b69fce9c866a96099abae0fbfde9c3ee3569f1f7
1068
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Ben
|
b69fce9c86 |
feat(dashboard-auth): single-use WS tickets + POST /api/auth/ws-ticket
Phase 5 task 5.1. Browsers cannot set Authorization on a WebSocket
upgrade, so in gated mode the SPA needs an alternative way to bind the
upgrade to its authenticated session.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/ws_tickets.py — in-memory single-use ticket
store with 30s TTL. Thread-safe (threading.Lock), token_urlsafe(32)
values, ticket value truncated to 8 chars in error messages for log
hygiene. Module-level state with _reset_for_tests() helper.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/routes.py — adds POST /api/auth/ws-ticket.
Auth-required (the gate middleware already attaches Session to
request.state.session). Returns {ticket, ttl_seconds}; emits
WS_TICKET_MINTED audit event with user_id + provider + ip.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/audit.py — adds WS_TICKET_REJECTED enum
value for the consume-side rejection event (wired into the WS
endpoints in task 5.2).
11 new tests covering round-trip, single-use, TTL boundary, unknown
ticket rejection, secret-hygiene truncation in error messages, and
concurrent mint+consume from 20 threads.
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Ben
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53736b3922 |
feat(dashboard-auth): fail-closed on no providers; proxy_headers when gated; suppress _SESSION_TOKEN injection
Phase 3, Task 3.5. Three changes to web_server.py:
1. start_server replaces the legacy SystemExit-refusing-to-bind guard
with: if app.state.auth_required and no providers registered, exit
with a clear message; otherwise log the gate-on banner. --insecure
keeps its existing behaviour.
2. uvicorn proxy_headers flag is computed from app.state.auth_required.
Loopback / --insecure keep it False (so _ws_client_is_allowed sees
the real peer for the loopback gate); gated mode flips it True so
X-Forwarded-Proto from Fly's TLS terminator is honoured for cookie
Secure-flag decisions in detect_https().
3. _serve_index no longer injects window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__ when
the gate is on — the SPA reads identity from /api/auth/me using
cookie auth instead. window.__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__ flag lets the
SPA pick between ticket-auth (gated) and token-auth (loopback) for
/api/pty + /api/ws (Phase 5 will wire this in the React layer).
4 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green.
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Ben
|
5b17eab67a |
feat(dashboard-auth): auth gate middleware + /auth/* routes + /login HTML
Phase 3, Tasks 3.2 + 3.3 + 3.4. These three pieces are mutually dependent so they land together. middleware.py - gated_auth_middleware engages when app.state.auth_required is True. Allowlists /login, /auth/*, /api/auth/providers, and static asset paths; everything else demands a valid session_at cookie. Verifies by trying every registered provider's verify_session in turn (multi- provider stack); attaches verified Session to request.state.session. Returns 401 JSON for /api/* and 302 -> /login for HTML. ProviderError during verify -> 503. routes.py - APIRouter with: GET /login server-rendered HTML GET /auth/login?provider=N 302 to IDP + PKCE cookie GET /auth/callback?code,state completes login, sets session cookies POST /auth/logout clears cookies + best-effort revoke GET /api/auth/providers public bootstrap endpoint (503 if zero) GET /api/auth/me verified session as JSON (auth-required) login_page.py - Inline-CSS HTML template, no React, no JavaScript. web_server.py - Mounted gated_auth_middleware between host_header and auth_middleware (FastAPI runs middlewares in registration order: host check -> cookie auth -> token auth). auth_middleware short-circuits when auth_required so cookie auth is authoritative in gated mode. Router is included before mount_spa so the catch-all doesn't swallow /login or /auth/*. 17 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green. |
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Ben
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a30c4d8ebd |
feat(dashboard-auth): cookie helpers for session_at/session_rt/pkce
Phase 3, Task 3.1. Three cookies: - hermes_session_at: OAuth access token (HttpOnly, TTL = token TTL) - hermes_session_rt: OAuth refresh token (HttpOnly, 30d max-age) - hermes_session_pkce: PKCE state + verifier + provider hint (10min) All SameSite=Lax + Path=/. Secure flag is set ONLY when the request scheme is https — uvicorn proxy_headers=True (enabled in gated mode at Phase 3.5) rewrites scheme from X-Forwarded-Proto so Fly's TLS terminator works. |
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Ben
|
628a52fce2 |
test(dashboard-auth): stub auth provider for E2E gate testing
Phase 2, Task 2.1. Self-contained fake IDP — start_login redirects
straight back to {redirect_uri}?code=stub_code&state=<s> so tests can
walk the OAuth round trip in-process. Tokens are HMAC-signed JSON blobs
(not real JWTs) — enough structure for verify_session to detect tamper
and expiry without pulling in pyjwt.
Lives in tests/ only — never registered as a real plugin. Phase 3's
end-to-end tests import StubAuthProvider directly.
Convention: exp <= now counts as expired (TTL=0 means born-expired)
— matches what Phase 6's silent-refresh test will need.
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Ben
|
865cae4f61 |
feat(dashboard-auth): json-lines audit log at $HERMES_HOME/logs/dashboard-auth.log
Phase 1, Task 1.4. Records every auth event (login start/success/failure, logout, refresh success/failure, revoke, session verify failure, WS ticket mint) as one JSON object per line. Token-like kwargs (access_token, refresh_token, code, code_verifier, state, ticket, cookie, Authorization) are dropped before serialisation so the log never contains live secrets. Write failures log at WARNING but never raise — auth flows must not fail because the audit logger broke. |
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Ben
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c32b17f557 |
feat(plugins): add register_dashboard_auth_provider hook on PluginContext
Phase 1, Task 1.3. Mirrors the existing register_image_gen_provider pattern (plugins.py:531) — wrong-type or duplicate-name registrations log at WARNING and silently return rather than raising, so a misbehaving auth plugin cannot crash the host. Deviation from plan: the plan's draft raised TypeError on non-provider input; switched to silent-warn to match the established image_gen convention. Test updated to match. |
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Ben
|
1bbfed70c4 |
test(dashboard-auth): cover registry register/get/list/clear semantics
Phase 1, Task 1.2. Verifies registration order is preserved, duplicate names are rejected with ValueError, and non-compliant providers fail at register time (not later when the middleware tries to dispatch). |
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Ben
|
2dc6d03a3d |
feat(dashboard-auth): define DashboardAuthProvider ABC + Session dataclass
Phase 1, Task 1.1. New package hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/ contains:
base.py - DashboardAuthProvider ABC with 5 abstract methods
(start_login, complete_login, verify_session,
refresh_session, revoke_session), Session + LoginStart
frozen dataclasses, three exception types
(ProviderError / InvalidCodeError / RefreshExpiredError),
and assert_protocol_compliance() for plugins to call
in their own tests.
registry.py - Module-level register/get/list/clear with a lock.
Nothing reads the registry yet — Phase 2 adds the StubAuthProvider and
Phase 3 wires the gate middleware. The plugin hook lands in Task 1.3.
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Ben
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949ad95e4b |
feat(dashboard): stash auth_required flag on app.state
Phase 0, Task 0.3. start_server now computes should_require_auth(host, allow_public) and records it on app.state.auth_required BEFORE the existing legacy SystemExit guard fires. This gives middleware, the SPA token-injection path, and WS endpoints a consistent read source for 'is the gate active'. The flag is set but no one reads it yet — Phase 3 registers the gate middleware. Note: 4 pre-existing test failures in tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py (PtyWebSocket) + test_update_hangup_protection.py reproduce on pristine HEAD and are unrelated to this change (starlette TestClient WS regression). |
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Ben
|
8773bbf186 |
feat(dashboard): add should_require_auth predicate for OAuth gate
Phase 0, Task 0.2. Single source of truth for 'is the auth gate active?'. Reuses the existing _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES frozenset so this stays in sync with the DNS-rebinding host-header check. RFC1918/CGNAT/link-local are treated as public — exact threat model the gate exists for. |
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Ben
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f2b479e7a2 |
test(dashboard): pin current loopback auth behavior as regression harness
Phase 0, Task 0.1 of the dashboard-oauth plan. Establishes a baseline for the loopback dashboard's auth surface so future phases can prove they didn't regress the existing _SESSION_TOKEN flow when adding the OAuth gate. |
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Teknium
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febc4cfec0 |
remove Vercel AI Gateway and Vercel Sandbox (#33067)
* remove Vercel AI Gateway provider and Vercel Sandbox terminal backend Both Vercel-hosted integrations are removed end-to-end. Users on the AI Gateway should switch to OpenRouter or one of the other aggregators (Nous Portal, Kilo Code). Users on the Vercel Sandbox backend should switch to Docker, Modal, Daytona, or SSH. What's removed: - `plugins/model-providers/ai-gateway/` provider plugin - `hermes_cli/vercel_auth.py` Vercel-Sandbox auth helper - `tools/environments/vercel_sandbox.py` terminal backend - `ai-gateway` provider wiring across auth, doctor, setup, models, config, status, providers, main, web_server, model_normalize, dump - `vercel_sandbox` backend wiring across terminal_tool, file_tools, code_execution_tool, file_operations, approval, skills_tool, environments/local, credential_files, lazy_deps, prompt_builder, cli, gateway/run - `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL` constant, `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS` auxiliary-client header set, run_agent base-URL header/reasoning special-cases - `[vercel]` pyproject extra and `vercel`/`vercel-workers` from uv.lock - env vars: `AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY`, `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL`, `VERCEL_TOKEN`, `VERCEL_PROJECT_ID`, `VERCEL_TEAM_ID`, `VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN`, `TERMINAL_VERCEL_RUNTIME` - Tests: deletes test_ai_gateway_models.py and test_vercel_sandbox_environment.py; scrubs references across 23 surviving test files (no entire tests deleted unless they were dedicated to AI Gateway / Sandbox) - Docs: provider tables, env-var reference, setup guides, security notes, tool config, terminal-backend tables — English plus zh-Hans i18n parity - `hermes-agent` skill: provider table entry and remote-backend list What stays (intentional): - `popular-web-designs/templates/vercel.md` — CSS design reference, unrelated to Vercel-the-AI-product - `x-vercel-id` in `stream_diag.py` headers — generic Vercel CDN response header, useful diag signal on any Vercel-hosted endpoint - `vercel-labs/agent-browser` URL in browser config — lightpanda browser project, different OSS effort - `userStories.json` historical contributor entry mentioning Vercel Sandbox — archive, not active docs Validation: - 1153 tests in the 22 targeted files pass (`scripts/run_tests.sh`) - Full repo `py_compile` clean - Live import of every touched module + invariant check (no `ai-gateway` in `PROVIDER_REGISTRY`, no `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS`, no `vercel_sandbox` in `_REMOTE_TERMINAL_BACKENDS`) * test: convert profile-count check from change-detector to invariant The hardcoded "== 34" assertion broke when ai-gateway was removed. Per AGENTS.md change-detector-test guidance, assert the relationship (registry count >= number of plugin dirs) instead of a literal count. Counts shift when providers are added/removed; that's expected. |
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emozilla
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3d9a26afad | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into jq/hermes-update-branch-flag | ||
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beardthelion
|
2fc77c53f0 |
feat(opencode-go): route qwen3.7-max via anthropic_messages
qwen3.7-max on OpenCode Go rejects the OpenAI-compatible (oa-compat) format with HTTP 401 but works correctly via the Anthropic Messages endpoint (/v1/messages with x-api-key auth). Route it the same way MiniMax models are routed: anthropic_messages api_mode. Changes: - hermes_cli/models.py: add qwen3.7-max routing + curated list - hermes_cli/setup.py: add to setup wizard model list - hermes_cli/auth.py: update provider comment - tests: add assertions for qwen3.7-max api_mode routing |
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Teknium
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bb4703c761 |
docs(auth): replace stale 'hermes login' references with 'hermes auth add'
'hermes login' was removed (the command now just prints a deprecation message and exits). The bundled hermes-agent SKILL.md, in-code error messages, the tip rotation, the proxy adapters, and the docs site still pointed agents and users at the dead command — so models loading the skill kept running 'hermes login --provider openai-codex' and getting a dead-end print. Replacements use the canonical 'hermes auth add <provider>' surface (or bare 'hermes auth' for the interactive manager). Files: - skills/autonomous-ai-agents/hermes-agent/SKILL.md (+ regenerated docs page) - hermes_cli/tips.py (tip rotation) - agent/google_oauth.py (gemini-cli error message) - agent/conversation_loop.py (nous re-auth troubleshooting line) - agent/credential_sources.py (docstring) - hermes_cli/proxy/cli.py + hermes_cli/proxy/adapters/nous_portal.py (proxy auth hints) - tests/hermes_cli/test_proxy.py (updated assertions) - website/docs/reference/faq.md, website/docs/user-guide/features/subscription-proxy.md - zh-Hans i18n mirrors for the above 'hermes logout' is still a live command and is left untouched. The 'hermes login' stub in hermes_cli/auth.py:login_command() and the cli-commands.md 'Deprecated' rows are intentionally kept as the discoverable deprecation surface. |
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Teknium
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ccd3d04fc5 |
chore(models): swap qwen3.6-plus → qwen3.7-max in openrouter+nous lists (#32809)
Updates curated picker lists for both the OpenRouter fallback snapshot (`OPENROUTER_MODELS`) and the Nous Portal list (`_PROVIDER_MODELS['nous']`). Regenerates website/static/api/model-catalog.json via `scripts/build_model_catalog.py` to keep the docs-hosted manifest in sync (drift guard in `test_in_repo_lists_match_manifest`). tests/hermes_cli/test_models.py fixtures updated — they pinned the old model id as their live-fetch sample. |
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Teknium
|
8b69ec03af |
feat(mcp): Nous-approved MCP catalog with interactive picker (#30870)
* feat(mcp): Nous-approved MCP catalog with interactive picker
Adds an optional-mcps/ directory mirroring optional-skills/: curated,
Nous-approved MCP servers shipped with the repo but disabled by default.
Presence in optional-mcps/ = approval. No community tier, no trust signals.
Entries are added by merging a PR.
New surface:
hermes mcp Interactive catalog picker (default)
hermes mcp catalog Plain-text list, scriptable
hermes mcp install <name> Install a catalog entry
Picker behavior:
not installed -> install (clone/bootstrap if needed, prompt for creds)
installed/off -> enable
installed/on -> menu (disable / uninstall / reinstall)
Manifest schema (manifest_version: 1) supports:
- transport: stdio (command/args, ${INSTALL_DIR} substitution) or http (url)
- install: optional git clone + bootstrap commands (for repos that need
local venv setup, like the n8n bridge); omit for npx/uvx servers
- auth: api_key (prompts -> ~/.hermes/.env), oauth (provider-mediated
or native MCP), or none
Catalog entries are never auto-updated. Users re-run `hermes mcp install`
to refresh. Credentials always go to ~/.hermes/.env (the .env-is-for-secrets
rule), never to per-server env blocks.
Ships n8n as the reference manifest (https://github.com/CyberSamuraiX/hermes-n8n-mcp).
Tests: 19 catalog tests + E2E install/uninstall round-trip via the shipped
manifest.
* feat(mcp): tool-selection checklist + Linear catalog entry
Adds install-time tool selection so users only enable the MCP tools they
actually want, and ships Linear as a second reference catalog entry to
demonstrate the http+oauth path alongside n8n's stdio+api_key+git-bootstrap.
Tool selection flow:
install (clone/auth/credentials) ->
probe server for available tools ->
curses checklist with pre-checked rows ->
write mcp_servers.<name>.tools.include
Pre-check priority:
1. user's prior tools.include (reinstall preserves selection)
2. manifest's tools.default_enabled (curated subset)
3. all probed tools (default)
Probe-failure fallback (server unreachable, OAuth not yet complete,
backing service offline):
- manifest declared default_enabled -> applied directly
- no default declared -> no filter written (all-on when reachable)
- both cases point user at hermes mcp configure <name>
Manifest schema additions:
tools:
default_enabled: [list, of, tool, names] # optional
Updates:
- optional-mcps/linear/manifest.yaml -- new reference entry (http+oauth)
- optional-mcps/n8n/manifest.yaml -- tools.default_enabled set to the
8 read-mostly tools; mutating tools (activate/deactivate, container_logs)
pruned by default
- docs: new 'Tool selection at install time' section in features/mcp.md
Tests: 7 new tests in TestToolSelection covering probe-success / probe-fail
matrix, manifest-default filtering, reinstall-preserves-selection, and
invalid-default-enabled rejection. 26 catalog tests + 32 existing
mcp_config tests passing.
* feat(mcp): polish — picker unification, include-mode convergence, hardening
Addresses review findings on PR #30870. Lands all improvements that
belong in this PR before merge; defers separate cleanup (consolidating
two probe implementations, change-detector tests) to follow-ups.
Picker UX (mcp_picker.py)
- Unifies catalog + custom (user-added) MCPs in one view with distinct
status badges (available / enabled / installed (disabled) /
custom — enabled / custom — disabled)
- Adds 'Configure tools (probe server + re-pick)' action to both the
catalog-installed and custom-row submenus — the existing
hermes mcp configure flow was previously unreachable from the picker
- Loops until ESC/q so the user can manage several entries in one
session instead of having to re-launch
- Uninstall message now mentions .env credentials are preserved with a
pointer to clean them up manually if no longer needed
- Surfaces a 'requires a newer Hermes' warning per future-manifest
entry instead of silently hiding it
Catalog (mcp_catalog.py)
- catalog_diagnostics() exposes which manifests were skipped and why
(future_manifest vs invalid) so UIs can give actionable feedback
- _do_git_install detects SHA-shaped refs (regex /[0-9a-f]{7,40}/)
and skips the doomed 'git clone --branch <sha>' attempt — clone --branch
only accepts branches/tags, so SHAs always failed noisily before
falling back to the full-clone path
- Probe-success all-tools-enabled message now mentions that new tools
the server adds later will be auto-enabled (no-filter mode)
Convergence (tools_config.py)
- _configure_mcp_tools_interactive now writes tools.include (whitelist)
instead of tools.exclude (blacklist), matching the catalog flow and
hermes mcp configure. The on-disk config shape no longer depends on
which UI the user touched last
- Two existing tests updated to assert the new include-mode contract
Discoverability
- Setup wizard final step now prints 'Browse curated MCPs: hermes mcp'
- Three tip-corpus entries pointing at the new catalog
- Docs updated with: trust model (manifests run code locally, gated by
PR review, but read before installing), runtime ${ENV_VAR} substitution
semantics, and the manifest_version forward-compat behavior
Tests
- 7 new tests covering future-manifest diagnostics, custom MCP picker
rows, SHA-ref git-install path, branch-ref git-install path, and the
tools_config include-mode write contract
- 80 MCP-related tests passing across test_mcp_catalog.py,
test_mcp_config.py, test_mcp_tools_config.py
* fix(mcp): drop setup-wizard catalog hint to satisfy supply-chain scanner
The wizard line 'Browse curated MCPs: hermes mcp' triggered the
CI supply-chain scanner because it pattern-matches on edits to any
file named hermes_cli/setup.py — that filename matches the Python
'install-hook file' heuristic even though this setup.py is the
user-facing 'hermes setup' wizard, not a packaging install hook.
The catalog is already surfaced via three tip-corpus entries in
hermes_cli/tips.py (which the scanner doesn't flag), so dropping the
wizard mention loses no discoverability. Worth revisiting after a
scanner allowlist for this specific file lands.
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Teknium
|
30928f945f |
fix(dashboard): suffix-allowlist plugin assets + denylist subprocess-influencing env vars (#32277)
Two posture fixes surfaced by the web-pentest skill self-test against the dashboard (issue #32267). 1. /dashboard-plugins/<name>/<path> previously returned 200 for any file inside the plugin's dashboard directory — including plugin_api.py and __pycache__/*.pyc. The path is unauthenticated by architecture (SPA loads JS via <script src> and CSS via <link href>, neither of which can attach a custom auth header), so the fix is not "require token" — it's "restrict to browser-fetchable suffixes." Allowlist now: .js .mjs .css .json .html .svg .png .jpg .jpeg .gif .webp .ico .woff .woff2 .ttf .otf .map. Everything else → 404. This stops a private user-installed plugin's Python source from being readable by anyone reachable on the dashboard's loopback port (other local users on a shared box, sidecar containers sharing the host netns). 2. save_env_value() now refuses to persist env-var names that influence how the next subprocess executes: LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LD_AUDIT, DYLD_*, PYTHONPATH, PYTHONHOME, PYTHONSTARTUP, NODE_OPTIONS, NODE_PATH, PATH, SHELL, EDITOR, VISUAL, PAGER, BROWSER, GIT_SSH_COMMAND, GIT_EXEC_PATH; plus HERMES_HOME / HERMES_PROFILE / HERMES_CONFIG / HERMES_ENV. PUT /api/env is authed but the session token lives in the SPA HTML where any future plugin XSS or local process can read it. Without this gate, a token-holder could plant LD_PRELOAD in .env and the next hermes process start would load attacker code via the dotenv to os.environ chain. This is enforced on write only — pre-existing .env values are left alone (the gate is in save_env_value, not in load_env). PUT /api/env now returns 400 with the explanatory message instead of an opaque 500. IMPORTANT: HERMES_* overall is NOT blocked — only the four runtime location names. Integration credentials following the HERMES_* convention (HERMES_GEMINI_*, HERMES_LANGFUSE_*, HERMES_SPOTIFY_*, HERMES_QWEN_BASE_URL, ...) keep working. Regression tests cover both fixes (30 new test cases). No existing tests changed; 257 passing in tests/hermes_cli/. Closes #32267. |
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Teknium
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46c1ae8b24 |
fix(tests): four pre-existing flakes from the security cluster merge (#32072)
All four failures were broken by the security cluster (#10082 / #10133 / #4609 / symlink-reject batch) merging on May 25. They were red on origin/main HEAD when #32042 and #32061 ran, gating PRs that touched unrelated code. 1) tests/hermes_cli/test_update_zip_symlink_reject.py test_update_via_zip_accepts_normal_member called the real _update_via_zip without sandboxing PROJECT_ROOT — so the function's shutil.copytree() actually copied the fake README from the test ZIP over the real repo's README.md, which then made test_readme_mentions_powershell_installer fail in any test run that happened to pick this test up earlier. Mock PROJECT_ROOT to an isolated tmp_path / install_dir, stub subprocess so pip/uv reinstall doesn't actually run, and assert the fake README lands in the sandbox (not the real tree). 2) tests/tools/test_windows_native_support.py test_readme_mentions_powershell_installer was the victim of (1) — nothing wrong with the test itself, the fix in (1) clears it. 3) tests/tools/test_file_read_guards.py test_proc_fd_other_not_blocked called _is_blocked_device('/proc/self/fd/3') expecting False. But _is_blocked_device runs realpath() and on pytest xdist workers fd 3 happens to be dup'd to /dev/urandom (because the worker subprocess inherits open fds from pytest's collection pipe machinery). Switch to the lower-level _is_blocked_device_path which is the path-pattern check the test actually means to exercise; realpath-resolution coverage already lives in test_symlink_to_blocked_device_is_blocked. 4) tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py Module installed a faster_whisper stub via sys.modules without setting __spec__, then later @pytest.mark.skipif called importlib.util.find_spec('faster_whisper') which raises 'ValueError: __spec__ is None' for modules with a None spec attr. Set __spec__ on the stub to a real ModuleSpec. Validation: 195/195 green across the 4 affected files. |
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codeblackhole1024andteknium1
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bd2756dd22 |
fix(update): reject symlink members in update ZIP
_update_via_zip downloads a source ZIP from GitHub and calls zipfile.ZipFile.extractall. The existing zip-slip path guard validates each member's path stays under tmp_dir, but does not check member type — so a ZIP containing a symlink member would still be materialized by extractall, and a symlink target could point outside the extracted tree (or to a sensitive system path). This isn't a high-likelihood threat for hermes-agent's actual GitHub source ZIPs (we don't ship symlinks), but the extractall path runs as the user's account and a compromised mirror could plant arbitrary files via the symlink → target → write chain. Reject any member whose Unix mode bits (upper 16 bits of external_attr) are S_IFLNK before extractall. Hermes source ZIPs contain only regular files and directories; a symlink member is unambiguously suspicious. Regression tests cover: symlink member rejection (raises ValueError, caught by the outer try/except as a clean SystemExit, no extraction), and the happy-path verification that a normal ZIP doesn't trigger the symlink reject message. Salvaged from PR #15881 by @codeblackhole1024. The remaining pieces of that PR were already on main or contradicted explicit design decisions: - config.yaml write-deny: already in agent/file_safety.py's control_file_names denylist (the modern guard); the proposed addition to build_write_denied_paths was the legacy path. - Quick commands danger detection: contradicts the explicit cli.py:8491-8492 comment 'shell=True is intentional: quick_commands are user-defined shell snippets from config.yaml — not agent/LLM controlled.' - Memory plugin shlex.split for dep checks: already on main (hermes_cli/memory_setup.py:133). Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com> |
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nguyen binh
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46d8b5dadf | fix(profile): reject symlinks in distributions (#25292) | ||
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nguyen binh
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0d55315c36 | fix(backup): skip symlinked files in zip archives (#25289) | ||
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Jorge Fuenmayorandgaia
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93660643a6 |
fix: harden skill trust source matching (#31229)
Co-authored-by: gaia <gaia@gaia.local> |
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Kasun AthaudahettiandHoang V. Pham
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2d422720b5 |
fix(codex): size and propagate timeouts for Responses-API requests; lower stale defaults
Codex / Responses-API requests had three latent timeout bugs that combined into the long silent hangs reported on #21444: 1. The non-stream stale-call detector estimated context tokens from ``api_kwargs["messages"]`` only. Codex / Responses-API payloads carry their conversational load in ``input`` (with ``instructions`` and ``tools``), so every Codex turn logged ``context=~0 tokens`` and the detector never applied its >50k / >100k tier bumps. 2. ``providers.<id>.request_timeout_seconds`` was silently dropped on the main Codex path. The chat_completions path and the auxiliary Codex adapter both forwarded it; the main path skipped it through three places (``build_api_kwargs``, ``ResponsesApiTransport.build_kwargs``, ``_preflight_codex_api_kwargs``). 3. The streaming stale detector had the same payload-shape bug for ``codex_responses`` requests, which route through the non-streaming detector (it's the path that emits the user-facing "No response from provider for 300s (non-streaming, ...)" warning that reporters keep pasting). This commit: - Adds ``estimate_request_context_tokens`` in ``chat_completion_helpers``, used by both the non-stream and stream detectors. Handles ``messages`` (Chat Completions), ``input + instructions + tools`` (Responses API), bare lists, and an unknown-dict fallback. - Forwards ``timeout`` through ``ResponsesApiTransport.build_kwargs`` and ``_preflight_codex_api_kwargs`` (with guards against zero/negative/inf/bool values), and wires ``_resolved_api_call_timeout()`` into the Codex branch of ``build_api_kwargs``. - Lowers the implicit non-stream stale defaults so fallback providers kick in faster when upstream stalls: * base 300s -> 90s * >50k 450s -> 150s * >100k 600s -> 240s These only apply when the user has *not* set ``providers.<id>.stale_timeout_seconds`` or ``HERMES_API_CALL_STALE_TIMEOUT``. Explicit config still wins. - Adds regression tests for the estimator shapes, the new defaults, the context-tier scaling, transport timeout pass-through, and preflight timeout pass-through / rejection of invalid values. Closes #21444 Supersedes #21652 #24126 #31855 Co-authored-by: Hoang V. Pham <26063003+hehehe0803@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
kshitijk4poor
|
2cd952e110 |
feat(stt): add register_transcription_provider() plugin hook
Add an opt-in Python plugin surface for speech-to-text backends,
mirroring the TTS hook pattern. New backends (OpenRouter, SenseAudio,
Gemini-STT, custom proprietary engines) can be implemented as plugins
without modifying tools/transcription_tools.py.
Built-ins always win
--------------------
The 6 built-in STT providers (local/faster-whisper, local_command,
groq, openai, mistral, xai) keep their native handlers. Plugins
attempting to register under a built-in name are rejected at
registration time with a warning and re-checked defensively at
dispatch.
Resolution order
----------------
1. stt.provider matches a built-in → built-in dispatch (unchanged)
2. stt.provider matches a registered plugin →
a. if plugin.is_available() returns False → unavailability envelope
identifying the plugin (not the generic "No STT provider"
message — the user explicitly opted into this plugin)
b. otherwise plugin.transcribe() with model + language forwarded
from stt.<provider>.{model,language} config
3. No match → legacy "No STT provider available" error (unchanged)
Per-provider config namespace
-----------------------------
Plugins read their config from stt.<provider> in config.yaml, mirroring
how built-ins read stt.openai.model / stt.mistral.model. The dispatcher
forwards `model` and `language` from this section. Caller's explicit
`model=` argument overrides the config-set model.
Files
-----
- agent/transcription_provider.py: TranscriptionProvider ABC
- agent/transcription_registry.py: register/get/list providers,
built-in shadow guard, _reset_for_tests
- hermes_cli/plugins.py: register_transcription_provider() on
PluginContext
- tools/transcription_tools.py: BUILTIN_STT_PROVIDERS frozenset,
_dispatch_to_plugin_provider() with availability gate, wire-in
after xai branch and before "No STT provider" error
- tests/agent/test_transcription_registry.py: 27 tests
- tests/hermes_cli/test_plugins_transcription_registration.py: 3 tests
- tests/tools/test_transcription_plugin_dispatch.py: 28 tests
(covering built-in short-circuit, plugin dispatch, exception
envelope, non-dict guard, availability gate, language forwarding)
- tests/plugins/transcription/check_parity_vs_main.py: 10-scenario
subprocess-pinned parity harness vs origin/main
- website/docs/user-guide/features/{tts,plugins}.md: docs
Behavior parity
---------------
10 scenarios, 8 OK + 2 expected DIFFs:
no_provider_error → plugin (plugin-installed scenario)
no_provider_error → plugin_unavailable (plugin-installed-unavailable
scenario; PR returns cleaner envelope)
Zero behavior change for users not opting into a plugin.
Issue follow-up to #30398.
|
||
|
Teknium
|
920b350e57 |
test(auth): align copilot-remove test with borrowed-credential policy (#31416)
PR #31416 (avoid persisting borrowed credential secrets) added sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload, which strips access_token from any auth.json pool entry whose (provider, source) isn't in the _PERSISTABLE_PROVIDER_SOURCES allowlist. (copilot, gh_cli) is borrowed (not in the allowlist), so the test fixture's pre-seeded access_token now gets stripped at load_pool() time, leaving the pool empty. resolve_target('1') then fails with 'No credential #1. Provider: copilot.' Fix: align the test with the new contract. At runtime, copilot tokens are hydrated by resolve_copilot_token() — mock that path so the pool gets an entry the test can remove. The behavior under test (suppression of gh_cli + env variants on remove) is unchanged. CI repro on origin/main HEAD; reproduced locally with stock checkout. |
||
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helix4u
|
ec4d6f1823 | fix(cli): show masked feedback for secret prompts | ||
|
zapabobandteknium1
|
2c3ca475c0 |
fix(cron): reject id mutation + validate output paths under OUTPUT_DIR
Two defense-in-depth fixes on cron output path handling:
1. cron/jobs.py:update_job() rejects mutation of the immutable 'id' field
(raises ValueError). Dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} converts this to
HTTP 400. Without this, an attacker who can reach the update endpoint
could rename a job's id to '../escape' and move its output directory
outside OUTPUT_DIR.
2. cron/jobs.py:_job_output_dir() validates job IDs before composing
paths: rejects '.', '..', '/', '\\', absolute paths, and Windows drive
prefixes. Used by save_job_output() and remove_job() so legacy unsafe
IDs (from before this guard) fail closed rather than half-applying a
shutil.rmtree or output write outside the sandbox.
Tests:
- update_job rejects {'id': '../escape'} without renaming
- remove_job(legacy '../escape' id) raises ValueError without deleting
files outside OUTPUT_DIR or removing the job from the store
- save_job_output rejects '..', './escape', 'nested/escape',
absolute paths
- dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} with {'id': '../escape'} returns
400, job list unchanged
Salvaged from PR #29826 by @zapabob. Simplified implementation:
- Dropped a 23-line _validate_job_output_id() helper using Path.parts
semantics. The inline check (path separators + dot-components +
is_absolute) is shorter and behaviorally identical.
- Dropped the secondary OUTPUT_DIR.resolve()/relative_to() check —
redundant once we reject any path separator at the input boundary.
- Dropped the _docs/2026-05-21_cron-output-path-hardening_codex.md
planning artifact (we don't check planning docs into the repo).
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||
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Ben Barclay
|
7e165e843d |
Merge pull request #31760 from NousResearch/hermes/hermes-bf5898da
feat(docker)!: s6-overlay container supervision (salvage of #30136) |
||
|
Teknium
|
46f8948bad |
test+harden(cli): cover parent-chain walk in concurrent-instance detection
Follow-up to @Strontvod's fix. Tests: - Five new tests in test_update_concurrent_quarantine.py cover the parent- chain exclusion: the .exe launcher is excluded, an unrelated sibling hermes.exe is still reported, multi-level ancestry is fully excluded, PID cycles in the parent chain don't hang, and a partially-stubbed psutil (no Process attribute) degrades gracefully instead of crashing. - New _fake_psutil_with_parent_chain helper builds a fuller stand-in (Process / NoSuchProcess / AccessDenied + process_iter) than the process_iter-only SimpleNamespace the older tests use. Hardening: - Broaden the except in the parent-walk to bare Exception. The original fix listed (NoSuchProcess, AccessDenied, ValueError), but those names are evaluated lazily during exception matching — if psutil is a partial stub without the attribute, the exception handler itself raises AttributeError that escapes. The function is documented as 'never raises' (the surrounding update flow depends on it), so the broader catch keeps the contract regardless of how the dependency is shaped. AUTHOR_MAP: - Map schepers.zander1@gmail.com -> Strontvod so the salvaged commit resolves to @Strontvod in the release notes. All 18 detect_concurrent + quarantine tests pass. |
||
|
Ben
|
4f416fc40c |
fix(docker): make s6 lifecycle work for the unprivileged hermes user
Resolves the explicit "Known follow-up" left by commit |
||
|
teknium1
|
af144cd60d |
fix(model): include Premium+ in xAI OAuth label
X Premium+ also grants Grok OAuth access — the 'SuperGrok Subscription' wording suggested SuperGrok was the only entitlement path. Updated to 'SuperGrok / Premium+' across the picker label, setup wizard, auth flows, and docs so Premium+ subscribers know the row applies to them too. |
||
|
helix4u
|
4987fd2a59 | fix(model): disambiguate xAI OAuth picker label | ||
|
teknium1
|
a4092ab217 |
fix(profiles): short-circuit s6 hooks on host before importing service_manager
Follow-up to @benbarclay's Docker s6 PR (#30136). The Phase 4 hooks `_maybe_register_gateway_service` and `_maybe_unregister_gateway_service` were already documented as "no-op on host", but they reached that no-op by: 1. importing `hermes_cli.service_manager` 2. calling `get_service_manager()` (which calls `detect_service_manager()`) 3. checking `mgr.supports_runtime_registration()` and returning False If anything in step 1 or 2 raised an unexpected exception (e.g. a host machine with a partial s6 install — `/proc/1/comm == s6-svscan` somehow, but `/run/s6/basedir` absent, or vice versa), the `except Exception` in the hook would print a confusing "⚠ Could not register s6 gateway service: ..." warning on a non-container machine that has never touched the container. Reorder so `detect_service_manager() != "s6"` is checked FIRST, and return silently for any detection failure. Host machines now: - never import the s6 backend - never call get_service_manager() - never print an s6-shaped warning under any failure mode E2E confirmed on host Linux (systemd): `_maybe_register_gateway_service(...)` produces empty stdout, detect_service_manager() returns "systemd". Existing tests updated to patch `detect_service_manager` for the s6 call-through cases (they previously relied on get_service_manager being the only gate, which is no longer true). Added one new test — `test_register_silent_when_detect_throws` — asserting that a broken detector cannot leak a warning to host users. cc @benbarclay — visible behavior change vs. your branch is one fewer code path on host. Test changes are minimal (one helper + `_patch_detect_s6` opt-in per s6 test). Happy to revert if you prefer the original shape. |
||
|
Ben
|
d0b1ab48dc |
fix(container_boot): publish reconciled service dirs atomically
PR #30136 review noted the asymmetry: `register_profile_gateway` used tmp_dir + rename to publish a new service slot atomically, but the boot-time reconciler wrote files into the slot directly. Same underlying concern (a concurrent s6-svscan rescan could observe a half-populated directory), different code path. Rewrite `container_boot._register_service` to mirror the manager: build everything in `<scandir>/gateway-<profile>.tmp/`, then `Path.replace` into place. If a previous interrupted run left a `.tmp` sibling, it's cleaned up before the new build starts. If the target already exists, it's removed before the rename so `Path.replace` doesn't error on a non-empty target (Linux `rename` overwrites empty targets only). Three new tests: atomic publication leaves no .tmp leftovers, overwriting an existing slot still leaves no .tmp leftovers, and a stale .tmp from an interrupted run is cleaned up automatically. |
||
|
Ben
|
4443fb481d |
fix(container_boot): rotate container-boot.log when it exceeds 256 KiB
PR #30136 review noted: container-boot.log was append-only with no rotation. On a long-lived container with frequent restarts and many profiles it would grow unboundedly (~80 B per profile per reconcile pass). Add a soft cap: when the file size hits 256 KiB (`_LOG_ROTATE_BYTES`, ≈3000 reconcile lines, ≈1 year of daily reboots × 5 profiles), the current file is renamed to `container-boot.log.1` (replacing any existing one) before new entries are appended. Worst case is two files at ~512 KiB — well within visibility limits for grep/cat. Rotation is intentionally simple (no logrotate or s6-log machinery for one append-only file). Failures during rotation are logged via the module logger and treated as non-fatal — we keep appending to the existing file rather than dropping the reconcile entry. Three new unit tests cover above-threshold rotation, below-threshold non-rotation, and overwrite of an existing .1 file. |
||
|
Ben
|
d735b083e8 |
fix(service_manager): rip out dead port parameter
PR #30136 review caught: `_allocate_gateway_port()` in profiles.py computed a SHA-256-derived port that was threaded through `register_profile_gateway(profile, port=N)` → `_render_run_script(profile, port, extra_env)` → and then **ignored**. The rendered run script picked the bind port from the profile's config.yaml (`[gateway] port = …`), never from the allocator. So the entire allocator + parameter chain was dead code. Remove: * `hermes_cli.profiles._allocate_gateway_port` (deterministic SHA-256 → [9200, 9800) — never used). * `port` kwarg from `ServiceManager.register_profile_gateway` (Protocol + Mixin + S6 implementation). * `port` positional arg from `_render_run_script(profile, port, extra_env)` — now `_render_run_script(profile, extra_env)`. * The pass-through call in `profiles._maybe_register_gateway_service`. config.yaml is now the single source of truth for gateway port selection — matches reality and reduces the API surface. Three explanatory comments in service_manager.py / profiles.py document the retirement so future readers don't reach for the allocator and find a ghost. Tests: drop the three `_allocate_gateway_port` tests; update fakes' signatures throughout test_service_manager.py and test_profiles_s6_hooks.py to match the new no-port API. |
||
|
Ben
|
b28b3f51d3 |
fix(service_manager): friendly errors for missing slots and s6-svc failures
PR #30136 review caught: `S6ServiceManager.start/stop/restart` called `subprocess.run(check=True)` on `s6-svc`, so any failure surfaced as a raw `CalledProcessError` traceback. The two cases operators actually hit are: 1. The service slot doesn't exist — most commonly because the user typed a profile name wrong (`hermes -p typo gateway start`). 2. s6-svc itself fails — most commonly EACCES on the supervise control FIFO when running unprivileged. Both deserve named errors with actionable messages, not stacktraces. Changes: * Add `S6Error` base + two concrete errors in `hermes_cli.service_manager`: - `GatewayNotRegisteredError(profile)` — carries the unprefixed profile name; message: `no such gateway 'typo': register it with `hermes profile create typo` first, or pass an existing profile name via `-p <name>``. - `S6CommandError(service, action, returncode, stderr)` — carries the s6-svc rc and stderr; message: `s6-svc start on 'gateway-coder' failed (rc=111): <stderr>`. * Factor lifecycle dispatch through `_run_svc(flag, label, name)`: pre-checks that the service directory exists (raises GatewayNotRegisteredError before invoking s6-svc), then runs s6-svc and translates any CalledProcessError into S6CommandError. * `_dispatch_via_service_manager_if_s6` in `hermes_cli.gateway` catches both errors and prints `✗ <message>` + `sys.exit(1)` instead of letting the exception bubble. The dispatch path that used to dump a traceback at the user now gives an actionable one-liner. Tests: 6 new tests for the error types and their CLI rendering; existing lifecycle test pre-seeds the slot directory before calling `mgr.start` etc. |
||
|
Ben
|
b044c1ac29 |
fix(container_boot): always register gateway-default slot
PR #30136 review caught: `hermes gateway start` (no `-p`) inside the container resolves `_profile_suffix() == ""` → service name `gateway-default`, but no such slot was ever registered. The Phase 4 profile-create hook only fired on `hermes profile create <name>`, and the root profile (which lives at the top of $HERMES_HOME, not under `profiles/`) was never one of those. So bare `hermes gateway start` landed on `s6-svc -u /run/service/gateway-default` → uncaught `CalledProcessError` → traceback to the user. Changes: 1. `reconcile_profile_gateways` now always registers a `gateway-default` slot before iterating named profiles. Its prior state is read from `$HERMES_HOME/gateway_state.json` (sibling to the profile root, not under `profiles/`); stale runtime files there are swept the same way. Auto-up only if the prior state was `running` — same rule as named profiles. 2. `S6ServiceManager._render_run_script` special-cases `profile == "default"` to emit `hermes gateway run` with NO `-p` flag. Passing `-p default` would resolve to `$HERMES_HOME/profiles/default/` — a different profile that almost certainly doesn't exist. The empty profile-suffix convention is the dispatcher's contract and the run script has to match. 3. A user-created `profiles/default/` collides with the reserved root-profile slot; the reconciler now skips it with a warning rather than producing two registrations of the same service name. Action-list ordering is stable: `default` first, then named profiles in directory order. Boot-log readers can rely on this. Tests: 8 new dedicated default-slot tests plus updates to every existing test that asserted against the action list (via the new `_named_actions` helper that drops the always-present default entry). |
||
|
Ben
|
6dedaa4846 |
fix(gateway): route --all stop/restart through s6 under container
PR #30136 review caught that `hermes gateway stop --all` and `... restart --all` were broken under s6. The Phase 4 dispatcher was gated on `not stop_all` (and the symmetric restart_all), so `--all` fell through to `kill_gateway_processes(all_profiles=True)`. pkill SIGTERMed every gateway, s6-supervise observed the crashes, and restarted every gateway ~1s later — net effect: `--all` *kicked* gateways instead of *stopping* them. Add `_dispatch_all_via_service_manager_if_s6(action)` that iterates `mgr.list_profile_gateways()` and routes stop/restart through each service slot. s6's `want up`/`want down` flips correctly, so a stop persists. Partial failures are surfaced per-profile with a running success count; the host pkill path is only reached when s6 isn't in play. `start --all` isn't a CLI surface — the helper rejects it and returns False (host code path can take over). |
||
|
Ben
|
fc39296e1f |
fix(service_manager): s6 detection works for unprivileged hermes user
PR #30136 review surfaced two issues, both rooted in the same audit gap: docker integration tests were running as root, not the unprivileged `hermes` user (UID 10000) that the runtime actually uses via `s6-setuidgid hermes`. Anything that probed PID-1 state or wrote to the s6 control surface worked as root in the tests but was inert in production. Fixes: 1. `_s6_running()` previously called `Path("/proc/1/exe").resolve()`, which is root-only readable. For UID 10000 the symlink yields PermissionError, `resolve()` silently returns the unresolved path, and `exe.name == "exe"` — so detection always returned False, the service-manager runtime-registration path was inert, and every `hermes profile create` / `hermes -p X gateway start` silently skipped the s6 hook. Replace with `/proc/1/comm` (world-readable) + `/run/s6/basedir` (s6-overlay-specific) — both required, fail closed. 2. `02-reconcile-profiles` now also chowns `/run/service/.s6-svscan/` {control,lock} to hermes so `s6-svscanctl -a/-an` works without root. Previously the directory chown stopped at `/run/service` and the FIFO inside stayed root-owned, so `register_profile_gateway` from hermes failed at the rescan-trigger step with EACCES — the wrapper in profiles.py caught the exception and printed a swallowed warning, so profile creation appeared to succeed while the slot was rolled back. Audit changes to flush this class of bug next time: - Add `docker_exec` / `docker_exec_sh` helpers to `tests/docker/conftest.py` that default to `-u hermes`. The module docstring explains why and flags `user="root"` as opt-in only for tests that explicitly need root (none currently do). - Refactor every `docker exec` call in tests/docker/ through the new helpers (test_dashboard.py, test_zombie_reaping.py, test_profile_gateway.py, test_container_restart.py, test_s6_profile_gateway_integration.py). - Add 5 unit tests covering `_s6_running` under various probe states (both signals present; comm wrong; basedir missing; PermissionError on /proc/1/comm; missing /proc — non-Linux). The PermissionError test is the explicit regression guard for the original bug. Known follow-up: the per-service `supervise/control` FIFO inside each `/run/service/gateway-<profile>/supervise/` is created root-owned by s6-supervise (which runs as root because s6-svscan is PID 1). `s6-svc -u/-d/-t` from the hermes user will get EACCES on those. The audit under `-u hermes` will reveal this in lifecycle tests — surfacing the issue cleanly so it can be fixed in a focused follow-up (likely via a small SUID helper or a polling chown loop in cont-init.d). The detection + svscanctl fixes here are independent and complete on their own. |
||
|
Ben
|
2afefc501c |
feat(docker): per-profile s6 supervision + container-restart reconciliation
Phase 4 of the s6-overlay supervision plan. Activates the Phase 3
S6ServiceManager by hooking it into the profile lifecycle and the
`hermes gateway start/stop/restart` dispatcher, and adds a cont-
init.d-time reconciliation pass that survives `docker restart`.
Task 4.0 — container-boot reconciliation:
/run/service/ is tmpfs, so every `docker restart` wipes every
per-profile gateway slot. /etc/cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles
invokes hermes_cli.container_boot.reconcile_profile_gateways() on
every boot, which walks $HERMES_HOME/profiles/<name>/, reads each
gateway_state.json, recreates the s6 service slot, and auto-starts
only those whose last state was 'running'. Other states
(stopped, starting, startup_failed, missing) register the slot
in the down state — avoiding crash-loops across restarts for a
gateway that was broken last boot. Per-profile outcome is recorded
to $HERMES_HOME/logs/container-boot.log.
Implementation: hermes_cli/container_boot.py + 12 unit tests.
Profile-marker is SOUL.md, not config.yaml, because `hermes profile
create` only seeds SOUL.md by default (config.yaml comes from
`hermes setup`).
Task 4.1 / 4.2 — profile create/delete hooks:
hermes_cli/profiles.py::create_profile now calls
_maybe_register_gateway_service(<canon>) at the end, which routes
through ServiceManager.register_profile_gateway when running on s6
and no-ops on host backends. delete_profile mirrors with
_maybe_unregister_gateway_service. _allocate_gateway_port produces
a deterministic SHA-256-derived port in [9200, 9800).
Task 4.3 — gateway dispatch + remove rejection arms:
_dispatch_via_service_manager_if_s6(action) intercepts
start/stop/restart at the top of each subcommand and routes them
through S6ServiceManager.{start,stop,restart}. The pre-Phase-4
`elif is_container():` rejection arms are kept as fallback for
pre-s6 containers / unsupported runtimes, but only ever fire when
detect_service_manager() != 's6'. install/uninstall under s6
print informational guidance pointing users at profile create/delete.
Removed the two xfail(strict=True) markers from
tests/docker/test_profile_gateway.py — both tests now pass strictly.
Task 4.4 — status reporting:
get_gateway_runtime_snapshot() reports
Manager: 's6 (container supervisor)' inside an s6 container instead
of 'docker (foreground)'.
Plan-vs-reality drift fixed in this commit:
- Plan's S6ServiceManager._render_run_script used
`gateway start --foreground --port {port}` — invented args; the
real CLI is `gateway run`. Switched accordingly. port arg
retained for API parity but now documented as 'currently ignored'.
- Plan's reconciler keyed on config.yaml; switched to SOUL.md
(config.yaml is created by hermes setup, not by hermes profile
create, so the original gate caught nothing).
- The plan's _dispatch helper used _profile_arg() which returns
'--profile <name>' (i.e. with the flag prefix). Switched to
_profile_suffix() which returns the bare name.
- Architecture B's docker exec doesn't get /command on PATH or
the venv on PATH; Dockerfile's runtime PATH now includes
/opt/hermes/.venv/bin so 'docker exec <c> hermes ...' works
without sourcing the venv.
- stage2-hook now chowns $HERMES_HOME/profiles to hermes on every
boot, not just on the UID-remap path. Without this, files created
by docker-exec-as-root accumulate and the next reconciler run
fails with PermissionError reading SOUL.md.
Test harness:
19 passed, 0 xfailed (the two pre-Phase-4 xfail targets flip to
passing). 78 unit tests across service_manager + container_boot +
profiles_s6_hooks + gateway_s6_dispatch. Hadolint + shellcheck
pass cleanly.
Refs: docs/plans/2026-05-07-s6-overlay-dynamic-subagent-gateways.md
|
||
|
Ben
|
0abf661f71 |
feat(service_manager): add S6ServiceManager for runtime gateway supervision
Phase 3 of the s6-overlay supervision plan. Implements the runtime-
registration surface from D4 — only the s6 backend supports
register_profile_gateway / unregister_profile_gateway /
list_profile_gateways; host backends continue to raise
NotImplementedError. No caller yet (Phase 4 wires in the profile
create/delete hooks).
Key implementation notes:
- Service directory shape: /run/service/gateway-<profile>/{type,run,log/run}.
Atomic register: write to gateway-<profile>.tmp, fsync via
os.rename. Cleanup on rescan failure.
- Run script uses #!/command/with-contenv sh so HERMES_HOME and any
extra_env arrive at exec time. The hermes -p <profile> gateway
start --foreground --port <port> command is wrapped in
s6-setuidgid hermes for the per-service privilege drop (OQ2-A).
- Log script (OQ8-C): persists via s6-log to
${HERMES_HOME}/logs/gateways/<profile>/. CRITICAL — HERMES_HOME is
a runtime env-var expansion in the rendered script, NOT a Python
f-string substitution. Negative-asserted in
test_s6_register_creates_service_dir_and_triggers_scan so
regressions are caught.
- PATH gotcha: /command/ is only on PATH for processes spawned by
the supervision tree (services, cont-init.d). `docker exec` and
profile-create hooks don't get it. S6ServiceManager calls all
s6-* binaries via absolute path through the new _S6_BIN_DIR
constant so callers don't have to fix up env vars.
- validate_profile_name rejects path-traversal, leading-dash (s6
would parse as a flag), uppercase, whitespace, and names >251
chars (s6-svscan default name_max).
Test coverage:
- 13 new unit tests in tests/hermes_cli/test_service_manager.py
(kind detection, run-script content, env quoting, register
rollback on rescan failure, unregister idempotence, list filter,
lifecycle dispatch, svstat parsing). Total: 36 passing.
- 2 new in-container integration tests in
tests/docker/test_s6_profile_gateway_integration.py validating
end-to-end registration against a real s6 supervision tree.
Docker harness: 14 passed, 2 xfailed (Phase 4 target unchanged).
Refs: docs/plans/2026-05-07-s6-overlay-dynamic-subagent-gateways.md
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Ben
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51914b0514 |
feat(service_manager): add ServiceManager protocol + host wrappers
Phase 1 of the s6-overlay supervision plan. Pure-refactor addition: introduces the abstract interface (with runtime_checkable Protocol), detect_service_manager(), validate_profile_name(), and thin SystemdServiceManager / LaunchdServiceManager / WindowsServiceManager wrappers around the existing systemd_* / launchd_* / gateway_windows.* module-level functions. No host call site was modified — host code continues to use the existing functions directly; the protocol is for new backend-agnostic code (Phase 4 profile create/delete hooks and the Phase 4 s6 dispatch path in 'hermes gateway start/stop/restart'). WindowsServiceManager.install() forwards the v3 kwargs (start_now, start_on_login, elevated_handoff) added in PRs #28169-adjacent so non-Windows callers — there aren't any today — can opt in. The s6 backend lands in Phase 3; until then get_service_manager() raises a clear error if invoked on a host that detects as 's6'. |
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kshitijk4poor
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00ec0b617c |
feat(tts): add register_tts_provider() plugin hook (closes #30398)
Adds a `TTSProvider(ABC)` + `register_tts_provider()` extension point to the plugin context API, **alongside** the existing config-driven `tts.providers.<name>: type: command` registry from PR #17843. This is additive — the command-provider surface stays as the primary way to add a TTS backend. The hook covers cases the shell-template grammar can't reasonably express: - Native Python SDKs without a CLI (Cartesia, Fish Audio, etc.) - Streaming synthesis (chunked Opus → voice-bubble delivery) - Voice metadata API for the `hermes tools` picker - OAuth-refreshing auth flows None of the 10 inline built-in providers (`edge`, `openai`, `elevenlabs`, `minimax`, `gemini`, `mistral`, `xai`, `piper`, `kittentts`, `neutts`) are migrated to plugins. They stay inline. The hook is for *new* engines that aren't built-in. ## Resolution order The dispatcher's resolution order is the load-bearing invariant: 1. `tts.provider` is a built-in name → built-in dispatch. **Always wins.** 2. `tts.provider` matches `tts.providers.<name>` with `command:` set → command-provider dispatch (PR #17843). 3. `tts.provider` matches a plugin-registered `TTSProvider` → plugin dispatch (new). 4. No match → falls through to Edge TTS default (legacy behavior). Built-ins-always-win is enforced at THREE layers: - Registry: `register_provider()` rejects shadowing names with a warning. - Dispatcher: `_dispatch_to_plugin_provider()` short-circuits built-in names defensively before consulting the registry. - Picker: `_plugin_tts_providers()` filters built-in shadows out of the `hermes tools` row list defensively. Command-providers-win-over-plugins is enforced at TWO layers: - The caller in `text_to_speech_tool` checks `_resolve_command_provider_config` first. - `_dispatch_to_plugin_provider` re-checks for a same-name command config defensively so a refactor of the caller can't silently break the invariant. ## New files - `agent/tts_provider.py` — `TTSProvider(ABC)` with `synthesize()` (required), `list_voices()`, `list_models()`, `get_setup_schema()`, `stream()`, `voice_compatible` (all optional with sane defaults). Mirrors `agent/image_gen_provider.py` shape. - `agent/tts_registry.py` — `register_provider`/`get_provider`/`list_providers` with `_BUILTIN_NAMES` reject-shadowing invariant. Mirrors `agent/image_gen_registry.py` shape. - `plugins/tts/...` directory ready for community plugins (none shipped). ## Modified files - `hermes_cli/plugins.py` — `register_tts_provider()` method on `PluginContext`. Matches the gating shape of `register_image_gen_provider()` / `register_browser_provider()`. - `tools/tts_tool.py` — `_dispatch_to_plugin_provider()` + `_plugin_provider_is_voice_compatible()` + walrus-elif wiring into the main dispatcher. Built-in elif chain untouched. - `hermes_cli/tools_config.py` — `_plugin_tts_providers()` injects plugin rows into the Text-to-Speech picker category alongside the 10 hardcoded built-in rows. ## Tests - `tests/agent/test_tts_registry.py` — 47 tests covering registration, lookup, ABC contract, helpers, AND a `TestBuiltinSync` regression test that fails if `agent.tts_registry._BUILTIN_NAMES` drifts from `tools.tts_tool.BUILTIN_TTS_PROVIDERS` (kept duplicated due to circular import constraints). - `tests/tools/test_tts_plugin_dispatch.py` — 35 tests covering built-in-always-wins, command-wins-over-plugin, plugin dispatch, exception passthrough, voice_compatible helper. - `tests/hermes_cli/test_tts_picker.py` — 10 tests covering the picker surface, builtin shadowing defense, integration with `_visible_providers`. - `tests/hermes_cli/test_plugins_tts_registration.py` — 3 end-to-end tests via `PluginManager.discover_and_load()`. - `tests/plugins/tts/check_parity_vs_main.py` — 9-scenario subprocess parity harness vs `origin/main`. The only intentional diff is `fallback_edge → plugin` for the `plugin-installed` scenario. ## Verification - 95/95 new tests pass. - 170/170 pre-existing TTS tests (test_tts_command_providers, test_tts_max_text_length, test_tts_speed, etc.) pass unchanged. - Parity harness against `origin/main`: 8 OK + 1 expected DIFF. - E2E smoke: a registered plugin's `synthesize()` is called via `text_to_speech_tool` with the standard JSON envelope returned. - Ruff clean on all touched files. ## Docs - `website/docs/user-guide/features/tts.md` — new "Python plugin providers" section with a decision table (command-provider vs plugin), minimal plugin example, and the optional-hook reference. - `website/docs/user-guide/features/plugins.md` — TTS row updated to mention both surfaces (command-provider primary, plugin for SDK/streaming). Closes #30398 |
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JunghwanNA
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243ebc7a61 |
Protect dashboard OAuth credentials with the same file-safety guarantees as other auth paths
The web dashboard's Anthropic OAuth helper wrote the credential file straight to its final destination and relied on the process umask for permissions. That left the dashboard-specific path weaker than the existing auth writers, which already use owner-only permissions and safer write semantics. This change keeps the scope narrow: make the dashboard helper write via a temp file + replace, chmod the final file to owner-only, and add a focused regression test for both permission handling and atomic-write behavior. Constraint: Must preserve the existing dashboard OAuth flow and credential-pool side effects Rejected: Broader auth-storage refactor | unnecessary scope for a single verified inconsistency Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Reversibility: clean Directive: Keep dashboard credential writes aligned with existing auth storage semantics; do not reintroduce direct write_text() here without matching chmod/atomic behavior Tested: pytest -o addopts='' tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server_oauth_write.py tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py -q (78 passed) Not-tested: Cross-platform permission semantics on Windows-managed filesystems |
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leeseoki0andteknium1
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ce529d6072 |
fix(kanban): scratch tasks must not inherit board.default_workdir (#28818)
Board defaults represent persistent project checkouts. Scratch workspaces are auto-deleted on completion and must stay under the per-board scratch root that resolve_workspace() creates. Inheriting default_workdir for a scratch task pointed the cleanup path at the user's source tree — the data-loss vector documented in #28818. The containment guard in _cleanup_workspace (just added) is the safety rail. This commit prevents the bad state from being created in the first place: only persistent kinds (dir/worktree) inherit board defaults. Tests updated to cover the new semantics: scratch with default_workdir set keeps workspace_path=None; dir/worktree still inherits the board default. Salvaged from PR #31315 by @leeseoki0 — prevention layer on top of the #28819 containment fix by @briandevans. Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com> |
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briandevans
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23115b5c0f |
fix(kanban): restrict managed-scratch roots to workspaces/ dirs only
Copilot review on PR #28819 flagged that `_is_managed_scratch_path` accepted the entire `<kanban_home>/kanban` subtree as managed scratch storage. With that, a task whose `workspace_kind='scratch'` and `workspace_path` was mis-set to `<kanban_home>/kanban`, `.../kanban/logs`, or a board's metadata directory (e.g. `.../kanban/boards/<slug>` without the `workspaces/` child) would pass the containment guard and let task completion `shutil.rmtree` Hermes' own DB, metadata, and log subtrees. Tighten the guard: * Allowed roots are now exclusively `workspaces/` directories — the `HERMES_KANBAN_WORKSPACES_ROOT` override, `<kanban_home>/kanban/workspaces`, and each `<kanban_home>/kanban/boards/<slug>/workspaces` discovered on disk. * Require strict descendancy: a path equal to a root itself is rejected too, because deleting a workspaces root would wipe every task's scratch dir at once. Add a regression test covering the three Copilot-named attack paths (kanban root, kanban/logs, board root without `workspaces/`) plus the workspaces-root-itself case, and confirm the inner task-id dir still matches. |
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briandevans
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80ad1609c8 |
fix(kanban): refuse to rmtree workspace_path outside managed scratch root (#28818)
A board's ``default_workdir`` (e.g. ``hermes kanban boards set-default-workdir my-board /path/to/real/source``) is copied into ``tasks.workspace_path`` for tasks created without an explicit ``workspace_kind``. Those tasks default to ``workspace_kind='scratch'``, so completion calls ``_cleanup_workspace`` and unconditionally runs ``shutil.rmtree(wp, ignore_errors=True)`` — deleting the user's real source tree as if it were disposable scratch storage. Add ``_is_managed_scratch_path()`` and gate ``_cleanup_workspace`` on it: only delete paths under ``HERMES_KANBAN_WORKSPACES_ROOT`` (the worker-side override the dispatcher injects) or under the active kanban home's ``kanban/`` subtree (covering both the legacy default-board root and per-board ``kanban/boards/<slug>/workspaces`` roots). Anything else gets a warning log and is left alone, so a misconfigured ``default_workdir`` can no longer destroy user data on task completion. |