fix(security): strip shell escapes in denylist normalizer; fail-closed on missing approval module
DANGEROUS_PATTERNS and HARDLINE_PATTERNS are matched on the raw command string, so backslash-escape (r\m) and empty-quote split (r''m) bypass both lists. _normalize_command_for_detection now strips these before pattern matching. tui_gateway shell.exec had a bare 'except ImportError: pass' that silently disabled the entire safety gate if tools.approval wasn't importable. Changed to fail-closed (return 5001 error). Added detect_hardline_command check. Fixes #36846, #36847.
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@@ -8490,15 +8490,20 @@ def _(rid, params: dict) -> dict:
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if not cmd:
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return _err(rid, 4004, "empty command")
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try:
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from tools.approval import detect_dangerous_command
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from tools.approval import detect_dangerous_command, detect_hardline_command
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is_hardline, hardline_desc = detect_hardline_command(cmd)
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if is_hardline:
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return _err(
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rid, 4005, f"blocked (hardline): {hardline_desc}. Use the agent for dangerous commands."
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)
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is_dangerous, _, desc = detect_dangerous_command(cmd)
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if is_dangerous:
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return _err(
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rid, 4005, f"blocked: {desc}. Use the agent for dangerous commands."
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)
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except ImportError:
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pass
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return _err(rid, 5001, "shell.exec unavailable: approval safety module not importable")
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try:
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r = subprocess.run(
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cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30, cwd=os.getcwd()
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