DS @keyframes
slide-up (0.6s ease-out). Honours prefers-reduced-motion.
Brand wordmark
- 'NOUS · RESEARCH' above the card in Rules Compressed, amber,
0.32em tracking. Establishes ownership before the user squints
at the buttons.
Empty-state page
- The 'Sign-in unavailable' fallback (no providers registered)
got the same colour-token and typography treatment so the
misconfigured-deploy experience is also coherent.
Fonts are served from /fonts/*.woff2 — a path the dashboard-auth gate
already allowlists pre-auth (see _GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES in
middleware.py:42), so the login page renders with the brand typeface
without needing the React bundle loaded. The page is still entirely
static HTML+CSS with no JS — the original constraint (no SPA
dependency, no session token) is preserved.
The class="provider-btn" selector is unchanged — the existing test
suite extracts the anchor href via that class, and a regression that
renamed it would silently break tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_401_reauth.py.
A docstring note on the module flags this so future visual tweaks
don't break the contract by accident.
Visual smoke-test: rendered both the happy path (multiple providers
listed) and the empty-state page in a browser and verified all five
DS criteria — brown-black bg, amber accent, uppercase wide-tracking
type, inset-bevel buttons, Nous · Research wordmark — render
correctly with no unstyled fallbacks. 208/208 dashboard-auth tests
remain green.
|
||
|
Ben
|
034ad95fed |
fix(dashboard-auth): propagate next= through login page + PKCE cookie
The gate's _unauth_response set next=<path> on the /login redirect URL,
but nothing downstream read it: render_login_html ignored next=,
auth_login dropped it, and auth_callback read next= from its own query
string — which an IDP never sets on the callback URL (real IDPs only
echo back code+state). The _validate_post_login_target plumbing in the
callback was unreachable on the happy path, so users always landed on
"/" regardless of what they originally requested.
Worse: reading next= from the callback URL was a latent open-redirect
sink, since an attacker could craft /auth/callback?...&next=/admin and
have the server honour it post-auth.
Fix carries next= through the round trip on a server-controlled channel:
1. login_page reads request.query_params['next'] and passes it (post-
validation) to render_login_html.
2. render_login_html threads next= URL-encoded into each provider
button's href, with HTML-attribute escaping as defence in depth.
3. auth_login accepts ?next= as a query param, re-validates, and
appends it as a fourth segment (next=<urlquoted>) in the PKCE
cookie payload alongside provider/state/verifier.
4. auth_callback no longer accepts a next: str = "" query param. It
parses next= out of the PKCE cookie and validates that with the
same same-origin rules. Any attacker-supplied ?next= on the
callback URL is silently ignored — server-only carrier.
Test coverage adds three classes:
- TestAuthCallbackNext drives /login → /auth/login → IDP-bounce →
/auth/callback end-to-end without smuggling next= onto the callback
URL (which is what the previous tests did and why they didn't
catch the bug). Includes test_attacker_callback_next_param_is_ignored
to pin the security property that the URL value is never read.
- TestRenderLoginHtmlNext covers the rendering function at the
unit boundary so a regression that drops next_path is caught
without spinning up the full app.
- TestAuthLoginPkceCookieNext inspects the Set-Cookie header on
/auth/login responses so a regression in cookie encoding is caught
without driving the full round trip.
Mutation-tested: reverting auth_callback to read next= from the URL
trips 3 of 6 TestAuthCallbackNext tests (the safe-path and attacker-
hardening ones), confirming the suite discriminates between the cookie
read and the URL read.
|
||
|
Ben
|
5b17eab67a |
feat(dashboard-auth): auth gate middleware + /auth/* routes + /login HTML
Phase 3, Tasks 3.2 + 3.3 + 3.4. These three pieces are mutually dependent so they land together. middleware.py - gated_auth_middleware engages when app.state.auth_required is True. Allowlists /login, /auth/*, /api/auth/providers, and static asset paths; everything else demands a valid session_at cookie. Verifies by trying every registered provider's verify_session in turn (multi- provider stack); attaches verified Session to request.state.session. Returns 401 JSON for /api/* and 302 -> /login for HTML. ProviderError during verify -> 503. routes.py - APIRouter with: GET /login server-rendered HTML GET /auth/login?provider=N 302 to IDP + PKCE cookie GET /auth/callback?code,state completes login, sets session cookies POST /auth/logout clears cookies + best-effort revoke GET /api/auth/providers public bootstrap endpoint (503 if zero) GET /api/auth/me verified session as JSON (auth-required) login_page.py - Inline-CSS HTML template, no React, no JavaScript. web_server.py - Mounted gated_auth_middleware between host_header and auth_middleware (FastAPI runs middlewares in registration order: host check -> cookie auth -> token auth). auth_middleware short-circuits when auth_required so cookie auth is authoritative in gated mode. Router is included before mount_spa so the catch-all doesn't swallow /login or /auth/*. 17 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green. |