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feat(dashboard-auth): Phase 6 — 401 re-auth envelope + next= propagation

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Contract V1 of nous-account-service PR #180 ships no refresh tokens, so
the original Phase 6 silent-refresh design is replaced with a thinner
'401 → redirect to /login' UX. The dashboard's gated middleware now
emits a structured envelope on any auth failure; the SPA's fetch
wrapper sees it and full-page-navigates the user through re-auth.

hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/cookies.py:
  set_session_cookies(refresh_token='') SKIPS writing the
  hermes_session_rt cookie. Forward-compat: a non-empty refresh_token
  still emits the cookie unchanged, so a future Portal contract that
  starts issuing RTs flips the persistence on with no other change.
  clear_session_cookies still emits a Max-Age=0 deletion for the RT
  cookie so stale cookies from earlier deployments get flushed on
  logout / session expiry. Deprecation marker + rationale in
  module docstring per the user's docstring-only deprecation pattern.

hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py:
  _unauth_response now builds a structured JSON envelope for API 401s:
    { error: 'session_expired' | 'unauthenticated',
      detail: 'Unauthorized',
      reason: <internal>,
      login_url: '/login?next=<safe-path>' }
  HTML redirects also carry next= so a user landing on /sessions
  without a cookie bounces back to /sessions after re-auth.
  _safe_next_target validates same-origin: drops protocol-relative
  paths (//evil.com), absolute URLs, and any /login or /auth/* loop.
  Dead cookies are cleared on the 401 path so the browser stops
  replaying invalid tokens.

hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/routes.py:
  /auth/callback accepts next= query param and validates via
  _validate_post_login_target (same rules as the gate's
  _safe_next_target — defence-in-depth because next= survived a full
  IDP round trip and attacker-controlled state can re-enter via the
  callback URL). Open-redirect attempts land at '/' instead.

web/src/lib/api.ts:
  fetchJSON parses the 401 envelope and full-page-navigates to
  body.login_url ONLY on the known session-expiry error codes.
  Domain-level 401s (e.g. permission errors) bubble up as regular
  errors. credentials: 'include' added so cookie auth works for all
  fetches routed through this wrapper. sessionStorage.lastLocation is
  preserved for future use by AuthWidget / hermes_status.

Test files marked with pytest.mark.xdist_group so the four files that
mutate web_server.app.state.auth_required serialize onto the same xdist
worker — eliminates 'works locally, fails in CI' app-state bleed.

20 new tests in test_dashboard_auth_401_reauth.py:
  - set_session_cookies(refresh_token='') skips RT cookie
  - clear_session_cookies still emits RT deletion
  - 401 envelope shape (unauthenticated vs session_expired)
  - dead cookie cleared on invalid-token 401
  - login_url carries next= for deep paths
  - login loop avoided when path is /login/auth/api-auth
  - protocol-relative URL rejected
  - _safe_next_target unit tests (accept same-origin, reject loops/abs)
  - /auth/callback respects safe next= but rejects open redirects

2 pre-existing tests updated to accept the new /login?next=%2F shape.

Full dashboard-auth suite: 168 passed, 1 skipped (Phase 0 pre-existing).
This commit is contained in:
Ben
2026-05-27 02:12:27 -07:00
committed by Teknium
parent 8971e94831
commit 5e9308b5b8
8 changed files with 506 additions and 22 deletions
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hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/cookies.py
+33 -12
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
"""Cookie helpers for dashboard auth.
Three cookies in play:
- hermes_session_at: the OAuth access token
(HttpOnly, lifetime = token TTL)
- hermes_session_rt: the OAuth refresh token
(HttpOnly, lifetime = 30 days)
- hermes_session_at: the OAuth access token
(HttpOnly, lifetime = token TTL)
- hermes_session_rt: the OAuth refresh token
(HttpOnly, lifetime = 30 days)
**DEPRECATED in OAuth contract v1** — Nous Portal
does not issue refresh tokens; we keep the cookie
name and clear semantics for forward compatibility
and to flush stale cookies from old browsers.
- hermes_session_pkce: short-lived PKCE state + CSRF nonce + provider
hint (HttpOnly, lifetime = 10 minutes)
@@ -16,6 +20,14 @@ which honours ``X-Forwarded-Proto`` upstream of Fly's TLS terminator
when uvicorn is configured with ``proxy_headers=True``. Loopback dev
traffic is always HTTP so ``Secure`` would lock the cookies out of
the browser.
.. deprecated:: contract v1
``set_session_cookies`` accepts ``refresh_token=""`` (the contract-v1
default) and silently skips writing ``hermes_session_rt`` in that case.
``clear_session_cookies`` still emits a Max-Age=0 deletion for the RT
cookie so users carrying a stale cookie from an earlier deployment get
it cleared on logout / session expiry. The full refresh-flow machinery
was rewritten as "401 → redirect to /login" in Phase 6.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -52,22 +64,31 @@ def set_session_cookies(
access_token_expires_in: int,
use_https: bool,
) -> None:
"""Set both session cookies on the response.
"""Set the session cookies on the response.
``access_token_expires_in`` is in seconds. Use the provider's reported
TTL for the access token. The refresh token cookie always lives 30
days regardless of the underlying provider's refresh TTL.
TTL for the access token.
``refresh_token`` is accepted for backward / forward compatibility but
SKIPPED when empty — Nous Portal contract v1 issues no refresh tokens
so a ``Session.refresh_token == ""`` from the provider means we don't
persist anything. If a future contract revision starts emitting refresh
tokens, this helper will write the RT cookie again with no other change.
"""
response.set_cookie(
SESSION_AT_COOKIE, access_token,
max_age=access_token_expires_in,
**_common_attrs(use_https),
)
response.set_cookie(
SESSION_RT_COOKIE, refresh_token,
max_age=_RT_MAX_AGE,
**_common_attrs(use_https),
)
# Contract v1: empty refresh token means "don't persist RT cookie".
# Keeping a literal empty-value cookie around would be dead state at
# best, attack surface at worst.
if refresh_token:
response.set_cookie(
SESSION_RT_COOKIE, refresh_token,
max_age=_RT_MAX_AGE,
**_common_attrs(use_https),
)
def clear_session_cookies(response: Response) -> None: